Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[Bob's World]

Like Japan in WW2? Osama Bin Laden puts lot of money and effort into staying alive. If an entire terrorist organisation wants to be suicide bombers, it is a very temporary threat. War is politics. Politics requires someone to be alive at the end.

Clausewitian Trinity? People, Leadership, and military? There's always something to squeeze.

CvC only has one oar in the water in today's environment. A good solid oar, but incomplete all the same; so don't pull on it too hard or you'll just go around and around.

So you squeeze Hezbollah good and hard by invading the sovereign country of Lebanon and waging war among their populace. Perhaps you have deterred Hezbollah, but who have you outraged and provoked in the process? Where did the air go when you squeezed that balloon?

When our media and government refuse to recognize Hezbollah as part of the Lebanese government we in effect grant them a sanctuary of status. In this category, where an organization chooses to play this game, I think a good first step is to officially recognize them as part of the state. Strike "LH" from our diplomatic lexicon and simply say "The Hezbollah party of Lebanon," or better yet "Lebanon." Then make it very clear to all that when Hezbollah acts so does the state of Lebanon. Take them out of their quasi-state status and place them into a full state status. Now our state tools work. If the government or populace thinks that is unfair, well then they need to police their own problem; and if they can't then it is proven true by their inability to do so.

This is just one category though, and again, all must be viewed holistically and relative provocation and deterrence effects must be wargamed across the spectrum when considering COAs.

[William F. Owen]

CvC only has one oar in the water in today's environment. A good solid oar, but incomplete all the same; so don't pull on it too hard or you'll just go around and around.

What oar is missing?

, I think a good first step is to officially recognize them as part of the state. Strike "LH" from our diplomatic lexicon and simply say "The Hezbollah party of Lebanon," or better yet "Lebanon." Then make it very clear to all that when Hezbollah acts so does the state of Lebanon.

That is exactly the mistake Olmert and Halutz made in 2006. Against the existing plan and advice, they went after "Lebanon" as well as "Hezbollah." Do not target the people you don't need to target.

Once the proper plan was "partly" enacted, Hezbollah began to suffer. They haven't fired a single rocket or conduct any actual military action since the ceasefire, in 2006.

[Bob's World]

The oar missing is the one that addresses the full spectrum of empowered actors on today's stage.

And as to Hezbollah not firing rockets, that kind of make the point I was making in regards to President Bush's metric about the US not being attacked.

A great indicator that your real goal is deterrence; but a very poor indicator that your opponent has been deterred.

[William F. Owen]

The oar missing is the one that addresses the full spectrum of empowered actors on today's stage.

Huh? What spectrum? He didn't mention drug gangs, or organised crime, but his observation are all still highly relevant. Pablo Escobar was defeated exactly in line with CvC observations.

And as to Hezbollah not firing rockets, that kind of make the point I was making in regards to President Bush's metric about the US not being attacked.

A great indicator that your real goal is deterrence; but a very poor indicator that your opponent has been deterred.

So let me get this right. You are suggesting that Deterrence is demonstrated by something other than action? Deterrence means "failure to ACT, through fear of harm." No action means deterrence is working. Deterrence by virtue of it's meaning relates to specific conditions within a specific time. Change any of the factors effecting the level of deterrence and it's effectiveness alters.

[Bob's World]

The base premise here is simply that:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

What one sees in the initial responses and comments above is a great example of the challenges to getting from where we are, and what we are doing currently, as we are all mired in what we have been taught and currently believe. We must step back, take a deep breath, and look at the entire problem set from a fresh perspective. Many changes may be subtle, some may be substantial.

But just as we changed the name of the War Department to the Department of Defense; there is very positive strategic communication in change the name of the Global War on Terrorism to a campaign of Deterrence of Irregular Threats.

CT leads to an Intel driven, reactive chasing of whoever they label as "threat" and conducting a very similar family of engagement against those threats regardless of their actual nature or purpose. Many argue that such an approach has eroded our national credibility globally, and though we have not been attacked, may in fact havecontributed to an even broader range of those who would do us harm today than we had in 2001.

