Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[Dayuhan]

Fascinating! I'm waiting for Paul Wolfowitzless to resurface somewhere and testify there is no ethnic tension in Syria and everything will be O.K.. Then I know we'll have a very positive outcome for a limited expenditure of resources. Grab your guns and CERP boys, let's go! We'll go kill some terrorists, build some schools, turn the power back on and democracy and peaceful development will simply grow beneath our feet. We'll be home by Christmas. Think I heard this story before, but since it has been over a decade now (I know, hard to believe), and of course we don't have lessoned learned, only lessons observed.

Maybe Michael Ledeen can resurface with a group of Syrian exiles who will make everything alright if we just give them lots of money and put them in power. We'll call them, let's see... the Syrian National Congress?

[TheCurmudgeon]

So now things should move to the UN where the use of Chemical Weapons is generally considered the kind of thing you do at home behind closed doors but not outside where the kids can see.

Russia is at least willing to support inspectors. China not so much:

On Wednesday, the security council expressed "strong concern" and called for more "clarity" on the use of chemical weapons, but Russia and China insisted on the watering down of a tougher approach backed by the US, UK, France and 32 other governments that called on the UN investigative team already in Damascus to be allowed immediate access to the site of the attack, and to be granted greater latitude by the Syrian government to carry out their enquiries.

Red Lines, they are not just for America anymore ... ?

Meanwhile, the Israeli press is more skeptical.

Steve Johnson, a leading researcher on the effects of hazardous material exposure at England's Cranfield University who has worked with Britain's Ministry of Defense on chemical warfare issues, agrees that "from the details we have seen so far, a large number of casualties over a wide area would mean quite a pervasive dispersal. With that level of chemical agent, you would expect to see a lot of contamination on the casualties coming in ,and it would affect those treating them who are not properly protected. We are not seeing that here."

Additional questions also remain unanswered, especially regarding the timing of the attack, being that it occurred on the exact same day that a team of UN inspectors was in Damascus to investigate earlier claims of chemical weapons use. It is also unclear what tactical goal the Syrian army would have been trying to achieve, when over the last few weeks it has managed to push back the rebels who were encroaching on central areas of the capital. But if this was not a chemical weapons attack, what then caused the deaths of so many people without any external signs of trauma?

"One alternative is that a large concentration of riot control agents were used here, which could have caused suffocation of large numbers of people who were pressed together in a bunker or underground shelter," says Gwyn Winfield, a veteran researcher and editor of CBRNe World, a professional journal the effects of chemical, biological and nuclear warfare. While riot-control substances, mainly various types of tear gas, are usually deployed in small quantities using hand-grenades, they can be used in much larger quantities in artillery shells or even dropped in barrels from aircraft as the U.S. Army did in Vietnam, trying to flush the Vietcong out of its underground bunkers. In large concentrations, these substances can cause suffocation, especially in closed spaces where many of the Syrian families would have been hiding from the bombing.

Of course, now there are lots of casualties. None-the-less there seemed to be an interest on the part of the Israeli Defense Minister to not get involved. Not really sure that much more than prolonged discussion will occur.

[SWJ Blog]

Cordesman on Syria and U.S. Options

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[Bill Moore]

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2...ervention.html

U.S. general's letter says attack options should be limited due to Syria's 'deeply rooted' conflict

"It is a deeply rooted, long-term conflict among multiple factions, and violent struggles for power will continue after Assad's rule ends," Dempsey wrote of Syria's war. "We should evaluate the effectiveness of limited military options in this context."

"The use of U.S. military force can change the military balance," Dempsey added. "But it cannot resolve the underlying and historic ethnic, religious and tribal issues that are fueling this conflict."

