Sisyphus and Counterinsurgency

[Cavguy]

CavGuy:

For the ME and South Asia where cities and capitals are a recent phenomenon, the certainty is far less if it exists at all -- though there is no question that AQ, The Talib, et.al. are smart enough to use that parameter as a psyops tool even if they know better. Rural populations worldwide don't think nearly as highly of cities as urban dwellers do, nor do they care much for or have much respect for urban dwellers. That is particularly true among mountain folks.

Pakistan is indeed an example of the principle -- it has suffered such bombings in the cities since 1947. It's still there...

Added note: % of Population urban; Iraq > 70; Afghanistan ~ 24 , Pakistan ~ 34%

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

I highly recommend John McCuen's take on this from his 1963 book, Art of Counterinsurgency War - he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

[Ken White]

Did in fact agree with him when I bought his book at the SF bookstore in 1966 -- until I tried apply that to Viet Nam and realized that a predominately rural nation with no particular concern for its cities doesn't react that way. Not at all. He is correct in this:

"...he talks in depth about "uncovering your base" while chasing enemy into his sanctuaries, thus allowing him to destabilize your base.

but that presumes there is such a base in the cities; in Afghanistan, unlike Iraq, there is none. Nor was there one in Viet Nam and only when we finally realized that and worked the rural areas did we start achieving any success in the COIN fight there.

He also said this in that book:
""To protect oneself against the methodical, crushing body blows of the revolutionaries and to be able to strike them in their most vital parts, it is necessary to fight them on their own battlefields-in their own media. It is necessary to parry the revolutionary weapons, adopt them, and then turn them against the revolutionaries."" (Emphasis added / kw).

I suggest that is more germane to Afghanistan and that what worked in Iraq will have limited -- not none, just limited -- applicability in Afghanistan.

No disagreement it's different, but the principle is the same - your urban centers, where the government is, have to be relatively stable. 100% security is never possible, but you have to avoid what is happening now, which is the growing roots of Taleban cells sprouting in Kabul and Kandahar.

They aren't sprouting in either city -- they never left. The Afghan intel and security guys can and will root 'em out (they're doing a pretty good job, BTW) but, unlike us, they aren't going to worry about the minor players, appearances, making a name for themselves or near term fixes; their concern is for long term stability and they'll get it in their own way. They will have to do it, we cannot (and should not even try, it'll merely set us up for failure) and they won't do it on our timetable -- nor should they.

Kabul and Kandahar have rarely been "relatively stable" over the centuries; the artificial domestic tranquility imposed by Saddam in Iraq or the Shah in Iran have never existed in Afghanistan and the cities have never had the pull they do in less harsh terrain. Add to that that mountain people would rather fight than eat and any attempt to concentrate effort on the cities in Afghanistan -- as was necessary in Iraq -- will create problems...

[Ron Humphrey]

First Ken, reference your wisdom about the importance of the larger urban cities as far as the outer regions. I accept that what you say is true because it makes sense from a less western perspective and given the population dispersal.

That said, if we go with that then more efforts should be made to help establish stability in outer regions and of course the enemy should be kept on the defensive. In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.

If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from. Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.

Long and short-
Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.

Thought's

[Ken White]

...In order to do this it would seem we would have to work towards greater development of infrastructure within those regions and thus hopefully bring them to at least more closely reflect the larger urban cities. Along with that comes the need for political and military ties between the parts in order to facilitate greater unity of effort and a stronger overall HN presence throughout the country.

Note I am not suggesting the cities be ignored, simply that they should not be a priority item. Cities in such nations are, at this stage, primarily a market location (thus the importance of roads -- to both the good and bad guys...), they do not serve as a base for much of anything.

If this all goes well wouldn't we still come back to the need for more stability in the largest centers since That is where the HN must project its power from...

True; not more stability, just stability. I question the statement "that's where the host nation must project its power from." I don't think that's necessarily correct -- or desirable.

Also considering that the more the coalition does the less the ANA is actually doing so that would seem somewhat counter-productive.

That does not track with what I'm hearing on one level yet I can acknowledge the logic -- and thus we need to be careful not to overdo our effort...

Would it not be more effective in the end to use coalition forces to assist in securing the urban areas and select outer areas from which the ANA with the capabilities assistance we can offer go out and take the fight to those who oppose them. In the end if AQ and others get to fight us then we easily become the problem if on the other hand we work to make sure they lose to Afghans then the picture might change all together.

(emphasis added / kw)

I thought that's what we were doing? Though I doubt the picture will change much...

