Retooling the Artilleryman

[Ken White]

The recent terminology shift from GPF to Multipurpose Forces (MPF) is a good harbinger, I think.

The Marines could be ahead of the power curve and effectively leverage the old MRU(SOC) into an MEU(COIN); I submit the Army can do the same thing.

The key is the doctrine. We did not train on COIN or ID for over 30 years because the doctrine lay dormant and we didn't want to play. We have no choice in whether we play or not; we have got to be prepared to play and play the total spectrum of warfare whenever the civilian heirarchy says "Go out and play in the traffic..."

We will not get to choose whether that traffic is comprised of fleets of 18 wheelers or a dozen baby buggies or whatever in between; we've got to be prepared to f do it all. We owe that much to the Nation, to the troops and even to the institutions themselves. Competence is justification to the max...

If the Doctrine says that FA Bns should be prepared to function as MPs in the post attack phase (Great idea, BTW) and the Spt Bn has to guard its own compounds and convoys, then we will resource, train for and be able to do that. If it says that Light Infantry will do the foot mobile missions, that the Stryker BCTs will do the Mech AND foot mobile missions and that Armor Bns will be able to provide Armor elements OR wheel vehicle mounted patrols OnO or any of dozens of potential variations on that theme -- then we'll do that.

If the Doctrine says that Cat I units are authorized 10% overstrength, stabilized, fully resourced and trained and equipped for both primary and alternate (and even supplemental) missions, then we will do that. If that Doctrine says that CAT II units will be at strength, train and be resourced for their primary mission and be capable of receiving an equipment set and training for an alternate (or even also a supplementary) mission in 60 days, then we will do that. Cat II units get 80% fill and 90 days...

We have the capability to do these things; the troops have the capability to absorb the training and do the tasks. If we spend wisely (not our strong point ) then we can provide an adequate number of Alt and Suppl Msn sets. If the Doctrine says do it, Congress will support it.

The capability is there, all that's needed is the will in high places...

Oh. Rob, the answer to your question is one word. We have to relearn things because of -- egos.

The very sad thing is that our very excessive branch parochiality, our tendency to adopt fads, our rejection of anything our predecessors did, our rejection of any good ideas until they become our ideas causes the effect that as new brooms move in and sweep out the old, they always do the baby - bathwater bit...

P.S.

That competence? It also goes a long way toward making bad guys think twice before they mess with you in any venue...

Lot of advantages to that...

[Rob Thornton]

Hey Ken - wondering where you'd been lurking at - thought I'd see if we could get you out

Do you really think its egos like we normally think of them? Could it be egos and lack of contextual understanding that prevents us from looking deeper and asking things like: - "wonder why they did things like that?" - until like/similiar conditions roll around and then we say - "hey that sort of makes sense."

I'd not heard about the switch from GPF to MPF. If I took something else like machine guns - and went from GPMG to MPMG would that change the nature and capabilities of that thing, or just the term we used to describe it? The GPMG thing is a bad analogy on my part- machines are not people. Maybe I can answer the broader question I just asked myself - at least take a stab - using the MEU analogy:

General -would mean - good for everything equally, not so good for any thing in particular (goes with the defend everywhere/not strong anywhere) whereas

Multi-Purpose might mean on a particular training cycle the unit was tailored for a specific range - multiple purposes/multi-missions, but not all - like when a MEU SOC does its train up.

This would allow units to be resourced beyond their base MTO&E & train on a range of METL tasks for that cycle - you could have several in the hopper with a different ranges based on the close in Strategic Intel assessment (which is going to be closer to getting it right then one that attempts to go beyond say 6 months to a year) - kind of like standing JTFs.

I'd qualify this by saying we'll have to acknowledge that when conditions call for a large commitment there will be some risk in that not all might have had recent training in all requisite areas - but there are no perfect answers.

