Iran, Nukes, Diplomacy and other options (catch all thread 2007-2010)

[JeffC]

The above speaks direct to the 3000 centrifuges producing HEU.

Iran hasn't yet revealed an accurate report of it's capabilities to produce HEU. It has old, unreliable centerfuges. If you read the AFCEA Intelligence newsletter NightWatch, the author, John McCreary writes:

Another paragraph of the Key Judgments merits special attention. “We judge with moderate confidence that the earliest possible date Iran would be technically capable of producing enough HEU (highly enriched uranium) for a weapon is late 2009, but that this is very unlikely.” At last this is a judgment that is consistent with what the world knows about Pakistani P-1 centrifuges which is the type they proliferated to Iran and North Korea, according to multiple technical sources – they are engineering nightmares. The rotors break and the centrifuge cascade cannot be stabilized, which explains why the Pakistanis developed and use P-2 centrifuges in their cascades.

The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead. And since that's unlikely, their only other use is to be a negotiating tool for Tehran to bargain with.

[J Wolfsberger]

The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead. And since that's unlikely, their only other use is to be a negotiating tool for Tehran to bargain with.

And if anyone really wants to look for hidden motives, the new NIE rather neatly takes Iran's nuke program out of play.

Some people might find that a clever diplomatic move on our part.

[Kreker]

Newsmax, Thursday, December 13, 2007: Kissinger: NIE Report Misread

Former presidential adviser and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argues that the much-publicized report on the Iranian nuclear weapons program issued last week by the National Intelligence Estimate has been widely misread.

And he asserts that it does not indicate that Iran has abandoned efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.

The key passage in the report reads: “We judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program."

In an op-ed piece in the Washington Post, Kissinger states that the passage “was, in fact, qualified by a footnote whose complex phraseology obfuscated that the suspension really applied to only one aspect of the Iranian nuclear weapons program (and not even the most significant one): the construction of warheads. That qualification was not restated in the rest of the document, which continued to refer to the "halt of the weapons program" repeatedly and without qualification.

“The reality is that the concern about Iranian nuclear weapons has had three components: the production of fissile material, the development of missiles and the building of warheads.....

This tosses a monkey wrench into the fray!

[tequila]

Wasn't Paul Bremer one of Kissinger's boys?

Pat Lang on Kissinger's editorial.

In this piece Kissinger insists that he (and his friends) know best what is important (and dangerous) in Iran's nuclear program. He insists that the mere enrichment of uranium is the most dangerous part of such a program. He denigrates the focus of the NIE on actual weapon and warhead research and production, claiming that such prodigies of engineering could be achieved with relative ease once the all-important store of enriched uranium is obtained.

In this process of reasoning, Kissinger ignores the fact that uranium enrichment is also necessary to produce fuel needed to have a large number of atomic electric plants. The difference in the two kinds of enrichment is that weapons production requires a much higher percentage of enrichment. The difference is detectable and so far the IAEA has not detected any efforts to produce weapons grade enriched fuel.

[Watcher In The Middle]

...of the 2007 NIE. Just a few minor "pol" observations.

First (from a pol standpoint), this isn't a "game changer" as much as it is a "playing field changer". It was sort of like trying to play soccer on an ice hockey rink, and now that's been changed to a basketball court. But, now it's not a major priority like it was before, so nobody wants to really play PERIOD.

Second, it's been an early Christmas present for all the political "Body and Fender" shops out there. The 2007 NIE conclusions weren't expected, so all the political punditry had to scramble around and had to acquire all the "expertise" they could get on the QT. Nice little unexpected bonus there, some people made out really well. The spin resulting from all of this has run the full spectrum, with some of it being nothing short of spectacular (from a "spin appreciation" standpoint).

Third, most of the major political candidates are silently counting their blessings. Took an item off the boards that nobody had a really good answer on, and nobody wanted to really run with.

Conclusions (political) I'm hearing: Iran is no longer a front burner International issue, for the domestic political front. And from the looks of it, the pols like it that way.

Thoughts?

[JeffC]

Despite whatever one may think about the opinions of a given individual I have always found it wise to listen to those to whom many other prominent decision makers listen.

If nothing else you know exactly where they stand in relation to yourself.

