Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006

[SWJED]

Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006 - LTC Gian Gentile, International Herald Tribune.

During the year I commanded a combat battalion in West Baghdad in 2006, some of the soldiers in our outfit were wounded and some were killed, but we did not fail. In my opinion we succeeded.

We cleaned up garbage, started to establish neighborhood security forces, rebuilt schools and killed or captured hostile insurgents, both Shiite and Sunni. Our fundamental mission was to protect the people. Other combat outfits we served alongside did the same.

In this sense there is little difference between what American combat soldiers did in 2006 and what they are now doing as part of the "surge." The only significant change is that, as part of the surge strategy, nearly 100,000 Sunnis, many of them former insurgents, were induced to stop attacking Americans and were put on the U.S. government payroll as allies against Al Qaeda...

[SteveMetz]

Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006 - LTC Gian Gentile, International Herald Tribune.

My sense is that the position that U.S. troops are now doing something different than before is a minority one. What I hear is that most people who know anything about Iraq recognize that by 2005 at the latest, our units were doing the right things. There just wasn't enough of them.

[PhilR]

I think that like anything, the realationship of causes and effects in Iraq will be debated for a long time. I agree that there was no wholescale change in tactics, except possibly in certain local areas. The "surge" enabled us to more effectively execute those tactics in critical areas. Also, I think that beyond the simple increase of troop numbers, the surge represented a political statement of will to continue the fight in Iraq at a time when we were signalling transition and withdrawal.
Contrary to many accounts, the Sunni awakening and the emergence of CLCs ("concerned Local Citizens") was not merely a case of us buying off Iraqi tribes. If it were just a matter of money, we could simply keep paying for a long time. The cost-benefit case could be easily made between paying them and maintaining troops here. There were multiple reasons for this phenomenon, among them: extremists overplaying their hands, the relentless pressure of Coalition and Iraqi military operations (current efforts build off of previous efforts), and the signal from the surge that we were not leaving anytime soon (commitment to stay in Iraq).
Obviously, the history of the war is yet to be written. While we see the obvious temporal relationship between the surge and the improved security and can draw some initial conclusions, it will be awhile before we can have a deeper understanding of the cause and effect relationships at play over the course of this war. In the meantime, I agree with LtCol Gentile that any disparagement of previous efforts (as opposed to serious lessons learned efforts--which become progressively more difficult when you move from tactical to operational to strategic levels) does nothing to advance our effectiveness or capabilities.

[Schmedlap]

The author wrote:

“Senator John McCain, now running for president, wrote in a recent opinion article that, prior to the surge, American strategy at the highest levels in Iraq was ‘mismanaged.’”

That quote is absolutely correct. LTC Gentile’s battalion command position did not represent “the highest levels in Iraq” and this should be fairly obvious. At the highest levels in Iraq, the trend was FOB consolidation. He also quoted a “neoconservative” writer who criticized this FOB consolidation. He makes a legitimate critique of that comment by pointing out that his battalion was not in FOB consolidation mode. But what the dastardly neo-con wrote was largely true for the country as a whole. That changed in 2007.

The author goes on to write:

“The main difference was a decision by senior American leaders in 2007 to pay large amounts of money to Sunni insurgents to stop attacking Americans and join the fight against Al Qaeda. Coupled with this was the decision by the Shiite militia leader, Moktada al-Sadr, to refrain from attacking coalition forces.

The dramatic drop in violence, especially toward Americans, that occurred in Baghdad from June to July 2007 can mainly be explained by these new conditions.”

That is an oversimplification that ignores the conditions that brought about the change in behavior by Sadr. It is one thing to omit mention of those conditions for the sake of OPSEC, but quite another to assume that they never happened and then draw an incorrect conclusion. Sadr did not decide, in a vacuum, to play nice with America. There was also a basic psychological appeal of increasing troop strength and renewing our commitment to remaining in Iraq that helped to sway some Sunni tribal Sheiks to play ball. They needed reassurance that we were going to stay there if they were to side with us against al-Qaeda. It was not as simple as throwing cash around.

I agree with the following point and I cannot figure out why he downplayed it:

“Granted, before the surge there were about 30,000 fewer U.S. troops and fewer American combat outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods. But the overall methods that the U.S. Army employed at the small-unit level where I operated were no different from the so-called new counterinsurgency methods used today.”

Absolutely correct. The key phrase is “at the small-unit level”. Many, if not most, units in Iraq had figured things out for the most part by 2006 and were doing the right things, but at the small unit level. I see no evidence that this was often occurring at, say, Brigade or above. Most certainly, it was not sufficiently understood at the MNC-I level. The trend was FOB consolidation. That was exactly counter to the efforts being made by those at the small unit level who had figured it out.

I agree with the general theme that Iraq has not been turned around by some enlightened Soldier-scholar with a PhD rolling in to town and using intellect instead of firepower. That was an image that appealed to the media and academia and was politically expedient. However, Gen Petraeus made a big difference by simply reversing the FOB consolidation trend. Units pushed deeper into the population in order to secure the population, rather than withdrawing to FOBs and securing their own perimeters (and I understand that LTC Gentile's battalion was not part of this withdrawal). This was made possible partly by the addition of troops, as the author points out, but there was also a fundamental shift in guidance to stop consolidating and get out into the population.

