Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[TheCurmudgeon]

I don't think any of the three feel they are in a corner. The almost universal consensus is that Asad is going down.

Perhaps among the Western powers. I don't think that is as inevitable as they would like to believe.

Sure, policymakers wish it would happen faster, worry about spillover and blowback (arms, radical jihadists), and worry about CW stockpiles. Generally, however, I think the view is that this will prove to be a gain in the end, and produce a Syria that will (eventually) be more friendly to the West and more responsive to its population than the Ba'thist dictatorship was.

I am not so confident that the result will be a better Syria, or even a better Middle East. Anyone interested in getting involved here is doing it based on their own interests not those of the Syrians (us included). Assad may have been a dictator but he kept a lid on things. I am not positive that letting those existing hatreds fed by outside interests is a better path.

[Dayuhan]

Perhaps among the Western powers. I don't think that is as inevitable as they would like to believe.

Possibly not, but I don't see that as a reason to try to stop him from falling. He'd be a first-class liability to anyone who intervened on his side, IMO.

I am not so confident that the result will be a better Syria, or even a better Middle East.

I'm also not that confident of those things... but again, it's happening and we're not going to un-happen it. Most likely Syria and the Middle East will be neither better nor worse, just different, with different opportunities and threats. What the parties involved do with and about those threats and opportunities will define whether things go better or worse.

Anyone interested in getting involved here is doing it based on their own interests not those of the Syrians (us included).

This of course is true, but it might be added that those who are not interested in getting involved are also acting according to their own perceived interests. There seems to be a pretty general disinterest in getting involved in any way beyond peripheral engagement with minimal commitment, suggesting that most parties do not see commitment as compatible with their interests.

Of course there are risks involved in letting things play out and dealing with whatever emerges, but there is no risk-free course of action, and I can see why decision makers would think that course of action presents less risk than any commitment to trying to direct the outcome.

Assad may have been a dictator but he kept a lid on things. I am not positive that letting those existing hatreds fed by outside interests is a better path.

A better path than what? Assad is clearly no longer able to keep a lid on things, and I see no point in trying to restore his ability to keep a lid on things... even in the unlikely event that we could do that, why would we want to? Not like he was ever any friend of ours.

It's not always up to us to dictate outcomes, and trying to dictate outcomes can get us into an epic load of mess.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Rex

It is a lot more than a few, covert deals aren't really possible, and the concern is genuine (even if one feels it is misplaced). I don't think massive ground intervention is a terribly likely outcome, however.

Covert deals in that part of the world are always possible, but of course not guarunteed. A lot of things are genuine concerns, and chemical weapons is one of them, but it must be viewed in the overall context of the situation to evaluate if it is worth the potentially much larger political risk to our interests if we put a large U.S. or coalition presence on the ground. We can't afford to get tunnel vision and simply see the chemical weapon warning light.

Most importantly it doesn't take thousands of troops to secure facilities unless you're defending them against large conventional forces. I think the assumption is enough troops to secure the site(s) long enough to neutralize, not park thousand of troops in country indefinitely.

We consistently fail when we attempt to prevent a group from getting weapons whether small arms, IEDs, and WMD (except for a successful operation that stopped the Nazi's from getting the bomb). It is almost equivalent to stopping the flow of illegal drugs. While oversimplifying for purpose of making a point, guns don't kill people, people kill people. The same line of reasoning applies to IEDs, WMD, etc. We can't simply focus on the weapon, we need a strategy for mitigating the threat (the people that will use it), which get backs to my larger point we have to appreciate/understand the larger context or we may make the threat worse.

[Dayuhan]

I don't envy any American politician who decides he needs to sell a military intervention to neutralize Syrian WMD to the American public. The old adage about boys crying "wolf" does come to mind...

[TheCurmudgeon]

No one sold intervention in Libya. The American public doesn't care as much as you think.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Of course there are risks involved in letting things play out and dealing with whatever emerges, but there is no risk-free course of action, and I can see why decision makers would think that course of action presents less risk than any commitment to trying to direct the outcome.

Any action (or inaction) we take present risks AND by its very nature, constitute an attempt to direct an outcome (or at least prevent other outcomes). The question is more how much are we willing to risk for which desired outcome.

A better path than what?

A regional war that we would get sucked into.

