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Thread: The Warden Collection (merged thread)

  1. #221
    Council Member pvebber's Avatar
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    No evil plan intended, just good discussion.
    I was being funny

    Especially the critical importance of the Navy as Warden pointed out in the article and as Fuchs brings up.
    The only reference to Navy's in Warden's latest piece is:

    Readers need no reminder that one of the world’s truly great empires grew largely on the back of a Royal Navy that frequently won “wars”—or prevented them—by its mere presence.
    An interesting testimony to a "non-Warden-like" strategy, particularly since the success of the Royal Navy was extremely improvisational, (ie it did not come from advnacing toward a future vision, but maintaining a status quo), it was very sequential (based on the time it took for infomation to travel, and the seasonal wind cycles), and was not system - theory based, but based on engagement with "forces" though often in the form of merchnatmen, not warships. The East India Company and its cargo were as important a form of "seapower" to the rise of British power as the '74 and its powder and shot.

    Here is a better example of breaking a physical system by bloodless means.
    No its simply a "revenge" attack against a "center of gravity". There was no strategy involved, it was simple revenge for having supported the ISrealis in the 73 war.

    Nothing was "broken". They simpy reduced supply so costs would go up. They where not trying to force us to do anything, they simply wanted to cause fiscal pain.

    And the "Moral Equivalent of War." It was an attack on our Physical System of Oil Dependence but no shots were fired. And they(OPEC/Arab Nations) won this one!
    Hardly one of our "Great Moments in Strategic Thinking"... Like the war on poverty, the war on hunger, the war on drugs, or the war on people who don't sport enough colored ribbons, etc, this is war as metaphor, not "real" war.

    To claim the Arab Oil Embargo as an example of the use of Warden's strategy is to claim that any activity involving centers of gravity is an example. And what is the role of airpower in such situations?

    And by what measure did anybody "win"? They took a course of action that would impose financial cost on us, and we have since demostrated that it was a foolish thing to have done (a statment justified by the fact they have never done it again...). Pissing off your customers is invariably bad for business, no matter how indispensible you might think you are to them.

    The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

    And even in that context bloodless is a narowly defined thing, becasue if you are really going to "go to war" using a rapid series of parallel operations, you are not going to emply an oil embargo that takes months to years to achieve any strategic effect.

    Trying to be all things in all ways, it ends up being "doing what you can against CoGs and hoping for the best (ie my desired picture of the future).

    It just doesn't hang together.
    "All models are wrong, but some are useful"

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  2. #222
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    pvebber, don't mean to be snarky but were you alive during the embargo? You do know that they physically stopped shipping oil at any price. It was not just a price embargo it was a physical embargo. I remember days when you could not get gas anyplace at any price and when you could there was usually a limit (rationing).

  3. #223
    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    Ken, Fuchs, PVebber, I don't think you guys are confused, by the questions ask you are seem to be getting it.
    Slap, not that it matters what I think, but you seem like a good guy and Warden comes across as sincere; however your admonition that others are slow to 'get' the Theory of Bloodless Airpower while dropped ordnance is still chopping up folks in SEAsia seems uncharitable.

    The following articles may be considered controversial:

    We heard a terrifying noise which shook the ground; it was as if the earth trembled, rose up and opened beneath our feet. Enormous explosions lit up the sky like huge bolts of lightning; it was the American B-52s.
    — Cambodian bombing survivor
    Recorded using a groundbreaking IBM-designed system, the database provided extensive information on sorties conducted over Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. Clinton’s gift was intended to assist in the search for unexploded ordnance left behind during the carpet bombing of the region. Littering the countryside, often submerged under farmland, this ordnance remains a significant humanitarian concern. It has maimed and killed farmers, and rendered valuable land all but unusable. Development and demining organizations have put the Air Force data to good use over the past six years, but have done so without noting its full implications, which turn out to be staggering.

    The still-incomplete database (it has several “dark” periods) reveals that from October 4, 1965, to August 15, 1973, the United States dropped far more ordnance on Cambodia than was previously believed: 2,756,941 tons’ worth, dropped in 230,516 sorties on 113,716 sites. Just over 10 percent of this bombing was indiscriminate, with 3,580 of the sites listed as having “unknown” targets and another 8,238 sites having no target listed at all.
    Bombing Cambodia - The Walrus (Canada) - October 2006

    Bombs Over Cambodia (pdf) - Yale - October 2006

    Benedict F. Kiernan (born 1953 in Melbourne, Australia) is the Whitney Griswold Professor of History, Professor of International and Area Studies and Director of the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University. He is a prolific writer on the Cambodian genocide. Kiernan has also published prize-winning work on the global history of genocide.
    Ben Kiernan - Wikipedia