[AmericanPride]

This raises a myriad of thoughts in my head regarding the relationship between COIN and demographic geography. Basically, what is the extent of the relationship between the security of the population and the dismantlement of the insurgency? There is some dissonance between the two because the logical extreme of asserting that the population itself is the decisive object suggests that we ought to build a McDonald's and Wal-Mart in every neighborhood and hope that somehow the provision of material needs will somehow deflate the political will of the insurgency. I'm not certain that bridge between population security and an insurgency is that steady to cross in full faith. I'm not a historical expert on COIN, so I must ask if there's any example of successful COIN that relied on or emphasized nation-building missions? The successful examples that come to mind immediately (Philliphines, Kenya, and South Africa) all include rough treatment of the locals, which seems to contradict the popular notion that the general population should be treated nicely. That seems to be the case, and please feel free to correct me if my observations are absurd, because those campaigns targeted the specific power structures of the insurgency rather than attempt to appeal to the broader base of the general population So, my thoughts:

The demographics of the insurgency itself -- not simply ideology, but also its ethic, religious, tribal/clan, racial, cultural make-up and what political, economic, and geographic features of the region augment its strength.

1. The combination of these features that shape the insurgent identity (or identities) more or less ensures that it does not represent the population-at-large. If it did, I would question why the insurgency exists in the first place if, in a democratic environment, the state represents the general will of the people (why aren't the insurgents themselves in power?). It suggests in my mind that the democratization of the indigenous state would be an ineffective, perhaps even counter-productive, process, if not irrelevant. To me, it seems not so much a question of human security but of power. The former originates from the latter in my opinion.

2. The insurgent demographics indicate the sources of the movement's strength. As Ken suggested, that strength may not be in locations we would initially assume. In what ways could an agrarian, radical religious, anti-modern insurgency (i.e. the Taliban) find sympathy among the demographics of a major urban center? If there's not much in the way of a power base in the cities, why devote extensive valuable resources to patrolling those cities? Which brings me to point three....

3. How does a military, other than by coercion, establish, generate, and project power? How does a military maneuver through the "demographic terrain" and place an insurgency in a position of most disadvantage? Should, for example, the military promote a favorable version of the indigenous religion in order to counteract the radicalism of the insurgency? Alternatively, should the military adopt a similar version to the insurgency's religion IOT to co-opt their beliefs (much like campaigning politicians do to draw support away from their opponent)? How do we go about shaping the demographic battlefield, if as it's commonly accepted, the people themselves are a part of the terrain, and how do we leverage demographics to our advantage?

[Cavguy]

Basically, what is the extent of the relationship between the security of the population and the dismantlement of the insurgency? There is some dissonance between the two because the logical extreme of asserting that the population itself is the decisive object suggests that we ought to build a McDonald's and Wal-Mart in every neighborhood and hope that somehow the provision of material needs will somehow deflate the political will of the insurgency.

Nice long post I will respond more later ... but I wanted to catch you on this point.

Building "things" for the population does not usually work. We have conflated economic projects and stability too often. Quite simply, there is not enough money in our treasury to make Afghanistan's infrastructure like ours - nor should it.

Re-read point #7 in the article - human infrastructure is key. Physical infrastructure matters so the government can provide basic needs for its people, but if the human ability is lacking, it really doesn't matter how many power lines you string or jobs you provide.

COIN, and "hearts and minds", is all about self-interest. Dr. Kilcullen would argue most people try and sit on the fence. Both sides work to push people off the fence. Therefore, your actions must focus on motivating the populace to get off the fence and take a clear side. This can be done through bribery, loyalty, coercion, patriotism, threats, and force. Winning "Hearts and Minds" doesn't mean they necessarily like you - just that you have made it in their interest to support your side. Their "mind" is the practical reason (money, job, etc), the "heart" is the emotional component (political, safety, religious, etc.) that goes with it.

[AmericanPride]

Nice long post I will respond to more later

I need to re-read Army effective writing. :P

I'll wait for your larger response before I release my next barrage of questions.

[reed11b]

Cavguy,
I think you are partially right, but the cities is where I disagree. I think Ken has it right on this account. The tribal make-up of the cities make them unlikely strongholds for the Taliban anyway and the majority of the ANA and ANP are going to focus on the two main cities. Yes provide them some support, but holing up in the cities in this case and bombing or sending out battalion plus size units to smash the rural tribal areas where the Taliban and AQ get most of there recruits will only provide more recruits. The concentration of force should be to isolate the region where the Taliban and AQ are stronger. From there practice COIN to reduce there support network, and be ready to use conventional tactics whenever they chose to consolidate there forces. Building an effective human infrastructure in the Afghan government is really a state department job, but if the DOD is the only one around to do it, that takes knowledge and skill sets, not manpower.
Reed