LTC Gentile may not have felt the frustration of FOB consolidation in 2006 - perhaps his AOR was not near the front of the queue for consolidation. My unit was. Even in 2005, there was a push for us to be withdrawn into a FOB, despite our protests that our AOR would go into the crapper overnight. We were able to delay this movement for the duration of our deployment, but we had to constantly be ready to move on a moment's notice, in the event that the powers that be made the subjective decision that it was time to go. The compromise struck between those who were implementing the nonsensical plan and those of us in the city who said that the plan was stupid was that, in 2006, we were not replaced by US forces. From our standpoint, this was a crappy compromise, but not one that we had much say in. We were replaced by an Iraqi force that we had only been training for a few months. It was a plan destined to fail, but that was the theme back then. Even if the plan was doomed to fail, it did not matter, because it was the plan and the plan had to be executed.

Thankfully, in spite of a lot of bad decisions at very high levels that set the conditions for failure, the author is correct when writes that our troops did not fail in 2006.

[Peter Mansoor]

The troops did not fail in 2006, but the strategy did. Gian Gentile is wrong when he writes about 2006, "Our fundamental mission was to protect the people." In fact, the fundamental mission in 2006 was to transition the mission to Iraqi forces. And there were not just "fewer Combat Outposts" in Iraqi neighborhoods in 2006; in fact, there were almost none.

Gentile's troops were forced to try to protect the Iraqi people by commuting from Camp Victory and other large bases on the periphery of the city. I contend that this is the reason why the local Iraqis did not side with his battalion, or others in the city, and why were willing to side with U.S. forces in the same neighborhoods a year later. The fact is that a year after his battalion left, our troops were living among the local inhabitants, not driving by on periodic patrols. Gian Gentile and his troops may have tried to do the right things, but they could not replicate the successes of 2007 because they did not live in the neighborhoods they professed to protect. Those successes required more than a surge in forces; they required a change in our doctrine and strategy.

[Gian P Gentile]

The troops did not fail in 2006, but the strategy did. Gian Gentile is wrong when he writes about 2006, "Our fundamental mission was to protect the people." In fact, the fundamental mission in 2006 was to transition the mission to Iraqi forces. And there were not just "fewer Combat Outposts" in Iraqi neighborhoods in 2006; in fact, there were almost none.

Gentile's troops were forced to try to protect the Iraqi people by commuting from Camp Victory and other large bases on the periphery of the city. I contend that this is the reason why the local Iraqis did not side with his battalion, or others in the city, and why were willing to side with U.S. forces in the same neighborhoods a year later. The fact is that a year after his battalion left, our troops were living among the local inhabitants, not driving by on periodic patrols. Gian Gentile and his troops may have tried to do the right things, but they could not replicate the successes of 2007 because they did not live in the neighborhoods they professed to protect. Those successes required more than a surge in forces; they required a change in our doctrine and strategy.

My mission was to protect the people; period!! General Casey told my Brigade commander Colonel Mike Beech shortly after the Samara shrine bombng when he gave him a combat battalion coming up from Kuwait to use it to stop the violence and protect the people. If i was not committed to protecting the people then why did my stomach get tied up in knots when dead bodies showed up on the streets?

You overstate the idea of a new doctrine being applied during the Surge. The American Army by and large has largely in Iraq been conducting correct counterinsurgency doctrine and practice since the middle of 2004. Are you to say that your Brigade that was in Sadr City in 2004 was all goofed up? General Chiarelli certainly didnt think so in the essay that he wrote in Mil Review in 2005 upon returning from Iraq.

You also overstate by using hyperbolic words like "commuting" and conducting "periodic patrols." What are you implying with those terms, especially the latter? My squadron conducted over 3000 combat patrols and operations during 2006 and contrary to the myth created by the neo con spin machine we didnt just drive by and look; we got out, walked, talked, fought, worked hard to protect the people. So too did the other outfits that i served along side.

You also overstate the notion of "living in the neighborhoods." The narrative that has emerged from Iraq is that American soldiers are living Galula-like in almost EVERY Iraqi neighborhood and there presence has been decisive in separating the enemy from the people. Briefs really well and Galula smiles in his grave but i have looked at briefing maps and the number of cops emplaced betray the ideal of "living with the people." Not to get into specifics but I saw the number of cops in my old ao and i know the terrain the size of the population, they were not the primary mechanism as you suggest that lowered the violence. Have they really "sided" with us? Or, are they siding with their own side and using us and our money to prepare for a bigger fight down the road that they know is coming?

So consider this counterfactual, if we had not bought off our former enemies to stop attacking us and become our allies against alqueda and if Sadr had not made his related decision to stand down attacks, would your Surge and your purported new doctrine and tactics produced the dramatic downturn in violence that occurred in the Summer of 2007 by itself?