    Taylor Owen is Post Doctoral Fellow at the Liu Institute for Global Issues, UBC. His Doctorate is from the University of Oxford where he was Trudeau Scholar. He has been a lecturer at the Trudeau Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, Research Fellow at the Center for Global Governance at the LSE, Fellow in the Genocide Studies Program at Yale University, was an Action Canada Fellow, has an MA from the University of British Columbia, and has worked as a researcher at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, and the International Development Research Center.
    Taylor Owen Bio - taylorowen.com

    ***

    The KR Tribunal is a national court, so I guess it makes sense that they are not allowed to put countries on trial. But that is not very satisfying to a lot of people in Cambodia. The folks about to be put on trial are already pointing fingers of responsibility at the US and China while the local farmers still can’t quite believe that one of their own could have killed so many.
    From the Cambodia Daily, 25 September: The total weight of bombs that the US dropped on Cambodia during its war with Vietnam may have been five times greater than previously thought, according to a new academic study.

    The bombing of Cambodia also began in 1965, more than three years earlier than is widely believed, according to historians Taylor Owen and Ben Kiernan whose analysis of US Air Force data released in 2000 appear in the October issue of Canada's The Walrus magazine.

    Air Force data indicates that 2,756,941 tons of bombs were dropped in 230,516 sorties over 113,716 sites between 1965 and 1973, the authors say.

    This surpasses the bomb weight dropped by the allied forces on all combat theaters during the whole of World War II, which totaled 2 million tons, they write.

    ...Information Minister and government spokesman Khieu Kanharith said the bombing encouraged rural Cambodians to join the Khmer Rouge. But he said he was not concerned with the numbers of bombs dropped. "We are Buddhists...so we try to forgive and forget," he said.

    US Embassy spokesman Jeff Daigle could not be reached for comment.
    Uh, forgiving and forgetting is probably a wise choice under the circumstances...

    Who Is To Blame? - Trials and Denials In Cambodia - 9/30/2006

    Graphic: Sites Bombed by the US Air Force in Cambodia, 1965-73 - 113,716 Sites - 230,516 Sorties - 2,756,941 Tons of Ordnance
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  4. #224
    Council Member pvebber's Avatar
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    pvebber, don't mean to be snarky but were you alive during the embargo? You do know that they physically stopped shipping oil at any price.
    We can start another thead to discuss the embargo if you want. As it pertains to the argument, whether I was alive or not is immaterial. They tried the embargo in 1967 to deter us from supporting Isreal in the 67 war. It was uncoordinated and inconsistently applied so it accomplished little.

    I was wrong in describing the 73 embargo as "revenge" with no objective. Knee-jerk on my part I apologize for. It was imposed in retaliation for our aid to Isreal, as a cost-imposing strategy to cause us to end our support to Isreal. It failed to do that. It achieved an effect that we both remember well, but 'causing an effect' is not 'achieving an objective'.

    OPEC did not end production, it raised the price and cut production in a series of increments. Wikipedia says a total of 70% in price and 25% in cut production. Oil, being a fungible commodity, can't be "cut off" by the supplier, it just gets redistributed by other customers once they take delivery. Stopping "direct shipments" doesn't mean much, except adding a "pass through tax" as the customer base redistributes what they get at a modest profit. There was a shortage, but not a "stoppage of shippin goil at any price".

    The response was not a give in to the OPEC demands, but an INCREASE in aid to Isreal. So from the point of view of achieving a desired outcome, the embargo backfired. Warden might argue it failed because it used a physical CoG to affect the moral domain, and by not being sufficiently cost-imposing, allowed us to adapt and overcome it. It didn't 'break' anything, it just casued an incovenience that we were able to weather. Hence the issue with "bloodless war". It works on that darned, complex, "moral" term in the equation.

    Back to the topic, I'll reiterate the problem with a focus on physical destruction:

    The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

    This seems to be a fundamental inconsistency in Warden's theory?
    "All models are wrong, but some are useful"

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  5. #225
    Council Member Backwards Observer's Avatar
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    Sorry for going off topic, but here's another useless thought. If US evangelical Christians, senators and congressman feel compelled to do the Jesus thing in foreign countries; maybe putting together a program with the USAF to help Cambodia dispose of some of that ordnance would be helpful. Perhaps this is already being done. If so, Praise the Lord!