I like the idea - it sounds feasible and mitigates strategic risk.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

Hey Ken - wondering where you'd been lurking at - thought I'd see if we could get you out

Do you really think its egos like we normally think of them? Could it be egos and lack of contextual understanding that prevents us from looking deeper and asking things like: - "wonder why they did things like that?" - until like/similiar conditions roll around and then we say - "hey that sort of makes sense."

I think egos are the principal driver but your contextual understanding and a strong (and sad) disregard for history contribute. There are other minor contributors as well. The personnel system is itself a major contributor to both the context and ego elements. I've had more than one GO tell me that just as they finally learned the job, they moved.

That same personnel system -- which needs to be destroyed -- is also responsible for insisting that the new brooms hit the road running and achieve rapid results; it forces the egos into overdrive and does not allow time for contextual scanning.

I'd not heard about the switch from GPF to MPF....

I have friends in low places...

If I took something else like machine guns - and went from GPMG to MPMG would that change the nature and capabilities of that thing, or just the term we used to describe it? Maybe I can answer it myself - at least take a stab - using the MEU analogy:

General -would mean - good for everything equally, not so good for any thing in particular (goes with the defend everywhere/not strong anywhere) whereas

Multi-Purpose might mean on a particular training cycle the unit was tailored for a specific range - multiple purposes/multi-missions, but not all - like when a MEU SOC does its train up.

Works for me. The big plus I see is that at least someone in the Pentazoo is thinking -- that's always a plus.

This would allow units to be resourced beyond their base MTO&E & train on a range of METL tasks for that cycle - you could have several in the hopper with a different ranges based on the close in Strategic Intel assessment (which is going to be closer to getting it right then one that attempts to go beyond say 6 months to a year) - kind of like standing JTFs.

True -- and we already have the DMETL today. We also have humungous stocks of predeployed equipment much of which is ancient and will need to be replaced soon. Or does it? A little jiggle of the POM and...

I'd qualify this by saying we'll have to acknowledge that when conditions call for a large commitment there will be some risk in that not all might have had recent training in all requisite areas - but there are no perfect answers.

Also true, always a possibility and 'no perfects' is correct. The key IMO, is the Intel -- I'm not nearly as confident about that piece as I am about the capability of units to do multiple missions.

One thing that I think would help with the Intel on a global basis is to form a MilAssistAdvisoryCmd with a BG / MG Cdr as a counterpart to the SOCom at each Combatant Commander. Staff it with regional FAOs and interface it with the DAO, MEDTs and SOC elms...

Provided, of course, that we start to realize the value of the FAOs.

I like the idea - it sounds feasible and mitigates strategic risk.

Best, Rob

We'll see what they come up with. At least it's being looked at. I just hope we don't go too far down the "COIN is God" route. We're bad about over correcting...

[slapout9]

I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

That would be my option #2, build specific SASO or what I call Rear Area, Stability and Reconstruction Brigades/Division. I like that name because RASR (pronounced RAZOR) sounds cooler than SASO (Got to start stroking those egos early).

I like this idea both as a rear area security element and, once the main battle is over, the elements that transition into the stability and reconstrution units. The Brigade would be built around two MP BNs, one EN BN and a CA/PA BN along with the normal support stuff. Just a thought.

[slapout9]

RAZOR sounds cool, it has MOJO as you say that is important. Like the organization to. MP's can hold it, Engineers can build it, CA can win support for it.

[wm]

That would be my option #2, build specific SASO or what I call Rear Area, Stability and Reconstruction Brigades/Division. I like that name because RASR (pronounced RAZOR) sounds cooler than SASO (Got to start stroking those egos early).

I like this idea both as a rear area security element and, once the main battle is over, the elements that transition into the stability and reconstrution units. The Brigade would be built around two MP BNs, one EN BN and a CA/PA BN along with the normal support stuff. Just a thought.