[Dayuhan]

The whole "red line" concept seemed like a bad idea from the start, to me. The use or non-use of chemical weapons does not change the basic calculation of intervention. There are still no vital US interests at stake. There's still no local partner we'd be comfortable cooperating with. There's still no clear, achievable, and desirable goal that leaves us a solid exit strategy. The risk of getting sucked into another quagmire remains high... but we've declared a "red line". So, if this turns out to be what it's said to be (and it's certainly not clear yet) do we go and shoot ourselves in the putz because our "red line" was crossed? Or do we just shoot off a bunch of cruise missiles and say we did something?

Never saw the point in boxing yourself into a corner.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I heard one commentator mention that any time you use a "red line" threat you may sound like you are being tough but you are actually shifting control to the other party. Now he has control over your actions and you have been boxed into a corner. You must act or you appear weak.

[jcustis]

And I've heard a commentator make the statement that the administration focus on WMD use is fairly hollow when juxtaposed against then tens of thousand of people apparently killed by conventional munitions. Even with the current videos, how many hundreds more times have we seen where post-artillery or -airstrike footage has shown similar deaths?

Why does the killing of 1,000 weigh more heavily than the slower grind of 10,000 deaths at the hand of the Syrian government?

And yes, outside of the Syrian conflict spinning off a multitude of other destabilizing conditions for the region, US national interests are not as direct as other places. Choking, blister, and nerve agents = bad, but employing military grade munitions poses a set of employment challenges that I'm not quite sure your run-of-the mill terrorist could surmount. They'll likely look at other resources.

It's like our white knuckle reaction about proliferation of man-portable surface to air missiles. Iraq was awash in SA-7 thru -18 missiles when we invaded, and we weren't directed to focus on them any more than other munitions. Has a SAM taken down a airliner in the intervening 10 years?

Furthermore, any Poli Sci grad worth their salt could tell the President that hollow threats are no bueno. He needs to fire his advisors and bring in some folks with a traditional international relations background, who are going to follow the massive body of knowledge that tells us you should not make hollow threats.

I am at least glad that the administration is not inclined to dance to the beat of Senator McCain's war drum.

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

On the main thread for Syria I posted a link to an actual plan. Amidst that was the following passage, the plan was written before the latest report of CW use:

Prepare war crimes prosecutions now—Just as U.S. forces in Iraq circulated a deck of cards identifying top regime figures, the United States and its partners should develop a working list of Syrian key regime officials, with categories of ‘target’, ‘subject’ and ‘witness’ related to personal responsibility for the wilful destruction of civilians and the use of chemical weapons. Rather than presuming indictment, this exercise should be an inducement for departure and defection of the civilian and security circle around Assad. People who abandon the regime and help the opposition should do so in expectation of separating themselves from otherwise certain culpability for crimes against humanity. Indeed, this enforcement mechanism for violation of international norms, rather than military action, should have been the administration’s tool of choice in setting the Presidential 'red line' on chemical weapons use.

Link:http://nationalinterest.org/print/co...lan-syria-8924

That is the minimum that can be done now IMHO. I am not convinced the UN will take this course, so a coalition of the willing is needed and with as many regional contributors as possible. If the terms of reference are to prosecute all parties involved, just perhaps Iran would join - after all they suffered from Iraqi use of CW awhile ago.

[carl]

It's like our white knuckle reaction about proliferation of man-portable surface to air missiles. Iraq was awash in SA-7 thru -18 missiles when we invaded, and we weren't directed to focus on them any more than other munitions. Has a SAM taken down a airliner in the intervening 10 years?

I would be a little careful with statements like that. There are missiles and there are missiles and some are pretty bad, or pretty good depending upon your point of view. There are SA-24s about now and those are very lethal. If no airliner has been shot down in the last 10 years it is because nobody has wanted to shoot down an airliner, at least in countries awash with shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles.

