Syria under Bashir Assad (closed end 2014)

[CrowBat]

... The second area you addressed which is we have limited means to compel any government to actually govern more effectively. At the end of the day it seems that understanding the failures and the consequences of poor governance are important to gain understanding/context, but if is there is something that threatens our interest that resides in that country, improving governance is seldom going to reduce that threat in a timely manner....

My English is not good enough to describe the following in an as eloquent fashion, and my style seems to appear rather 'aggressive' although there's no intention to be such: yet, it is indeed so that I cannot but wonder about some expressions here.

Are you sure that it's 'seldom' that the US can change the way some of its allies are governed? Or isn't it so that this is next to never attempted?

Then when it's attempted, then there is 'no problem' to change things.

Let's consider the latest (known to me) example of an 'intervention' (of sort) in one of countries in question: removal of famous Prince Bandar from his post as Chief of Saudi Intel.

Frustrated by Obama's indecision on Syria, Bandar became a vocal propagator of the idea 'Saudis are going to do all it on their own'. I'm too lazy to search for all the possible links, but '5 minutes of googling' should be enough to find out that as of autumn 2012 and through early 2013, certain papers were full of statements by various Saudi ambassadors essentially stating the same, plus reports about massive Saudi purchases of specific arms for insurgents (usually such that could be obtained only from one source, which was motivated with the idea that should any end in 'wrong hands', these wrong hands couldn't get spares and ammo for them).

Then there was that issue of the FBI's report on 9/11...and bam! Because Sauds are such valuable friends one couldn't ruin relations with them: thus, Obama made it clear to Abdullah that the US are a 'senior partner' in that relationship - and Bandar has to go. In exchange for this, parts of the 9/11 report damning Saudis for their support and involvement were 'weakened' or even deleted.

If it's 'so easy' to kick out an important and highly influential minister, why to hell should there be a problem to force them to do many other things too? Except it is so that there is _no_ interest to force them to change anything, because that would jeopardise own interests?

For example because dictatorships are easier to control than pluralist societies...?

Of course, there are better - or, should I say, 'more humane' - examples from the past too, like imposing a parliament upon the emir of Kuwait in exchange for liberating his sheikdom, back in 1990. Why is it so that nobody recalls that?

But then, that's only 'one more indicator' that it's really anything but 'seldom' that certain 'friends' can be forced into specific decisions.

We certainly have the means to make quick work of any ISIL/ISIS conventional capability and probably should, but then what?

Then you'll have to offer 'them' - all those presently more than happy to join the ISIS - more attractive alternatives than the ISIS could.

Otherwise, you'll have another al-Qaida, another ISIS, another whatever else - at latest in another 10-15 years. Otherwise, this war of which you're tired, is never going to end.

Yet the fact is: you can't offer such alternatives while upholding bigot, corrupt, and oppressive regimes.

[Dayuhan]

Are you sure that it's 'seldom' that the US can change the way some of its allies are governed? Or isn't it so that this is next to never attempted?

It's seldom attempted because Americans have finally figured out that it doesn't work. Might get a cosmetic shuffling of faces, a few paper "reforms" that are not enforced or taken seriously... but not meaningful change in governance. These countries are governed the way they are for a reason: the people that run them want them run that way and see substantive change as a threat to their own power.

Let's consider the latest (known to me) example of an 'intervention' (of sort) in one of countries in question: removal of famous Prince Bandar from his post as Chief of Saudi Intel.

Let's not pretend that Bandar's removal was solely or even primarily due to US pressure. Bandar had made a pile of enemies in his own tent and a lot of people in Riyadh wanted him out. When Syria didn't go as he wished, and when it became clear that he no longer had the capacity to get the US to do the Saudi dirty work for them, his days were numbered.

Frustrated by Obama's indecision on Syria, Bandar became a vocal propagator of the idea 'Saudis are going to do all it on their own'.

What indecision? Obama made the decision to stay out and stuck to that decision, at least until now, when indecisiveness really is creeping in. He may not have made the decision that you (or Bandar) wanted, but that's not indecision.

If it's 'so easy' to kick out an important and highly influential minister, why to hell should there be a problem to force them to do many other things too? Except it is so that there is _no_ interest to force them to change anything, because that would jeopardise own interests?

It was only "easy" because powerful people in Riyadh also wanted it done. If you think the US can compel any fundamental change in the way the Saudis govern, think again. What leverage does the US have that could force such a change?

For example because dictatorships are easier to control than pluralist societies...?