I wonder how much support towards Iran's nuclear ambitions Kissinger provided when he was Nixon's National Security Advisor, and if he's having any second thoughts, particularly as regards the loopholes in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty? Here's a bit of Iran's nuclear history back in the 60's and 70's:

Although Iran began developing its nuclear program in the 1950s, it was slow to progress until late in the 1960s, when the U.S.-supplied 5MW thermal research reactor (TRR) went online at the Tehran Nuclear Research Center (TNRC). In 1973, spurred by an influx of oil revenues, the Shah of Iran embarked on an ambitious goal of modernizing the country and building its image abroad. He did this by shifting the country's budgets toward the military and the newly established Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI). The Shah set his goal high: "...get, as soon as possible, 23,000MWe from nuclear power stations."[1] In 1968, Iran signed the NPT in an effort to speed up its negotiations for nuclear agreements, particularly with the United States. In 1970, the government ratified the NPT and its obligations went into force.

In the five years that followed, Iran concluded several contracts for the construction of nuclear plants and the supply of nuclear fuel: with the United States in 1974; Germany in 1976; and France in 1977. In 1976, Iran also purchased a stake in Eurodif's (the European consortium) Tricastin uranium enrichment plant in France and purchased a stake in the RTZ uranium mine in Rossing, Namibia. Also in 1976, the government signed a $700 million contract to purchase uranium yellowcake from South Africa and sent Iranian technicians abroad for training in nuclear sciences.

(source: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Iran/1819.html)

[Rex Brynen]

I'm very far from a Kissinger fan, and as has been apparent on this board I've been critical of (bellicose) Administration handling of Iran (nuclear and other issues).

His editorial does point out an important issue, however.

The enrichment issue is an absolutely key aspect of a weapons programme, and also relates directly to future Iranian strategic power. It is also the hardest part to crash-start, and the hardest part to do covertly.

The unclassified portions of the NIE seems to suggest that it is the weapons design/weaponization portion of the programme has been stopped. Whether the enrichment programme is meant to have civilian, military (immediate weapons production), or strategic-scientific-technical (future weapons potential) goals is still unclear. I suspect the third is at least as important as the first.

[JeffC]

I'm very far from a Kissinger fan, and as has been apparent on this board I've been critical of (bellicose) Administration handling of Iran (nuclear and other issues).

His editorial does point out an important issue, however.

The enrichment issue is an absolutely key aspect of a weapons programme, and also relates directly to future Iranian strategic power. It is also the hardest part to crash-start, and the hardest part to do covertly.

The unclassified portions of the NIE seems to suggest that it is the weapons design/weaponization portion of the programme has been stopped. Whether the enrichment programme is meant to have civilian, military (immediate weapons production), or strategic-scientific-technical (future weapons potential) goals is still unclear. I suspect the third is at least as important as the first.

But no one has denied that there's still an enrichment issue. It is the single greatest fault that the IAEA has with Iran's other-wise more or less acceptable compliance, and it's still being negotiated as far as I know. Neverthelessr, I don't know of any credible experts who claim that Iran has anything other than ancient centerfuges which might be able to generate enough HEU in 18 months to produce one nuclear warhead - and that's a big "if".

[Rex Brynen]

"U.S. puts brakes on Israeli plan for attack on Iran nuclear facilities," Haaretz, 13 August 2008.

The American administration has rejected an Israeli request for military equipment and support that would improve Israel's ability to attack Iran's nuclear facilities.

A report published last week by the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) states that military strikes are unlikely to destroy Iran's centrifuge program for enriching uranium.

The Americans viewed the request, which was transmitted (and rejected) at the highest level, as a sign that Israel is in the advanced stages of preparations to attack Iran. They therefore warned Israel against attacking, saying such a strike would undermine American interests. They also demanded that Israel give them prior notice if it nevertheless decided to strike Iran.

As compensation for the requests it rejected, Washington offered to improve Israel's defenses against surface-to-surface missiles.

The report mentioned is David Albright, Paul Brannan, and Jacqueline Shire, "Can military strikes destroy Iran’s gas centrifuge program? Probably not" ISIS, 7 August 2008:

From the time that Iran halted the suspension of its centrifuge manufacturing efforts and its adherence to the Additional Protocol, the IAEA’s knowledge of Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing complex has degraded dramatically. U.S. and other intelligence agencies appear to have only partial information about Iran’s centrifuge complex and its ability to reconstitute its program following an attack. Iran’s decision to disperse and keep secret several of its key sites further hinders the development of a full picture of its centrifuge complex. Considering the modular, replicable nature of centrifuge plants, we conclude that an attack on Iran’s nuclear program is unlikely to significantly degrade Iran’s ability to reconstitute its gas centrifuge program.

(Apologies to anyone also on MESHnet, since I've made the same post there.)

[Sean Osborne]

The 3000 centerfuge cascade, working properly with no downtime, would at best create enough HEU in one year for ONE nuclear warhead.

Given the nature of the Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran, that's one nuclear weapon too many for a regime which has declared its intent to wipe another sovereign state off of the face of the earth.

