Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War

[marct]

cuts through the verbiage to the heart of the issue .

All goes back to Robert Fulghum; be careful what you want, you may get it. Seems to me that defining two things; (a) the National Interest; and (b) as Marc said "The point I am trying to make is that the ideology / symbology - what we stand for - must transcend any individual national interest." is the first step and that it is a quite difficult if not impossible step. Still, if one succeeds in doing that, then one must reconcile the two -- even more difficult.

Absolutely. Actually, I think that such an ideology / symbology is rather simple to build since most of the base ideas are already floating around in various forms. As I see it, it can be structured around the basic idea of a convention between sovereign entities (BTW, not limited to nation states) along the loose confederate lines Rob mentioned at a global level. As long as it also includes guarantees of internal sovereignty within minimal agreed upon limits, including the right of departure, it should work. Of course, negotiating those limits and the conventions would be a freakin' nightmare .

[Rob Thornton]

Of course, negotiating those limits and the conventions would be a freakin' nightmare .

You know Marc, the other day I got asked to brief a foreign attaché on JCISFA. There was a set of slides to go over as a kind of info brief. The most wonderful thing happened - technical difficulties arose and caused a pause. The pause allowed a real, no fooling conversation to take place. In that brief time I found out he'd already gotten a similar info brief not 6 months ago. At that point we were both relieved and nixed the slides and talked about what was on his mind with regards to SFA, and many of the other subjects we've discussed in this thread and others. We probably talked for a good hour - and I believe we all got infinitely further then any set of slides could go.

So the key I think is the interaction, the discussion, the negotiation. I think up front, although terribly unpopular as it does not hold "solution" like answers that can be filed away as another win in time to hold up as one more reason to elect or re-elect. This gets to the reconciliation that both Ken and you mentioned between what you want and what you can realistically achieve (for whatever reasons), what you want and what your partners want (or believe to be more in their interests), how it plays in one place vs. somewhere else, etc. None of those things are easy because they are conditional and that means unless you are willing to roll the dice and be able to live with comes up, then you are going to have to bring appetite and stomach into balance. That our political cycle is what it is does not engender itself to that reality, but it does not stop us from perpetuating the fiction that there are easy wars either.

So we're back to the nightmare that is, and the guy who gets sent forward to do the best that he can, be he a soldier or civilian advising foreign forces or bureaucrats, or the guy getting off a Blackhawk as part of an AASLT to seize some key piece of terrain to extend the Line of Operation.

One of the things I'd mentioned early on is that I don’t consider the genesis of this thread as something novel - if anything it is an attempt to synthesize what I think we're already doing in many ways (and many have done before us), just maybe in a disconcerted manner. Putting it in the format that I did just helps me to frame the strategic and perhaps operational contexts as I contemplate where SFA fits, be it as part of BPC in an Indirect sort of way, or be it in post conflict operations following a Direct application of military power. This is one of the reasons why the SFA slide showing breadth and depth in an attempt to consider its scope was upfront.

I think of the two approaches (Direct and Indirect) as complementary. Indirect, for many of the reasons Ken mentioned and I think I brought up early on is hard, and from a military standpoint (if not a political one), somewhat contrary to our nature. However, I also believe we have to have an indirect component to fight a long war, particularly one in which just access can be so critical to be able to be direct at times and places more (not completely) on our terms. We could quickly exhaust ourselves in terms of domestic will, international political capital, and military means by trying to unilaterally pursue a direct approach. The other thing about framing it into direct and indirect components is it helped me consider where the broader inter-agency, multi-national partners, IOs and maybe even NGOs might work together to better achieve (or achieve out right) what military power may not be able to accomplish in and of itself. To me its about better positioning ourselves to take advantage of things as they are vs. how we’d like them to be, then when we realize they are not so, we reach for military power applied in a direct manner, because that is the only element we developed, and the only manner we have time for.

As stated over and over, t’aint easy.
Best, Rob

[Ken White]

...
Absolutely. Actually, I think that such an ideology / symbology is rather simple to build since most of the base ideas are already floating around in various forms. As I see it, it can be structured around the basic idea of a convention between sovereign entities (BTW, not limited to nation states) along the loose confederate lines Rob mentioned at a global level. As long as it also includes guarantees of internal sovereignty within minimal agreed upon limits, including the right of departure, it should work. Of course, negotiating those limits and the conventions would be a freakin' nightmare .

Taking the last (and most difficult) first; very much so -- but that also leads one to your three earlier points; the ideas are out there; confederations; and guarantees.

All those fall afoul of human foibles and perversity:

The "... but it's not MY idea..." syndrome.

To quote Eisenhower "This world of ours... must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect." I see little evidence that his admirable desire is on the horizon. I believe that mutual trust and respect have been ruined by a short sighted, immediate gratification view of national interest (on the part of virtually every nation, not just the US). The Politicians are at fault -- but we elect them...

Add that, as R. Reagan said of guarantees, "Trust but verify" as an innate human trait and you have an admitted encapsulation of some of the obstacles to a better world order.

I think those human factors are what make the agreements so very difficult and are also those which most confound today's strategic planning.

More germane to this thread. I see three points:

Strategic planning is difficult at best, more so in the politico-military environment of the US and, indeed, the world today. The very factors that make it difficult are the same factors that make it imperative that it be done.

Both direct and indirect approaches will be required; the indirect to bypass some problems; the direct to confront those that cannot -- or should not (not always the same thing) -- be circumvented. This requires great flexilbility, a willingness to innovate (and for the powers that be to accept, even encourage, innovation), knowledge not only of own aims but of target goals and aspirations as well as an acknowledgment of those and a willingness to be pragmatic and accept what is achievable as opposed to what is desired (while preparing stepped plans to over the long term* arrive at the desired end state). That's a terribly long way of saying we must break the habit of trying to get everything done on one person's watch; that has crippled us since the early 60s.

Such planning in the mass and immediate communication environment of today must balance conflicting demands but due simply to the fact that everything always comes out should always emphasize simplicity, transparency and total honesty (OPSEC contingent on the last two items, of course).

* Not one of our strong suits. In fact, I'm not even sure we have that suit...

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 6 Jan 09:

Unfolding the Future of the Long War: Motivations, Prospects, and Implications for the U.S. Army

....This report uses the generation of either “trajectories” or alternative paths in which the long war might unfold to explore the implications for the U.S. military. The discussion focuses on the potential threats the U.S. faces in each trajectory and considers the confluence of three major problems raised by the war: those related to the ideologies espoused by key adversaries in the conflict, those related to the use of terrorism, and those related to governance (i.e., its absence or presence, its quality, and the predisposition of specific governing bodies to the United States and its interests). The goal of this report is not to determine which of these areas is the key problem. Instead, we take the stance that in order to ensure that this long war follows a favorable course, the United States will need to make a concerted effort across all three domains. Numerous broad conclusions and recommendations are given for addressing issues surrounding the long war.....

[Ken White]

I don't fully agree with their conclusions and recommendations but I'm sure they'll start a flood...

[Rex Brynen]

May I start by saying how much I dislike the term "The Long War" ?

[Steve Blair]

Can I start by saying how much I dislike the term "The Long War" ?

No....

[Ron Humphrey]

May I start by saying how much I dislike the term "The Long War" ?

don't look like it's goin away anytime soon

[Tom Odom]

don't look like it's goin away anytime soon

how about the "don't look like it's goin away anytime soon" war?