Initial Officer Selection

[Fuchs]

I suspect that an objective look at Switzerland would show that it wasn't just their "credible defense" that allowed for peace. For example, it's quite often convenient (for a number of reasons) for belligerent powers to have a "neutral zone" where they can conduct business (and if you doubt this, look at the activities of the OSS and other groups in Switzerland during World War II as well as the banking habits of certain other powers during that same conflict).

Canaris saved Switzerland in 1940, but without their overt defence-readiness and non-intervention policy he wouldn't have been able to do so.
(It was the Swiss' overt army strength and fortification strength that allowed him to bluff and tell Hitler that Switzerland would be a too tough nut, while he had in fact long-obtained detailed and correct construction drawings and locations for every single Swiss fortification thanks to fabulous Humint.)

Spain and Portugal are fine examples for countries which could get along as neutral countries just fine. Sweden did well, too.


Besides; I was rather writing about deterrence and non-aggression policy than about neutrality. Defensive alliances that do not turn aggressive may be fine.

Repeat:

Deterrence was proved to be a failure?

I suspect our survival of the Cold War, the history of Switzerland and Sweden as well as a lot of other examples beg to differ.

Occasionally deterrence is not perfect, but it's the prime mechanism to preserve peace next to good relations and not proved to be a failure at all.

[ganulv]

Spain and Portugal are fine examples for countries which could get along as neutral countries just fine. Sweden did well, too.

Besides; I was rather writing about deterrence and non-aggression policy than about neutrality. Defensive alliances that do not turn aggressive may be fine.

Repeat:

Occasionally deterrence is not perfect, but it's the prime mechanism to preserve peace next to good relations and not proved to be a failure at all.

How would you assess Portugal’s colonial wars within your framework? Were they the result of policy failure—either via poor colonial administration or just by trying to maintain colonies in the first place—or were they the result of a failure in deterrence (my understanding being that during the initial period of the anti-colonial violence the fact that the Portuguese forces stationed in their colonies received second-rate kit was indicative of their relative importance in the scheme of things)? Or both or neither?

[Fuchs]

I was looking at Europe in regard to Portugal.
The nearest it came to real troubles post-Napoleon was when the Allies wanted the Azores as base for the 2nd Battle of the Atlantic.
In case of Portugal, a minimum amount of deterrence (merely enough military to be acknowledged as a sovereign nation) did work.

Colonialism in itself was always a failure that did not benefit more than a tiny share of the population. The only European overseas adventures that really paid off were discoveries (which brought the potato to the Old World, for example) and trade outposts.
Even the great Spanish booty of gold and silver in the 16th century did no more than to cause inflation and neglect of domestic economy for domestic needs.

[Stan]

Back to the year 2011...

But today (91 to present) Portuguese military as a deterrent ranks where ?

Could they even muster a viable threat to say keep the Spaniards at bay ?

They've either been supported by the British and Belgians, or, similar to today, lead by the Italians.

[ganulv]

I was looking at Europe in regard to Portugal.
The nearest it came to real troubles post-Napoleon was when the Allies wanted the Azores as base for the 2nd Battle of the Atlantic.
In case of Portugal, a minimum amount of deterrence (merely enough military to be acknowledged as a sovereign nation) did work.

I think a lot of the disagreement over the last couple of days on this thread might boil down to the fact that your framework assumes that a military’s job is defense of borders against incursion by neighboring national forces (correct me if I am wrong). This is just not and probably never will be the whole of the job description of the U.S. Military. Since WW2 ended it has been a purveyor of American hegemony (not saying that American hegemony is good or bad, just that that role seems uncontestable to me) and it plays a role in U.S. counterterrorism efforts.* I personally think the military should never be conceived of as the main institution for CT as in prevention—civilian intelligence agencies and the Coast Guard are the institutions I think of as the foilers of terrorist plots, and I for one do believe we should take seriously the notion that the State Department can play an important role in ameliorating conditions that foster terrorism (but do fully acknowledge that such an assertion is open to plenty of critiques)—but I don’t see why the U.S. would ever want to remove its military’s role in responding to acts of terrorism.

*I try to use a term other than ‘terrorism’ whenever possible for a variety of reasons, but here I mean it as shorthand for “non-state actor perpetrated paramilitary violence.” Or something like that…

[Fuchs]

Back to the year 2011...

But today (91 to present) Portuguese military as a deterrent ranks where ?

Could they even muster a viable threat to say keep the Spaniards at bay ?

They've either been supported by the British and Belgians, or, similar to today, lead by the Italians.

This has been off-topic for a while...


Today they have good relations with all potential threats, the international system adds deterrence (every aggressor would have a severe political loss) and its military is strong enough to signal sovereignty.

