North Korea: 2012-2016

[max161]

Mr. Fuchs,

I would respectfully submit that the considerations of the Korean people (north and South) are pretty important in the equation for analyzing how to achieve one's interests.

I think the Ministry of Reunification in the ROK might have a different view than your sample size of Koreans visiting Germany. Sure the South Korean people are conflicted and even more so because President Lee has been very vocal in discussing the reality of potential costs and even put forth a proposal for a reunification tax to save money for the enormous costs. But I would submit that there will be no long term solution to the Korea problem until reunification can be achieved. And I think German and Korean reunification will be nearly an apples and oranges comparison - there are a lot of lessons to be applied but the conditions that exist on the Peninsula are vastly different between Korea and Germany.

[Fuchs]

I think the Ministry of Reunification in the ROK might have a different view than your sample size of Koreans visiting Germany.

I would be surprised if not, bureaucratic self-interest is quite universally strong.

They might build a Ministry of Non-Reunification next to it and the people there would be fierce about their bureaucratic self-interest (and survival) as well.

[max161]

Mr. Fuchs,

I will ask the Minister of Unification when I attend a meeting with him in two weeks when he is here visiting the states.

[max161]

I received this important comment (and very succinct analysis) in response to the article below from a Korea Hand which should be studied by anyone who wants to understand north Korea. He is one of the most well qualified to make this statement particularly because he is fluent in Korean and has extensive experience communicating face to face with north Koreans as well as reading north Korean primary source documents so when he gives us the north Korean translation and differentiates between policy and politics we should pay attention. I am personally guilty of using military-first policy when it should be military first politics. I will pay more attention to my "kiyosunim" (most learned professor).

This treatment of outsiders trying to invest is nothing new...it is consistent with past practices for the last 30 years under Kim Jong-il influence. Hatred of foreigners and encouragement and reward for xenophobia has been a very successful tool for Kim Jong-il's rule. Chinese reforms always started with decentralization, giving local administrators a chance to develop as they could as long as they were loyal to the party. Nothing of the kind is possible in the NK political system where centralization is absolute and reward for rejecting all outside influence is one of the keys to leadership. Songun chongchi does not mean "military-first policy." It means "military-first politics" and the Kim Regime has never, ever, used the term military-first policy – songun chongchaek. That is an international media misrepresentation that our government has adopted. However, there has been a defacto military first policy since 1964 with the introduction of the four military lines. And military-first means everything outside NK is the enemy...everything. .. because the regime’s strategy is to project everything is the enemy except the regime. Half of its own people are projected as the enemy.

September 5, 2012

North Korea Launches Barbed Attack on Chinese Investor
By REUTERS
http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2012/...gewanted=print

[max161]

I would also offer this for those who want to understand more about north Korea. Andrei Lankov (truth in lending I have known him for many years) was a Soviet Citizen who studied in Pyongyang, is fluent in Korea and then later defected to Australia and is now a professor in South Korea. He is one of the biggest advocates for getting information into north Korea.

This excerpt is why I am skeptical of north Korean reforms. But if they really do attempt reforms we (the Alliance South Korea in the lead with US in support) absolutely need to be preparing for regime collapse. We need to be aware of the potential fallout from reforms because as much as we want them to reform, open up, and change, those reforms might not lead to the change we want to believe in:

This is a recipe for discontent and even a revolution, somewhat similar to the recent events in Tunisia or the events of 1989 in Romania and East Germany.

And the real question is whether Kim Jong-un can find a balance among the north Korean "trinity" (fear, economic reforms and propaganda):

Alas, a North Korea in the throes of reform would not become immediately more stable but would become less stable than the ossified state of the Kim Jong Il era. It is possible, though unlikely, that the regime would find a balance of fear, economic incentives and propaganda that would allow it to keep the populace under control.

I am not optimistic that they can find balance other than one weighted most heavily on fear, secondarily on propaganda to reinforce that fear (and control), and only cosmetic economic reforms.

The risk in reforming North Korea

By Andrei Lankov, Published: September 4

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinio...430_print.html

[Bill Moore]

Posted by max161

The other point is we continue to talk about the Korean Problem with little regard for Korea. Again, many of the comments in this string are seemingly made in the spirit of big brother knowing how to solve all and again with little understanding of Korean culture, politics, tradition, history (and emotions)of the Korean people. I cannot emphasize enough how many of these comments sound just like discussions of Afghanistan by those who knew nothing of the culture, politics, tradition history (and emotions) of the Afghan people. And we see how things have turned out for us in Afghanistan.

Each thread tends to start with a slice of a larger problem and then expands from there. Fuchs opened this thread focusing on the North Korean military and questioned its ability to be a viable threat. Accordingly the the discussion initially focused on how to deal with the potential threat. Reunification is an interesting topic, but first I want to touch upon your cherry picking of experts.

Admittedly there is little discussion on the ROK view since like ours it is inconsistent and divided among party lines. Like many you seem to assume reunification is going to happen, but there are others who also claim some expertise in the region that disagree with that assessment. They see no sign whatsoever that the DPRK is going to collapse (as we have been hearing for over the past 20 years) and believe two separate Koreas is in the best interests of most concerned. Maybe it will, maybe it won't, but the larger point is relying on those we label as experts can actually impede gaining understanding of the situation, because those we label experts tend to have strong views on a topic that are hard to sway even when emergent facts call their views into question.

This reliance on cherry picked experts has resulted in bad policies in the past when we later learn that the experts were wrong. I recall one school of experts on Iraq telling us the Iraqi people would embrace democracy and that there was no ethnic tensions in the country, while another school of experts called the shots accurately. Everyone is qualified to evaluate the available evidence and question the experts. Expert views should be sought out, but not blindly accepted. All experts have one key shortcoming which is they're human and have biases that skew their best efforts to be completely intellectually honest.

Obviously many, if not most, Koreans in the North and South want to reunite the Koreas, but of course have different views on what a united Korea should look like. Putting that to the side for a minute, I wonder what nations (I hope the U.S. is) are thinking a reunified Korea will mean to the region and the world? Would two the world's largest militaries united into one under one the world's strongest economies lead to greater regional stability or instability? How would Japan feel about it? Would China or the U.S. have more or equal influence with a united Korea? If the U.S. pulled it troops out of Korea after reunification how would that our ability to deter hostilities in the region? If the Koreas united, would there be a justification for a large ground force in East Asia? Of course most of these questions can't be answered factually until after events unfold, but we can only offer opinions on what we think will happen and what will be in our interests. East Asia with a unified Korea would require a new security paradigm for all concerned.

[max161]

Bill,
If you read my work you might see that I cite experts from across the spectrum (even Bruce Cumings who claimed for many years that the US started the Korean War) to include north Koreans. I am expressing my opinions based on my years of analysis and I have linked a cross section of the body of work I have produced over the years. I stand by my research and scholarship and I offer it to the forum for discussion. I will be happy to discuss anything but if you think I am cherry picking experts I would recommend you read my work. I thought the forum would benefit from two current open source articles that seem relevant to the discussion with some commentary and analysis but if you think that is cherry picking then my sincere apologies.
V/R

Dave