Possibly so, but the US doesn't have a great track record at controlling either. Certainly the US does not control or even significantly influence the Saudis and the other Gulf monarchies. They do what they want. Look what happened when the US tried to pressure Bahrain to respond to their Arab Spring demonstrations with accommodation and reform. That's a good example of how much influence the US has when serious matters of governance are on the line.

Of course, there are better - or, should I say, 'more humane' - examples from the past too, like imposing a parliament upon the emir of Kuwait in exchange for liberating his sheikdom, back in 1990. Why is it so that nobody recalls that?

Possibly because that kind of leverage doesn't exist without a foreign occupier... and has the pattern of governance in Kuwait really changed that much?

Then you'll have to offer 'them' - all those presently more than happy to join the ISIS - more attractive alternatives than the ISIS could.

Who's "you" in that picture? The US hasn't the right, obligation, or capacity to offer alternative forms of governance to nations in the Middle East. They have to build those for themselves.

[Bill Moore]

Crowbat

While I agree with some of your ideas about pluralism, better alternatives, etc., those ideas are not ideas that "we" can put into practice for others. It is sort of like the super model who looks good on the cover of a magazine after considerable air brushing, but when you see in person she is not much more than a plain Jane. There is a gap between the ideas you're proposing we pursue and the means to do so.

Where I principally disagree with you is that you seem to assume that if we do X then Y will happen. The real world doesn't work that way, there are many factors influencing the outcome of situation beyond what we do. All to often we have to relearn that lesson. Our actions are not necessarily going to be deterministic, they'll just be part of a larger whole. Providing support to various so called moderate insurgent groups could work in our favor, may not have any effect, and could backfire on us. To assume we have perfect control of the outcomes is hubris. We have to make educated assumptions on probable outcomes, and consider if the worst case happens is the risk worth the potential gain?

If we knew how Iraq was going to turn out, do you think Congress would have supported it if we could all go back in time? Some predicted what would happen in Iraq quite accurately, but that doesn't mean they knew. They made an educated assumption. Others assumed we could easily defeat Saddam's military (we did), and then the people would embrace as liberators and they would welcome democracy (they didn't). We learned that there was considerable tension between the ethnic groups, we learned Iran gained considerable sway with the Shia community, we learned that removing all the Ba'athists resulted basically in removing any semblance of governance, opening up control of the state/or sub-regions to a wide range of actors competing for control. Most importantly I hoped we learned the world will do things we don't anticipate, and there are no easy wars where the outcome is certain.

Indeed: 'state-building before it provides growing ground for extremism'.

That is the theory, but it is important to note that others are competing with us to build their version of a state. Unless we completely bring an adversary to their knees, which we haven't done since WWII it is unlikely we'll be able to build a state. We can help the locals build their state, but if there isn't a common vision for what that state should look like between the warring parties then state building will continue to be a distant dream outside the realm of reality.

Let's consider the latest (known to me) example of an 'intervention' (of sort) in one of countries in question: removal of famous Prince Bandar from his post as Chief of Saudi Intel.

Frustrated by Obama's indecision on Syria, Bandar became a vocal propagator of the idea 'Saudis are going to do all it on their own'. I'm too lazy to search for all the possible links, but '5 minutes of googling' should be enough to find out that as of autumn 2012 and through early 2013, certain papers were full of statements by various Saudi ambassadors essentially stating the same, plus reports about massive Saudi purchases of specific arms for insurgents (usually such that could be obtained only from one source, which was motivated with the idea that should any end in 'wrong hands', these wrong hands couldn't get spares and ammo for them).

First off I have no idea if we facilitated the removal of Bandar, but even if we did that doesn't mean we can facilitate good governance. We probably just paid someone off to get rid of someone we didn't like. That doesn't change the culture of a government.

It is certainly worth surfacing all ideas for consideration, but we should also be critical and realistic about each idea. If we decide to pursue it, fine but we have to watch for signs it isn't working and have back up plans and adjust as needed. Although we preach this, I have seldom seen it done.

[CrowBat]

...Where I principally disagree with you is that you seem to assume that if we do X then Y will happen. The real world doesn't work that way...

Perhaps it does, perhaps not.

If we follow what's said by that gent who said he was ordered to go to the elected pres of Ecuador, and tell him he either has to follow US instructions and - between others - indebt the country forever by taking development loans from the World Bank, or he's going to get assassinated (and this happened just a few months later)... then sorry, but yes, we have to assume that if 'we' do X then Y will happen.