This organization sounds a lot like one of the "augmentation" Bdes discussed early on in the transformation process-it was called a Maneuver Enhancement Bde---BOI was going to be maybe one per lower level command and control headquarters (UEx--somewhere between a div and a corps)--all depended on the COCOM's RFF and strategic tailoring IIRC. The Army used to have rear area protection/rear area combat operations (RAP/RACO) units--it was a secondary mission for sustainment/MP forces in the rear (back in the days of linear battlefields in Europe with Spetsnaz trying to disrupt our rear area activities.

[selil]

I have a question for all. First the importance of Military Police in SASO seems to have been down played. By that I mean instead of tasking other units to do this or creating a multi-purpose Artillery unit, why don't we just increase the size of MP units?

Just use those cannon cockers and civilian kitchen staff.

Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop.


Egads I think I'm choking on my own sarcasm.

[Penta]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

[Norfolk]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

Very good point Penta! Why indeed should senior officers have to be up-or-out by 55 (at the latest), never mind junior officers that are automatically tossed if they don't make Major within 10 years? The present system was based on what was introduced to clear out the deadwood back in the early days of WWII, but is based on more of a corporate (ie. individual career track) rather than an institutional model.

Not surprisingly, that leads to many officers in general and many flag officers in particular not only developing along much the same lines as businessmen (and for many of the same sorts of reasons), but given that they're going to need a civvie job when they retire, they're already going to be looking ahead to that day when they take off the uniform and put on a business suit. If mandatory retirement (and FULL pension and benefits) were available at an age limit of say 60, there may be somewhat less incentive for senior officers to learn the often less useful traits of businessmen and subsequently to prepare their way for employment in business after their military career.

There really isn't so much of a military-industrial complex so much as there is a political-industrial complex; military spending is just grist for its mill, and military officers who go along with it in their careers become accomplices to it. Professionalism is necessary for the Army; careerism, it goes without saying, is seriously damaging to it. And of course the system as it exists is mostly about the latter, to the detriment of the former.

Now, to the topic of the thread at hand. Unless the Army is going to form Constabulary Regiments like it had two generations ago, and to do that it will have to come out of someone else's hide - principally the BCTs, then it's just going to have to keep doing what every other Army in the English-speaking world has been doing since the 1960's. And that is taking units of all the Combat Arms and re-rolling and -training them as infantry for low-intensity warfare. It is a huge disruption to unit (and parent Formation) training and readiness.

And to give just an example, several years ago, a Commonwealth Artillery Regiment being sent to Cyprus on UN duties not only was (obviously) re-rolled as infantry for the duration, but required a draft of troops from an Armour Regiment just to bring itself up to strength. And no, it's not practically possible to do both infantry training and operations [I]and/I] keep up one's parent Arms training and skills. Something will suffer. Ask the Brits or the Canadians, they've been doing this for over 40 years, and it never gets any easier.

[Ken White]

From my outsider POV, it looks like one generally gets (approximately) 30 years on active duty before you're retired. Combine that with age limits, probably less.

And meanwhile I see 70 year olds running marathons and such so often it barely makes the news.

...Might a "good first step" be to eliminate time-in-service and age restrictions, and instead base mandatory retirement on health factors? It really does seem like as soon as someone makes a degree of headway, they hit the age limit and are retired.

Or, more accurately, the altitude. Oops -- attitude. While there are a few (very few) who an beat the odds, most folks past 40 do not function well in combat, they get overly cautious. The more combat they've had, the lower the age that caution becomes a detriment instead of a blessing.

While there are indeed those in their 70s -- even 90s -- out running, not too many of them are multiple tour ground combat veterans; that job is hard on the old bod, it gets beaten up a lot.

There's a reason for 20 year and 30 year marks for retirement. Only things that need to happen to the retirement system are to make it contributory and thus portable and give the whole package in cash and cut the benefits (I await multiple slings and arrows... ).

I guess the answer to your question is that the physical is only part of it, mental attitude, tolerance for risk and rapidity of thought are very important. So yes, a very, very few 70 year olds could hack it, most could not.

