"Occupation by Policy" - How Victors Inadvertantly Provoke Resistance Insurgency

[davidbfpo]

I have read the posts to date and wondered about the reverse effect of a 'no occupation policy' in the context of Western Europe, in particular the Iberian pleninsula - where in 1945 Franco ruled Spain, had been an Axis ally and next door Portugal had the Salazar dictatorship, which had eventually allied itself with the Allies.

Yes in the Cold War context both were seen as allies, providing bases notably, but politically until 1974 kept at a distance politically. Both successfully became and remain democracies - without major bloodshed.

It is a curious fact that the USSR shared occupation in Austria till 1954 IIRC; withdrew from northern Norway promptly and negoitated a semi-submissive realtionship with Finland. "Finlandisation" was a theme during the 'Cold War' about what could happen if the USSR was successful.
Yugoslavia partly freed itself, but the USSR withdrew swiftly.

Not to overlook all the countries of Eastern Europe it did occupy, each evolved a communist regime that the USSR could normally accept.

Anyway just a thought.

[slapout9]

I have read the posts to date and wondered about the reverse effect of a 'no occupation policy' in the context of Western Europe, in particular the Iberian pleninsula - where in 1945 Franco ruled Spain, had been an Axis ally and next door Portugal had the Salazar dictatorship, which had eventually allied itself with the Allies.

Yes in the Cold War context both were seen as allies, providing bases notably, but politically until 1974 kept at a distance politically. Both successfully became and remain democracies - without major bloodshed.

It is a curious fact that the USSR shared occupation in Austria till 1954 IIRC; withdrew from northern Norway promptly and negoitated a semi-submissive realtionship with Finland. "Finlandisation" was a theme during the 'Cold War' about what could happen if the USSR was successful.
Yugoslavia partly freed itself, but the USSR withdrew swiftly.

Not to overlook all the countries of Eastern Europe it did occupy, each evolved a communist regime that the USSR could normally accept.

Anyway just a thought.

The Air Force has been saying this since the end WW2 as part of the Air Power/Project Control Theory.

[AmericanPride]

David and Slap,

Bob's thesis is that "policy alone can be enough [to spark the "resistance effect"] if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution." He cited World War II and the Arab Spring as examples where policies without occupation incited armed resistance as a "natural human response". As stated in my previous posts, I think the example of World War II is problematic, though I think an argument can probably be made about the Arab Spring.

So, in the examples of Mexico, Finland, Spain, and Portugal, what about the policies pressed upon them by the US or USSR were not "excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution"? In his comments about WWI and WWII, Bob stated that rational decision-making was fundamental ("the Allies were the lesser of two evils") in the German response, even though Germany survived WWI and was virtually dismantled after the second. If perception of policy is the determinant of armed resistance, what options to policy-makers have in shaping perception to co-opt resistance or must they abandon their policies?

[davidbfpo]

David and Slap,

Bob's thesis is that "policy alone can be enough [to spark the "resistance effect"] if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution." He cited World War II and the Arab Spring as examples where policies without occupation incited armed resistance as a "natural human response". As stated in my previous posts, I think the example of World War II is problematic, though I think an argument can probably be made about the Arab Spring.

So, in the examples of Mexico, Finland, Spain, and Portugal, what about the policies pressed upon them by the US or USSR were not "excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution"? In his comments about WWI and WWII, Bob stated that rational decision-making was fundamental ("the Allies were the lesser of two evils") in the German response, even though Germany survived WWI and was virtually dismantled after the second. If perception of policy is the determinant of armed resistance, what options to policy-makers have in shaping perception to co-opt resistance or must they abandon their policies?

AmericanPride,

You can make a case that post-1945 US and Western European policies towards Spain especially reinforced the Franco regime. Spain took a long time to ditch its anti-US stance as a result. If anything neither country had 'policies pressed upon them by the US'. Look how long Portugal clung on to its African colonies, without US & Western European support.

I am no expert on Finnish history, but expect the Soviet oversight developed over time, e.g. leaving the naval bases on the Gulf of Finland. Plus the Finnish Communist Party was only able to get a small popular vote.

Occupation after military defeat is different from occupation when the nation-state remains viable in the perception of its citizens. Eastern Europe and Finalnd were devasted by WW2, followed by a sometimes, even often, brutal Soviet military presence e.g. Hungary 1956. 'Excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution policies' followed by the USSR and its communist partners I would contend diminished over the decades.

[slapout9]

David and Slap,

Bob's thesis is that "policy alone can be enough [to spark the "resistance effect"] if those policies are perceived as excessively inappropriate and illegitimate in nature and execution." He cited World War II and the Arab Spring as examples where policies without occupation incited armed resistance as a "natural human response". As stated in my previous posts, I think the example of World War II is problematic, though I think an argument can probably be made about the Arab Spring.