(And 'we' can only be the USA, then here in the EU we don't have strong, united foreign policy that would matter on international plan and be supported with the use of force as necessary, but 27 sets of entirely different commercial interests supported by lame and slowly applied economic sanctions.)

Translated to the ME, characters like Abdullah know all too well how dependable on Western support for their survival they all are, and that's why they shut up when said to shut up. All provided somebody comes to the idea to tell them to shut up - instead 'bowing - to tie shoelaces, of course'...

And regarding 'many factors': fact is that sanctions like travel bans (i.e. a la 'you'll not go to Geneva to drown yourself in cognac, buy yourself 1001st Rolex and enjoy Ukrainian whores until you order your police and intel to finally stop all the private donations for AQ and similar idiots') are really easy to impose. They would hit the selected few, 1000% sure and send a strong signal that proverbial sh!t has hit the fan and enough is now enough.

Anything is better but hushing up such facts like FBI's findings that the wife of the Saudi ambassador financed the 9/11 idiots (and I don't want to know what kind of possible connections can be found behind bombings in London or in Madrid; not only that local intels imposed extremely strict bans on any kind of relevant reporting but it's a 'historic fact' that such affairs are even easier to hush up here in the EU).

If we knew how Iraq was going to turn out, do you think Congress would have supported it if we could all go back in time?

Iraq is, IMHO, an extremely rare, very special case - where the entire nation went after an idiotic president like a flock of sheep follows its shepherd into a slaughter.

Frankly Bill, I was monitoring what was going on back then 'front row, legs free' as we say it here, and simply couldn't believe what's going on. Until then, I could never imagine Americans going that 'retard'. There was no sane discussion of pros and cons, no argumentation, no critique, nothing. Even within the IC it was like in a church with worshipers repeating dogmas and reciting in trance, 'The president said, the SecState said, the MOD said, the president said, and amen...'

The entire affair stood in absolutely no relation to 9/11, yet everybody was happy to forget what was all the uproar about - and plunge into that catastrophe too. Perhaps it's really so that in such cases your nation functions like broken software, and whenever in doubt wants back to mama. It's definitely so that when facing a hard-to-determine sort of threat, it selected a kind of enemy that was much easier to determine...

Now, whether everybody there was bribed, or so shocked by 9/11 that nobody could see further than the tip of one's nose... no clue. But, like I mentioned in my post above, it's tragic that even 13 years later nobody learned anything about Islamic extremism at all. The only difference is that nowadays every conflict with potential involvement of the USA is seen through the prism of that 'Iraq mistake'.

Some predicted what would happen in Iraq quite accurately, but that doesn't mean they knew. They made an educated assumption.

Sorry, nah. The people I happen to know have clearly said things like, 'well, beg your pardon, but all that's missing are 100kg of Sarin, that's a clear matter of fact - and Curveball is bull-####ting'. The only thing such people couldn't believe was how short their careers became, and how fast they found themselves on receiving end of utterly destroying defamation campaigns.

So, no 'educated guessing' there: that was a 'system error', the decision taken was completely wrong and against any better advice - and all of that was clear right from the start.

First off I have no idea if we facilitated the removal of Bandar...

Admittedly, what I mentioned above is my theory, an 'educated guess' if you like - also based on 'uproar' it caused within specific circles of the Saudi military: but, sigh, the timing was EXTREMELY strange, simply too much to be an 'accident'.

Overall Bill: such 'things' are doable, and not only 'seldom'. It's just about what 'things' the US decides to do, and what not.

[AmericanPride]

but if there isn't a common vision for what that state should look like between the warring parties then state building will continue to be a distant dream outside the realm of reality.

How much effort is actually placed in building a "common vision" between different internal actors? This kind of facilitation/mediation does work when applied appropriately but it's the kind of work that is often difficult and long-term; not exactly the kind of thing that succeeds in when passions are high and elections are near. I think the U.S. can do a much better job in this part of it's soft-power / smart-power tool kit.

[Bill Moore]

How much effort is actually placed in building a "common vision" between different internal actors? This kind of facilitation/mediation does work when applied appropriately but it's the kind of work that is often difficult and long-term; not exactly the kind of thing that succeeds in when passions are high and elections are near. I think the U.S. can do a much better job in this part of it's soft-power / smart-power tool kit.

