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    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
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    Default A Thin Blue Line in the Sand

    Latest from the SWJ Blog - A Thin Blue Line in the Sand by Carter Malkasian.

    Iraqization is a dead-end strategy. But there is still some hope of saving the country, and it lies in an unlikely place: local Sunni militias and police.

    For more than two years, the heart of U.S. military strategy in Iraq has been “Iraqization,” the creation of an effective Iraqi security force that can take the place of U.S. Marines and soldiers. Thereby, the United States can eventually withdraw without leaving behind a terrorist safe haven and fractured Iraq. A wide range of military officers, policymakers, and scholars argue that through re-invigorated American efforts at training, equipping, and advising the Iraqi Army, any shortcomings in the Iraqi security forces can be overcome. Even Democrats who oppose the surge strategy support Iraqization, contending that Iraqi security forces are perfectly capable of suppressing violence now but that only when the United States “stands down” will they truly “stand up.”

    Between February 2004 and February 2005, and later from February to August 2006, I served as an advisor to the I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF) in Al Anbar province. During that time I interviewed members of the Iraqi Army and police, held discussions with American advisers, and directly observed Iraqi Army and police operations. Al Anbar is overwhelmingly Sunni and infamously a center of insurgent activity. Therefore, it is critical to the success of the Iraqization strategy. Failure there means a U.S. withdrawal would leave hard-core insurgent groups, specifically Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), free to operate and possibly organize terrorist operations outside the province. Even if it is successful everywhere else in Iraq, Iraqization will have failed if it cannot work in Al Anbar...

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    Default And if you see fit...

    Give it a bump and a vote at Real Clear Politics. Thanks - Dave

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    I have been saying this since I have been here. It is a shame this was not done sooner. I love the quote "Nothing strikes fear in an Insurgent like the sight of a Police Uniform."

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    Smile It is the one he does not see he truly fears

    I like your choice in police pics. Plain cloths cops for insurgents is even more unnerving.

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    MASON, thanks. On a more serious note what the article is proposing is nothing but my 4SW theory. The Secret Slapout Shanghai Strategy. Here it is in a nutshell. The way the Shanghai Municipal Police and the China Marines controlled the situation was by dividing and segregating the city by ethnic groups. They then instituted the SMP reserves (trained militia support to police) and one of the most extensive "population pass" id card systems I have ever seen. The Police and reserves were recruited from the" local ethnic "groups who had extensive local intelligence. All under the umbrella of the British led police commission. The Marines protected the International settlement and major American infrastructure and backed up the SMP if needed for major riots,etc. The famous Shanghai Riot Busters and the term "GANGBUSTER" comes from here also.

    COIN is simple all these super educated types try to make it complicated. It is nothing but hard ass grinding police work until you begin to stabilize things. Then the "local" leaders can begin to build the type of society that they want!! Which will not be what we want, but we will have truly gained a friend.

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    Quote Originally Posted by slapout9 View Post
    MASON, thanks. On a more serious note what the article is proposing is nothing but my 4SW theory. The Secret Slapout Shanghai Strategy. Here it is in a nutshell. The way the Shanghai Municipal Police and the China Marines controlled the situation was by dividing and segregating the city by ethnic groups. They then instituted the SMP reserves (trained militia support to police) and one of the most extensive "population pass" id card systems I have ever seen. The Police and reserves were recruited from the" local ethnic "groups who had extensive local intelligence. All under the umbrella of the British led police commission. The Marines protected the International settlement and major American infrastructure and backed up the SMP if needed for major riots,etc. The famous Shanghai Riot Busters and the term "GANGBUSTER" comes from here also.

    COIN is simple all these super educated types try to make it complicated. It is nothing but hard ass grinding police work until you begin to stabilize things. Then the "local" leaders can begin to build the type of society that they want!! Which will not be what we want, but we will have truly gained a friend.
    Good points, Slap. I'm working up a paper with a proposed unconventional warfare/COIN reaction force model, and its intent is to work in this way. IMO where COIN becomes "complicated" is when you start having turf wars over who does what (or who doesn't do what depending on the service/organization involved). Some of it may also stem from the US practice of approaching law enforcement and military affairs as two totally separate things (never the two shall meet and all that).
    "On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
    T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War

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