    Link to a New Zealand company doing UXO clearance in Cambodia and Laos among other places:

    Phoenix Clearance Limited Website

    Female Bomb Disposal Technicians - Phoenix Clearance

    Pic: Laotian UXO Clearance Lady.
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  6. #226
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber View Post
    We can start another thead to discuss the embargo if you want. As it pertains to the argument, whether I was alive or not is immaterial. They tried the embargo in 1967 to deter us from supporting Isreal in the 67 war. It was uncoordinated and inconsistently applied so it accomplished little.
    The reason I asked is in the past I have found it hard to discuss just how effective it was unless they some personal experience about it(part of the 5 minute attention span America seems to have). OPEC was formed in or around 1960 I believe and in 1967 they had not really become a real threat but by 1973 they were extremely effective. It is also a very concrete example of an attack on a System. The target chosen did not just have a tactical target effect, it had a Strategic System Wide effect, it bypassed our Ring#5 miltary forces and went straight to the inner rings of our country as Warden talks about. It Affected our Leadership, our System Essentials and our Population, some which have lasted to this day.

    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    I was wrong in describing the 73 embargo as "revenge" with no objective. Knee-jerk on my part I apologize for. It was imposed in retaliation for our aid to Isreal, as a cost-imposing strategy to cause us to end our support to Isreal. It failed to do that. It achieved an effect that we both remember well, but 'causing an effect' is not 'achieving an objective'.
    No need to apologize, knee-jerk reactions are common to all mankind but I disagree with your conclusion. There was a very clear Arab objective and that was to stop the Israeli counter-attack by conducting a Strategic Systems Essential Ring #2 attack against their supporter(The US) and it worked exactly as you described (that type of strategy is listed in Warden's The Enemy as a System) and as they (OPEC) wanted it to.

    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    OPEC did not end production, it raised the price and cut production in a series of increments. Wikipedia says a total of 70% in price and 25% in cut production. Oil, being a fungible commodity, can't be "cut off" by the supplier, it just gets redistributed by other customers once they take delivery. Stopping "direct shipments" doesn't mean much, except adding a "pass through tax" as the customer base redistributes what they get at a modest profit. There was a shortage, but not a "stoppage of shippin goil at any price".
    Again that is exactly what they wanted to do and I disagree Oil is or at least was not fungible, the demand is/was basically inelastic as the economist say.

    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    The response was not a give in to the OPEC demands, but an INCREASE in aid to Isreal. So from the point of view of achieving a desired outcome, the embargo backfired. Warden might argue it failed because it used a physical CoG to affect the moral domain, and by not being sufficiently cost-imposing, allowed us to adapt and overcome it. It didn't 'break' anything, it just casued an incovenience that we were able to weather. Hence the issue with "bloodless war". It works on that darned, complex, "moral" term in the equation.
    We did give into OPEC demands. Israel was going to be overun until US Airpower resupplied them with one of the most massive Air Lifts ever accomplished(Israel owes it life to American Airpower) and then when Israel counter-attacked the embargo was placed against the US and in a matter of days we saw a cease fire. But the Arabs were not satisfied and when the embargo was lifted in 1974 OIL had tripled and shortly after the stock market would crash(50% loss in value due to OIL) and we would enter one of the worst recessions we have ever had until 2008.

    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    Back to the topic, I'll reiterate the problem with a focus on physical destruction:
    It is about very precise destrcution. Not carpet bombing (unless that is the political objective) more like a laser beam burning through a five dollar part of a million dollar machine.

    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    The fundamental non sequitor is still there. To the extent Warden's theory is about bloodless war (desired!) it is not about airpower. To the extent it is about airpower, it is not about bloodless war (not desired!). To the extent that it is bloodless, it is not about the physical, but the moral (too hard!) and to the extent it is about breaking things and killing people (simple), it must drive that factor quickly to zero. That leads to the resentment and bad peace one is trying to avoid.

    This seems to be a fundamental inconsistency in Warden's theory?
    No, the article is in 2 parts first is Strategy which is independent of any service the second part is about the future of Airpower, about Precision of impact and Precision of Effect.

  7. #227
    Council Member pvebber's Avatar
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    It is also a very concrete example of an attack on a System. The target chosen did not just have a tactical target effect, it had a Strategic System Wide effect, it bypassed our Ring#5 miltary forces and went straight to the inner rings of our country as Warden talks about. It Affected our Leadership, our System Essentials and our Population, some which have lasted to this day
    .

    Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory.

    In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory

    It is about very precise destrcution.
    Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause.

