IIRC Ghaddafi used Pakistani mercenary pilots in the past.Originally Posted by CrowBat
IIRC Ghaddafi used Pakistani mercenary pilots in the past.
Pakistanis used to train Egyptian and Libyan pilots on Mirage 5s of the Libyan Arab Republic Air Force, in Libya, back in the early 1970s (before and during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War).
They might have acted as instructors when LARAF purchased Mirage F.1ADs and F.1EDs, in the late 1970s, again, but that remains unconfirmed. Eventually, the Pakistani connection functioned until 2004 or so, when the Pakistani Air Force bought all the remaining Mirage 5Ds and 5DDs (two-seat conversion trainers).
The Yugoslavs have constructed the entire Air Academy at Misurata, supplied more than 100 G-2 Galebs and J-21 Jastrebs for it (Italians then sold over 260 SIAI-Marchetti SF.260 basic trainers), and subsequently helped in maintenance of the same aircraft, as well as of MiG-21s - partially in Libya, but foremost in Yugoslavia. Large numbers of Libyan (as well as Palestinian) pilots were trained in Yugoslavia too.
Syrians manned two complete MiG-23 units through the 1980s, and - together with Iranians - maintained the LARAF Su-24 fleet during the 1990s (that's why some used to call the LARAF the "Syrian Air Force West" at those times). The Iranians were also maintaining the Libyan fleet of CH-47 helicopters during the 1990s.
The Soviets mainly acted as advisors at air base/wing level, during the 1980s, since the quality of work provided by their instructors (for MiG-23s, for example), was found insufficient and most of these were kicked out already by 1977.
But, that's all "past tense".
Most authoritative reports from recent times indicate the presence of Belarussian, Ukrainian and/or Serbian mercenaries. Sadly, my sources simply can't recognize the language they use while flying.
BTW, a Su-24MK was shot down by the rebels near Ras Lanoof, yesterday. The crew of two was killed in the crash. A Sudanese ID was found at one of them...
I don't get it about all this no fly and military stuff.
Do the math. Two million or so folks in Tripoli, a large metropolitan city which has no indigenous food/water supply.
Two million people need how much food, water, medical supplies, on a daily basis, to be happy and productive?
If ports are open in the east (where the oil is anyway) and closed in the west due to instability (and increasing lack of oil to operate things), how long does it take for events to play out?
International assets are already frozen, and could, for example, be earmarked for humanitarian relief to the east (but not to the west), so trade, and especially new weapons, will be chaotic at best, begging the question of whether even a naval blockade is critical. If no access to global credit, what shipments need to be intercepted?
At the same time, a limited, but well distributed, supply of hand-held devices (and IEDs) can stop the biggest of armies/air forces in its tracks, as we know. Chasing adequately armed, but highly dispersed, local opponents can break the back of any army not highly motivated, equipped and civilian-supported.
Didn't we learn all this stuff already?
Where are the main water/waste water supply systems feeding Tripoli?
Game, set, match.
Obviously, this is the crucial question (i.e. how long can the regime hold out at the current rate of fighting).
Usually, countries have anything between 6 and 12 months of strategic reserve in fuels, something like 6 months in ammo and spares etc. But, here we're talking about Libya. Following the 1973 War, they were buying a lot more arms, equipment and spares than they could need in years.
Just one example: they purchased a total of 110 Mirage 5s in the early 1970s. Although a large number of these was sent to Egypt during the 1973 War with Israel (where at least a handful was shot down), and they saw plenty of fighting not only against Egypt in 1977, but also in Chad, from 1981 until 1988, etc., there were still no less but 54 of them in 1st class condition, with less than 1000hrs on their clocks when Pakistan decided to buy them, in 2004 (together with a significant reserve of spares, including some 50 spare engines). The Libyans never operated more than four squadrons of these fighters, and at least one third of the fleet was always kept in stored condition. They would regularly replace used aircraft with stored examples, and so on. Thus, none of the aircraft became "spent" even after 40 years in service.
Another example: at the start of the uprising in Libya, on 17 February, a transport loaded with 2,000 rifles and US$18 Million in cash arrived in Kufra. These weapons and money were destined to arm and pay the locals so they would fight for the regime. The locals "captured" (i.e. grounded) that plane, armed themselves with rifles, deposited the money at the local bank, and said "no thanks" to the regime.
Overall, there is really plenty of armament stored around various parts of Libya. Much can be found in a number of depots around Benghazi (like the one that flew to the Mars, two nights ago), but particularly so in the area between Syrte and al-Jufra, in central Libya, and then again around Tripoli.
Provided it can get enough fighters, the regime is likely to be able to go on like this for several years.
IMHO, only two things would make sense for the international community to do in this situation:
- saturated and permanent jamming of all means of communication in the hands of the regime (also cutting off all of its sat comms);
- total blockade of aerial traffic to and from Libya (impossible until last foreigners are out, and there are currently still more than 1 Million of them there).
I doubt that hardware is of much relevance in this conflict.
Determination (loyalty to your side, combat morale) are going to be more important in the next weeks.
He's no going to stay in power if only the equivalent of an effective light brigade sides with him.
Crow:
I think you are starting to draw the bead.
Of those fighters and stores, how many are in Tripoli and under control?
In that whole scenario, what are the critical points than can be targeted?
You hit one---communications. But even that can be highly targeted, with jamming at minimal key points, and knocking out specific towers, all by low-tech rebels with hand-held or SUV-deployed arsenals.
