Background on AQIM: a growing threat?

[Bill Moore]

This sounds an awful lot like a forged document.
Right now I cannot remember another war-related document capture confirming suspicions so nicely, being such a perfect vindication of fears.

The papers captured in the Mechelen incident are the closest historical example I can recall.

Those are my feelings exactly, it appears to be generated to champion the current strategy. The question is who generated it? France or the U.S.? Definitely doesn't read like the other translated Islamist Manifestos I read. I think this so poorly conceived that it doesn't come across as feasible. If it is legitimate I would be surprised and wonder if this is the view of one Jihadist who can't think strategically or the movement as a whole?

Previous manifestos emphasizing waving the black flag in various countries to draw the West in intentionally with the stated intent of bankrupting us. That is a true asymmetric strategy. Unless there has been a considerable change in their approach, I suspect their intent was to draw the West in. There are different levels of drawing in, if the French keep their intervention short and then the West conducts small scale low visibility special operations it will be affordable and ultimately result in their defeat. If we attempt another major stability operation we'll be playing into their game.

[M-A Lagrange]

This comes just after Canada expressed their fear of a "new Iraq or Afghanistan" in Mali to justify not sending troops.
IMHO this (the document + Canada position + that particular discussion) translate the feeling some political deciders may have: after 2 invasions that turned to be half victories at best they are very much affraid to engage their troops in an another military adventure. In that perspective, AQ reached one of its objectives: terrorise governments.

On the other hand, what Bob is saying makes a lot of sens:

There are different levels of drawing in, if the French keep their intervention short and then the West conducts small scale low visibility special operations it will be affordable and ultimately result in their defeat. If we attempt another major stability operation we'll be playing into their game.

But I believe many in the field and at the flag level are aware of that choice.

[J Wolfsberger]

By all means, let's adopt the George Armstrong Custer Strategy:

1. Disregard available intelligence.
2. Disparage the opponents capabilities.
3. Adopt a tactically (and in this case, strategically) inferior position.
4. Victory!

Look how well it worked for him!

Because, it could be a fraud. There's no evidence whatsoever that it is, but we all know how clever those intelligence agencies are at making completely undetectably fraudulent documents that read exactly as though they were written by the people they want us to think wrote them. They're even so devilishly clever they have the documents written saying exactly the same things as the purported authors would say!

Probably the same group that Bush, Chaney and Haliburton used to plan 09/11.

</sarc>

[J Wolfsberger]

Somebody has learned. A lot. I recall discussion of this from the early 2000s - as this conflict progressed, the stupid would get weeded out and Al Qaeda would become more effective, and more dangerous. These fragments indicate that at least one person in their senior leadership has gained some knowledge about effective social change.

[Fuchs]

Those are my feelings exactly, it appears to be generated to champion the current strategy. The question is who generated it? France or the U.S.?
(...)
That is a true asymmetric strategy. Unless there has been a considerable change in their approach, I suspect their intent was to draw the West in. (...) If we attempt another major stability operation we'll be playing into their game.

Forged by US, forged by France, forged by AP, or maybe even forged by AQIM itself to achieve exactly what you wrote last.

Anyway, I've rarely had had such a strange feeling about news. It's fitting too nicely to a simple narrative. Reality rarely does this.

[davidbfpo]

Shiraz Maher, ICSR @ Kings College London, has written a short 'Insight' commentary:http://icsr.info/2013/02/icsr-insigh...from-mistakes/

It ends with:

This document offers one insight from a primary source document of just how al-Qaeda is reconsidering its strategic approach.

The main points start with:

This ICSR Insight summarises key themes, revealing how al-Qaeda is learning from its previous failures, becoming more aware of the need to engage and capture public opinion in the territories it controls, and maturing in tactical awareness.

One of the most notable features of al-Qaeda’s internal communications which discuss how the movement should best exploit the political turmoil arising from the Arab uprisings is its implicit recognition of past failures.

In what seems like a clear reference to al-Qaeda’s failure in Iraq, the document argues that the greatest errors happen where the group is overstretched, alienates public opinion, and squanders opportunities to establish safe havens.