On top of that they're in NATO and EU, the two most powerful alliances in human history. What endangers them the most today is the excessive disrespect and aggressiveness of their allies, which can drag Portugal into conflicts just as excessive disrespect and aggressiveness of an ally dragged Germany into the First World War.


I suspect you have an exaggerated idea of deterrence.
Deterrence does not require to ensure defeat or destruction of an aggressor. It merely needs to turn an aggression into an undesirable scenario for the potential aggressor.

In some cases this means that the mere fact that an aggression wouldn't directly turn into an occupation (~Czechoslovakia), but instead lead to a messy resistance (official and covert, ~Finland and ~Iraq) would deter. You gotta get this into the potential aggressor's head, of course.
Stupid aggressors are stupid - some people only learn through pain.

[Stan]

I suspect you have an exaggerated idea of deterrence.
Deterrence does not require to ensure defeat or destruction of an aggressor. It merely needs to turn an aggression into an undesirable scenario for the potential aggressor.

Nope, not at all exaggerated. I simply used your version since it was you telling me the role of the military in a sovereign state.

In fact, I doubt that Portugal could do much if Spain decided to come across her border - similar in shear size to say Russia if they once again decided on invading Estonia.

This is just not and probably never will be the whole of the job description of the U.S. Military.

Don't go telling anyone that I actually agree 1,000% with Ganulv... But I do. We have never been content with sitting at home watching the Europeans get into wars and screwing things up

[Fuchs]

Nope, not at all exaggerated. I simply used your version since it was you telling me the role of the military in a sovereign state.

So what's the military's purpose in peacetime?
Support the policy in its quest for good outcomes by making war and sovereignty violations less likely. This can be pursued by putting a hefty risk premium on all foreign aggressions. This risk premium is the visible and widely known probability that an aggression would fail to overcome the resistance (at costs that appear to be acceptable to the aggressor's top decisionmakers).

I emphasised the possibly overlooked part now.

Deterrence works also if a potential aggressor estimates that he will succeed to disarm and occupy the country, but concludes that it's not worth it because it would be too costly.

[JMA]

I think a lot of the disagreement over the last couple of days on this thread might boil down to …

Well the introduction of the political factors has little to do with the topic of the thread.

One understands that Germany had a bad (understatement) experience and that shows up in the thinking introduced into this thread by Fuchs. I am not sure how prevalent this line of thinking is in Germany and how it may influence the selection and training of officers.

As opposed to the US and the UK there is probably no requirement for the German military to be ready for a war right now and thus there is most likely a lack of urgency in the military and (back to the thread) no requirement to select for an officer (and NCO) corps which is not only trained for but also psychologically ready for a war.

A person who sits in a base in Afghanistan in a passive, mainly static role is not a soldier but more a kind of militia. I can understand that given Germany's recent history they have probably selected out those who have aggressive soldier tendencies and retained and promoted passive individuals who will not upset the national psyche by producing a military which will bring back memories of the past. This is understandable.

It would be worthy of a separate study to see how the German military has been contained and restrained over the years to the point where perhaps they merely just go through the motions (of being a military) and effectively pack no punch. Quite sad but again, understandable.

[Fuchs]

No, the lack of balls is a political issue. It's not really an officer corps issue. The politicians moved some game chips to AFG, they are not really at war. Why should our soldiers risk much? There's nothing to be gained.


The intensity of the experience has rather led to the acknowledgement that you better avoid wars. Seeing how your "allies" planned to nuke our country (your part and the other part of it) in many major exercises was certainly influential, too. At one point in the 80's the German representatives did quit a NATO exercise and our soldiers did afaik quit it, too. The Americans were playing genocide against Germany in that NATO exercise.


Overall, there's little if anything to net gain in war, but much to lose.
To rest planning and concepts on recurring war means thus to plan for recurring catastrophic failure of your national security policy and that's strictly unacceptable.

If there's anything specific German in this, it's that we don't do small wars as much as great ones. With us, it's usually the big deal. We fought the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War, the army-annihilating wars of the Napoleonic Age, the army-annihilating wars of German unification wars and both world wars. During WW3 we would have become the 137k sq mile Chernobyl.
We don't pay attention to the marginal profits to be had from warfare such as oil contracts or junior officer experiences. War means to use mass destruction - even without so-called WMDs.
Being on the "winning" side doesn't improve it - we know both sides, and neither is a good idea.


Don't fight a war if it's not the least terrible alternative. Period.

To repeatedly manoeuvre your country into a position where organised mass killing and mass destruction is the least terrible alternative means that your manoeuvring would be terrible. In fact, doing so once already disqualifies the whole political establishment of the country.