[SteveMetz]

Just use those cannon cockers and civilian kitchen staff.

Don't you know police work doesn't require any training. I mean it's just like artillery or tanks. You just point here, push that, and things are obliterated. Law enforcement operations with military personnel are a piece of cake. Anybody can be a cop.


Egads I think I'm choking on my own sarcasm.

Don't scoff. In Baghdad late April 2003 I came to a check point that was manned with a Paladin. The gun was lowered to the horizontal, direct fire position. I imagine one of those firing into your windshield from 20 meters would get your attention.

[selil]

Don't scoff. In Baghdad late April 2003 I came to a check point that was manned with a Paladin. The gun was lowered to the horizontal, direct fire position. I imagine one of those firing into your windshield from 20 meters would get your attention.

Can you imagine seeing that on Interstate 95 pointing up traffic with a RADAR sign that says "Your speed is....." above it? High impact policing I like it.

[Rex Brynen]

I think Jim and Selil have highlighted an important point here, that I hope we don't lose in the discussion: it may not be all that easy retooling into MPs, and especially not for the broad range of tasks that MPs may be called upon to perform in COIN and stability operations (checkpoints, escorts, detention, law enforcement, training assistance to local police forces, liaison, broader contributions to rule-of-law efforts, etc, etc.). As we saw at Abu Ghraib, poorly or inappropriately trained MPs may do far more harm than good.

Moreover, just as armour or artillery may have trained and equipped for a very different kind of (force-on-force) war, it seems to me that the same has probably also been true (until recently) among MPs. Does anyone know how much evolution has taken place in doctrine and training in recent years?

[wm]

Hey Ken - wondering where you'd been lurking at - thought I'd see if we could get you out

Do you really think its egos like we normally think of them? Could it be egos and lack of contextual understanding that prevents us from looking deeper and asking things like: - "wonder why they did things like that?" - until like/similiar conditions roll around and then we say - "hey that sort of makes sense."

I'd not heard about the switch from GPF to MPF. If I took something else like machine guns - and went from GPMG to MPMG would that change the nature and capabilities of that thing, or just the term we used to describe it? The GPMG thing is a bad analogy on my part- machines are not people. Maybe I can answer the broader question I just asked myself - at least take a stab - using the MEU analogy:

General -would mean - good for everything equally, not so good for any thing in particular (goes with the defend everywhere/not strong anywhere) whereas

Multi-Purpose might mean on a particular training cycle the unit was tailored for a specific range - multiple purposes/multi-missions, but not all - like when a MEU SOC does its train up.

This would allow units to be resourced beyond their base MTO&E & train on a range of METL tasks for that cycle - you could have several in the hopper with a different ranges based on the close in Strategic Intel assessment (which is going to be closer to getting it right then one that attempts to go beyond say 6 months to a year) - kind of like standing JTFs.

Regarding the relearning issue--I suspect it is the centralized selection process and up or out promotion system that requires one to do something "different" (even though it really isn't) in order to get a good report card and stand out from one's peers to get picked up for those career enhancing nominative assignments and promotions more than ego that is the reason for all the wheel re-invention we do (unless we equate ego to getting promoted to as high a rank as possible, regardless of actual ability).

My take on GPF vs. MPF:
GPF = jack of all trades, master of none.
MPF = jack of many trades, master of some. Combat engineers are MPF--they really can fight as infantry when required

[Jim Rodgers]

This is a great thread. Two separate points, which I'll weigh in on with different posts.

Re: D3A, EBO, and the targeting cycle - MAJ Thornton was helpful to me offline on this topic (and a couple of others) a couple of weeks ago. Steve, respectfully, I'm not sure that it's realistic to say that all D3A "melts away" all the problems, or that it's some sort of strategic\operational\tactical panacea.