Deterrence allows us to step back from waging war against the world, and chasing threats to an approach more focused on building a credible package of deterrence balanced across the full spectrum. I think it is a concept worth considering.

[William F. Owen]

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

[Bob's World]

Sorry Bob, but all this "Complexity" and "Empowered Actors" you are just ignoring 3,000 years of History. How is any of this different from the assassination of Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand, the "Gun Powder Plot" hatched in in 1605.

Look at Europe in the 14th Century. Greatly more dangerous and disordered than anything we can possibly imagine today. I just don't get all the confusion here. What is it you find so complicated?

Every generation talks about the challenges of raising teenagers....I get it. Some things don't change much.

However; anyone who thinks that the new tools of communication have not had a powerful effect on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have been applied to such timeless acts and motivations to act is whistling past the cemetary.

[Entropy]

The base premise here is simply that:

1. What we are really attempting to do through GWOT is deter irregular threats from attacking the US and US interests.

2. The US also has an enduring mission to deter "regular" threats from doing the same

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

4. What may be an act of war if done by one actor may be a criminal act if done by another (and requires a different response that is appropriate to the nature).

5. What may have been deterrent to one actor before, may be less effective now; what may be deterrent to one actor may be provocative to others. This creates a new complexity that must be taken into account to shape a new, holistic family of deterrence and response that is calculated and balanced across the full spectrum of actors and actions.

I don't have any real disagreements with that, but I don't see how you get from there to a policy holding governments accountable for peoples they have no control over - ie. HA and various tribes along the AF-PAK border.

I also "get" that new communication tools do have powerful effects though maybe not to the extent that you think they do. Technology certainly has made demagoguery easier than it's probably ever been and governments have pretty much lost the ability to significantly control negative information. That is a powerful combination.

BTW, I also like your slide.

Wilf,

On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

Someone upthread said that "terrorists" cannot be deterred because they are not afraid to die for their cause. In some cases that is true, but fear of failure is universal. For example, all the additional security measures protecting airplanes are deterring those who'd like to blow them up or fly them into buildings because their chances of success are greatly diminished.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf,

On deterrence correlation is not causation. Other factors may play a prominent or decisive role in "preventing" action. Gauging the reasons an enemy chooses a particular course of action is not always straightforward as it appears and the opportunity for assumption and mirrior-imaging are significant. In fact, failed deterrence is the result of failing to properly understand the motivations of an adversary.

Wallah! If my Aunt had wheels she would be truck.
Can you deter anything but an action? No you cannot.
Correctly applying the threat of harm to your opponent is required. Did I say anything different?

[slapout9]

3. In this post cold war, globalized world several categories of newly empowered politically oriented actors with global reach are on the stage creating a new complexity across this total spectrum of actors (that I attempt to lay out on the slide).

Couple of points.

1-I don't think it is more complex, there are just more of them, it's the quantity and massive geographic area to be covered that is daunting.

2-Personal motives vs. political motives. The Lone Revenge Bomber who is mad at the world and has no definable organization, but yet can affect large population targets is a big problem and this type of terrorist can not be deterred IMO.

[Bob's World]

Slap,

Agree completely that the far right end of the spectrum, the individual who is committed to some deadly course, cannot be deterred. I list him only because he is part of the fabric, and when he acts, it will be criminal in nature must be accounted for by those who will respond to that act. Part of effective, holistic deterrence is understanding what one can and cannot influence; and responding appropriately when sh#* happens.

I do think it is more complex though. More actors, more distinct statuses, all having to be considered collectively in a balanced program of deterrence is complex.

For example: If one deters Iran from siding with the Soviets by employing a British-built UW network to overthrow the democratically elected prime minister and replace him with a puppet Shah in, say, 1953; it would creates far different set of ramifications across this new spectrum of actors today than a much more limited spectrum then.

Images would be immediately blasted around the world; those Iranian citizens at the epicenter of events would text the word through out both the populace at home, and Shia everywhere. Most likely the Shah would have not lasted a week and the re-established Iranian government would have reached out to the Soviets to prevent this from happening again. Or an insurgency would have been born at home, but with a regional or global base of support; with attacks not just launched at the Shah but at the US and England to attempt to break our support for him. Hezbollah would weigh in on behalf of their Iranian ally and target the US and England and their allies as well; most likely attacking Israel. Bin Laden, who has no love for Shia, would recognize the Strat Com potential to engage all Muslims; and would turn this into a PR event to boost his own support by highlighting how by our actions the West validates his claims against us; using this to encourage and incite nationalist insurgent movements in Muslim states who have governments shaped by or overly influenced by the West....and so it spirals out.

