Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[Ray]

Ray since 1998 when Suharto stepped down have you seen any of these turn to a strongman tendencies in Indonesia that you say are inherent in Muslim culture?

Indonesia is uniquely different.

It is because of the unique syncretic mix of culture, they being Santri, Abagan and Priyayi.

Santri is the practice of orthodox Islam, who are basically urban and who go to the Mosque, read the Quar'an and follow Sharia.

The Abagan tend to be rural people who have absorbed both the Hindu and Muslim ways and are sort of animist, if you will, and who follow folk tradition, to include beliefs that centres on spirits, magic, and the ceremonial feast or salametan .

The Priyayi are those who follow Hindu Javanese traditions.

Indonesia's political history would give an idea of how Indonesia functions and why it is different.

The Santri played a the key role in Indonesian Nationalist movements, and formed the strongest opposition to President Suharto's New Order army-based administration.

In contrast, the Abangan have tended to follow the prevailing political wind; they supported Sukarno's overt nationalism, while during Suharto's subsequent presidency, they loyally voted for his Golkar party. Poorer Abangan areas became strongholds of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in stark opposition to the orthodox Muslim Santri. The cultural divisions descended into bloody conflict in 1965/66 when Santri were opposed to communists, many of whom were from Abangan streams.

For further details, see

Elections and Politics in Indonesia

http://books.google.co.in/books?id=k...ed=0CDYQ6AEwBw

SANTRI - ABANGAN DICHOTOMY IN TODAY INDONESIA: RECONSIDERED

http://sudirmansetiono.blogspot.in/2...-in-today.html

[OUTLAW 09]

Indonesia is uniquely different.

It is because of the unique syncretic mix of culture, they being Santri, Abagan and Priyayi.

Santri is the practice of orthodox Islam, who are basically urban and who go to the Mosque, read the Quar'an and follow Sharia.

The Abagan tend to be rural people who have absorbed both the Hindu and Muslim ways and are sort of animist, if you will, and who follow folk tradition, to include beliefs that centres on spirits, magic, and the ceremonial feast or salametan .

The Priyayi are those who follow Hindu Javanese traditions.

Indonesia's political history would give an idea of how Indonesia functions and why it is different.

The Santri played a the key role in Indonesian Nationalist movements, and formed the strongest opposition to President Suharto's New Order army-based administration.

In contrast, the Abangan have tended to follow the prevailing political wind; they supported Sukarno's overt nationalism, while during Suharto's subsequent presidency, they loyally voted for his Golkar party. Poorer Abangan areas became strongholds of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) in stark opposition to the orthodox Muslim Santri. The cultural divisions descended into bloody conflict in 1965/66 when Santri were opposed to communists, many of whom were from Abangan streams.

For further details, see

Elections and Politics in Indonesia

http://books.google.co.in/books?id=k...ed=0CDYQ6AEwBw

SANTRI - ABANGAN DICHOTOMY IN TODAY INDONESIA: RECONSIDERED

http://sudirmansetiono.blogspot.in/2...-in-today.html

Totally agree to the comments--a whole different world developed there and could if needed be a model for the ME ethnic groups if they wanted a model which they do not currently want.

[ganulv]

Indonesia is uniquely different.

Yes, Indonesia is uniquely different. Just like every other country.

[Ray]

Yes, Indonesia is uniquely different. Just like every other country.

Is that one liner a statement of fact or your failure to grasp the issue under discussion that elicited my post and the statement?

Apparently, you have missed the point. Or maybe, you wanted to state something but lost the chain of thought.

Indeed all countries are unique. Is there anything that is unique in that statement of yours that every country is has unique singularity? Forgive me, I must have missed the point.

However, if I can clarify, the point under discussion was why is Indonesia different from other Islamic countries in its interpretation of Islam and why it lacked the fervour that other had.

I merely indicated why so.

Now, if you have some enlightening discourse to set us on a course that is different and what I failed to understand, I assure you I shall be delighted if you can clear the cobwebs.

[Ray]

Teetering on the edge

Meanwhile, the uncertainties in Iraq are causing international oil prices to rise, not least because hitherto accessible oil fields in the northern provinces could be cut off if fighting starts there. In sum, Iraq now faces a power vacuum which could be extremely dangerous, and although the United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has expressed his shock at the recent events, it is highly unlikely that any proposal for intervention will be put to the U.N. Security Council. Yet if the international community seems not to want to intervene, others will very probably take over, and Iraq now faces not only civil war but potential disintegration.