Nevertheless, I don't know of any credible experts who claim that Iran has anything other than ancient centerfuges which might be able to generate enough HEU in 18 months to produce one nuclear warhead - and that's a big "if".

Graham Allison had a good article in the YaleGlobal back in June 2006.

He wrote:

The dog that hasn’t barked is Iran’s covert programs for acquiring nuclear weapons. Four huge “known unknowns” lie at the heart of judgments about the threat posed by Iran.

But on the specifics about Iranian centrifuges Allison wrote:

...the father of the Pakistani nuclear program, Dr. A.Q. Khan, sold Iran advanced P2 centrifuge designs that are still unaccounted for.

[bourbon]

Given the nature of the Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran, that's one nuclear weapon too many for a regime which has declared its intent to wipe another sovereign state off of the face of the earth.

What is the expression "to wipe [something] off the map” in Persian? I have been told that they do not even have such an idiom. There are some SWC members with significant Iran experience, hopefully they can help here.

Where in the history this “Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran” have they acted not in their interest, and acted irrationally? I am not speaking of rhetoric, but of behavior.

[Sean Osborne]

What is the expression "to wipe [something] off the map” in Persian? I have been told that they do not even have such an idiom. There are some SWC members with significant Iran experience, hopefully they can help here.

Okay, would the Farsi translation of the following suffice instead?

"They are angry with our nation. But we tell them 'so be it and die from this anger'. Rest assured that if you do not respond to the divine call, you will die soon and vanish from the face of the earth," he said.

Where in the history this “Shi'a Twelver regime in Iran” have they acted not in their interest, and acted irrationally? I am not speaking of rhetoric, but of behavior.

US Embassy, Tehran. USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon. Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia. Or how about the cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops? There are other examples of irrational Shi'a Twelver behaior, but this will suffice for now.

[Rex Brynen]

US Embassy, Tehran. USMC Barracks and US Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon. Khobar Towers, Dahran, Saudi Arabia. Or how about the cross-border crap the Qods Force of the IRGC has executed in iraq against US and British troops? There are other examples of irrational Shi'a Twelver behaior, but this will suffice for now.

I'm not sure I would put many, if any, of those in the "irrational" column. Certainly no more irrational that the "topple Saddam Hussein's regime with grandiose ideas of establishing a stable, pro-Western free-market democratic ally in its place" (accompanied by "shift focus away from Afghanistan," "dissolve the Iraqi army," and "initially propose a bizarre system of Iraqi caucuses instead of elections"). Indeed, when in Tehran during the summer I was struck by how often I was asked to explain "irrational" American policy, which many interlocutors seem to have understood as reflecting a mix of Bush's personal views, Israeli influence, a cabal of neocon advisors, and Christian fundamentalism.

One of the most interesting thrusts of the declassified judgements of the NIE is the assessment that Tehran generally does weigh cost and benefit, and thereby acts in a strategic manner. Establishing a potential weapons capability, without actual weaponization, may well be quite rational from their perspective, given both perceived threats and the neighbourhood they live in.

[Jedburgh]

LA Times, 9 Dec 07: CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect

The CIA launched a secret program in 2005 designed to degrade Iran's nuclear weapons program by persuading key officials to defect, an effort that has prompted a "handful" of significant departures, current and former U.S. intelligence officials familiar with the operation say.....

.....Intelligence gathered as part of that campaign provided much of the basis for a U.S. report released last week that concluded the Islamic Republic had halted its nuclear weapons work in 2003. Officials declined to say how much of that intelligence could be attributed to the CIA program to recruit defectors.

Although the CIA effort on defections has been aimed in part at gaining information about Tehran's nuclear capabilities, its goal has been to undermine Iran's emerging capabilities by plucking key scientists, military officers and other personnel from its nuclear roster......

.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....

[Sean Osborne]

LA Times, 9 Dec 07: CIA Has Recruited Iranians to Defect

.....The program has had limited success. Officials said that fewer than six well-placed Iranians have defected, and that none has been in a position to provide comprehensive information on Tehran's nuclear program.....

Dang... there goes my coveted HUMINT. POOF!

[Jedburgh]

As has been noted by others, this thread began to go in circles while taking a nosedive a little while ago. In an attempt to clean things up, I've removed the last few posts and changed it up. None of the deletions are targeted at the posters invidiually - just trying to get this rebooted in a more substantive manner.

This is an important subject, but I will lock the thread if it goes off-kilter or becomes stridently partisan.

Thanks

[Galrahn]

I'm not an expert on negotiations, but I've been largely unimpressed with the US approach of unconditional terms with Iran. It seems counter intuitive to me that the US should expect any results other than failure with the “unconditional terms” approach.