AP,

Another approach that briefs well because it sounds logical, but in practice it rarely works. I think we go to great lengths to assist opposing groups identify common interests and a common vision, but we can't force them to do so. How many years has the U.S. been trying this with Israel and the Palestinians? We have assisted the UN throughout much of the world seeking peace agreements, sometimes it works (at least temporarily) other times it doesn't based on the number of obstacles/issues to reaching an agreement. I know we tried to negotiate such agreements between the various ethnic groups in Iraq, and sat in some of those discussions. Gen Zinni was probably right when he wrote that sometimes we need to sit back and wait until the fighting is over either due to one side winning, or both sides reaching a state of exhaustion and a desire for the fighting to end.

I don't think attempting to arrange peace between warring parties is what is meant by soft power, but I get your point. I have spent a lot of time reading theories on war, theories that are grounded in history and still prove to be generally true today. I haven't seen any peace theories that are grounded in reality as of yet, but would love to study them if you are aware of any. I'm not talking about visions of unicorns and rainbows, but theories that have been proven to work over time.

[AmericanPride]

I haven't seen any peace theories that are grounded in reality as of yet, but would love to study them if you are aware of any. I'm not talking about visions of unicorns and rainbows, but theories that have been proven to work over time.

'Peace theory' is actually a relatively new development in academic study - the theories of war go back into ancient history as you know, but this '[grounding] in history' in and of itself does not necessarily make them relevant for modern problems. That we as a species are still quick and prone to violence says more about our lack of development than advanced weapons says about our progress. Now 'peace theory' or 'conflict resolution' or whatever else you want to call it - just because the theory is young does not mean the practice is also young. I'd start with Contemporary Conflict Resolution by Ramsbotham, et al since they provide a good once-over-the-world view of the emerging field.

I wouldn't call 'peace theory' new insofar its inventing something novel, but instead a reframing of the same problems that theories of war investigated. How do wars end? How are wars prevented? These are things that have been well practiced in history but not studied in the same depth as actually fighting wars. Why should war be the anchor in conflict studies and not peace since peace is in one way or another the desired outcome. If we accept Clausewitz's premise that war is fundamentally 'politics by other means', then what are the political means other than war? And there are 'means' - negotiation, mediation, facilitation, peacebuilding, etc. Not all are applicable in every situation just like not every military tactic is relevant in every war. And just like war is not guaranteed to succeed every time, neither is 'peace theory' - so we shouldn't hold it to impossible standards.

We also shouldn't assume that means other war also aren't confrontational, dangerous, or even sometimes fatal in themselves - labor actions, political agitation, etc all fall within the range of activities short of war but also aim to compel an adversary to change their behavior and to gain leverage at any subsequent negotiation. This isn't about 'raindows' and 'unicorns' - not sure why any discussion of 'peace' by military professionals should be seen with skepticism since doesn't the 'soldier above all pray for peace'? - but about limiting the costs of violent conflict and resolving political problems in a way that it is sustainable and hopefully just. And of course, there's a significant difference in process between emerging and on-going conflicts - there's alot of complexities to be untangled before people can even 'reason' together.

Implementing these practices in a deliberate, targeted, and sustained way is fairly new and it's mostly the work of international organizations and NGOs, with some but not all governments participating. Much of it is done through a social process although sometimes with official political sanction or oversight. Although states do practice these things in their own unique ways - the Congress of Vienna, the United Nations, the European Union, etc; these were/are all mechanisms in resolving disputes short of war. So there's alot of momentum in that direction and of course as evidenced by events this year, there's also many challenges and setbacks. That's not surprising but it's also no an indicator that it's impossible or undesirable for states, particularly the U.S., to pursue activist policies through means other than war.

EDIT: I also tend to sympathize with Crowbat's line of argument that it's not so much what the U.S. can and cannot do but what it wants to and does not want to do. If the State budget was at all comparable to the DoD budget, there would probably be a significant change of direction in U.S. policies and strategies vis-a-vis conflict. What are U.S. priorities and who makes (and how do they make) those determinations? So the U.S. can definitely do more to influence and/or facilitate pluralistic reform and I would also argue that in the long-term, pluralist governance is good both for the U.S. and for international security.

[Bill Moore]

AP,

I'll take a look at the recommended reading, thanks.

What I meant by historically grounded, is that there is some evidence this theory will work, versus just being another good idea that isn't feasible. Obviously new ideas have to be tested, and I'm not opposed to that, but it isn't a theory by my definition until it has been tested and proven to be effective. It is an idea or concept, and while being open to new ideas we should probably go in with the assumption that is only an idea, so we should be prepared for it to fail and have contingencies in our hip pocket.

