Design for military operations

[Ken White]

recall I'm easily confused...

Thanks for the clarification and yes, I do now see what you meant and acknowledge the process as it has grown is the culprit -- but that was sort of my overall point, the process is the problem. it might also have been perhaps your 'culture' point. Have we not allowed process to take over?

Sounds like form over function to me.

What happened to products -- usable products, not perfect products...

[Ron Humphrey]

recall I'm easily confused...

Thanks for the clarification and yes, I do now see what you meant and acknowledge the process as it has grown is the culprit -- but that was sort of my overall point, the process is the problem. it might also have been perhaps your 'culture' point. Have we not allowed process to take over?

Sounds like form over function to me.

What happened to products -- usable products, not perfect products...

Part of the larger issue may be simply the fact that as more and more ways of leading, learning, defining, designing the goals and specific objectives leave many sifting through mountains of possibilities with less than explicitly defined forms, knowing which forms are supposed to be used for which functions becomes less static and more dynamic.

For those who are used to quickly discerning their objectives and then using whatever forms are available interchangeably to achieve it this isn't a big deal. For others it seems to be a much more difficult or at least painful process.

[Ken White]

It was that because in war, simple things work best; the more convoluted the processes, the more people involved, the more headquarters involved, the greater the chance for error. Those kinds of errors do not result in production glitches or shortfalls -- they kill people. Unnecessarily.

I think your first point is very accurate and it certainly describes what we have done and some of the logic behind that. It also shows just how badly we have muddied the waters -- but I don't think it answers either of my questions.

Your second item is correct also. It leads to two new questions. Could that mean we should be more selective about who gets what job? For those who have difficulties doing that synthesis, could more pressured, graded practices in the field in simple easily organized TEWTs improve their capabilities?

(As an aside, exercises run in a garrison environment develop sloppy tactical and operational habits)

I understand the imperative of training everyone in the military basics; educating all to do things in a standard way; the importance of teaching methodologies to organize thoughts and efforts; and the statutory requirement of fairness in entry, opportunity and promotions. Recognizing all that, I still believe my two questions are valid. We are doing things the way we do them only because we have chosen that approach. There are others.

I'll again say that my second question in the 04:07 PM post above is more important than the first one. Perhaps I should insert the word 'far' between 'is' and 'more important.'

[Ron Humphrey]

Although I'm sure this will automatically draw fire from many it does seem that one of the best answers to your question is simply good information management, sharing, and well developed interagency KM efforts should help facilitate more reach back groups more than sufficiently manned and informed to do much of that. Even if comms get knocked out whats the chance they all are? Also If that were to happen how much operational and strategic planning would be being done in that particular AO vs tactically continuing the fight and addressing the conditions at hand.

Is it too much to believe that the days of groups of leaders getting very little sleep and under constant pressure having to bear the sole burden of all things happening in their AO should be gone? They have visibility and accountability for it but they should darn well be able to get some of the heavy lifting done by those not knee deep in the fight.

[Ken White]

Old Asian proverb. Still, that's one approach. Many today will agree.

However, your excellent comments still do not answer either of my questions. Your first point is an approach -- but I suggest that over reliance on communication means that failed has been the downfall of entirely too many Commanders. If I understand you correctly, you're saying that knowledge management will adequately do the job in a major conflict when we will have smaller staffs. That size factor is a given; the current size will not be sustainable in a war with even moderate casualties (as opposed to the light casualties overall in both theaters today). Given smaller staffs and a rapid tempo of combat with casualty rates above 10% per day at times and movements of one-half to ten or more miles day -- in one direction or the other -- I strongly question whether that reach back will be adequate. Nor do I believe it can be sustained. Perhaps some day, though I would question the wisdom of it, we aren't there yet.

You ask

"Also If that were to happen how much operational and strategic planning would be being done in that particular AO vs tactically continuing the fight and addressing the conditions at hand."

That's the issue. That's exactly what will -- and does -- happen. I'm not sure we're ready to do that. Nor am I sure that our sophisticated networking capability is -- particularly against a near peer enemy who targets it to disrupt and confuse.

As Schmedlap said elsewhere; "...The most essential skill is comfort operating amidst ambiguity and uncertainty and adapting to it. That cannot be quantified or tasked. It requires mission-oriented orders, significant trust in subordinates, decentralized execution, and solutions that are too creative, complex, and varied to quantify. It is not nearly as amenable to metrics and quantifiable tasks as the preferred leadership technique of micromanagement."