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-e...?homepage=true

[OUTLAW 09]

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-e...?homepage=true

Ray--reference the question concerning oil belts and the Shia---in Iraq the majority of the bigger fields were in the south of Iraq and yes in Shia areas, and in the north where they fall under Kurdish control which has led to a minor fight between Malaki and the Kurds because the Kurds released oil drilling contracts without Malaki approval and are shipping oil out of the Kurdish areas earning a solid revenue for the Kurds who are not sharing with Baghdad.

The Sunni triangle was for the most part oil empty and that led to the open disputes between the Sunni and Malaki over oil revnues the Sunni were not getting for their development.

Then surprise surprise for Malaki---several rather large oil deposits were located, drilled, and the results were extremely good which now could give the Sunni provinces an oil revenue stream they have been missing under Malaki.

What we do not discuss in this thread is not the oil but the good old Silk Road that runs from AFG through Iran, then over Mandali and through Baqubah on to Syria and from Syria into Lebanon.

A large under noticed fight between the Shia and Sunni is actually over control of the old Silk Road ie who controls the Road controls the ME.

Khomeini spoke often about the "Green Crescent" containment theory---meaning there are Shia ranging from AFG through Iran , Iraq , Syria and into Lebanon thus building a wall between the Shia and the Sunni' protecting the Shia.

During his lifetime he did everything possible to implement the Green Crescent theory. Actually if you go back and read just how the Hezbollah ended up in Lebanon there is something to the Khomeini concept.

[OUTLAW 09]

An interesting read on funding to ISIS.

http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...ding-isis.html

[Ulenspiegel]

Sorry Outlaw,

during their history the SilkRout(s) were only useful when one country controlled a large chunk of them, their last height was when the Khans could maintain the Pax Mongolia. However, the Silk Routes became quite meaningless with larger ships and later railroads, it is nothing worth fighting for sice 1600 AD.

[OUTLAW 09]

Sorry Outlaw,

during their history the SilkRout(s) were only useful when one country controlled a large chunk of them, their last height was when the Khans could maintain the Pax Mongolia. However, the Silk Routes became quite meaningless with larger ships and later railroads, it is nothing worth fighting for sice 1600 AD.

Ulenspiegel---then the virtual "control" via religion of a Shia global "community" stretching from AFG through Iran, thru Iraq and on to Syria and into Lebanon following the Silk Road means what exactly? Notice how the Silk Road follows the "Green Crescent" or global Shia "communities".

The following are comments from Khomeini which many in Europe and the US often do not read nor have see before;

“We have often proclaimed this truth in our domestic and foreign policy, namely that we have set as our goal the world-wide spread of the influence of Islam and the suppression of the rule of the world conquerors … We wish to cause the corrupt roots of Zionism, capitalism and Communism to wither throughout the world. We wish, as does God almighty, to destroy the systems which are based on these three foundations, and to promote the Islamic order of the Prophet … in the world of arrogance.”

“We shall export our revolution to the whole world. Until the cry `There is no God but God` resounds over the whole world, there will be struggle.”

“Establishing the Islamic state world-wide belong to the great goals of the revolution.”

These comments were the background comments in his concept of the "Green Crescent".

These are thoughts and ideas currently floating in the ME concerning the "Green Crescent".

The king of Jordan has worried aloud about the rise of a “Shiite crescent” in the Arab east that would ally with Shiite Iran and menace the traditional monarchies.

Amman worries that the new Shiite axis of Baghdad and Tehran will have natural allies in a Syria dominated by Alawis (an offshoot of Shiites) and in the Shiite Hezbollah Party of southern Lebanon. Shiites may now be over 40 percent of the Lebanese population, and they will likely form a majority of
the country within 20 years. A Shiite Iraq would also inevitably establish ties with the Shiite majority in Bahrain and the Shiite plurality in the oil-rich Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia. (Ever wondered why the KSA is totally against an Iranian hegemony?)

The old sectarian balance in the eastern Arab world, with Sunni rulers and Shiite ruled, is coming unraveled as Shiite masses are mobilized into new forms of sectarian politics.

The Khomeinists were deeply disappointed that no Arab state adopted their new system, since their aspirations had been pan-Islamic. Until 2003, Iranian Khomeinist influences had been largely contained in the Arab world, although Tehran had a foothold in Lebanon through the radical Hezbollah
Party. With religious Shiite parties now operating freely in Iraq, and even influencing government policy and the wording of the new constitution, Khomeini’s ideas have finally entered a phase of wider practical influence.

Some in the ME will privately say that the overthrowing of a secular nationalist Sunni leader who was a buffer nation unleased a tidal wave that we are now currently seeing in the ME-there is some truth in this.

