Training observations

[Ulenspiegel]

@JMA

If you check the official manuals for the years 1905-14 you find that the Boer war and the Russian/Japanese war had indeed an impact. However, only for aspects on side of the defender: Better field fortifications, hand granades, etc. ...

The crucial question, how could the attacking force overcome this improved defense was not answered, despite the fact that the war of 1904/5 already showed most of the problems the attacker faced when there were long fortified lines.

The impact of veterans depends on the relevance of their knowledge, if they provide the relevant stuff they are a kind of force multiplier, if their knowledge is not longer relevant they may even become a problem when being higher commanding officers.

Military history shows all facettes of this problem.

The BEF had 1914 IIRC a much higher percentage of officers and NCOs with combat experience compared to the French and German forces, did this translate into better performnace? To my best of knowledge the first attemps -after half a million KIA/WIA on each side - to develope small unit tactics that allowed attacking fortified enemies without crippling losses were made by French and German officers in 1915.

[davidbfpo]

The nearby University of Birmingham has a Centre for War Studies, until recently it was the Centre for First World War Studies, has at least one post-graduate student is working on the themes raised here.

Aimee Fox-Godden - Beneath the Learning Curve: Inter-theatre Knowledge Management in the British army, 1914-1918. From her official bio:

My research examines the British army’s use of knowledge as a force multiplier through the identification and examination of formal and informal processes for knowledge sharing between three operational theatres in the First World War: the Western Front, Gallipoli and Palestine. Underpinned by the concept of the ‘early information society’, the efficacy of these processes is examined through engagement with Knowledge Management theory, particularly the work of Ikujiro Nonaka, Gabriel Szulanski and Linda Argote, providing a framework within which the British army’s acquisition, exploitation and adaptation of knowledge can be measured and validated. Knowledge sharing will be considered with reference to key areas such as artillery, logistics and medical services, charting whether there is evidence of best practice from various theatres influencing their development.

Over the last twenty years, First World War scholarship has been driven by the broad concept of the ‘learning curve’ theory. Despite recent re-evaluations of other operational theatres and attempts to position them within the broader experience of the British army, the learning process still remains focused on the Western Front. Manpower and materiel constraints aside, there has been limited research into the relationships between theatres and even less about how knowledge and experience were exchanged between them. My research will address this gap by assessing how operational theatres shared best practice and, ultimately, whether they were successful in doing so. By considering these relationships, my research seeks to show how the British army developed a cross-theatre ‘learning network’ to increase its competitive advantage, thus enhancing its ability to cope with the changing nature of warfare.

Link:http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research...-students.aspx

[Fuchs]

The whole quote only shows the effect of the language barrier.
It's quite obvious in German literature how the Eastern Front experiences influenced the final offensives against Italy and France:

Bruchmller became famous after the breakthrough at Riga and his brand of breakthrough artillery support proved itself on the Eastern Front.

The Brussilov offensive initially featured several highly effective tactics, and delivered a demonstration of what was at the same time being developed in by the German army on the Western front in limited attacks.

The large-scale advances in the East reawakened the belief of the OHL in the possibility of manoeuvre past the breakthrough.

The success against Italy in the final offensive (half of Italian army was ruined) again confirmed and convinced; the breakthrough and exploitation happened in a high force density battle, more reminiscent of the Western front than almost anything in the East. Equipment and ammunition supply of the Italians were also more Western Front-like. Success was achieved with relatively modest advances, so the problem of supply past the railheads did not seem as importnat as it turned out to be in 1918.


The British forces' learning was particularly poor in regard to the defensive system, since they hadn't been on a large-scale defence since 1914 and the typical German limited attack provoked exactly the opposite defence as required to stop a large-scale offensive without excessive losses (the dilemma about how many forces shall be exposed in the forward defences to stiffen them).

[davidbfpo]

What I did find curious browsing in the RUSI Library, some years ago, was that for at least sixty years up to WW1 it was common to have official military observers missions on both sides, which published volumes of work. One wonders how those missions reported on the Boer War, but more particularly the significant "peer on peer" Russo-Japanese War - which I think signaled many lessons for WW1.

I must look at those volumes one day (if they are still there).

Just as we are being told of a 'foreign fighter' issue, in the limited context of terrorism, it is useful to recall that before 1914 for a hundred years Europeans had fought as private citizens, sometimes liberated countries - Italy, more especially in Latin America. My recollection is that some of this experience was fed back to their home national armies.

[Fuchs]

Just as we are being told of a 'foreign fighter' issue, in the limited context of terrorism, it is useful to recall that before 1914 for a hundred years Europeans had fought as private citizens,

This happened a lot in Finland 39/40 and in the Spanish Civil War as well. Later on, it was common in Bosnia and Chechnya is actually still in Europe, too.

[JMA]

David, she says:

... my research seeks to show how the British army developed a cross-theatre ‘learning network’ to increase its competitive advantage...

If you know her perhaps suggest that she investigates the 'drag' on adopting necessary changes. Little point in exchanging reams of reports and lessons learned if few read them and they never get actioned.

The nearby University of Birmingham has a Centre for War Studies, until recently it was the Centre for First World War Studies, has at least one post-graduate student is working on the themes raised here.

Aimee Fox-Godden - Beneath the Learning Curve: Inter-theatre Knowledge Management in the British army, 1914-1918. From her official bio:

Link:http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/research...-students.aspx

[JMA]

Yes in deed the Brits learned first hand many lessons from the Boer war.

Coming after the Sudan Campaign 1881-1899 a different enemy in different geography gave the Brits a wake up call.

I would suggest what is important is how the institution - in this case the British military - absorbs these lessons across the board. By who and why are changes resisted? To what extent and how rapidly are the lessons absorbed?

It would be interesting to know how many amendments have been brought into the basic training ciriculum for infantry soldiers (as one example) in the British and US basic training schools since Iraq and afganistan and are the instructors qualified - by experience - to conduct this new training?

So I suggest the 'relevance of veterans' depends on who they are. There are many who have value through their personal experience for as long as they serve... but are not able to transfer that knowledge and experience to those with little or no experience.

So once again it comes down to that select few capable of transfering the knowledge to others and converting it into policy and procedure.

I could go on...

@JMA

If you check the official manuals for the years 1905-14 you find that the Boer war and the Russian/Japanese war had indeed an impact. However, only for aspects on side of the defender: Better field fortifications, hand granades, etc. ...

The crucial question, how could the attacking force overcome this improved defense was not answered, despite the fact that the war of 1904/5 already showed most of the problems the attacker faced when there were long fortified lines.

The impact of veterans depends on the relevance of their knowledge, if they provide the relevant stuff they are a kind of force multiplier, if their knowledge is not longer relevant they may even become a problem when being higher commanding officers.

Military history shows all facettes of this problem.

The BEF had 1914 IIRC a much higher percentage of officers and NCOs with combat experience compared to the French and German forces, did this translate into better performnace? To my best of knowledge the first attemps -after half a million KIA/WIA on each side - to develope small unit tactics that allowed attacking fortified enemies without crippling losses were made by French and German officers in 1915.