    No, the article is in 2 parts first is Strategy which is independent of any service the second part is about the future of Airpower, about Precision of impact and Precision of Effect.
    But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:


    Regardless of airpower’s potential, it can never realize its real capability so long as it remains bound to an anachronistic view of war with an anachronistic vocabulary. On the contrary, if airpower is truly to come of
    age, it must do so in the context of a mod#ern concept of war that associates the use of force as directly as possible with end# game strategic objectives, not with the act of fighting. If this is to happen, the opera#tors of airpower must understand, believe, and teach end#game strategy as the foundation of airpower. Failure to do so will con#demn airpower to suboptimization and de#prive its owners of using force in such a dramatically different way that will achieve national objectives quickly and at minimum cost.
    The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums.

    I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively.
    Last edited by pvebber; 04-09-2011 at 04:03 AM.
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  8. #228
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber View Post
    .

    Or it was a case of "if you only have 1 card to play, you don't need systems analysis to play it". Just because in hindsight, you can look at the US as a system, and interpret things other people do in terms of system effects, doesn't mean that at the time, they were thinking in terms of system theory.
    Maybe, but it worked so good they did again in 1979 when Iran pulled bascially the same stunt.

    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    In any case it appears you have retreated from the notion that war is only about breaking PHYSICAL systems. I will agree to disagree on how good an example the oil embargo is and revel in my (moral) victory
    Retreat! Hell we just got here.(I think some Marine said that) War is about AFFECTING Physical systems, you get 2 points for my poor choice of words.



    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    Yes, but to reduce the PHYSICAL side of the outcome equation to ZERO you need to strike lots and lots of targets. That is lots of broken stuff, even if it only has little holes in it breaking it. IF you break an electrical system nationwide, yes you may have done it by breaking a 5$ part, but without power, people will die and bad things will happen, and they will still hold you responsible for shutting their country down and ruining their economy, despite how economically you destroyed it. A devastating effect is a DEVASTATING, regardless of its cause.
    Then those people should be very carfull about attacking my country in the first place.




    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    But the two parts have to hang together if it is to acheive Warden's intent:

    The strategy provides the context for airpower's coming out party. Once again the strategy is valuable, the argument has not been made convincingly that it apply's universally to all military problems, or is necessarily better than other strategic methods. Airpower is useful, but not omnipotent and assuming that it is until proven otherwise is not a logical approach as it invites accepting great risk by being disproven only by tragic outcomes, or the expenditure of vast sums.
    I don't think he is saying that at all, it's more like we need to find out what all Airpower can truly do, because we have just "assumed" (often because of current technology limits) it has limits, instead of finding out what they actually are.

    Quote Originally Posted by pvebber
    I don't feel you've satisfactorily addressed the criticisms made to this point. I'm not saying the strategy is "bad" or that airpower does not have value. I'm saying the strategy is but one of many ways to skin the proverbial cat, and that airpower is tool that does not have any more "potential" to be applied to "any problem until proven otherwise" than a hammer does. I will continue use my hammer to drive nails, but turn to a screwdriver to turn screws and a saw to turn one piece of wood into two pieces, despite the fact my hammer can also do those tasks, just not as effectively.
    If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.
    Slapout9,

    that is indeed the sentence that closes Warden's circular reasoning. His exact phrasing is:

    Quote Originally Posted by Warden
    If we cannot or will not operate in the parallel domain, then we should first look for ways to avoid war (in any event, probably a reasonable course in most instances).
    In summary: airpower is the best way to win a war and if it is not, we should not go to war. Allow me to present one concrete example of the implications of this type of circular reasoning. As Warden concedes himself:

    Quote Originally Posted by Warden
    Offhand, I can think of only one thing that airpower cannot do and that some other form of military power can: physically take people into custody.
    This means that, if Warden had been President George W. Bush's strategist in 1989, Manuel A. Noriega would still be the dictator of Panama. To paraphrase Slapout9's statement: "when people say Airpower can not bring democracy to Panama what they really mean is that Military power can not bring democracy to Panama." Well, if you read a history book about Panama, I think you will have to admit that the facts contradict Warden's circular reasoning.

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    Council Member pvebber's Avatar
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    War is about AFFECTING Physical systems
    Affecting physical systems is but one WAY of conducting war. War, I'll say again, is about getting someone to do what you want, stop doing what you don't want, or simply revenge. It is waged against people, which is why "leadership" and not physical infrastructure is at the center of Warden's five rings.

    Then those people should be very carfull about attacking my country in the first place
    .

    What if they didn't attack your country, but you require them to do something, or stop doing something? (We are Good guys so don't do the revenge thing...)

    OR is your interpretation of Warden that we should only engage in war if we are physically attacked?

