7.62 x 51mm at the section/squad level
I for one believe the need for suppressive fire means a belt-fed full calibre weapon at the squad level. Suppressive fire can only be provided by a proper machine gun. Unless a suppressive fire weapon can chew through bricks, concrete, wood etc it is a waste of space and weight. You shouldn't need to spray rounds on automatic, as heavy barrelled assault rifles are not heavy or robust to provide effective automatic fire. You should be only using 3-5 round bursts unless they are almsot on top of your position.
Why belt fed? Why at the Squad level?Originally Posted by GI Zhou
Not true. Suppression is created by any weapon the enemy believes can harm him.Suppressive fire can only be provided by a proper machine gun.
Chewing through bricks, concrete, and wood is destructive fire, not suppressive fire.Unless a suppressive fire weapon can chew through bricks, concrete, wood etc it is a waste of space and weight.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Dr Storr's definition.
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets...DS_feb2010.pdfFor the purposes of this article we shall use the following
definitions. ‘Suppression’ is the effect of small arms and other
weapons which prevents the enemy firing its weapons or
moving in the open whilst the fire is falling. ‘Neutralisation’
is the effect of weapons that prevents the enemy firing its
weapons or moving in the open for some time after the
fire stops. It is generally associated with indirect or area
fire. ‘Destruction’, in dismounted combat, means death or
incapacitation. For a piece of equipment, such as an armoured
Thanks. I do not wholly agree with that definition. I have discussed it with him at some length.
See the bottom of the article
"The author is grateful to Dermot Rooney and William Owen for
their comments on a draft of this article."
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
This is incorrect. 'No-escape' weapons (usually) don't suppress. You'll only be suppressed if you have some cover that you believe is effective (extreme psychological reactions aside).
Let's use a model: You have a 1x1 m wall of armoured glass in front of you and an AT weapon. 30m to your right is a stone building.
An enemy tank approaches, his turret swings into your direction.
Three options:
(a) fire the AT weapon
(b) run for cover behind the house
(c) cower behind the clear wall (<- be suppressed)
I'm sure that (c) isn't the typical reaction.
- - -
You cannot suppress someone (who fires from behind a wall) with 25mm airburst projectiles, for example. You do rather motivate him to run (not bad either, but completely different).
The same applies to many air-launched munitions.
Firepower can even step beyond suppression into deterrence. German troops didn't march in daylight in the summer of '44 in France. All marches were night marches. The air attack firepower wasn't suppressing; it was deterring on a grand scale.
This 'beyond suppression' thing is relevant in regard to 20, 25 and 40 mm airburst munitions and in regard to weapons with good penetrating power against typical cover (sniper rifles, LAW).
Summary:
Suppression is created by any weapon the enemy believes can harm him
unless he stays behind cover.
For starters, fully automatic rifles are actually not all that common in the US Army (I don't know about the Marines). Most are issued rifles with a three round burst option instead. This is because, by and large, fully automatic rifle fire leads to a waste of ammo. The SAW and the various GPMGs (M60, M240B etc.) that are belt fed allow for more sustained automatic fire. Basic load for a the M4 is 210 rounds per man by doctrine. That, of course, gets modified based on METT-TC but 210 rounds will not last long in a weapon with a rate of fire, if memory serves, around 700 RPM (don't quote me on that number but I'm sure that it is close). Basic load for the belt fed weapons is, of course, much higher, which allows for more sustained fire. Additionally, most, if not all belt fed guns, have the removable barrels to allow hot barrels to be switched out. I don't know if the IAR has this but it is hardly practical for everyone to have spare barrels for their weapons.
In any case, automatic fire is really unnecessary for most rifle equipped soldiers in most situations anyway. Slow, steady aimed fire (I was always taught around 1 round every two seconds) is far more effective than bursts or fully automatic fire. As I have stated before, the only two drills that I have been taught to use fully automatic fire for in the last few years are near ambush and vehicle drills (where the vehicle is coming at me and I have no where or no time to get out of the way).
“Build a man a fire, and he'll be warm for a day. Set a man on fire, and he'll be warm for the rest of his life.”
Terry Pratchett
Not quite. Suppression is in its most general form, is actually the failure to act through fear of harm. - That is its most coherent meaning and its meaning in most well written doctrine.
Suppression can be as simple as shouting "stop or I shoot!"
UAVs/OPs can provide suppression, because many enemy associate detection with harm. - So likewise "hard targeting" as done on foot patrols also provides suppression.
Snipers and MGs apply suppression in the same general way, using specifically different means. Anything that prevents effective enemy action is applying suppression.