[ganulv]

Now, if you have some enlightening discourse to set us on a course that is different and what I failed to understand, I assure you I shall be delighted if you can clear the cobwebs.

Your thing is that the essential nature of Islam explains it all. It has been pointed out to you that it does not in the case of Indonesia. That is more than a stray data point considering Indonesia has more Muslim residents than any country in the world. You went to great lengths to massage the data into your model. You fell back on historical particularity to do so.

Now, let’s say that colonial administration were to be my magic bullet explanation for why democracy has not succeeded in most countries with majority Muslim populations. I am sure that it would be not very difficult for someone to come up with a nation which gives the lie to my one-size-fits-all explanation. I could do exactly the same thing you have and say, “Yeah, but. They don’t count because [laundry list of historical factoids].”

Now, if one chooses to dig into the historical background of all of the cases under consideration, one finds that all of them involve historical complexity. Freud said that sex explains everything; it doesn’t. Marx said capital explains everything; it doesn’t. You say religion explains everything about governance in the societies under discussion here; it doesn’t. That’s not to say that religion -- or sex or capital -- don’t matter, it’s to say that no one thing alone explains it all. (Feel free to say that that isn’t what you have been saying, but only if you are willing to go back and show me where you said otherwise.)

[OUTLAW 09]

Your thing is that the essential nature of Islam explains it all. It has been pointed out to you that it does not in the case of Indonesia. That is more than a stray data point considering Indonesia has more Muslim residents than any country in the world. You went to great lengths to massage the data into your model. You fell back on historical particularity to do so.

Now, let’s say that colonial administration were to be my magic bullet explanation for why democracy has not succeeded in most countries with majority Muslim populations. I am sure that it would be not very difficult for someone to come up with a nation which gives the lie to my one-size-fits-all explanation. I could do exactly the same thing you have and say, “Yeah, but. They don’t count because [laundry list of historical factoids].”

Now, if one chooses to dig into the historical background of all of the cases under consideration, one finds that all of them involve historical complexity. Freud said that sex explains everything; it doesn’t. Marx said capital explains everything; it doesn’t. You say religion explains everything about governance in the societies under discussion here; it doesn’t. That’s not to say that religion -- or sex or capital -- don’t matter, it’s to say that no one thing alone explains it all. (Feel free to say that that isn’t what you have been saying, but only if you are willing to go back and show me where you said otherwise.)

I personally have no interest in the Indonesian Muslim environment as it developed totally different from the ME as did the Indian Muslim environment and right now it is the ME that impacts the global Muslim community not vice versa.

[OUTLAW 09]

Dayuhan---as I mentioned the symbolism of the Silk Road and how it is was used by the Shia---I will give you another tip.

Symbolism was a major part of both the Shia and Sunni insurgency and their various groups including first QJBR, then AQI then ISI and finally ISIS while for AQI certain symbolism has remained the same from 2004 to 2014.

One of the first and about only symbolism studies was done by the West Point Counter Terrorism Center---was never ever really used by the US Army in Iraq. It was never really updated after they completed the study.

This symbolism was especially used in their logos which was found on their videos and press releases. Symbolism is a critical part of the Shia/Sunni conflict in the ME and especially in Iraq and is a critical element in "radicalization" and recruitment.

Symbolism was also a form of communication between the various Islamic groups and lend creditability to each group.

The US IC never really paid any attention to the logos as they viewed it simply as propaganda---I was one of the few that could define groups simply by the logos as the logo says a lot about the thinking of the groups and their position on Islam---even the insurgency starting using logos of one group to put blame on any group during some of their internal "disagreements" in 2006/2007.

Example:

Saraya al-Dafa’ al-Sha’bi: Kata’ib Hizballah’s New Force in Iraq

SDS’s Symbolism

One of the first, and thus far only, pieces of imagery to come out regarding SDS has been their logo. The symbol features elements common to most Iranian-backed Shia Islamist organizations. These include the extended fist clenching a Kalashnikov-style rifle (in this case coming out of the final alif in “Saraya”). Underneath the rifle rests a globe with a map of Iraq in its center. It is likely that the globe, as with the symbol for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Lebanon’s Hizballah, represents the hope for global expansion of the ideology of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Revolution. The map of Iraq in its center, as with Kata’ib Hizballah’s and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq’s logos demonstrates the group’s primarily Iraq-focused agenda.