Assad is clearly no longer able to keep a lid on things, and I see no point in trying to restore his ability to keep a lid on things...

I don't think it is that clear that he could not have kept a lid on things. He probably had the ability prior to other interested parties providing support. Remember, this has been going on for some time and Assad has only recently resorted to real military might like air strikes. Had Turkey and the Saudis not gotten involved he might have little problem keeping a lid on things.

This is no longer a civil war, it is a proxy war. Containment and damage control are our primary interests. Actions (or inaction) we take should, IMO, be based on those two interests.

[ganulv]

“Machine gun in right hand. Cell phone in left. On duty on the gun-truck’s machine gun, at 80 miles an hour into Aleppo, checking messages along the way.” [LINK]

[AdamG]

“Machine gun in right hand. Cell phone in left. On duty on the gun-truck’s machine gun, at 80 miles an hour into Aleppo, checking messages along the way.”

Also

An insurgent army which claims to be up to 15,000 strong is being coordinated from Turkey to take on President Bashar al-Assad of Syria, which risks plunging the region into open warfare.

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-on-Syria.html

and

What Russia taught Syria: When you destroy a city, make sure no one -- not even the story -- gets out alive.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article..._the_messenger


and

BEIRUT (AP) — The Syrian regime threatened Monday to use its chemical and biological weapons in case of a foreign attack, in its first ever acknowledgement that it possesses weapons of mass destruction.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Jihad Makdissi stressed, however, that Damascus would not use its unconventional arms against its own citizens. The announcement comes as Syria faces international isolation, a tenacious rebellion that has left at least 19,000 people dead and threats by Israel to attack to prevent such weapons from falling into rebel hands.

http://news.yahoo.com/syria-says-che...103925213.html

[Entropy]

Awesome!

[AdamG]

Budget brand tactics #8783 : how to draw fire from a sniper in Homs, Syria

[Dayuhan]

No one sold intervention in Libya. The American public doesn't care as much as you think.

I'd say Obama made some effort to sell the intervention, ably assisted by media: for a while it seemed like you couldn't look at a TV without seeing a reporter on the ground in Benghazi reporting on the imminent sack of the city and interviewing people who were about to be slaughtered. The lack of a similar media-safe threatened zone is, I suspect, a major reason for the lack of enthusiasm for intervention in Syria. The Anglo/French willingness to take at least a nominal lead role was also critical in the sale.

Any action (or inaction) we take present risks AND by its very nature, constitute an attempt to direct an outcome (or at least prevent other outcomes).

Is the current strategy an attempt to direct an outcome or an acknowledgement that our capacity to direct outcomes is limited?

The question is more how much are we willing to risk for which desired outcome.

I'd also ask whether we have or at any point had an available move that had any meaningful chance of providing our desired outcome. I've yet to see any suggestion that we did, and in the absence of one I'm not inclined to be very critical of the course adopted, which seems to me not unreasonable.

A regional war that we would get sucked into.

That would be an adverse outcome, but what available course would have prevented it? Diving into a mess out of fear that one might in the future get sucked into it seems a course of questionable wisdom.

I don't think it is that clear that he could not have kept a lid on things. He probably had the ability prior to other interested parties providing support. Remember, this has been going on for some time and Assad has only recently resorted to real military might like air strikes. Had Turkey and the Saudis not gotten involved he might have little problem keeping a lid on things.

I'm not sure that fits the chronology very well... seems to me the lid was well and truly off well before any outside parties got involved in any meaningful way, nor is it clear that outside involvement has at any point been a major driver of the conflict... not that the US could at any point have prevented outside parties from getting involved.

This is no longer a civil war, it is a proxy war.

Based on what evidence? Certainly outside parties are involved, on both sides, but I've seen no evidence or suggestion that outside involvement has reached the point where either Assad or those who oppose him could reasonably be said to be anyone's proxy. What's the actual extent of the outside support? Could either side not survive without it? All I've seen suggests that accelerated defections from the armed forces account for more of the rebel's gains than outside assistance. Of course we don't have inside information, but is there any evidence to suggest that outside assistance is a make-or-break factor for either side?