Last edited by William F. Owen; 04-28-2010 at 12:38 PM.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Sir,
I think a lot of wht you've written, stirring up a hornet's nest as you go, has helped to carify a lot of the issues for many (including myself). I have read that article and a few others before. Personally I find you're suggestion, in another article, of the merits of issuing PDWs (such as the Magpul PDW) to riflemen to enable the section and platoon to carry more CSW very, well, er, suggestive. I read an article in the Marine Corps Gazette by a Cap. P. K. S. Sprincin (I think) entitled "Rethinking the Rifle Platoon" (link broken) which argued along similar lines (in "Rethinking the Rifle Company" he also has a reconnaisance platoon attached to each COY which if allied to a sniper team [+TI sights per team as well as FOOs] would be a potent combination with recce plt finding and fixing with long range fires, the two rifle plts striking and the weapons plt providing SBF, but I digress
). The CLU (4kg) also has a useful point reconnassance(sp?), surveillance(sp?) and battle-planning/assigning TRP function. The fact that the system can be deployed by two men who can still carry an IW/PDW means you haven't lost two riflemen but gained a vluable capability. But I still the see the need for IW with at least an effective range of 300m+ and just wondered if a true IAR would be better along the lines suggested by webb. Anyway, as a layman I much appreciate the knowledge avaliable here offered ...for free no less!. I can't remember interaction this good since I left Kings College London and the Department of War Studies (I was a student, nothing more important than that)
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 04-28-2010 at 03:21 PM. Reason: man-portable not MANPAD...then again with the proliferation of tactical UAVs you never know!!!
So, essentially, the SAW/LMG offers a greater deal of endurance in the fire-fight viz the IW which, when used properly, deliver point fires against PID targets while the LMG/SAW gets them out into the open or keeps their heads down to enable said shots?
I have also wondered wether or not having a SAW/LMG acts as a psychological crutch/sop for squadies. Would removing them aid in habituating offensive IBT rather than waiting for the SAW to start opening fire. I think I recall another thread or a post on this one that stated that the SAW/LMG/BAR was usually the only effective weapon firing or some such while others kept themselves suitably out of harms way (or did I read that wrong; probably in connexion with SLA Marshall's "work")
Something like that. The machine guns allow us to put a lot of rounds down range quickly which allows us to gain and maintain fire superiority. Now that concept has been drilled into me since I was a private but it is fairly controversial here. There are other issues as well. It is difficult at best to maneuver with a GPMG and even the SAW is not great for moving with under fire. I am not a huge fan of the saw. It lacks the punch of the GPMG and the accuracy and maneuverability of a rifle (anyone who has gotten up to do a short rush with one of these and had the ammo box fly off knows what I am talking about). The only real advantage it has it the ability to put a lot more lead down range. Sometimes that is a great thing to have and sometimes it just means more wasted ammo.
I am reading On Infantry at the moment and that sounds like the old French model for infantry developed during the Great war, where the job of the rest of the team/squad was to protect the automatic weapons. That is not a good way to do things and we got away from that a long time ago. There are times when the GPMG might be the only really effective weapon for a specific engagement due to its range and penetration but that is not the rule.
“Build a man a fire, and he'll be warm for a day. Set a man on fire, and he'll be warm for the rest of his life.”
Terry Pratchett
I'd be a bit careful of "On Infantry." It gets some stuff plain wrong. Not sure about the French, but a recurring theme in German and to some extent the UK infantry tactical doctrine is the constant movement of the "Guns" (LMG and/or GPMGs) forward, using the squad/section to get them into position, while then seeking out a new fire position, which to move the gun to next.
This was explicit in the 1941 "Battle Craft" manual and very much implicit to the Wigram Grouping of 1943. I would also submit that if you look at the British 1918 Infantry Platoon of 2 x Gun Sections and 2 x Rifle Sections, you see the same idea. BUT - from about 1942/3 onwards, the UK just ignores the idea and reduces everything to the "Section Attack." The rest is a sad history of bad infantry tactics.
Once you have section or squads of 2-3 equally equipped fire teams, this type of "gun manoeuvre" becomes impossible, - which is a pity because it works really well.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Reliability and accuracy
is far more important in extended combat than rate of fire.
Accurate fire provides better suppression against trained or experienced fighters than a large number of inaccurate rounds or more noise.
Energy at range is more important than velocity; knock down power helps but shot placement is still key.
The M249 and similar weapons fail on all three counts.
The M240 / PKM / MG3 are GPMGs and should be Company weapons, detached to Platoons and Squads only occasionally and as the situation demands (as opposed to habitual...).
The Stoner 63 system offered an automatic rifle with a fast change top fed and thus more reliable magazine. Get that and one of these LINK. Magpul also allegedly has one LINK.
It is not desirable or possible to train or equip a vast mobilization Army in accordance with those parameters. It is possible desirable to so equip and train a small professional Army.
This is intriguing. Why? I would generally want to hold GPMGs in the Platoons.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
The Russians and Chinese in combat, as opposed to exercises, have always emphasisied the pushing forwrad belt fed machine guns, regardless where they were/are held on the TO&E. The Russian Army's experience in the Causasus only reinforced it, and has seen the trend to go away from 5.45 x 39mm back to 7.62 x 39mm and 7.62 x 54mmR weapons by pushing the PKM et al into the squad/section level. Armies on operations will configure their forces with what works, and the need for a belt fed 7.62 x 51mm or equivalent weapon has been proven over time to give the edge in combat. I finish with this example but can provide Russian and Chinese examp[les from combat operations.
