Gloomy US intelligence assessment coming or Let's hear from the spies

[Dayuhan]

His recommendation is to shoot for a federated* rather than centralized form of government with defense organized at the most local level possible.

I think this steers toward a dangerous trap that we fall into too easily and too often: the trap of thinking that we installed the "wrong" sort of government and can make everything right by uninstalling that and re-installing the "right" form. This goes back to our typically mechanistic approach to governance in other places, often characterized by a belief that an externally installed government can work if it just achieves some kind of "right" balance or structure.

I don't think that's the case. An appropriate system of governance is never going to be installed. It has to evolve, and the process of that evolution will typically involves some level of conflict and disorder. It's not just about refining the system, it's about the various contending parties refining their expectations and their abilities to work together... or not to, as the case may be.

I don't think we got this wrong because of a threat-centered intel system or because we installed the wrong sort of government. I think we got it wrong the moment we decided that we had to leave behind a functioning government that Americans could recognize as "democracy". Once we chose that road we were on our way into the scheisse.

[ganulv]

I think this steers toward a dangerous trap that we fall into too easily and too often: the trap of thinking that we installed the "wrong" sort of government and can make everything right by uninstalling that and re-installing the "right" form. This goes back to our typically mechanistic approach to governance in other places, often characterized by a belief that an externally installed government can work if it just achieves some kind of "right" balance or structure.

To be clear, I was just regurgitating my understanding of Nazif’s take on things, which has been consistent for the past decade. Your point is well taken, nonetheless.

[Steve the Planner]

On Dahuyan's point, the latest on Iraq's political/governance structure:

http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayP...4CF9297CDAB21C

The article does a fair job of explaining some of the many unresolved sub-national issues pending in Iraq--mostly still chafing at the Baathist restructurings of 1976 and beyond.

Salah ad Din's testing of the Article 140 right to form its own region---the same as KRG---with broad political freedoms separate from a Central government.

In large part, the right to regional governance ala Article 140 is heavily supported by all sides (as a refuge from Central government abuse) but with many varying maelstroms of conflict around the practicalities of it. Central government sends a fixed percentage of money; own courts; police, internal army, etc... (Just like KRG, and what Ganulv's reported proposal suggests).

If Salah ad Din were its own largely Sunni region, does Balad/Ad DuJail (mostly Shia) return to Baghdad Amenate, as geography, population and political history factors suggest? What to make of Sammara, a Sunni city of great Shia religious significance and national importance?

Does, as the Kurdish article suggests, Kirkuk become reconstituted, with Kalar, Kifri and Tuz Hormatu get re-attached (whether from Sulimaniya or Salah ad Din)?

If all this rolling back to pre-1976 sub-national structures were considered, what about returning the Haj Trail lands (the routes from Qom to Karbala/Najaf to Mecca) back to those cities, and away from Sunni Anbar?

The maps and history of all of this are in an article on Musings on Iraq:

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...nance-and.html

The answers, however, rapidly become complex local ones---as Dayuhan wisely surmises, these are not questions for a foreign power to address, but ones that must evolve, or be fought through by locals.

In truth, Ganulv's reported solutions are, in fact, identical to what is on the front boiler in Iraq today (and will be immediately after our major departure from Afghanistan), whether we pay attention to it or not.

When this issue (Disputed Internal Boundaries) came to the fore in Iraq in 2008 and 2009, Ambassador Crocker wisely determined (to the surprise of many) that these were not issues which the foreigners should push on the Iraqis, but ones they must resolve.

The reason this format of regional governance structures with minimal national power continues to re-emerge is that it is the only historical one that has, over centuries, provided success for these lands in lieu of a major dictatorial power.

There is often more wisdom in history than we care to acknowledge where it conflicts with our intentions.

[Surferbeetle]

The maps and history of all of this are in an article on Musings on Iraq:

http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/20...nance-and.html

The answers, however, rapidly become complex local ones---as Dayuhan wisely surmises, these are not questions for a foreign power to address, but ones that must evolve, or be fought through by locals.

STP,

Good job as always on your map work and the many associated linkages.