So, in the examples of Mexico, Finland, Spain, and Portugal, what about the policies pressed upon them by the US or USSR were not "excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution"? In his comments about WWI and WWII, Bob stated that rational decision-making was fundamental ("the Allies were the lesser of two evils") in the German response, even though Germany survived WWI and was virtually dismantled after the second. If perception of policy is the determinant of armed resistance, what options to policy-makers have in shaping perception to co-opt resistance or must they abandon their policies?

. I believe Ike had the proper 3 part policy. Massive retaliation at a time and place of our choosing. Which included three parts. First a strong economy at home. Second strong nuclear forces. Third strong covert action capabilites based upon plausable deniabilty.

[AmericanPride]

Slap,

Third strong covert action capabilites based upon plausable deniabilty.

Aren't the consequences of that policy (i.e. blowback) one of the major problems highlighted by Bob's argument against "occupation by policy"? In particular, wouldn't it be "illegitimate in nature and execution" to conduct "strong covert action"?

[Bob's World]

Certainly covert actions would be viewed as illegitimate by those they are employed against. This is a risky business, but Slap raises a good point, and added the qualifier of "plausible deniability." Of course these things can blow up in one's face. Take our actions to put the Shah in power in Iran. The Iranian people will not soon forget or forgive that bit of Cold War manipulation.

What we seem to discount, however, is that legal, totally overt actions can be equally or even more damaging to our security. Again, with Iran as an example, how do we think the Iranian people perceive the US in our hard, overt sanctions against Iran intended to deter them from developing a nuclear weapon? Even Iranians who do not believe their nation needs such weapons tend to believe even more fervently that the US has no right to curtail Iranian sovereignty to be something less than the sovereignty of those nations currently in possession of nukes.

We, being a nation of laws, tend to put too much faith in actions being ok so long as they are legal. Nothing could be further from the truth. The primary test must be one of perceived appropriateness, not legality. Often this is primarily a constraint on "how" rather than "what" one believes they need to do. The vast majority of our actions in response to the attacks of 9/11 have been legal. But the majority of our actions have also been perceived as inappropriate by those they affect and by many who watch from afar. It is the inappropriateness of our responses that is, IMO, the primary reason that for all of our tactical successes we are failing at the strategic level.

Too often we are unwilling to compromise tactical gains (that are objective, measured and reported to measure our success) in the name of attaining greater strategic gains (that are subjective, nearly impossible to measure, and therefore largely discounted in importance). How many times has President Karzai asked for reasonable constraints on tactical operations in his own country to be told "no" by the same American government that professes to be there as a guest of a sovereign nation with the mission of enhancing the legitimacy of their government? We say one thing, but then our actions have the opposite effect. We even publicly chastise President Karzai as being ungrateful when he dares to stand up for extremely reasonable sovereign rights that we would certainly demand if roles were reversed.

So our occupation of Afghanistan is both physical and by policy. And the resistance insurgency there is very strong as a result. This resistance insurgency will wane rapidly once we back off on both of those lines of provocation. (However the revolutionary insurgency against the government we elevated into power will continue regardless of what we do, we need to accept that fact as well).

[slapout9]

Slap,



Aren't the consequences of that policy (i.e. blow back) one of the major problems highlighted by Bob's argument against "occupation by policy"? In particular, wouldn't it be "illegitimate in nature and execution" to conduct "strong covert action"?

The world is a tough place and it is going to get tougher IMO. We need covert options and operations and let somebody else take the credit and or the blame for them. Most of the world works that way anyway which is why we get beat up so much. It is the nature of Big Power Nation Politics. We need to be able to do things quietly.

Sure there will be mistakes and blow back but it is a far more realistic option than just saying we will send in the Marines and beat you up on world wide television because we are going to make the world safe for puppies, kittens and bunny rabbits. In a since the USA needs to grow up and act like an adult and not some spoiled child with a lot of money,weapons and Polly Anna beliefs.

What did that dead Chinese guy say....All war is based on deception!! sometimes he is better than that dead German guy.

[Bill Moore]

The problem with this discussion/debate is the extreme arrogance that underpins it. America this and America that, as though we're sole power that influenced good and evil in the world. Our policies certainly contributed to rebellion in some situations, but wherever we played others also played whether they were Soviets, French, Chinese, Israel, India etc. All nations pursue their interests using their own strategies and ways to achieve their ends. Seldom do populations in developing nations within our concept of a State determine their destiny without considerable interference from multiple third parties. A proxy war is just that, an extension of war between two states in another state using proxies. Both sides are being manipulated by the powers that support them, and powers are being manipulated by the proxies. The world has always been this way, this isn't unique to the Cold War and the so called inappropriate policies that we allegedly still follow (which is a very questionable assertion).

I'm not arguing against Bob's ideas, they are old and sound ideas that have been around at least since the beginning the Cold War. Nothing written here that Ed Lansdale and others didn't write over 60 years ago about the necessity of avoiding attempt to force our ways upon foreign populations with our aggressive policies. Not surprising, that line of thought didn't garner a lot of traction back then either. Conventional minded leaders will remain conventional minded leaders.