[Rex Brynen]

Based on what evidence? Certainly outside parties are involved, on both sides, but I've seen no evidence or suggestion that outside involvement has reached the point where either Assad or those who oppose him could reasonably be said to be anyone's proxy. What's the actual extent of the outside support? Could either side not survive without it? All I've seen suggests that accelerated defections from the armed forces account for more of the rebel's gains than outside assistance. Of course we don't have inside information, but is there any evidence to suggest that outside assistance is a make-or-break factor for either side?

Agreed. Outside assistance at this point probably counts for 5% or less of rebel resources, although it is starting to increase.

The "civil war vs proxy war" dichotomy that people throw around is an odd one, since the vast majority of civil wars involve some sort of external involvement. In this case, Gulf, Turkish, diaspora, and (to a lesser extent) Western aid to the opposition will likely speed the end of the Asad regime, but they are hardly the cause of its impending demise.

[Dayuhan]

Agreed. Outside assistance at this point probably counts for 5% or less of rebel resources, although it is starting to increase.

Sending weapons is of no use if there are no fighters willing or able to use the weapons... material aid can assist a rebellion, but it can't create one. I suspect that ultimately Assad's fate will depend on his ability to retain the loyalty of his armed forces, not on any outside involvement.

It might be claimed that outside introduction of certain weapons could be decisive in an insurgency. That claim has sometimes been made for the US introduction of MANPADS during the Soviet-Afghan war, though that claim has been credibly challenged. I've seen no suggestion that any such game-changing weaponry has been introduced in Syria.

The "civil war vs proxy war" dichotomy that people throw around is an odd one

Odd, but useful: there's always propaganda value, for either side, in claiming that your opponent is a tool of the manipulative furriner.

[davidbfpo]

Although I have a reasonable mind map of Syria these maps really help, especially for showing regime supportive areas:http://www.understandingwar.org/pres...ing-insurgency

Or a BBC edition with less detail:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-19285076

[JMA]

Despite the Brits convincing themselves they had no dog in the fight it appears the law of inintended consequences has crept up and bitten them on the ass:

Syria is now the biggest threat to Britain's security

This could be behind a pay wall for regular visitors, so here is an alternative:

British Syria-radicalized jihadists biggest threat to UK national security

Once again the non-interventionists at all costs have miscalculated. Don't expect a mea culpa though.

[Dayuhan]

Is there any reason to think that British intervention in Syria would have avoided or reduced that threat?

[JMA]

Is there any reason to think that British intervention in Syria would have avoided or reduced that threat?

I dunno... what you think?

[davidbfpo]

Intervention in Syria three years ago was the subject of a debate here, IIRC it was before Bashir Assad's regime launched such a harsh response street protests were replaced by a popular rebellion across a large swathe of Syria. Then again it became an issue after the gas attacks in Damascus.

I assume here that intervention means coercion.

I have not looked back at my post, but external Western overt military action was very unlikely to be enough to crack the Assad regime - such as disabling his air force. Nor have covert military options, notably supplying ATGM & SAM, enabled the opposition to defeat the regime, although as Crowbat repeatedly points out it has reduced the regime's capabilities.

Yes 'red lines' have been drawn, for apparently little effect, except as satisfying the politicians and diplomats need to show "we've done what we can".

Syria is now into its third year of a bitter civil war. A war that has no clear future and could drag on for a very long time - such is the bitterness on all sides.

Back to the UK angle. This week the UK stated refugee aid to Syria would reach US$900m. Hopefully this will have a far greater impact for those refugees than the small number (maybe hundreds) of UK nationals / residents fighting there - although as Crowbat recently pointed out real fighting is not their major role.

If the UK had joined in an early military intervention or after the gas attacks I do wonder if there would have been a domestic consensus supporting such a role. One of the questions for those who support intervention is not only what was the objective and the exit strategy, but when "our boys" are in the middle under fire what do we do then?

[Dayuhan]

I dunno... what you think?

I think Western involvement in Syria's civil war, directly or by proxy, would be seen as another self-interested attempt by the Western infidel to influence or control Muslim lands. I think that perception would accelerate and increase the recruitment and deployment of foreign fighters and create an increased incentive for direct attacks on Western homelands. In short, I think it would exacerbate, rather than alleviate, the threat of terror attacks against the intervening party or parties.

[JMA]

Syria Rebels, Government Report Poison Gas Attack

Syrian government media and rebel forces said Saturday that poison gas had been used in a central village, injuring scores of people, while blaming each other for the attack.