The Australian Army in Vietnam emphasised this early, even when the L2A1 heavy barrelled magazine fed version of the SLR (FN-FAL) was available. On page 72 of the April 2010 Australian Infantry Magazine it notes about 1RAR (infantry battalion) in early 1966 that:
'Each standing patrol was made up of usually a small group of men. Ideally it could be up to a section of ten men, but in reality it was more likely to be one NCO and four to five diggers. The equuipment carried would consist of a radio, at least one M60 machine gun (emphasis added), hand grenades, flares and personal weapons. The patrol would travel light with only basic combat webbing. There was no requirement for much else as the patrol would depart the perimeter at last light and would normally return a little after first light. Or earlier if things got exciting.'
Interesting that this is of a Standing Patrol - who normally seek not to fight, so I guess the M60 was just to break contact.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
Maybe if their position had been compromised and they were attacked they would have to extricate themselves?
Standing patrols did not generally turn into a major firefight and are still practiced today where appropriate. Generally an enemy and a patrol stumble upon each other and break contact unless one has had time to set up a hasty ambush. The M60 gave an important advantage in case the enemy group turned out to be larger than the patrols. The Vietnamese found the RPG2 to be an effective weapon to break contact too.
The use of CS gas is frowned upon to break contact, as is the use of a similar grenade top the M34 WP.
The purpose of the patrols are to keep an enemy off balance by denying him the ability to stage attacks and close recon of your positions, and early warning of an impending attack. Two M60s/MG3s/GPMGs provide a rather potent problem on an enemy's flank.
Night vision equipment is a bonus as they make it easier to patrol and conversely rreduce the need for as many patrols providing the ground doesn't have too many daed zones, hence the need for standing patrols in close country.
Re: GPMGs located at Company level.
My observation has been that MGs at Platoon level are misused and overused -- generally not because they're needed or in many cases even make tactical sense but simply because they're available. They are the least reliable Platoon weapon (now that the Dragon is gone), misused they can burn up a heavy ammo load, most Rifle Platoon Machine Gunners are not at all well trained (I said most, not all) and more. Placed in Co level MG Plat, they can be farmed to Platoons as required based on METT-TC, the gunners and squads train together and become true specialists instead of being just the guy who got stuck with (or loves...) the gun (neither of those two poles guarantees the best man for the job. Indirect fire. There's more, that's just openers.
A proper AR or true LMG, magazine fed for reliability, works more than adequately in most situations, the weapon is less complicated, more reliable easier to learn and fire, lighter and more flexible, uses less ammo and with a single shot capability will not give away the positions of your automatic weapons under a probe or recon by fire....
GI Zhou:
Both the Russians and the Chinese still have mostly conscript armies, thus an emphasis on automatic weapons to compensate for the lack of decent marksmanship training and to counterbalance the inherent inaccuracy of sloppily made weapons. No reason for a professional force to spend that much money on ammunition for combat when they could simply spend a bit more for training purposes and far less for combat.
My observation of 1 and 5 RAR in Viet Nam was that they carried the M60 for the same reason the US Army and Marine Corps did -- it was available and no suitable AR or LMG happened to be.
A CS grenade atop an M34? Never tried it. What does REALLY work to break contact is an M8 HC Smoke Grenade taped to an M18 Claymore equipped with a 30 second piece of M700 time fuze and a Fuze Lighter, preferably the M2 or M60 -- the others don't do damp. One usually works, two were virtually guaranteed to do so. They now have this little dude: LINK...
OK, (1) you mention the old "train separate, fight together" issue. It can find application in everything from infantry to armor/mech infantry battalion training up to the question why the AF is usually separate of the army.My observation has been that MGs at Platoon level are misused and overused -- generally not because they're needed or in many cases even make tactical sense but simply because they're available. They are the least reliable Platoon weapon (now that the Dragon is gone
(2) You seem to assume that tactics (one of the METT-TC "T"'s., after all) permit such a shifting of machine guns from the Coy Cmdr's pool to the Plt in need.
This is questionable in many situation because of the shortage of infantry and the therefore necessary wide spacing / dispersion.
You may end up with another recurring phenomenon:
Specialists pooled at HQ, but in the field de facto permanently attached to subordinate units.
The only reliable way to avoid this from happening is afaik to pool less support than subordinate units in the formation/unit. Like 2 machine guns for a Coy of 3 Plt.
I meant either a CS grenade or a M34, not taped together, but the effect could well be imagined. The Chinese have a tear gas grenade that would be good for breaking contact. The BZ 45mm explosive tear gas rifle grenade which utilises a bullet trap design.
It is heavy at 450g, and are very accurate being designed to be able to land in a 0.3 x 0.3m area at 100m. They however are dangerous in use, as their use by Thai security forces during the disturbances on 7 October 2008 showed. Three protestors were killed, and eight lost legs, feet or toes due to grenade explosions. Tests by Thai forensic examiners showed that there was a considerable amount of RDX explosive and that it ‘left a crater eight centimetres wide and three centimetres deep (three-inches wide and one-inch deep) in the ground’, further noting that it ‘left a hole in a metal pipe.
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