As one 'Iraq-Hand' to another here are a few articles that may provide some additional context with respect to the importance of having a broad contact base as well as a flexible mind...(as you and I were 'incentivized' to learn during our time in the Middle East )

Iraq oil: fools rush in, by Lex, Last updated: November 20, 2011 7:21 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Central bank gold buying at 40-year high, by Jack Farchy in London, November 17, 2011 7:54 am, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Shell pulls out of Kurdistan oil talks, by Sylvia Pfeifer and Javier Blas in Erbil, northern Iraq, November 16, 2011 10:05 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Qatar joins Mexico with oil hedge, by Javier Blas in London, Last updated: October 26, 2011 10:49 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

Torrents in Arabia: the momentum for reform, by Lex, October 21, 2011 7:22 pm, Financial Times, www.ft.com

The Arab spring is delivering on its political promise. Three dictators have been ousted in north Africa, and the momentum for reform may now be unstoppable. If the vaguely democratic awakening that is now taking place is to have any chance of flourishing, however, it must be accompanied by total economic regeneration. Without that, sky-high expectations will be dashed.

[Steve the Planner]

Beetle:

I think this is where we really stalemate on these "threat assessments"---by focusing on things like the stability of a central government as measured by protests, attacks and opposition movements.

Somewhere down the road, Afghans will confront the problems of how they are to govern themselves---within a very conflicts and highly-differentiated political/economic/societal landscape bounded by certain physical geography.

The answers will, in all reality, move to the likes of regional special government considerations and reconstituted maps, boundaries, authorities and allegiances (ala Iraq's Article 140/123 issues). It is complicated stuff, does not result from outsider decisions (and there are many winners and losers) where, through underlying conflict, there are many unresolved grievances.

Economics plays a big role, too, but usually is represented by allocational challenges of the very kind in debate in the US (rich, middle class, poor; who gets it?).

For me, the Arab Spring, in its early stage, is still a debate about who sits in the seat of power, and has not yet reached the meaningful issues: How do we govern ourselves differently to achieve a different result?

Monitoring military threats, and driving responses to metrics related to military threats does not solve the underlying problem, answer relevant societal questions, etc... In fact, maybe the opposite---creating them.

[Bob's World]

I prefer to think of myself as an advocate for a fresh perspective. Some may find that to be "myopic," it's a fine line I admittedly cross at times. Guilty as charged, but that in no way grants amnesty to the intelligence community for remaining doggedly focused on threats to capture, kill or defeat as what we need them to apply their considerable skills on the most. We need them to study the roots, not the branches.

But I don't put everything at the feet of government. I don't think the government of Mexico, for example, created the drug violence that threatens their stability; as an example. Such profit-motivated challengers are not "insurgency" in my opinion, because I do (myopically) believe that conflicts need to be categorized by their causal roots rather than by the various tactical branches they might take. I believe that insurgency must be both internal and political, or it is not insurgency. By categorizing by like causes one also categorizes by family of solution as well. By mixing conflicts of various causation by categorizing by the tactics applied, one is far more likely to apply the wrong type of solution for the problem they actually face.

But when the causal roots are in domestic policy (insurgency) or foreign policy (transnational terrorism), I do indeed strongly advocate that governments challenged in such ways are only likely to find true "victory"/stability by honestly looking at the effects of their actions and making reasonable changes in how they do business where it affects a handful of critical perceptions that are major drivers of such conflicts. Always room for supporting efforts to mitigate those who wage illegal violence, or to improve effectiveness of how the government serves the people, but those should remain supporting efforts.

Governments are made up of politicians, and politicians are not big on personal responsibility. Just a fact.

Militaries fight wars, and went launched by politicians to resolve a conflict with some group waging illegal violence the military is apt to view that engagement as war and warfare. Just a fact.

Stepping back and breaking the cycle requires that we look at such conflicts differently if we hope to achieve different results. After all, its not like the historic approach and our current approach of massive foreign interventions, regime changing/protecting; followed by massive programs of assassination and state building (a bit of an oxymoron of an approach by any measure) is working in any enduring way.

What I offer is cheap and respective of the sovereignty of others in a manner consistent with the principles that America is founded upon. That alone makes it worth serious consideration.

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

Agree in part. Karzai did not create the problems in Afghanistan.

Pashtun issues are cross-border. 10-20% of Afghanistan's total population is transnational. Answers will not come in a vacuum, especially as Pakistanis, for their own domestic reasons, may pressure Afghans to return home at some point.

One thing I do know is that Ambassador Crocker has a very good grasp of the neighbor issues, which is a big asset. Real-life is that those neighbors in total are not just Pakistan by any means.

Looking perhaps way too out of the box, the underlying problems started with the artificial Durand carve-up, were exacerbated by the Muslin Exodus during the Indian Partition, and the push of that population created historical pressures on the Pashtuns, who are still struggling on both sides of the line with how they will succeed in a future where many different neighbors (internal and external) will ultimately crush them (notwithstanding their deep and unique cultures) if they do not find a self-contained and non-threatening way forward.


All these money flows from us have not been helpful.