That's combat reality. All that sophisticated planning takes place at Corps or higher; at the Bde level, it's all about execution; at Bn it's even simpler. At both levels, there is planning but there is no time for the sophistication and detail prevalent in both theaters at those levels today. Time is a bigger problem than staff size; time and enemy disruption. Neither of which is a significant problem now.

With regard to your second question, I'll point out that I for one not only do not think those days should be gone, I'll bet big money they will not be. The solution to the valid problem you cite (and which is induced by that "tactically continuing the fight and addressing the conditions at hand" you mentioned) is simply to build in a rotation of combat elements plan -- something the Army has only rarely done because it's 'too complicated.' It isn't but that's another thread. The Marines used to do it pretty well.

As for involving those not knee deep in the fight, it's been my observation in a bunch of fights that those who are not knee deep in it aren't nearly as interested in that fight as those that are...

[Ron Humphrey]

Rely on black boxes cause black days

Serious questions, two of them:

How much of all this emphasis today on 'planning,' IPB, MDMP and Design is due solely to the fact that overlarge staffs can afford to expend the effort?

Without getting into the specifics although that may be one piece of it the enablers both digital and otherwise available to commanders has to be seen as a part of it as well. Comparing to the stuff available when I first joined one or two fairly good soldiers can keep tabs on more stuff then 5 or six of us before.

Although I accept the wisdom in the proverb above does that mean you still don't find ways to work those capabilities available into the standard procedures for staffs. The expectation that the enemy gets a vote and that that will be one of his targeted areas may affect how dependant on it you are but isn't that where you focus countering through mutually assured limitations(ex: make sure the only way they knock out comms is to knock em all out thus your both fighting with hands tied behind your back. )?

What is going to happen in a major conflict when those large staffs are unaffordable due to casualties and other personnel issues -- and the time to do all that is simply not available?

That really tough question is made all the tougher by the fact that I'm young and dumb and as such have a somewhat hard time imagining how exactly something like that is going to happen in any context that is not equally as detrimental to ones opponents.

Also because as I look at plans now compared with plans from back then-

That was why Patton, Slim and a few others were able to plan major operations in 24 hours and issue Op Orders on one page. None of these guys even tried to anticipate everything. It was all about preparation, not prediction.

It's hard to see how it's actually any different in its less digitally supported form. IF you have C2 and full staffs you plan with what you have for what you can. IF you run low on either you plan with what you have for what you can. On papyrus if necessary and with a bunch of grunts and new officers instead of 16 -20 highly educated 0-6 and aboves.

Old Asian proverb. Still, that's one approach. Many today will agree.

However, your excellent comments still do not answer either of my questions. Your first point is an approach -- but I suggest that over reliance on communication means that failed has been the downfall of entirely too many Commanders. If I understand you correctly, you're saying that knowledge management will adequately do the job in a major conflict when we will have smaller staffs. That size factor is a given; the current size will not be sustainable in a war with even moderate casualties (as opposed to the light casualties overall in both theaters today). Given smaller staffs and a rapid tempo of combat with casualty rates above 10% per day at times and movements of one-half to ten or more miles day -- in one direction or the other -- I strongly question whether that reach back will be adequate. Nor do I believe it can be sustained. Perhaps some day, though I would question the wisdom of it, we aren't there yet.

Knowledge management only in the sense of what soldiers that have been empowered to share and learn from each other, history, academia, and especially you old guys and are able to perform this with or without static enablers.

The one thing the younger generation has going for it that even my generation only slightly gets, is that everything they learn comes without restrictions as to how it happens. You can build all the infrastructure you want in order to facilitate it but regardless with or without it they will network, collaborate, research, wargame, etc. They will use whatever is available to do that and more often than not it may even be more efficient and or productive then what you provide them. Unfortunately it's also a major opsec problem so there you have the why on what we need to provide them.

No matter what happens on the battlefield it seems to me we have to understand that those coming into the future leadership are not going to end up doing it the way many in the past may have.

The same lessons may apply but how they address them will probably be as radically different as they way cars are built today compared with the Model T.