I'd negotiate with Iran, and bring to the table every issue, even the most complicated or controversial. I'd also put the media microphone in front of the Iranian negotiators every day for as long as I could in the process. My observation on Iran is their government has a very difficult time articulating their message in person without advertising an obvious disconnect with the west that is very difficult to conceal in media spin. The thing about Iran’s message is, their talking points work for either an audience in the Middle East or the West, but almost never does the same hard line message work for both audiences at the same time.

The region in general is less open to the hardliner message than in the past, too many economic interests counter to the hard line old school message Iran touts, so I'd let them talk. Their rhetoric adds little to their position in the region today, how would it be any different at the negotiating table.

The examples are the UN over the last few years (which largely goes uncovered by the media), but an even better example was Columbia University earlier this year. I get the impression that negotiations and plenty of public attention would strengthen the west’s position more than it would hurt it, because while Iran's message is appealing to hard liners, the hard line message is losing its steam regionally among the major players.

If it really is about talking, then let Iran speak. They really aren't very good at talking when they have to improvise, they are only good at it when they can package the message. That is my observation anyway.

[bourbon]

Post

Very well said.

Agree 100% about the Columbia University event. That worked out very bad for Iran. The only people who came away looking more of a buffoon then Ahmadinejad, were Bollinger and the people who complained so much about having him speak. Ahmadinejad came off more like a clown then a pariah, and I imagine his performance and how he was essentially laughed at in the west hurt his domestic standing.

PS: The "I-Ran" song parody about Ahmadinejad in NYC this fall was probably the best sketch Saturday Night Live has done in a few years.

[Rex Brynen]

Agree 100% about the Columbia University event. That worked out very bad for Iran. The only people who came away looking more of a buffoon then Ahmadinejad, were Bollinger and the people who complained so much about having him speak. Ahmadinejad came off more like a clown then a pariah, and I imagine his performance and how he was essentially laughed at in the west hurt his domestic standing.

I heard the opposite from many Iranians (including opponents of Ahmadinejad)--the open hostility of Bollinger was seen as so rude and contrary to the norms of hospitality that it overshadowed the content of Ahmadinejad's speech. As a result, he came off (remarkably!) looking like the statesman to domestic mass audiences...

While many in the Iranian foreign policy elite cringe at the President's antics and declarations, don't underestimate the way it plays with both hardliners and his broader voter base, among whom tweaking the US can score domestic points.

[JeffWolf]

Hi,



1) It's unclear to me whether the drafters of the NIE had any political motivation one way or the other. I can think of many, all plausible, but in the absence of additional information, it seems to me impossible to infer the drafters' intentions from the finished product. Additionally, people might not be angels, but they also often take pride in their work and their identity as "professionals." Maybe this betrays incredible naivete, but it does not seem beyond the realm of the possible that the drafters assessed the best available evidence, and made their conclusions accordingly. I recognize this may well not be the case, but I do think, as with all these hypotheses, it is probably difficult to rebut absent additional information.

2) I think the NIE does a reasonably good of acknowledging it is assessing issues that are uncertain - that is, cannot be quantified with any degree of precision. Moreover, I think the NIE does a reasonably good job of acknowledging, and trying to overcome, the difficulty of trying to convey that uncertainty via inevitably imprecise language. I think Sherman Kent once wanted percentages placed on intelligence estimates. I'm not sure about the practicality of that, but again, I think the scope conditions at the beginning of the NIE move in that direction.

3) Because of 2) I think to a certain extent, it is probably not particularly useful to parse particular word choices too much, and even less useful to do so without reference back to the scope conditions outlined at the beginning of the documents.

4) To use the same reasoning as to 1), I'd be wary of inferring a state's motives from its actions, just as I'd be wary of inferring drafters' intentions from the final product. Aggregates can produce different outcomes than individuals simply acting together. (Put more simply, the sum can be different than the whole of the parts.) A state's motives may not be transparent. Moreover, "states" consist of suborganizations, and their interplay (e.g., bargaining, conflict) may result in actions neither suborganization (or only just one suborganization) intended. (See Graham Allison, Essence of Decision, for the classic cite on this.) To me, it's actually easier to find a rational explanation for every state's behavior, than it is to determine every (or any) action taken by a state is "irrational." And I can think of lots of rational reasons why people within a state, rather than the state per se - say, Ahmadinejab - might display given behavior. And finally, my suspicion is that since I know little about Iran or Ahmadinejab, and have never been Ahmadinejam, most of those rational reasons would probably be wrong.

My $.02.

Regards
Jeff