    I don't think he is saying that at all, it's more like we need to find out what all Airpower can truly do, because we have just "assumed" (often because of current technology limits) it has limits, instead of finding out what they actually are.
    So is the Air Force remiss in conducting war games and exercises that address these things? I've been the Red Cell lead for the last 3 or 4 AFRL futures wargames and they addressed a remarkable array of things that airpower might do. Are these efforts somehow insufficient? Col. Warden has been involved as a guest speaker at at least one of these as I recall (one of the opportunities I got to chat with him). They are constantly "finding what they actually are".

    Airpower has demonstrated that it has limits. That is a fact. Technology has acted over time to reduce those limits, but they have to demonstrate that they do so. Just as the advance of technology has removed limitations on land and seapower. Capabilities have to be proven, not taken as fact until disproven. We can't afford, particularly now, to do otherwise.


    If you read the article Warden says something to the effect that when people say Airpower can not solve the problem what they really mean is that Military power can not solve the prolem.
    This is a view that gives in to the "dark side" of tacticizing war. What I mean by that is the idea that achieving tactical objectives is necessary and sufficient to achieve operational objectives,and operational objectives are necessary and sufficient to achieve strategic objectives. In its most extreme form it denies the operational level and claims tactical objectives are necessary and sufficient to directly achieve strategic objectives.

    The Viet Nam war, where the North lost nearly all tactical battles, yet won the war, serves as a counter example.

    It tends to frame warfare (the ways of conducting war) in terms of picking targets and breaking them (or seizing them). Operational Art is not seen as necessary, because ,done quickly and pervasively enough, the strategic outcome can be achieved without the "enemy ever getting a turn".

    This sounds a lot like Warden's view. And it suffers from myopia to the potential ways the adversary can 'take their turn' in ways that render airpower either irrelavant, or take advatage of over aggressive utilization of it.

    The reality of modern war is that the cases where the adversary can be indiscriminately attacked to the point of paralysis are extremely rare. By international law, if you "break it you own it". You can't just cause a country to stop functioning and then just say "serves you right for pissing me off". You can get to the "mission accomplished" moment, but as we have seen, that doesn't mean you have achieved your war objectives.
    Last edited by pvebber; 04-11-2011 at 12:19 AM.
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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Marc and pvebber. I had a close encounter with the dentist yesterday not up to speed yet, so I will respond later.

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    Council Member pvebber's Avatar
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    Hope you recover quickly!

    Somethings to think about:


    The limitations of systems thinking

    a partial pdf (can't find the rest) slides 6 and 7 being the important ones

    and

    Dark side of systems thinking

    and how potential adversaries look at strategy in very different terms than we do.

    We play chess and football, they play Go and Soccer
    Last edited by pvebber; 04-12-2011 at 06:53 PM.
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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    Marc and pvebber. I had a close encounter with the dentist yesterday not up to speed yet, so I will respond later.
    Get well soon. All the best.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Slap, I got a cure. Rinse with Bourbon 12 times a day.

    It won't help but you won't care.

    (Get well, Podner)

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    Default My point is different...

    Quote Originally Posted by Cole View Post
    Shouldn’t we organize/train/equip for the most realistic fight?
    Cole,

    I'm not arguing that we need significantly higher investments in airpower... only pointing out that we have just barely enough, and can't afford to lose anymore.

    We buy nukes to deter Russia/China…and reasonable air and seapower...but not at the expense of conflicts with 90% probabilities vs 1%.
    Again, this would put us in the same trap as we found ourselves in with the New Look- nuke 'em or appease 'em.

    Reasonable statisticians comparing probabilities of a Soldier/Marine dying in current and future conflict versus hypothetical threats to a B-2 by a foe with 5th gen aircraft would see.
    It's simple risk management. With only 20 B-2s, we can't afford to lose many.

    Even classified assessments can be questionable. Look how we exaggerated the threat of the Mi-25?
    Assume you meant MiG-25. Since we have flown against Flankers in live fly exercises, we know the actual capes of the aircraft.

    Meanwhile, real Soldiers/Marines/Sailors/Airmen on the ground are getting killed…not Airmen at altitude or Sailors at sea. Since the end of the Cold War, only ground combatants have faced serious risk. 327 fourth generation aircraft based on the F-16 and Su-27 could not down more than a handful of F-22/F-35, B-2s, or stealthy cruise missile/ UAS. None of those U.S. systems facing 252 advanced SAMs would experience losses approaching what Soldiers/Marines experience in one month of current/future combat….multiplied by 100 months.
    Cole, I think you're being a little bit unreasonable here, perhaps because I'm not making my point very clearly.