As to the conversation on covert operations, of course they should be in our toolbox, but that is ultimately nothing more than a way/tool. What objective are we pursuing? Then determine which way to achieve it is best. It does all start with policy, and since 9/11 we have been suffering from terrible ones.

[OUTLAW 09]

Robert---back to your comment on it is simple---that is in fact the whole crux of the matter meaning yes we see the actions being made by say us and we see the results of those actions coming back as feedback from the population we are dealing with BUT then we the US do not want to believe that the feedback is what it is.

Being simple means from the beginning one looks at the perception of what and how the US action is going to be received on the other end---meaning just how in the heck will the targeted population "receive" or "perceive" our actions in their own minds.

This is where our policy and policy leaders always go astray and I mean astray.

Will give you an example on Iran---in the 60s through the late 70s the Shah sent a number of Iranian students to study in Berlin at the cost of the Iranian government---the students who were initially shy became in a short time "radicalized" by the German student movement which was by the way in 67/68 taking on the dictatorship of the Shah went most US students had never even heard of the Shah or his SAVAK. The first German student shot by the Berlin Riot Police in 67 was demoing against the Shah during his visit to Berlin

For those that now nothing about SAVAK it was the internal security police trained by our CIA and brutally put down anything that resembled resistance insurgency against the Shah.

Those Iranians who were not radicalized out of fear still in their personal beliefs and in private comments hated the Shah.

As an American it was an experience trying to catch up on the history of our coup in 53 that the Iranians you are right still resent to this day---never mentioned in any US history book of the 60s in a high school or university.

Now this is where the fundamentalism kicks in---those students- many left and communists in the mean time raced back to Iran to help in what they viewed to be a final overthrown of US involvement in Iranian politics only to end up either killed, imprisoned or fleeing back to Berlin totally disillusioned.

Never once during the Shah events did we the US admit to the CIA involvement in SAVAK which was truly hated in Iran.

I happened to be flying out of Houston back to Berlin the day that the US literally kicked out the Iranian pilots who had been training in Lackland AFB as "our response" to events in Iran---GUESS WHAT everyone of those pilots were executed when they returned to Iran.

As a former SF vet and someone who had understood what was going on inside Iran my heart broke for them---you could see in their eyes the resignation of their deaths--but they never said anything as they waited for their flight to NYC which was mine as well.

What were the policy makers thinking---did they not understand the population, did they not truly think through their actions and how their actions would be perceived on the other end---no we just reacted out of "anger and wanted to punish Iran" for the embassy event.

If it were so simple the world might not be where we are currently.

To ask national policy makers to think through their actions especially on how it will be received or perceived by the target population is really hard as most Americans never have been on the ground in those countries.

I go back to a former SF PhD Det A vet who is still working and living in Jordan who had the courage to stand in front of over 80 US MI/interrogators in Abu Ghraib in 2005 and say it takes three things to be a good interrogator;

1. speak well any foreign language
2. have physically lived and resided in any foreign culture for a period of time
3. have a natural curiosity of the world around you

I would say that they are also the requirements for a national policy maker and or his advisors---how many Presidents had we had that speak anything other than English?

Again fundamentalism and perception in the ME are the key drivers---without them there would have never been a OBL and AQ.

But then with them we have had the Arab Spring--we should just sit back and let it flow---populations will in the end work through their problems. That is the inherent lesson we fail to understand. We should have learned long ago to accept the results of what the population does-not fight it if it does not match our "values"---sometimes being a good friend/listener gets one further.

I had a Kurdish interpreter in Iraq who during the ethnic cleansing that said you all need to let the Arabs literally kill each other until both are on the ground exhausted then and only then will they negotiate and settle their issues---it has always been the Arab way.

[carl]

Not to overlook all the countries of Eastern Europe it did occupy, each evolved a communist regime that the USSR could normally accept.

They didn't develop regimes acceptable to the USSR on their own. They were guided every step of the way by the gentle hand of the Red Army and the NKVD and often the people who eventually ran those govs were selected and trained by the Russians. It is important to remember that the Red Army was always there to do what needed to be done if the USSR was displeased. They did what needed to be done on several occasions.

Anne Applebaum wrote an extremely good book about how the USSR occupied and thoroughly pacified the countries of Eastern Europe.

http://www.amazon.com/Iron-Curtain-C.../dp/140009593X

It is very much worthy of study from a small war standpoint. What the Russians accomplished was quite remarkable as those countries weren't exactly pre-war hotbeds of communism and the Russians weren't well liked. Remember one of those countries was Poland. But they did it and were able to keep that boot on the faces of those countries until their relative economic power declined. Then they left, they weren't ejected. What the occupied peoples thought about it never really mattered.

'Excessively inappropriate illegitimate in nature and execution policies' followed by the USSR and its communist partners I would contend diminished over the decades.

It did, but that was only because thoroughly entrenched, powerful police states don't need to use the rough stuff so often. The hard part is forcing the guy into the cell. Once he's in there there isn't much need to get physical.