Rob made some points that, in my mind, makes it more useful as a decision aid than perhaps I had previously considered, and I acknowledge my lack of real world experience with it in the field. I get the importance of decision aids in a chaotic, complex tactical environment. And "targeting" has always been done, formally or informally, whatever buzzwords are hung on it. But I still think that some sort of catch all matrix for "effects", where lethal and non-lethal "fires" are simply levers to be pulled, vastly over-simplifies this.

This is a fairly active argument, with different takes on it being represented in the outgoing and incoming commanders at JFCOM. Rob bridges the gap by acknowledging the friction and complexity. I have no trouble believing that some sort of hybrid approach where both

-a formalized targeting process is used,
-great care is taken in pushing commander's intent down to the lowest level

is the most appropriate solution. But I just don't see where EBO (as I understand it) accurately reflects the choices a commander has to make.

There are a couple reasons for my take on this. The lesser concern is that D3A might - subtly - drive higher echelons to keep chasing the HVT at the expense of lower level initiative and freedom of action. This is a lesser concern because strong leadership would probably prevent this, and in the absence of strong leadership, a matrix is probably not the most pressing concern.

But the bigger issue, that no one has really explained (to me) how to work around, is that the "Assess" phase is forced to fit into the unit's preferred battle rhythm.

That may not sound like that big of a deal. But I keep coming back to Information Operations (more accurately Psyops). Civilian side, I'm a web analytics specialist. Basically, I develop and assess metrics in support of marketing of web services, e.g. USAA's web site. There's a lot of overlap between IO and marketing, a point made in a somewhat different context in the Trent-Doty piece in the July-August 2005 Military Review. Broad marketing efforts simply CAN NOT be assessed that cleanly and quickly, and I would argue the same applies to any kind of well thought out IO plan. Oh, you can assess, briefly, a single promotion. But that has to be trended over time, coupled with long term "brand" research and lots of other things filled with buzzwords IOT get an accurate picture. And that's in a vastly less complex, ambiguous environment.

IO is supposed to be a key focus in COIN. In fact, if you were to retool the "Battlefield Operating Systems" (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) for a population focused environment, it would probably be an Operating System of it's own, instead of simply being lumped in with Fires. It might be employed separately or in conjunction with other types of ops. Measuring success\failure will likely be murky and take a long time. Given those things - I simply don't see how D3A gets you to where you need to be, at least not by itself.

And that's just IO, which I mention because of my marketing experience. The same is true of

-Civic Projects (CERP\PRTs\whatever), which will likely take a long time to unfold
-ISR, where patterns that unfold in a few days at a CTC might take months downrange
-and lots of other things

IIRC, I read a piece where the "preferred" cycle for EBO was three weeks. A smart commander could and probably would tailor that. But I can get the image out of my head of a frustrated commander either

-yelling "Repeat" at the trooper with the handbills or
-writing off a promising COA after a couple of weeks because "Assess" was coming up murky, particularly if higher was pushing hard

Am I misunderstanding something? Or lacking the experience to put it into context? Because every time I consider lumping IO (and other effects) into a Fires focused targeting process, my skin crawls.

[slapout9]

This is a great thread. Two separate points, which I'll weigh in on with different posts.

Re: D3A, EBO, and the targeting cycle - MAJ Thornton was helpful to me offline on this topic (and a couple of others) a couple of weeks ago. Steve, respectfully, I'm not sure that it's realistic to say that all D3A "melts away" all the problems, or that it's some sort of strategic\operational\tactical panacea.

Rob made some points that, in my mind, makes it more useful as a decision aid than perhaps I had previously considered, and I acknowledge my lack of real world experience with it in the field. I get the importance of decision aids in a chaotic, complex tactical environment. And "targeting" has always been done, formally or informally, whatever buzzwords are hung on it. But I still think that some sort of catch all matrix for "effects", where lethal and non-lethal "fires" are simply levers to be pulled, vastly over-simplifies this.