    The issue with losing air superiority isn't the folks in the air that will get killed... The problem is the damage the enemy can do to everything else- ground troops, the Navy, bases, civilians, infrastructure. Oh by the way, no more RPA intel, no C-17s to deliver supplies, no ships to bring in fuel, etc etc. While the strategic corporal is a reality, most corporals screwing up an engagement will not result in massive loss of human life. Not saying that we'll necessarily lose the war... but we will lose a lot of people, and we probably will not achieve our objectives without air superiority. Again, probability is lower - consequences are WAY catastrophic in terms of national interests.

    I think you are underestimating the capabilities of the enemy. I've trained against this threat... it is not a pushover.

    I will re-iterate again... I'm not calling for abolishing the Army and letting the Air Force do everything itself- I am simply pointing out that we have a USAF that is just big enough to achieve a moderate level of risk.

    I agree that the risk to folks on the ground has been great over the last 10 years. I respect and honor all those who serve. But I think it's a little cheap to use that fact to say that we shouldn't worry about risk on the high end of conflict.

    It’s a zero sum gain budget environment with Iraq winding down, Afghanistan on a countdown, and Libya starting its upward spiral with a less than clear endstate and poor current results.
    Planned tanker numbers were based on nuclear bomber requirements of 50 years ago. Current tankers are at half their lifespan despite advanced age and we never have used more than 300+ of the 500+ in any conflict, nor do we have the space to park them outside TBM range.
    Current tankers are becoming increasingly expensive to maintain. New tankers will also allow basing further from the threat while still delivering significant fuel offloads. Are you really trying to say we don't need new tankers? If we can't get the Joes to the fight, or get the troops their supplies and equipment, how will you fight your counterinsurgency you think is likely?

    Given numbers of actual aircraft shot down in past decades, how many CSAR aircraft are required when MV-22/CV-22 already exist and plenty of MH Special Ops and Naval helicopters are fielded? Agree we need a new bomber but considering that only a handful of B-2s were required in Libya and stealthy Navy UAS and MC-X will exist, we may not need anywhere near 80-100 new stealthy bombers.
    Ask the folks in A-Stan what they think about the USAF having dedicated CSAR aircraft... I think you'll find they like having the robust CASEVAC capability.

    As for the bombers, we need to have enough that they are not a silver bullet force- see points on B-2 fleet above. Remember that next gen bomber will replace B-2s, B-1s, and some B-52s, not just B-2.

    Believe the Libya model will prove not nearly as successful as some believe. Even if it is, it is atypical terrain and a minor threat. Try the same thing in the terrain of Lebanon, North Korea, Venezuela, or Ukraine, and try to find TBMs in Iran. Distaste for boots on the ground does not preclude that need in multiple much more likely conflicts than China/Russia. From the looks of unrest in the Middle East both now and in the past 20 years, more of the same is inevitable.
    Agree that terrain in other places is more difficult. I don't think that changes the fact that the appetite for boots on the ground is 0. As multiple folks have pointed out, our strategy is set by politicians. I doubt any President any time soon will commit significant land forces if he can avoid it. Again, I am not saying this WILL NOT happen, only that it is unlikely.

    Proof lies in deployments required per service member. Any service that deploys less than the Army has more force structure than the Army proportionally.
    I really have a problem with this. The USAF was deployed WAY more than the Army from 1991-2001... but you didn't see folks complaining and saying that the Army should be cut to give the USAF more force structure.

    We would never use nukes in North Korea, Lebanon, Syria, Ukraine, or Venezuela. ....The rogue nations with unstable leadership are the ones most difficult to deter, and as Qaddafi’s actions show, no amount of air and seapower are a deterrent when we tell him we won’t go ashore with anything but the CIA and SOF/SF.
    I agree on no nukes... point being that you have no options if you only have nukes which you don't want to use and you don't have some conventional capability.

    I would submit that we're not trying to deter Qadaffi... if we were doing that, we'd be doing things in a little more direct way. I think everyone understands we're trying to use the minimum force possible to keep him from attacking cities.

    1988 was well before Desert Storm. March 1991 was shortly thereafter because we stopped short of doing the job correctly…and settled on a NFZ.
    Cole, we did not enforce the NFZ till after March 1991. We explicitly let Saddam fly his helicopters (we can discuss the reasons why we did that if you want). Northern and Southern Watch were 100% effective once instituted in protecting the Kurds and Shia from attack. If you have evidence to the contrary, please present it. Continuing to make false statements with no evidence is not productive.