[carl]

Anthony Cordesman makes the argument that there may be just as many disadvantages to doing nothing, as we are mostly doing now, as there are disadvantages to doing more, only nobody is talking much about the disadvantages of doing nothing. Among the disadvantages are, the dying of innocents goes on bigger, better and longer. If Bashir wins and regains the whole country, there may be an Iranian dominated arc running from the Iranian plateau to the Mediterranean Sea. That might not be good. The country may be split, with Bashir holding a part and the insurgents holding a part. As time goes on now, the wild eyed Islamist killers dominate the insurgent ranks more and more. That is not good. And finally the insurgents may win somehow. The might be worst of all, a Syria run by wild eyed takfiri killers. Then again if we were to try and do something, given the character of our leadership, it would be tentative and fearful, a "follow me boys, sort of, if things look good but only for a bit and we must be prepared to run away" type of thing. Not so good is that.

[jcustis]

It's thread drift, but that's part of my point; no one really wants to. I'm sure there have been plenty of attempts and grand designs on the part of terrorists, but deploying/employing a MANPAD is not a lowest common denominator task.

Downing an airliner might be a horrific, most dangerous event, but it's not the most likely. That's why the obsession with countering a SAM seems misplaced. Perhaps it is just media hype.

I can't imagine anyone has studied it, but I wouldn't be surprised if a SA- variant (no matter the capability of the seaker head) couldn't damage a modern twin-engine jet enough to "bring it down". Single-engine fighters are a different proposition.

[jcustis]

Cordesman's analysis that if Assad remains in power, he will be worse of a boogeyman for Israel, is odd.

There isn't a lot in the historical record to support that, so it makes me wonder if he overstates the influence of that other regional boogeyman, Iran.

Anyone know Cordesman's position on countering or containing Iran? There may be a link.

[carl]

An A-300 was hit in 2003 by one or two of the much less capable missiles. It was God's own miracle that airplane made it onto the ground. The crew controlled it strictly with engine thrust. You have no idea how hard that is. Those guys are gods.

Two Viscounts were shot down in what was then Rhodesia by SA-7s. A TU-154 was shot down in 1993. And on and on.

http://bigstory.ap.org/article/news-...t-down-manpads

There is plenty of empirical evidence that shoulder fired anti-aircraft missiles can kill large civil aircraft.

Those things, even the relatively primitive ones like the SA-7 and SA-7B are deadly to civil aircraft that have no defensive systems. Why the insurgents didn't kill a Gryphon flight or two I don't know, maybe they got a cut of the revenue. But they could have any time they wanted to.

[carl]

Cordesman's analysis that if Assad remains in power, he will be worse of a boogeyman for Israel, is odd.

Not so odd maybe. If Bashir survives to a large extent it will be because Iran and Hez saved him. If he wants to keep that help coming, he may have to give something back when the time comes.

[Madhu]

http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2...ervention.html

U.S. general's letter says attack options should be limited due to Syria's 'deeply rooted' conflict

He's got it right on the deeply rooted nature of the conflict and the three dimensional chess game of competing interests, all of which would like to use our military and our money to accomplish their goals.

What's this?

http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Pen...options-324097

PS: GEN Mattis in his Aspen talk mentioned that he'd never seen refugees as traumatized as the Syrian refugees. This three dimensional chess game between competing Mid East interests doesn't care at all about the Syrian people, not the innocents suffering. And so many that say they are concerned turn their attention first to military matters over increasing humanitarian support to the refugees and those caring for them. Humanitarianism is now equated with no-fly zones as a first impulse. I get the impulse, can't deliver goods to war torn areas but there are refugees we CAN get at, so why isn't the main humanitarian impulse there?

[carl]

Mindful of Carl's gripe elsewhere this article is valuable, it actually provides a plan for the USA with the 'wicked problem' of Syria:http://nationalinterest.org/print/co...lan-syria-8924

David:

I read it and it seems a very good plan with some very imaginative ideas. There are a couple of glaring weaknesses though.

The first is it talks of aiding the opposition. I don't think aiding an amorphous 'opposition' is going to cut it. We would have to pick a side and back it, really back it and drive it and influence it. And if they didn't meet the standard, change it or pick another side. That is a hard thing that will take a determined heart.