The one thing that is overwhelming from Small Wars is how, under so many scenarios short of Big Army to Big Army, the vulnerabilities can be simply exploited in an environment without strong popular support in areas immediately surrounding critical facilities.
Me neither, should not be that difficult to ground G air capacities once and for ever, with or without security council permission.I don't get it about all this no fly and military stuff.
Apparently, G can leave decades without receiving external support. The questio is rather how long it will take for them to get weak enough to flip the coin of popular support. In fact it can take ages especially as you cannot have a official blocus on basic life saving items as food and water.Do the math. Two million or so folks in Tripoli, a large metropolitan city which has no indigenous food/water supply.
Two million people need how much food, water, medical supplies, on a daily basis, to be happy and productive?
International assets are already frozen, and could, for example, be earmarked for humanitarian relief to the east (but not to the west), so trade, and especially new weapons, will be chaotic at best, begging the question of whether even a naval blockade is critical. If no access to global credit, what shipments need to be intercepted?
In and around Tripoli, the regime should have an equivalent of three brigades (5th, 32nd and one called Kuwelidi al-Hamidi). Large parts of these are busy assaulting az-Zawiya since four or five days.
In Tripoli there is also Mitiga AB, where much of the LARAF is currently concentrated, including at least a squadron of MiG-23s, remnants of Mirage F.1ED squadron, and several transport and helicopter units (including a squadron each of Mi-8s, Mi-24s and CH-47Cs, plus one unit equipped with An-26s; then one "police" squadron flying A.109s and a unit equipped with UAVs). It appears they moved most of operational G-2/J-21s and SF.260s from Misurata to this place as well.
However, this is not only about "what's in Tripoli": as mentioned above, the regime still controls two huge air bases in central Libya (Syrte and Hun), with immense underground depots in between. They have one squadron each of Su-22s, Su-24s (between 3 and 5 aircraft), Mi-24s, and Mi-8s there at least, plus another brigade of ground forces.
Yet another Army brigade is active between Misurata and Beni Wallid (it attacked Misurata yesterday, but lost an equivalent of a company in the process).
The ballance of forces under regime's control (those on the eastern side of Tripoli, plus those along the border to Tunisia and Algeria) equal to another brigade.
Provided you're talking about theoretical targets for air strikes by the West or neighbours or a coalition of the both....IMHO, in the current situation there would be four major targets:In that whole scenario, what are the critical points than can be targeted?
- Bab Azizzia barracks in Tripoli
- Syrte AB (to keep the LARAF there grounded)
- concentration of regime troops besieging az-Zawiya (the latter is also of major humanitarian concern, IMHO)
- Mitiga AB (to keep the LARAF grounded in the West too).
I declare myself a "democracy zealot", and consider this a popular, mass uprising of internal and secular forces in Libya. Their protests were initially peaceful: they turned viollent due to a brutal and merciless reaction from the regime. Right now, only the regime could stop the fighting, which it clearly refuses to do, since that would mean it would give up: the choice the rebels are facing is to stop fighting and get slaughtered if they do, or die while attempting to bring the regime to fall.
My conclusion is that - regardless what the rebels say - the regime has to get hit in a most massive fashion possible, and be forced to give up.
What do you think about adding small groups of people equipped with SA-18s who would co-operate with the rebels? The people could come from any number of organizations from any number of countries. Probably enough Arabic speakers are available. The SA-18s could come from any number of friendly countries who have them. That way you could establish a "no fly zone" for tactical jets and helos over the only place it really mattered, whatever was passing for the front line, without a big spectacle.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Depends on the troops that would operate these SA-18s: if they can cope with plenty of people who have quite a few very personal "bills" to pay back, bunches of youngsters firing their AKs - or ZPU-4s - into the air any time they are bored because of all the waiting (and a few other, smaller bunches of youngsters that smoke hashish when there is nothing better to do)... I think they would do well.
Just, somehow... I doubt one might find such troops in the West.
The would stick out like a sore thumb, so don't assume any sort of plausible deniability. And they would have to maintain very close custody of the SA-18s, given how much harm a modern MANPADS on the open market can do.
The recent SAS experience near Benghazi is a useful lesson in getting too clever by half on the special forces front.
On top of that, so far the LAF hasn't been a decisive factor.
They mostly come at night. Mostly.
- university webpage: McGill University
- conflict simulations webpage: PaxSims
No-Fly Zone...
In reference to some of the discussions above on a no-fly zone:
A NFZ over Libya would require some work, but is definitely do-able- see Danger Room's analysis.
It would require some airstrikes on SAM sites, if they are operational. Unless significant civilians have encamped on the SAM sites, it wouldn't involve too much risk of collateral damage.
As Secretary Gates has pointed out, you would have to be prepared to rescue downed pilots, and this does increase the risk of getting pulled into the conflict, however.
As for killing friendly aircraft, that risk has been over-hyped. The only incident of this that I am aware of is the 1994 Blackhawk shootdown. This incident wasn't due to the NFZ being ineffective, but due to negligence on both the E-3 and F-15C crews involved. We have operated extensive no-fly zones over the United States for the last 10 years with 0 friendly fire incidents; this would not be a big issue.
All my opinions of course, but having done a lot of NFZ work, it's not rocket science tactically. As to the strategic wisdom of doing it, that's a different can of worms.
V/R,
Cliff
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