I think this is complex. But that's just me.

In 1953 the Iranians complained, it was news for a while, and then the world got on with life, accepting the new construct. Then when some 25 years later the Iranians were finally able to break out from under this construct imposed upon them, we acted like we were the victims. The real fact is that the fabric was beginning to unravel and we did not recognize it as such, choosing to believe that old ways would continue to work in the face of change.

So, to deter the Iranians from such an action today would require a much more sophisticated approach, as it is not just the state actors one must consider, but a much more empowered and connected set of populace-based organizations as well.

[Entropy]

BW,

I think your position is becoming a bit clearer. Let me paraphrase and you tell me if I've understood you correctly:

1. US policy is too wrapped up in a cold-war style of deterrence that is overly focused on disproportional retaliation and is failing to consider other, more nuanced forms of deterrence.

2. Retaliation-based deterrence is unlikely to deter many of the non-state based threats we face today, therefore something new or reinvented is needed.

3. Deterrence can therefore be anything that constrains an unfavorable COA from our point of view. For example, improving governance is deterrence because it raises the relative costs of violent action and therefore makes peaceful political resolution more likely. Extending governance into areas with weak governance is deterrence for the same reasons - it serves to constrain our adversary.

So it seems to me the basic argument you're making is that deterrence is anything (accommodation, negotiation, coercion, threats, political/material support, etc.) we can do to limit or prevent an adversary from taking actions that we oppose.

[Dayuhan]

No action means deterrence is working.

Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary. Suppose (and I don't think it an unlikely supposition) that AQ's intention was to use the 9/11 attack to pull the US into an action in Afghanistan that could lead to a war of attrition. This would target the greatest military weakness of the US - lack of long-term political will - and create one of the few scenarios in which a military defeat for the US is a real possibility.

If this is the case, additional attacks on the US would be completely counterproductive: having initiated the war of attrition, AQ's task now is to wear down America's will to fight, and further direct attacks on the US would bolster and sustain that will.

[William F. Owen]

Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary.

Huh? Sorry do not understand. I said that deterrence is based on deterring action, not thought, intent or desire. If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, by any measure the deterrence has been successful. If you have another definition, I'm all ears.

[Dayuhan]

Huh? Sorry do not understand. I said that deterrence is based on deterring action, not thought, intent or desire. If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, by any measure the deterrence has been successful. If you have another definition, I'm all ears.

If you seek to deter an action and that action does not occur, that does not necessarily mean that the action didn't occur because of something you did to deter it. I would think that to declare a policy of deterrence "successful" there would be have to be some evidence to suggest that our actions deriving from the policy of deterrence were the cause of the inaction.

If there was an intention to carry out more attacks on the US, and those attacks were not carried out because our actions left the enemy unable to proceed with their intention, the policy of deterrence was successful. If there was no intention to carry out further attacks, the policy of deterrence was irrelevant. If a riot policeman holds up a shield when the people throwing rocks have already moved on to other targets, it's hard to declare that the shield was what protected the policeman.

The question is whether no further attacks were made because we prevented them, or because, having achieved the desired goal, the enemy had no further need or desire to attack. Of course we don't know which is the case, but there's enough uncertainty there that I wouldn't want to claim success for a policy of deterrence.

[Bob's World]

Not necessarily. For example, the absence of any AQ attacks on US soil since 9/11 does not necessarily mean that such attacks have been deterred. They may no longer be necessary. Suppose (and I don't think it an unlikely supposition) that AQ's intention was to use the 9/11 attack to pull the US into an action in Afghanistan that could lead to a war of attrition. This would target the greatest military weakness of the US - lack of long-term political will - and create one of the few scenarios in which a military defeat for the US is a real possibility.