    Add the wear and tear on aircraft that now must be replaced prematurely and cost of ONW/OSW to the cost of OIF to finish the job…not to mention higher gas prices due to “oil for food.”
    Getting Saddam out of power was not the objective of the NFZs. You are correct on the wear and tear, but that's already included in the costs in terms of phase hours. I would say that none of the aircraft have really been replaced prematurely... unless you think 30+ years (at the shortest) is a premature replacement for a high performance aircraft.

    Maybe. Seem to recall the last time we sent cruise missiles into Sudan and Afghanistan, it didn’t work well. Bombing did not stop genocide in Bosnia. A NFZ won’t stop terror attacks or safe havens. NFZ won’t hinder Iran or Hezbollah TBMs or a DPRK attack across the DMZ. Russia could attack Ukraine
    Airpower has the ability to affect all the situations you mention above. Cruise missiles are not a good substitute. Bombing did stop the genocide, it just happened too late due to a lack of political will.

    Again, I'm not arguing we don't need an Army... I'm saying we need to face the reality that because airpower in uncontested situations is lower risk (as you have harped on repeatedly) our leaders will probably tend to use it more frequently than massive landpower when they can. Obviously if the DPRK invades the South we will need massive landpower. But that's not the situation I'm discussing...

    No fly zones and airpower/seapower have been incapable of ending warfare, terrorism, and irrational despots as we have known them over the past 50 years. By themselves, air and seapower won’t deter or end war over the next decades, either.
    I rest my case. See above, you are completely missing my point, probably because I didn't make it clearly. NFZs don't end wars, or terror, or change governments. Airpower can end SOME wars... but again I'm not saying it can do that in all cases. Not arguing for increased spending at the expense of the Army... simply saying that the USAF is at about the minimum level we can afford if we want to continue to be a superpower. Without air superiority we would end up losing a lot more troops on the ground in any contested scenario. We lost 3000 folks in under 2 hours on 9/11 due to a loss of air superiority. That was accomplished with four airliners. Think of what actual weapons could do.

    I should probably be happy that folks think the way you do- it is a result of the fact that the USAF and USN have been so successful in the air over the past 30 years. I just would hate to count on being lucky to achieve the same results in the future.

    V/R,

    Cliff

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    Default Good point Ken...

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    Fighter Jocks are great folks.
    Aww, shucks... I didn't know you cared, Ken!

    One of my best friends was once one, many good acquaintances are or were. However, most pilots suffer from two minor problems as war fighters (IMO, obviously...); they're conditioned to using checklists and what they do relies on knowledge and acceptance of the theory and laws of Physics. Problem with that is you cannot develop a checklist for people activity and war fighting is an art, not a science. A rather lawless art at that...
    These are problems? Just kidding. I agree about the checklists. I also agree about the physics. Disagree about the people... at least where air-to-air folks like Warden (he was a FAC early on but finished up as a F-15C guy) are concerned. One of the awesome parts of air-to-air fighting is that you are constantly faced with a different problem precisely because the other guy is also trying his best to kill you. Good air-to-air pilots understand the human dimension and try to use it to their advantage. There's a good deal of art to it... Not to say that there aren't good TTPs, or that some folks don't use them like cookbooks. I think that's true in any military effort, though- TTPs exist as a starting point, and how far beyond them you get depends on how capable you are at progressing.

    Back to the "in theory" bit. That's the rub -- theory and actuality often differ, intelligence is rarely adequate to the degree he envisions and that entails making assumptions. That's always dangerous and the Intel guys won't ordinarily do it, they're rather -- excessively, some say -- cautious that way.
    Agree on the intel!

    That leaves the final stategery up to the decider -- who will decide based upon his gut feeling and his assumptions rather than on the precision that Warden's strategy demands for best execution. We have literally seen that in operation several times over the past ten (20 ? Back even unto DS/DS?) years when several decision makers had the power but not the knowledge to make decisions (and that in a system that strongly militates against disagreeing with the Boss).
    Valid, I think Warden would argue that we should work on this.

    Warden's theories have merit, his process is sensible in some situations. Neither his nor any other 'system' has the route to the always best solution. Nor is anyone likely to develop a better idea because, as he said: "Conversely, the morale side the human side is beyond the realm of the predictable in a particular situation because humans are so different from each other..." Totally true. Might work better if every 'implementer' (and every opponent...) was another Warden -- they have not been and will not be.
    Interesting point on the implementer mattering...