Second, the takfiri killers will be an enemy at the end as much as Bashir is. If they were to win it would be quite bad, quite bad. Any kind of plan should acknowledge this. Those guys are not going to go away without a fight.

Third, the plan should come out and say, straight, that Bashir will die. No life for you. You could tie that in with some of the other aspects of the plan as written. Something along the lines of 'Bashir is dead and you don't want to be close when he goes. Nice is nice this time of year.' Following from that direct efforts to kill the man himself if the opportunity presents itself should be part of the plan.

To me, the plan is good but it is still a bit tentative if it doesn't recognize the above three things.

One thing that we need to keep in mind about the general situation is the Iranians and the takfiri killers are trying like hell to get things to go in a certain way. We would not like at all that way. It would be very unpleasant for us. Those two groups don't have much in the way of material resources but they have very determined and hard hearts and they will not be dissuaded by words or good intentions.

[jcustis]

I knew of the Viscounts, but neither they or the TU-154 are modern designs though.

I get where you are coming from, but still believe the fear of a SAM is somewhat misplaced.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Anthony Cordesman makes the argument that there may be just as many disadvantages to doing nothing, as we are mostly doing now, as there are disadvantages to doing more, only nobody is talking much about the disadvantages of doing nothing. Among the disadvantages are, the dying of innocents goes on bigger, better and longer. If Bashir wins and regains the whole country, there may be an Iranian dominated arc running from the Iranian plateau to the Mediterranean Sea. That might not be good. The country may be split, with Bashir holding a part and the insurgents holding a part. As time goes on now, the wild eyed Islamist killers dominate the insurgent ranks more and more. That is not good. And finally the insurgents may win somehow. The might be worst of all, a Syria run by wild eyed takfiri killers. Then again if we were to try and do something, given the character of our leadership, it would be tentative and fearful, a "follow me boys, sort of, if things look good but only for a bit and we must be prepared to run away" type of thing. Not so good is that.

There are other disadvantages, but they are rarely considered. The long term implications of sectarian violence is that it can be used to justify retribution at a later date anywhere in the world. Using the popular argument that the purpose of war is to make a better peace, sometimes you have to actually engage in war if you want that better peace.

Not that I am interested in jumping in, but I think we have a tendency to only look at the short term when - a trait of the corporate culture that only looks at profits to be gained in the next quarter (or next election) to make decisions.

[carl]

I knew of the Viscounts, but neither they or the TU-154 are modern designs though.

I get where you are coming from, but still believe the fear of a SAM is somewhat misplaced.

Modern designs are built lighter in general than old planes. They didn't know as much about strength of materials in the old days so they tended to over build, the DC-3 being a case in point. And Russian airplanes, well, they're Russian, like the IL-76 that was downed in Mogadishu in 2003. For civil aircraft, fear of shoulder fired SAMs is not misplaced. Civil airplanes just are not built to withstand the effects of a pound or so of explosives blowing up here or there. It a roll of the dice whether the aircraft lives or dies. They are a very big deal to civil airplanes.

[jmm99]

Jack has spawned two decent pieces on the legal issues regarding US intervention in Syria (air strikes & cruise missiles seem the latest leaked plan), How Administration Lawyers Are Probably Thinking About the Constitutionality of the Syria Intervention (And A Note on the Domestic Political Dangers of Intervention) (by Jack Goldsmith, August 24, 2013); and The Kosovo Precedent for Syria Isn’t Much of a Precedent (by Jack Goldsmith, August 24, 2013).

IMO: One can construct a legal argument for intervention proving that it's justifed under the Constitution, domestic law and international law - as well as tossing in morals, ethics, "just war theory", and the family cat and dog. One can also construct a legal argument against intervention using the same subheadings.

Thus, as Jack said in the first piece,

Will any of these legal issues matter to the decision to intervene in Syria? Probably not at first ...