[Stan]

Deterrence works also if a potential aggressor estimates that he will succeed to disarm and occupy the country, but concludes that it's not worth it because it would be too costly.

While I got your point the first time around, it seems the Russians don't always see things the way we want to rationalize

Well the introduction of the political factors has little to do with the topic of the thread.

I'd have to disagree with that having served in embassies in Africa and Europe and observed just who ends up at a working post and who ends up in say Frankfurt or Paris. Never used to have much to do with an officer's background nor education, but as of late the Ambassador can pick and choose not only his State staff, but deny potential "do gooders" which would infect his country team (disagree with the Amb's logic and lack of background at post).

It would be worthy of a separate study to see how the German military has been contained and restrained over the years to the point where perhaps they merely just go through the motions (of being a military) and effectively pack no punch. Quite sad but again, understandable.

According to our folks the German officers and NCOs are sick of their passive roles in Afghanistan. Their officer training rivals any of the West but yet are not employed to use it. The German police certainly are not restricted to daylight ops and ask first before you shoot only when accompanied by an American medivac helo. Going through Rein Main filled with H&Ks is impressive !

[JMA]

No, the lack of balls is a political issue. It's not really an officer corps issue. The politicians moved some game chips to AFG, they are not really at war. Why should our soldiers risk much? There's nothing to be gained.

Nobody can be sure whether the soldiers are using the political smokescreen to excuse their lack of determination in prosecuting the war in their little area of Afghanistan.

It is a low intensity war. The practical and combat experience to be gained would come cheap at the price for the German military... after all when last were German soldiers exposed to combat to any significant degree?

The intensity of the experience has rather led to the acknowledgement that you better avoid wars. Seeing how your "allies" planned to nuke our country (your part and the other part of it) in many major exercises was certainly influential, too. At one point in the 80's the German representatives did quit a NATO exercise and our soldiers did afaik quit it, too. The Americans were playing genocide against Germany in that NATO exercise.

Yes I understand the history is bad and had FDR and Truman had a better grasp of what lay ahead with the Soviets (as Churchill for example did) there would have been no Cold War, no NATO and no threat of the nuclear destruction of geographical Germany. That is history.

Overall, there's little if anything to net gain in war, but much to lose.
To rest planning and concepts on recurring war means thus to plan for recurring catastrophic failure of your national security policy and that's strictly unacceptable.

Let me answer that with a few quotes:

The military don't start wars. Politicians start wars. ~William Westmoreland

and

Anyone who has ever looked into the glazed eyes of a soldier dying on the battlefield will think hard before starting a war. ~Otto Von Bismark

If there's anything specific German in this, it's that we don't do small wars as much as great ones. With us, it's usually the big deal. We fought the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War, the army-annihilating wars of the Napoleonic Age, the army-annihilating wars of German unification wars and both world wars. During WW3 we would have become the 137k sq mile Chernobyl.
We don't pay attention to the marginal profits to be had from warfare such as oil contracts or junior officer experiences. War means to use mass destruction - even without so-called WMDs.
Being on the "winning" side doesn't improve it - we know both sides, and neither is a good idea.

Yes... but how does this impact upon Initial Officer Selection?

Don't fight a war if it's not the least terrible alternative. Period.

Yes I agree, as I believe do most soldiers who have been involved in a war. Now the question is how do you sell that to the politicians.

To repeatedly manoeuvre your country into a position where organised mass killing and mass destruction is the least terrible alternative means that your manoeuvring would be terrible. In fact, doing so once already disqualifies the whole political establishment of the country.

My point on this remains that the military must be prepared and ready to pick up the pieces when the politicians screw up. Of course if you have no effective military there will be no toys for the politicians to play with... not much of a deterrent though. Maybe thats the current German thinking?

[JMA]

I'd have to disagree with that having served in embassies in Africa and Europe and observed just who ends up at a working post and who ends up in say Frankfurt or Paris. Never used to have much to do with an officer's background nor education, but as of late the Ambassador can pick and choose not only his State staff, but deny potential "do gooders" which would infect his country team (disagree with the Amb's logic and lack of background at post).

You are correct in the context of your service but perhaps not in the context of Initial Officer Selection. I would dearly like to know what qualifications these Ambassadors have and on what basis they are appointed. Would love to hear more about the intrigue and doings and screwings in these Embassies

According to our folks the German officers and NCOs are sick of their passive roles in Afghanistan. Their officer training rivals any of the West but yet are not employed to use it. The German police certainly are not restricted to daylight ops and ask first before you shoot only when accompanied by an American medivac helo. Going through Rein Main filled with H&Ks is impressive !

They want to be careful. If they show interest in or enthusiasm for any form of 'closing with and killing the enemy' their careers may well come to a grinding halt.