This is a fairly active argument, with different takes on it being represented in the outgoing and incoming commanders at JFCOM. Rob bridges the gap by acknowledging the friction and complexity. I have no trouble believing that some sort of hybrid approach where both

-a formalized targeting process is used,
-great care is taken in pushing commander's intent down to the lowest level

is the most appropriate solution. But I just don't see where EBO (as I understand it) accurately reflects the choices a commander has to make.

There are a couple reasons for my take on this. The lesser concern is that D3A might - subtly - drive higher echelons to keep chasing the HVT at the expense of lower level initiative and freedom of action. This is a lesser concern because strong leadership would probably prevent this, and in the absence of strong leadership, a matrix is probably not the most pressing concern.

But the bigger issue, that no one has really explained (to me) how to work around, is that the "Assess" phase is forced to fit into the unit's preferred battle rhythm.

That may not sound like that big of a deal. But I keep coming back to Information Operations (more accurately Psyops). Civilian side, I'm a web analytics specialist. Basically, I develop and assess metrics in support of marketing of web services, e.g. USAA's web site. There's a lot of overlap between IO and marketing, a point made in a somewhat different context in the Trent-Doty piece in the July-August 2005 Military Review. Broad marketing efforts simply CAN NOT be assessed that cleanly and quickly, and I would argue the same applies to any kind of well thought out IO plan. Oh, you can assess, briefly, a single promotion. But that has to be trended over time, coupled with long term "brand" research and lots of other things filled with buzzwords IOT get an accurate picture. And that's in a vastly less complex, ambiguous environment.

IO is supposed to be a key focus in COIN. In fact, if you were to retool the "Battlefield Operating Systems" (FMs 3-0, 5-0, 6-0) for a population focused environment, it would probably be an Operating System of it's own, instead of simply being lumped in with Fires. It might be employed separately or in conjunction with other types of ops. Measuring success\failure will likely be murky and take a long time. Given those things - I simply don't see how D3A gets you to where you need to be, at least not by itself.

And that's just IO, which I mention because of my marketing experience. The same is true of

-Civic Projects (CERP\PRTs\whatever), which will likely take a long time to unfold
-ISR, where patterns that unfold in a few days at a CTC might take months downrange
-and lots of other things

IIRC, I read a piece where the "preferred" cycle for EBO was three weeks. A smart commander could and probably would tailor that. But I can get the image out of my head of a frustrated commander either

-yelling "Repeat" at the trooper with the handbills or
-writing off a promising COA after a couple of weeks because "Assess" was coming up murky, particularly if higher was pushing hard

Am I misunderstanding something? Or lacking the experience to put it into context? Because every time I consider lumping IO (and other effects) into a Fires focused targeting process, my skin crawls.

Hi Jim, no you haven't missed anything you are tracking right on. My comment dealt strictly with the fact that between EBO and D3A...D3A is better and it is a lot simpler and will still achieve the same effect(pun intended) that is all I meant by it.

Having said that, when EBO was first conceived it had several steps to it not just targeting. These steps in the process are pretty much gone so I wouldn't worry to much about it ( based upon the J9 EBA unclassified manual I read). To review the history though for something to be a true EBO operation you would have to have great intelligence,Precision Guided Munitions, the ability to attack all targets in parallel. All that had to be there or it was not likely to work out as it was originally conceived.

It is no longer published but if you can find the Air Command and Staff College student handbook on planning the Air Campaign you would see how simple it really was. I have checked and the old handbook is no longer on line


Point two and it is a big one EBO is based on systems theory (not chaos theory) if you don't believe in this it will not work. The hybrid theory of combing EBO with D3A will just make things more complicated in my opinion. D3A is already integrated in the MDMP and that would be a better choice. The worst thing is to make things more complicated which EBA is doing IMO. Hell I don't even understand that anymore. When did the military start attacking "Nodes" thats just non-sense IMO. They should have left PEMSI(I keep wanting to say Pepsi) as the 5 rings it has the same effect

Final point. EBO in one word is why? Why will attacking this target lead you to your final objective. If you can't answer that... it might work out... but it probably want.