Since legalities are not of great materiality (at least ab initio), Jack sees a more important set of questions (and I concur):

The much harder question is the other prong: What is the important national interest in intervening in Syria? No U.S. persons or property are at stake. That fact alone distinguishes most executive branch precedents.

In the Libya opinion, OLC argued that the “credibility and effectiveness” of a Security Council Resolution gives rise to an important national security interest. This is a stretch considered by itself – but in any event, there is no Security Council resolution for Syria.

Nor can OLC even invoke the “credibility and effectiveness” of a regional organization in which the USG participates (such as NATO, in Kosovo) as giving rise to an important interest that would justify the President’s use of military force.

That leaves the weakest of all interests: preservation of “regional stability” and maintenance of “peace and stability.” These interests will of course always be present when the President is considering intervention, and thus by themselves are no limit on presidential power at all.

Such interests were invoked in Libya and in earlier OLC opinions, but they were always invoked in connection with other factors (such as the consent of the nation in question) or other interests (such as the protection of U.S. persons or property, or the preservation of the U.N. Charter or a regional security treaty commitment), and never as sufficient by themselves.

To the all-important national interest question set, Amb. Bloomfield argues:

For the United States, Syria has long held strategic importance. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, President Nixon escalated the nuclear-alert level to DEFCON 3 to deter Moscow from sending Soviet troops to bolster Syrian forces fighting against Israel; Moscow was deterred. During President Reagan's intervention of U.S. Marines along with French, Italian and British forces seeking to stabilize Beirut after Israel's 1982 incursion against the PLO, Syria served as a staging ground for young Iranian fighters sent into Lebanon's Bekaa Valley to arm and train Shiite Lebanese members of the new militant Hezbollah organization, which then launched catastrophic truck-bombing attacks on U.S. diplomats and Marines in Lebanon. Kissinger's famous dictum, "No war without Egypt, no peace without Syria," is surely no less true now that Syria is engulfed in sectarian conflict.

These examples are weak tea - or somewhat nutty in the present context. Do we really want to threaten Putin with nuclear war - over Syria ?

What did Reagan do after the barracks bombing ? He concluded that Middle East politics were a nuthouse and drew back from direct overt involvement.

Finally, if Kissenger's dictum (famous or infamous) has any validity, the US will have to go to war without Egypt because right now that country has enough problems to deal with.

What Bloomfield's arguments boil down to are two points of preservation of “regional stability” and maintenance of “peace and stability”, as exemplified by his initial paragraphs:

In recent years Pentagon contingency planners have imported, from social science, the concept of the “wicked” problem—that theoretical future security crisis that defies solution. Today that future security crisis is here, and its name is Syria. How important is the eventual denouement of this catastrophic civil war? Apparently, important enough to draw major security responses from Iran, Saudi Arabia, Russia and Qatar, Shiite Hezbollah fighters from Lebanon and Sunni militant Islamists from across the Arab world.

Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan face major humanitarian relief burdens for displaced Syrian civilians, fleeing at a rate of more than five thousand per day. Iraq’s tenuous internal cohesion is being stressed by the sectarian breakup next door. France and Britain are exerting what leverage they can in domains they once controlled. Israel—after decades of fending off conventional and nuclear dangers from the regimes of Hafez al Assad and his son Bashar—now must contemplate a future northern neighbor in which Hezbollah may be further strengthened, a vengeful Sunni Muslim Brotherhood could vie for power long denied by the Alawite regime, and even jihadist Jabhat Al Nusra fighters from across the Arab world will seek a new operational base.

This argument does prove that a dozen or so countries (and any number of "groups") have expressed interest in this problem - whether "wicked" or not - by intervening directly or indirectly. So, let them solve the problem - or not solve the problem. It seems entirely plausible to me that most of Syria will end up as a parking lot. If so, I can live with that on my conscience.

Regards

Mike