Air Power in the New COIN Era

[Entropy]

Entropy,

The capability to keep the skies clear forever and ever against all enemies foriegn and domestic is the mission dejour for AF as a whole (at least in my limited perspective). But what about the sudden introduction of anything (use your imagination) which would cause manned flights to be untenable. What then?

Just trying to take a stab at the meat of it.

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

[Old Eagle]

A lot of chatter among the air guys about the efficacy of a prop airplane. In truth, props are bad, it would be much better to mod F-15s to run at a coupla hundred bucks per operational hour instead of whatever it costs now. The mods should also allow maintenance by largely illiterate populations with materials readily at hand.

As far as "BPC" goes, don't worry about it. Some enterprising company will step up to fill the void. Blackwater is already active in the air world; wouldn't take much to develop a core of contractors to advise HN air forces (or Army Air Corps in countries who keep the relationship in order.)

That way, OUR air force could fly air superiority missions against ...um..

[wm]

. . .it quite often helps to look at the past. I am currently reading Lee Kennett's The First Air War 1914-1918. I heartily recommend it to those who are trying to figure out where the attitude and culture of the worlds' air forces come from. We have not heard from our non-American readership about the other air forces of the world, but I suspect their reports would not be that different. Kennett has some interesting discussion that I find explains much of it quite handily. But, I suspect there is more to this as well.

While working in a strategic intelligence unit that was a tenant in USAREUR, my troops and I were treated by the folks from 7th Army units with an attitude similar to that expressed here by ground forces types about the air arm. On an almost daily basis we were subjected to comments like "get a haircut" and "try sleeping in a tent for a change." My troops would be jerked awake at 0500 (after working a second shift and getting back at about 0100) by Jodies about them "sleeping in," yelled by the neighboring FA Bn's batteries as they ran by in their PT formations. I suspect some part of it was envy/sour grapes on the part of the FA and Armor guys that we affectionately referred to as "treads." And, within our joint organization, interestingly enough, the Army INSCOM folks made similar snide comments about the Air Force and Navy personnel worked along side us. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism while some is simply an expression of group rivalry.

[Ron Humphrey]

. My point here is that some of the attitude expressed by members of the junior service may be a defense mechanism {while some is simply an expression of group rivalry}.

Not too sure this part is such a bad thing since a little competition helps keep the rust off

[Ron Humphrey]

That certainly could be a possibility at some point, but one could say the same thing about manned tanks, for example. I know there's a lot of focus on unmanned aircraft for the future, but I think a lot of people are missing some significant vulnerabilities they introduce. Specifically, control of the aircraft has to come via some signal which could be hacked or jammed. An attack on the satellite network or the comm network could disable the entire force. Unmanned aircraft offer a lot of possibility, but until there is pretty solid assurance that the supporting C3 network cannot be interdicted I think a man-in-the-loop will remain a requirement. However, given that airframes are lasting longer and longer, I would not be surprised if the follow-on to the F-22 is unmanned 30-40 years from now, or perhaps platforms will go away completely in lieu of long-range autonomous weapons. Or maybe we'll get Iron Man! Now that would be cool, but imagine the service fight over who would get to develop it!

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

[Entropy]

However consider that an armor guy would probably be one of the first to try his hand at driving them by remote considering what happens if one actually gets hit by something which can hurt it.

Also consider that from their perspective if it stops moving then you get out and you "are " infantry. For a grunt whats the comparison to that scenario for the pilot?

Not trying to play devil's advocate so much as simply trying to get perspective on it.

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Additionally, I hinted above that big changes are coming in the Air Force and the service could be fundamentally different in 50 years - perhaps unrecognizable. I think the current leadership, despite their old-school mentality, may sense it as well which may explain why the AF has such a woody for "space" and "cyberspace." On the latter, I suspect the AF's effort here will prove them either be fools or visionaries. In either event, it will be interesting to see what happens!

[120mm]

No, you're right. Both the Air Force and Navy are limited by their environments and depend on their machines not only to fight, but for basic human survival. But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

Ummm, some of the best fighters I've ever met were armor types. They tend to have extremely good awareness of how to apply sightlines and fires, as well as bringing a different paradigm to the infantry combat framework.

[Cavguy]

But I should point out that although a tanker has the potential to be infantry, but does the average tanker have the training and mentality to do more good than harm if they find themselves on foot?

<sigh>

OIF has shown that the tankers (and artillerymen, and engineers) can convert into quite adequate infantry if need be. The cost is that they degrade their primary MOS sills. At a basic level, tactics are tactics. Infantry platoon maneuver isn't conceptually that much different than armor or cav maneuver. Leadership is leadership. Tactics for the environment can be quickly learned.

Even more so, their leaders are often exceptional COIN fighters. As has been repeatedly noted, Armor officers have sheparded the most significant successes in Iraq, and developed tactics and operational art that became models for the rest of the country.

Peruse some of the Armor/Mech in COIN threads for your answer. Look for anything on Tal Afar, Ramadi, Kerbala, or Najaf. Google the branches of H.R. McMaster, Sean MacFarland, John Nagl, and Peter Monsoor.

[Entropy]

<sigh>

Thanks for setting me straight. I made some dated erroneous assumptions based on the tales a couple of old school armor guys I know. My apologies on that.

[Rob Thornton]

Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often.

Re-reading Secretary Gate's speech at Maxwell (and worth comparing to his speech at USMA, and Secretary Geren's speech at the Marshall Awards), I don't think he was worried too much about the procurement end and hardware - he was targeting grey matter.

I don't discount the $$$s - but I point out that the materiel piece is the end product. If we let the product define and constrain us, the enemy gets the advantage at some point. I think most of the hardware pieces I've seen in action are mostly suitable to us and our range of requirements - the piece that is sometimes lacking is our ability to get past our constrained thinking. On the ground - its people that make it work, that innovate, adapt, cooperate, empathize and understand the operational environment - breaking free from service cultures and prejudices. I've got many an Army 19D, Logistician and MI bubba, many an airman (who flew ISR, EW, and CAS missions), many a seaman (the naval EWOs & logisticians) to thank. All of these guys broke the mold - they discarded the mantra "that's not my job" and adopted "support the mission".

If we get the "grey matter" piece right - the rest will follow.

Best, Rob

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Man - seems like we retake this hill every so often.

Weigley's The American Way of War?