To consolidate al-Qaeda’s position in northern Mali, Droukdel advises his fighters to engage other Islamists. This is, again, an important departure from established al-Qaeda strategy which has traditionally been hostile to other groups — viewing them with suspicion.....Finally, Droukdel is acutely aware of the need to manage perceptions of al-Qaeda’s ambitions among both policy makers in the West, and local Muslims. He advises fighters to adopt a more temperate tone and to avoid making unnecessary statements which inflame public opinion.

[Bill Moore]

This is, again, an important departure from established al-Qaeda strategy which has traditionally been hostile to other groups — viewing them with suspicion.....

The record doesn't support this claim. They have a long track record of co-opting other groups. Much like any coalition to include ours their are disagreements in the ranks and fissures that can and should be exploited.

In what seems like a clear reference to al-Qaeda’s failure in Iraq, the document argues that the greatest errors happen where the group is overstretched, alienates public opinion, and squanders opportunities to establish safe havens.

AQ Senior Leadership frequently criticized AQI leadership for excesses, so this isn't a good example of AQ core strategy, and furthermore it appears AQI is now making a come back and extending their reach into Syria.

Posed by Fuchs

Forged by US, forged by France, forged by AP, or maybe even forged by AQIM itself to achieve exactly what you wrote last.

It is a narrative many of CT policy folks believe in, and I can't help but think this appears to be crafted to justify their expensive CT strategy. Denying safe havens with occupation forces is not sustainable and all too often results in our actions defeating ourselves.

The tactical fight is important, preventing terrorist attacks is important, but most of our CT strategists seem to confuse the tactical with the strategic. In no way am I implying we should reduce pressure on their foot soldiers and leaders. However, from a strategic view it seems that the only feasible way for AQ and their ilk to achieve their aims is if we enable them by defeating ourselves by over extending ourselves financially. Strategies, campaigns, etc. must be sustainable to be feasible. If what appears to be the perfect strategy isn't sustainable, then it isn't the perfect strategy.

Intelligence, special operations, law enforcement operations for the most part seem to be appropriate and sustainable responses to this type of threat (this includes substantial psychological warfare to hasten their defeat, because ultimately AQ seem to defeat themselves over time whenever they gain a foothold, and regardless of whether they're a learning organization or not, it is likely they'll continue to do so based on their deeply flawed and unappealing ideology). When needed for specific cases we can surge in paratroopers or Marines for a short duration operations to reduce their paramilitary threat.

It is too late in Afghanistan to change course substantially. We need to finish what we started (with more modest aims, but we can't afford to bail), but in the future I hope we don't default to long term stability operations with a large footprint on the ground with the ever elusive goal of denying safe haven. Never say never, as there may be rare exceptions where that is the best course of action, but it shouldn't be the default option.

[J Wolfsberger]

... but in the future I hope we don't default to long term stability operations with a large footprint on the ground with the ever elusive goal of denying safe haven. Never say never, as there may be rare exceptions where that is the best course of action, but it shouldn't be the default option.

I agree with that.

Building on it, shouldn't we simply let them have their safe haven and establish a harsh cordon sanitaire around it? I don't think it would take much in the way of manpower, and could be enforced with drone strikes. Let them have their 6th century sharia derived utopia, as long as they don't bother the rest of us.

[Bill Moore]

Safe havens are also known as free fire zones.

[Fuchs]

I agree with that.

Building on it, shouldn't we simply let them have their safe haven and establish a harsh cordon sanitaire around it? I don't think it would take much in the way of manpower, and could be enforced with drone strikes. Let them have their 6th century sharia derived utopia, as long as they don't bother the rest of us.

Cordon sanitaire enforced by drone strikes?!? Seriously?


Not far south of Malia and Niger is ended the expansion of Muslim faith. That is containing.

[Dayuhan]

Not far south of Malia and Niger is ended the expansion of Muslim faith. That is containing.

The concern may be less with containing the spread of an Islamist empire than with containing individuals or small groups who may leave the area with the intent and capacity to make messes elsewhere.