Norfolk: I'll try to condense my thinking thus,

1. Manpower is limited. All resources are limited. Budget is everything. Accountants do not tell you how to fight but they do tell you how much you can have. We have to balance efficiency with effectiveness and so we have to have methods to measure this, or at least make useful comparisons.

2. There are huge flow down effects of just massing men and equipment to try and generate combat power, or address redundancy. These are mostly negative.

3. How you train, equip and organise has far more effect on combat power than pure numbers. You cannot argue that a 40 man platoon is more effective than a 30 man platoon, in terms other than numbers, for the same given training and equipment. The actual argument is whether to organise a 120 man company in 3 x 40 man platoons or 4 x 30 man platoons.

4. Task organisation works. We know this, so why fixate on fixed numbers for any other reason than budgets. I may have a 120 man platoon, but that does not stop me generating a 75 man fighting patrol under a skilled platoon commander.

5. As concerns "Patrols", I just refuse to get stuck in the 1915 phraseology that has held back infantry doctrine for nearly 80 years. We can do things better and also do better things. US/UK Infantry doctrine is till stuck in a WW2 set piece conventional battle mindset, that is retained for emotional and organisational reasons. If I were to subscribe to this mindset, I would be failing in my attempt to try and improve the wider understanding of infantry operations.