Wasn't there a quote attributed to David Hackworth (or maybe Charlie Beckwith) about (how mad the US system had become) where an officer had been marked down for being too enthusiastic?

Edit: It was Hackworth and he quoted a report : “Lieutenant Col. Gibson has strong emotional feelings and frequently expressed his opinion that a soldier’s duty is to fight. This attitude limits his value to the service, his desire for self improvement, and adversely affects his subordinates.”

[Stan]

I would dearly like to know what qualifications these Ambassadors have and on what basis they are appointed.

PM sent

Be careful what you wish for !

[Fuchs]

Yes... but how does this impact upon Initial Officer Selection?

Select 'em for the "right" kind of war: Great Wars of necessity.


Part of great wars is the annihilation of entire battalions, if not divisions and armies. Crisis becomes the litmus test.
The ability of a young man to withstand crisis (extreme psychological pressure) can be tested and later improved (by getting him accustomed and more physically fit).

Send him in full firefighter equipment through a firefighter training house with lots of smoke and flames, a screaming and pushing Oberfeldwebel behind him if you like.
Visit him after work or school, put him through hours of stress and simulate a car accident if you like.

[JMA]

PM sent

Be careful what you wish for !

Now tell Fuchs its clowns like these who help start the wars soldiers die in.

[JMA]

Select 'em for the "right" kind of war: Great Wars of necessity.

Not going to happen. 39-45 (followed by Korea) did if for Europe and the yanks. The yanks took Europe through an impressive production run of planes/tanks/ships/war materials and soldiers. Think they can out-do China in this?

No the yanks will 'negotiate'. Hand Alaska back to the Russians and make a peace offering of Hawaii to China. There will be no great war.

Part of great wars is the annihilation of entire battalions, if not divisions and armies. Crisis becomes the litmus test.

Then what is the point of training if such losses are inevitable? Just push the cannon fodder forward... followed by the burial parties.

The ability of a young man to withstand crisis (extreme psychological pressure) can be tested and later improved (by getting him accustomed and more physically fit).

I merely suggest that a test of this should happen before he is selected for officer training with more of the same during the course. Don't wait until he is commissioned before you realise he can't take it.

Send him in full firefighter equipment through a firefighter training house with lots of smoke and flames, a screaming and pushing Oberfeldwebel behind him if you like.
Visit him after work or school, put him through hours of stress and simulate a car accident if you like.

Yes good stuff... and while you have Afghanistan on the boil send him in there to give a taste of the real thing, yes?

[JMA]

The Transformation of Selection Procedures - Hugh Murray outlines the development of the Brit Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) as we have come to know it.

A must read for those interested in this subject.

[JMA]

From Policies, Procedures, and People: The Initial Selection of U.S. Military Officers - Dr. Jane M. Arabian we learn:

Rather than identify and select individuals for attributes, skills, and abilities needed at advanced officer grades, the U.S. military practices an "up or out" philosophy wherein the training and selection of officers occurs throughout the course of a career.

and also from the summary:

Officer selection and commissioning in the U.S. is notable for the variety of programs, both within and between the Service branches. Although the initial selection process is central to the development of a volunteer, professional cadre of officers, the emphasis is more on "growing" military officers rather than on the initial selection process itself. Selection and training are continuous processes revolving around an "up or out" philosophy; in fact, the promotion system, beyond the scope of this paper, is an integral part of the system. As noted earlier, the U.S. approach to officer selection is to identify intelligent men and women of good character who can be trained to provide the leadership and management of the armed forces.

One wonders whether this is an accurate representation of the US system and if so is this really the most effective way to approach this matter?

[Ken White]

The approach is based on equal opportunity in all aspects -- anyone remotely qualified should get a chance to compete. There's more to it than that but it's complex and tedious and that egalitarian aspect is the principal driver.

A Commission in the US Armed Forces is certainly a chance to compete. I could make a strong case for the fact that our system is too competitive. That excess breeds cases where top flight individuals are sabotaged or subverted, usually covertly, by nominal peers as too threatening to their own advancement.

It is not ideal from a military stand point but it does mesh with the 'we're all in this together' mentality of most Americans and it is very much dictated by a vigilant (for a change...) Congress which resolutely and consistently insists on 'fairness' and 'objectivity.'

Yes, both chimerical but there you are...

The answer to your question is no, it is not the most effective way -- far from it. We know that and grouse about it from time to time. However, it is an acceptable way and it works particularly well (is ideal even) in the rushed raising of a mass Army ala 1861, 1917 and 1940 -- it is thus a hedge for an uncertain future that works quite well for really bad times and at other times adequately for most purposes if not really well for many.