    His follow on to that last quote: "Our war efforts, therefore, should be directed primarily at the physical side" goes circular -- we're back to needing quite accurate physical Intel. We've almost never had that and are even more unlikely to do so in the near future...
    Good intel is a must. I still argue that knowing the end state you want to achieve should be the starting point... even if you can't know EXACTLY how to get there it is probably best to have a direction.

    Good insight Ken, thanks.

    V/R,

    Cliff

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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Backwards Observer View Post
    Slap, not that it matters what I think, but you seem like a good guy and Warden comes across as sincere; however your admonition that others are slow to 'get' the Theory of Bloodless Airpower while dropped ordnance is still chopping up folks in SEAsia seems uncharitable.
    I think Warden would agree with you B.O., and point out that maybe we could have bombed some targets in NVN (ala 1972) instead of Cambodia... Warden is not saying that warfare is bloodless now. He is saying that the potential is there and we should keep trying to get there.

    The following articles may be considered controversial:
    Why? We bombed the heck out of Cambodia, Laos, and S. Vietnam- more ordnance there than on NVN if I recall correctly. It wasn't pretty. Warden argues we should try and avoid repeating this in the future. I agree.

    Cambodia could be a very depressing place based on its' history, but isn't because the people there are so happy and friendly. You have to admire their resilience.

    V/R,

    Cliff

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    Default Jesus is my G-Suit

    Quote Originally Posted by Cliff View Post
    Warden is not saying that warfare is bloodless now. He is saying that the potential is there and we should keep trying to get there.
    Warden is a visionary, I'm just a random internet clod. My humble suggestion would be that a deeper understanding of how different cultures interact in their own regional contexts rather then attempting to template a system over them might help reduce the confusion and/or chopping. If not, then a better way of persuading/restraining folks than unloading millions 'o' tons of bombs on subsistence farmers would certainly be desirable. I know that's not how it's done no more, just sayin'.

    Why?
    To be honest, who knows what the f**k is or isn't controversial anymore. Not too long ago, there seemed to be a controversy over who was actually a human being and who wasn't. Wait...folks still ain't sure? Well, there ya go. Maybe we're all just systems. Does that mean some systems are more equal than others?

    Cambodia could be a very depressing place based on its' history, but isn't because the people there are so happy and friendly. You have to admire their resilience.
    If by 'happy and friendly', you mean 'made a virtue out of region-wide trauma', then sure. I think I know what you're trying to say, er, that is, I think I know what I'm trying to say..

    Cliff, I appreciate your taking the time to reply. I gotta say, flying around in the heavens sure seems to make for an enviably upbeat outlook, I say this sincerely. Thanks again.

  19. #239
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default You are *not* getting a hug...

    Quote Originally Posted by Cliff View Post
    Aww, shucks... I didn't know you cared, Ken!
    I duz -- but it's totally like play-tonic. Not to say you can't get the random kiss to make sure the ungodly are paying attention.
    One of the awesome parts of air-to-air fighting is that you are constantly faced with a different problem precisely because the other guy is also trying his best to kill you. Good air-to-air pilots understand the human dimension and try to use it to their advantage. There's a good deal of art to it...
    Unquestionably and most of you guys almost certainly do that one on one bit at altitude far better than would I. You even excel at the small groups in conflict thing. The problem I've noted is when multiple groups doing different things on the ground intrude in the air oriented bubble, things sometimes get connfoozed and much the skill set falls into the non productive (sometimes even mildly counterproductive... ) realm. Skill sets have specificity by definition.
    I think that's true in any military effort, though- TTPs exist as a starting point, and how far beyond them you get depends on how capable you are at progressing.
    Totally true. There are green suiters with skill sets not amenable to close combat or even generic land warfare. To include, regrettably, some in high places.
    Interesting point on the implementer mattering...
    That's really the only thing that is slightly more important than good or at least adequate Intel -- the wrong guy in the job will almost inevitably make flawed decisions. The Military personnel system with its strong tendency to make like Peas in the Pod militates (bad pun...) a median personna. Mediocrity is akin to median. We need round pegs for round holes -- you can put a square peg in a round hole but it's less than optimum and it'll be smaller than desirable...
    Good intel is a must. I still argue that knowing the end state you want to achieve should be the starting point... even if you can't know EXACTLY how to get there it is probably best to have a direction.
    And I certainly agree. I suspect Warden, Slap and pvebber can also agree. the issue then becomes which of us is the designated Elector of Directions...

    The implementer, acting on the Intel available...

    Be careful up there...
    Last edited by Ken White; 04-13-2011 at 03:22 PM.

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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    It won't help but you won't care.

    (Get well, Podner)
    Best advice I ever recieved

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