If the State budget was at all comparable to the DoD budget, there would probably be a significant change of direction in U.S. policies and strategies vis-a-vis conflict. What are U.S. priorities and who makes (and how do they make) those determinations?

It is unrealistic to think that DOS's budget should be comparable to DODs based simply on the amount of money it costs us to purchase and maintain our various systems, conduct major exercises, daily training, etc., but your point is taken. By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts. The problem from the outside looking in is it doesn't appear leaders in the State Department are held accountable, unlike a General or Admiral who does something stupid or has demonstrated incompetence is likely to be relieved.

Finally, when DOS took over the security assistance mission from DOD and used it more as a form of diplomacy than building real capacity the U.S. has wasted billions of dollar pursuing inept efforts to build partner nation capacity because it is led by State reps who have limited expertise in the field. I understand why it went under State, but they need to be augmented with sufficient DOD and law enforcement expertise to put together effective capacity building efforts that will more likely ensure that Americans will see a return on their investment of tax dollars. These are areas State out of necessity, or by choice, under resources, so if more money could help address some of these shortfalls.

[AmericanPride]

What I meant by historically grounded, is that there is some evidence this theory will work, versus just being another good idea that isn't feasible.

I agree - my point is that whereas military study has many decades (and centuries) behind it, the field of 'peace studies' has existed for only the last several decades. That we are just now coming around to investigating the nuances of conflict resolution and peace-building, however, does not mean that there are not numerous historical examples of this in practice. As far as developing working theory, you're right, that takes time and there's been a significant amount of work done in that regard. But how many years was it between Sun Tzu and Thucydides, and Thucydides and Machiavelli, and Machiavelli and Clausewitz? And how many more years before someone brought all of their thoughts together in a cohesive 'theory' (and there are still numerous competing theories)? And at the end of the day, I'm sure you'll agree, whether the theory is about war or peace, it's just an idea and events have a way of overtaking them at the ground level.

By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts. The problem from the outside looking in is it doesn't appear leaders in the State Department are held accountable, unlike a General or Admiral who does something stupid or has demonstrated incompetence is likely to be relieved.

My experiences have been mixed too - and I would say there are 'true heroes' and 'bubble heads who have no clue' in the military as well. And I would dispute your last statement if we are to use the outcomes of Iraq and Afghanistan as measurements of competence. Anyway, I think a significant problem for the U.S. is the the process of inter-agency cooperation. Each department is fairly effective at their own tasks, but not so much at understanding the tasks of others. In some fields - like joint military operations and interagency cooperation on counter-terrorism - there have been significant improvements but this isn't true across the whole of the government or the full range of its responsibilities. Maybe there needs to be some bureaucratic reform as well as emphasis on 'jointness' at the department level. But I think the U.S. sub-par performance is less an indicator that 'peacebuilding' doesn't work and more that the U.S. is just a bad practitioner of politics other than war.

[Dayuhan]

By interaction with the State Department has been mixed. There are some true heroes who have strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries, and there are a fair amount of bubble heads who have no clue how the world works, as demonstrated by the State Department rep who foolishly posted a twitter photo stating the U.S. stands behind the opposition with the Syrian Resistance. Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts.

Very few DoS people spend enough time in one country (let alone enough time outside the embassy/bubble) to offer realistic "strategies for promoting peace and economic development over time in their particular countries".

DoS is set up to manage relationships between and among states, not to deal with the internal problems of other countries: even AID is less about promoting development than about using aid as a lever to advance perceived US interests. It's tempting to say that the US should have more capacity to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, but I have doubts: not really our business, we don't do it well, and the potential for adverse unintended consequences is high.

I understand that some people find pleasure in imagining that the US has the capacity to dictate policy to other countries and then castigating the US for failing to use that imaginary capacity, but it doesn't seem a particularly productive pastime to me.

[CrowBat]

...Giving bubble heads more money to promote bad policy approaches will probably result in more conflicts....

Come on, Bill: as if it is the DOS that's determining US foreign policy...

The DOS neither has the 1st, 2nd, 5th, 55th, 99th, nor the last word in this regards - and there is rarely such a brilliant example for this fact, but Syria.

Especially when it comes to the Middle East, if you demand - and expect - specific type of actions from the DOS, the US should better follow my advice (see one of posts some 4-5 pages back), and save plenty of tax-payer's money by disbanding it.