[Bill Moore]

Back to Iraq

I realize the following claim may not be accurate, but it would explain a lot if it is. Why would Maliki order his army to surrender/withdraw? One theory is to create conditions where he could declare a state of emergency, which would assist him during the upcoming elections. Its that part of the world, everything is possible.

http://www.trackingterrorism.org/art...ul-insider-job

Was ISIS's Plunder of Mosul an Insider Job?

"As Iraqi government forces crumbled in disarray before the assault [on Mosul], there was speculation that they may have been ordered by their superiors to give up without a fight. One local commander in Salahuddin Province said in an interview Wednesday: 'We received phone calls from high ranking commanders asking us to give up. I questioned them on this and they said, This is an order.”

TRAC sources in the region confirm that the retreat by the Iraqi soldiers was well planned, perhaps at the highest level of government.

This attempt to show the various actors and how they interact is helpful, but far from complete.

http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2...ties.html?_r=0

In Iraq Crisis, a Tangle of Alliances and Enmities

The major players in the Iraq and Syria crisis are often both allies and antagonists, working together on one front on one day and at cross-purposes the next. Here are brief sketches of some of the confluences and conflicts in the deepening crisis

.

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/wo...icks=true&_r=0


Rebels’ Fast Strike in Iraq Was Years in the Making

When I read through this I have to wonder if our intelligence was actually broken, or if the administration decided to white wash the intelligence on ISIS because it didn't fit their narrative?

In 2007 the group published a pamphlet laying out its vision for Iraq. It cited trends in globalization as well as the Quran in challenging modern notions of statehood as having absolute control over territory. Mr. Fishman referred to the document as the “Federalist Papers” for what is now ISIS.

Under this vision, religion is paramount over administering services. Referring to citizens under its control, the pamphlet states, “improving their conditions is less important than the condition of their religion.” And one of the most important duties of the group, according to the pamphlet, is something that it has done consistently: free Sunnis from prison.

“When you go back and read it, it’s all there,” Mr. Fishman said. “They are finally getting their act together.”

The group’s recent annual report, wrote Alex Bilger, an analyst at the Institute for the Study of War, makes clear that, “the ISIS military command in Iraq has exercised command and control over a national theater since at least early 2012,” and that the group is “functioning as a military rather than as a terrorist network.”

In short they're expanding their control in both Syria and Iraq, and while extremely violent they're able to generate support by directing the people's ire against the Shia. We're focused now on Mosul, but don't forget they still control two big cities in Western Iraq and a good part of Eastern Syria.

[OUTLAW 09]

Back to Iraq

Bill ---you might be right about the martial law bit---he attempted it right after the collapse of the 4 divisions---but the parliament refused to pass the martial law bill by simply not showing up to vote---still has not been passed.

It is the last thing that stands in the way of Malaki becoming the "new" Saddam and some of the Shia leaders openly say that about Malaki.

US intel was broken for a number of reasons---all of the Sunni insurgent groups including AQI always released their battle videos, IED strike videos, thinking, manifests, ideas etc. on the web and even carried on massive conversations amongst themselves all on the web.

They even once released an IED training video depicting exactly where to place the IED strikes on every mine road clearance vehicle being used in Iraq in 2008/2009 and then released a series of actual strike videos over the next few days--all as hands-on learning via the net for the insurgent groups to watch in their various safe houses. There was a lot of cross sharing among the various groups.

At times it reminded me of US Army Special Forces UW training.

They never really cared if we watched, listened, and or downloaded---I was able to inject into the NTC training scenarios things seen in a 0200 battle video taken off one of the jihadi web sites ie say the RKG 3 anti tank grenade released in a single AQI video and roll it into the next day BCT scenario along with the battle videos as learning materials.

Most of the officers though felt, thought, and openly disliked using the videos because they would openly state we were being used by the enemy---as it was "propaganda".

[davidbfpo]

The following is meant to provide an overview of the military situation in Iraq for non-experts.

Link:http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-fr...xm5MgY.twitter

Very good explanation and the caveat is well worth it too:

Caveat. It is exceptionally difficult to understand the dynamics of ongoing military operations. Oftentimes, the participants themselves do not know why they are winning or losing, or even where they are in control or where their troops are. For non-participants, it is often equally difficult to gain more than a rudimentary sense of the combat without access to the sophisticated intelligence gathering capabilities—overhead imagery, signals intercepts, human reporting, etc.—available to the United States and some other governments. As one of the CIA’s Persian Gulf military analysts during the 1990-91 Gulf War, I noted the difficulty that many outside analysts had in gauging the capabilities of the two sides and following the course of operations because they did not have access to the information available to us from U.S. government assets. Consequently, readers should bring a healthy dose of skepticism to all such analyses of the current fighting in Iraq, including this one.