Look at the enemies we face today, even they manage to come up with remote controls, sat phones, and virtual trainers.

As for involving those not knee deep in the fight, it's been my observation in a bunch of fights that those who are not knee deep in it aren't nearly as interested in that fight as those that are...

While unfortunately true enough and for understandable reasons there should be ways to help address that. One of them is getting those who support you involved in supporting you. Occasionally that means making them a part of the solution. Most that I've met care they just don't necessarily see or feel the impact they can and do have on those on the line. (for good and bad)

[Ken White]

Without getting into the specifics although that may be one piece of it the enablers both digital and otherwise available to commanders has to be seen as a part of it as well. Comparing to the stuff available when I first joined one or two fairly good soldiers can keep tabs on more stuff then 5 or six of us before.

True -- and that's good. the real issue though is how much of that stuff -- the staff products -- being tracked is really necessary versus nice to have...My experience from early days in Viet Nam forward until my second retirement in 95 was that I had way too much data; far more than I needed and the guys that were supposed to sift through it for me in the later years did the job with varying degrees of success. A lot of it was useless and too much more of it was the result of make-work programs (at which GO Hq excel...).

...(ex: make sure the only way they knock out comms is to knock em all out thus your both fighting with hands tied behind your back.)

I agree we should try to do that -- and may be able to. I also suggest we cannot rely on the fact that we can do that. If we could now say that we could do so; we have no assurance that will be true in 90 days or a year. Technology changes rapidly and we aren't the only inventive folks about.

That really tough question is made all the tougher by the fact that I'm young and dumb and as such have a somewhat hard time imagining how exactly something like that is going to happen in any context that is not equally as detrimental to ones opponents.

Well, you aren't dumb and that's proven by your very valid observation. The answer is that it will be as you say -- then it's an issue of who's the better trained sharper more operationally or tactically competent Commander (and the one with the better staff and / or connectivity... ).

...IF you run low on either you plan with what you have for what you can. On papyrus if necessary and with a bunch of grunts and new officers instead of 16 -20 highly educated 0-6 and aboves.

True -- and one should train to do that. If you only train to always win, you're going to miss something. That is part of my point in raising the issue. Training must be aimed not at ideal situations but to cope with worst case. To do less than (which we mostly now do) is to invite disaster.

...They will use whatever is available to do that and more often than not it may even be more efficient and or productive then what you provide them. Unfortunately it's also a major opsec problem so there you have the why on what we need to provide them.

True and that's a real plus. The problem is that all you sharp young guys have a bunch of old guys who are not so adaptable in charge.

No matter what happens on the battlefield it seems to me we have to understand that those coming into the future leadership are not going to end up doing it the way many in the past may have.

I would certainly hope not. I went to two fair sized wars and three or four little incursions. One of the latter was screwed up due to a Commander who should not have had the job; the others worked out real well.

The problem is both the fair sized wars were completely screwed up due to command failures, poor (and oversized) staffs, and, more importantly, political bickering in the middle of a war -- political bickering in Theater by folks in uniform, not the DC stupidity. And poor training. We fouled up badly in Korea and we were worse in Viet Nam -- we only did as well as we did because the competition was, fortunately, worse than we were.

So, yeah, I sure hope you guys don't do it the way we did -- you deserve better.

While unfortunately true enough and for understandable reasons there should be ways to help address that. One of them is getting those who support you involved in supporting you. Occasionally that means making them a part of the solution. Most that I've met care they just don't necessarily see or feel the impact they can and do have on those on the line. (for good and bad)

three problems intrude, minor one - parochialism (it does not stop in combat; CSS guys who get called Fobbits will pay you back. Plus, they believe they have their own problems..).

Middling one - inadequate training. We are poorly trained for many reasons. That creates in combat the problem that what should happen often does not. That can include support. Having a support system designed for a 1945 Army does not help.

The big problem is the impact of fairly rapid movement on support; it's not like peacetime. I have literally been supported by three different maintenance units in less than a week. That factor and the casualties and the resultant personnel turnover in operating and supporting units -- far more than most today have ever seen -- preclude those kinds of relationships. That, as you say, precludes their realizing or caring too much what's happening on the line. Way of the world and cannot be relied upon to change.

You cannot best case stuff in a war; you HAVE to worst case it.

Then if it ain't that bad, you can enjoy your success...