If this is the case, additional attacks on the US would be completely counterproductive: having initiated the war of attrition, AQ's task now is to wear down America's will to fight, and further direct attacks on the US would bolster and sustain that will.

Too often we focus on the wrong indicators and draw the wrong conclusions. Usually because we look at them based upon an understanding built from our experience and colored by what we want to see.

Certainly in politics perspectives may sometimes be cast in a light most favorable to the politician and shaped to tell his constituency what they want to hear.

[Entropy]

Strike "LH" from our diplomatic lexicon and simply say "The Hezbollah party of Lebanon," or better yet "Lebanon." Then make it very clear to all that when Hezbollah acts so does the state of Lebanon. Take them out of their quasi-state status and place them into a full state status. Now our state tools work. If the government or populace thinks that is unfair, well then they need to police their own problem; and if they can't then it is proven true by their inability to do so.

Everyone knows the state of Lebanon cannot control HA or "police their own problem." They do not have that capability, so how can our "state tools" work in that case?

Should we use that logic for the AQAM sanctuary in Pakistan, despite the fact that we know Pakistan is incapable of controlling its territory?

[Bob's World]

Everyone knows the state of Lebanon cannot control HA or "police their own problem." They do not have that capability, so how can our "state tools" work in that case?

Should we use that logic for the AQAM sanctuary in Pakistan, despite the fact that we know Pakistan is incapable of controlling its territory?

The distinctions between these groups is critical. This is arguably the greatest failing of the GWOT approach is that it conflated threats by lumping them all under a terrorist banner by judging them by their tactics and their affiliations rather than by their true natures and individual goals.

AQ does not claim to be part of Pakistan; they just take advantange of the sanctuary of a poorly governed populace and a legal border.

We have trampled down the border to go after them, but what effect that on the populace? Any less poorly governed or likely to lend sanctuary? No, the opposite, in fact.

A "quasi-state" is not equal to a "non-state," is not equal to an "insurgency".

We talk about "separating the insurgent from the populace," yet we cannot even differentiate effectively between the various groups employing "terrorist" tactics.

If we are to deter, we must first understand and and respect the differences.


Oh, and if the master cannot control the servant, then who really is the master after all?? This actually supports my case. If lebanon cannot control LH, the LH is in fact Lebanon.

[George L. Singleton]

Various governments including Lebanon and now Syria don't have the means, sometimes the will, but definately lack the means, to overcome terrorists operating on and through their soil.

"Deterrance" is to me a useless term here. Suppression, permanently, via NATO forces replaced ASAP by native local troops we are supposed to be training up, for permanent maintenance of law and order, long term suppression by force of arms, concurrently by a jobs and construction program that generates economic benefits never before available to the locals.

[Bob's World]

What is a "terrorist organization?" This is an intentioally emotion-laced term that is used to cast a negative light, yet does nothing to truly identify the nature and purpose of one you impose it upon. Not unlike racial name calling, it is intended to dehumanize ones opponent and generate charged emotions.

Every current "terrorist" organizatoin currently on the Department of State roster would have to put in a hell of a lot of over time to match the body-count produced by the U.S. Airforce in what could arguably be called "terrorist" tactics as well. Purpose for action is critical, becasue if it is just action alone that condems one, then we are in big trouble. It is time to get a little more sophisticated and less biased in our thinking.

We have to get past name calling if we are going to move forward. Means and Will are two very different things as well.

If a state lack the means to control an informal organization, then it has become ineffective and illigitimate. It is no longer really "the state." If LH is the majority, then recognize them as such and hold them accountable.

If a state lacks the "will", then perhaps they simply have no real incentive to place your interests and desires above their own. By holding them accountable you may very well provide them with such will. I seriously doubt the government of Syria is unable to control the elements of Hezbollah within their borders; they just have no reason to.


The COA you propose is the COA that brought us here. Excessive exercise of US legitimacy over the govermments of the region in order to produce conditions favorable to the U.S.

We can still work to shape conditions favorable to the pursuit of US interests in the region, but we need to adopt new COAs that better recognize and respect the interests of others; and that does not co-opt the legitimacy of others in favor of that imposed by us.

Harder and Faster won't get us there. Smarter will.