Hope this helps or do you have more questions? Slap

Here is a link to one of the best papers I ever read on the subject.
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...szafranski.htm

[TheCurmudgeon]

We have the capability to do these things; the troops have the capability to absorb the training and do the tasks. If we spend wisely (not our strong point ) then we can provide an adequate number of Alt and Suppl Msn sets. If the Doctrine says do it, Congress will support it.

The capability is there, all that's needed is the will in high places...

Oh. Rob, the answer to your question is one word. We have to relearn things because of -- egos.

I agree with you on both points. I don't think we give our soldiers as much credit as they deserve, or believe that they are as capable of taking on multiple complex missions. It is often the officers who, as you said, are parochial about their branch, that fail to fully appreciate this.

There is more than ego. There is no glamour in stability operations ... being a glorified policeman, a "peacekeeper". Without that glamour the leadership does not want to do it and Congress doesn't want to pay for it.

I am not sure if you could really use the same units that kicked in the door to immediately shift to providing security in a way that does not alienate the population, in a manner that co-opts any potential insurgency rather than reinforces thier themes. For the Infantry I don't think this is feasible or wise. I want them on the top of thier game. But some of the other units, like FA and ADA could make the shift. But I still have reservations on how to get the second, supplemental set of equipment into theater. It would also require the DIV HQ to be able to make that shift. But now I am just rambling.

I remember seeing what we used to call RACO, Rear Area Combat Operations, slowly fall by the wayside. All the Corps support assets transitioned into front line units. We lost ASGs and the likes as more BCTs were built. Now we have the "Non-Contiguous Battlefield". To me, that just means that we have ceded control of sections of the battlefield to the enemy. I am wandering off down a rabbit hole but I feel that the two subjects are related. It seems to me that if we quit concentraing on lean and lethal we might make some progress toward a force that is capable of performing all the missions that we need to be able to handle.

[Rob Thornton]

I can see it working out well -

ex. BCT Alpha receives a mission that tells it to conduct FID in a COIN environment in country #1. During its MA it decides it needs X number of MiTTs, Y number of PTTs & SPTT, and Z number of PRTs (augmented with Inter-Agency folks and contractors). It develops at Task Org that puts one BN TF like organization for the MiTTs, one for the PTT & SPTTs, and one for the PRTs - this provides the C2 and support structure within each to plan, execute, coordinate resources for, and generally sustain all of those missions while securing its own LOCs. It might decide it needs to keep one or two company sized elements back for QRF like organizations, and one or two company sized elements back for FOB security of the BCT HQs and sustainment base (if not contracted or run by a higher HQs). This does not mean its OIF or OEF - it might be in support of AFRICOM or another Regional COCOM.

From the moment of alert and initial MA - the training base moves to support the resources required - from hardware to movement - from language and cultural training, from Inter-Agency augmentees to a CTC like path that provides a MRE tailored to that mission.

I believe we can do that!

Meanwhile...

HBCT Bravo get told to do TSC where it is told to go out and do a combination deterrence against a conventional threat to an ally while conducting TSC by helping them train their conventional mechanized forces to secure their sovereignty - they also task organize accordingly based off their MA and the training base gets in line to assist and resource.

and the list of possibilities goes on to include units training in CONUS and OCONUS against a suite of most likely enemy COAs, etc.

I think that is an executable balance given the possibilities that exist, and well within our ability to execute - I do think getting the extra BCTs online is critical to meet the demand and have enough capability training n the various categories to meet the demand and have depth - but those can only be built so fast.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

MPF = jack of many trades, master of some. Combat engineers are MPF--they really can fight as infantry when required

Wayne- good catch! Sappers are among the most versatile and creative soldiers I know.

Best, Rob