Germany (catch all, incl. terrorism)

[Fuchs]

Well, the Turks and German-Turks in Germany are worker class or unemployed.
It's an often denied fact, but they are in competition with the German worker class and unemployed workers for jobs. The social situation also causes unfavourable criminal statistics and low respect of middle and upper classes.
That's not helpful.

Another aspect is that the Turkish culture is quite different, especially the very backward version that's in use with the emigrants (who often stick to a culture as of 1950's rural Turkey). They provide occasionally terrible examples (like murder of sister because she was too Western and 'dishonoured' the family and such nonsense).

Finally we have some really stupid newspapers in both languages.

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About racism and national conflicts in Germany in general:
There's no real "racism" in Germany. It's rather an antipathy towards specific nationalities.

positive:
UK
Scandinavian countries
France (although they're not particularly friendly to us)
Spain & Portugal
Italy
Austria & Switzerland (they speak German...kind of)
Australia & New Zealand
Canada
Asians (India to Japan)
Netherlands (although they dislike us)

divided:
Poland (hard-working helpers in agriculture and grey market in general, but also notorious for stealing cars)
USA (this goes to negative for sure if McCain gets elected)
Russia ("drunk")
Arabs (quickly drifting to negative due to corruption and extremists)

neutral:
Bulgaria
Slovakia
Czech
Belgium
Latin Americans
most non-Russian Eastern Europeans
most Africans
Carribbean countries

negative:
Romania (Romanian gangs had serious looting campaigns in Germany in the early 90's. They crashed into stores, about 10 Romanians stole as much as possible and loaded the truck, then they drove to next town. Seriously.)
Ghana (quite many Africans sitting unemployed in cities and supposedly dealing drugs - many of them are assumed to be from Ghana for some unknown reason)
Afghans (drug troubles)
Vietnamese (cigarette smuggling, most of them are a leftover of DDR friendship policy with Vietnam in 70's and 80's)
Albania (lots of very violent criminals)
Turkey (mentioned above)

An American black man would feel next to no discrimination in office clothes in Germany, but if misunderstood for a Ghanaan seeking asylum he might run into troubles monthly.
A Romanian would be under close scrutiny, a Bulgarian likely not.
A Macedonian would have little if any troubles (I had a Macedonian friend and he never had serious problems), but an Albanian would likely get no job.
Skin colour and religions are quite unimportant, nationality is much more important in Germany.

[Sarajevo071]

Skin colour and religions are quite unimportant, nationality is much more important in Germany.

Generally speaking, yes I will agree... Nationalism was always bigger in Europe.

Back to Turks... Majority of them are secular, right? And talking about different culture, would you say that Serbs have same culture values like Europeans? And if so, why would they be more accepted (being responsible for genocide in Bosnia and Croatia, and still harboring war criminals which did not stop Europeans to have talks with them about joining EU) then Turks?

Can I assume that you know that Serbs also recognize "honor" killings in they culture and instances of that crimes are often in serbian villages? Or you think European hate for those crimes is only limited on Muslims?! BTW, I read International Crisis Group report on Turks in Germany and it was interesting read that explained allot about Turks in Germany, they life and hopes... You should look into it (if you didn't by now).

What I am trying to say is that bias in Europe (together with they own background, education level and culture) has to do with how others are treated there and how will they respond on it. Germany, having the experience with migrant workers and WWII history is maybe less engage in racist profiling but they are coming around and quickly choosing sides.

[Wagram]

A snippet of information linked to the thread; Sarkozy has recently offered Germany the possibility of basing some german units in France within the frame of the Franco-German brigade (FGB).

Everybody in France thinks the germans will decline.

This has been presented as a way of silencing local german opposition to the withdrawal to France of a Mech unit (16 BC in Saarburg) and to the possible return to France of two other units (110 RI and 3 RH), both part of the FGB and based in Donaueschingen and Immendigen.

[Surferbeetle]

From American Institute for Contemporary German Studies (John Hopkins) by Gunther Hellman: A Status-Conscious Germany between Adolescence and Retirement: Foreign Policy Commemorations on the 60th Anniversary of the Federal Republic

One way to recount the history of Germany’s foreign policy over the past sixty years is to tell it as a story of an unflagging yet patient drive for equal status. It is almost entirely a success story—particularly because the status of all the other states relative to which Germans aspired to be treated as “equal” has continuously risen. Membership in the European Coal and Steel Community, the predecessor to the European Union, in the early 1950s; then NATO in 1955; the UN and the G7 in 1970s; and, most recently, the “P5 plus Germany” group, the exclusive club made up of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany that tries to tackle the Iranian nuclear program—all this marks an impressive line of continuous successes of (West) German diplomacy rising within the ranks of the international hierarchy of power and prestige. Given the lack of hard military resources upon which ascending powers had traditionally relied in pushing for admission to the great power club, Germany’s success is undoubtedly due in no small part to its “civilian power” qualities—i.e., the emphasis on soft power tools such as diplomacy, economic aid, and restraint.

[jmm99]

Germany is a 'great power", given this from Economy of Germany:

As of 2007[update], comparable IMF figures, billion dollars, current prices:

United States: 13,807.550
Japan: 4,381.576
Germany: 3,320.913
China: 3,280.224

As of 2008[update], IMF staff estimates:

United States: 14,334.034
Japan: 4,844.362
China: 4,222.423
Germany: 3,818.470

"Report for Selected Countries and Subjects". World Economic Outlook Database, October 2008. International Monetary Fund. Retrieved today (JMM).

Some times power comes from the barrel of a gun; most times, it comes from the barrels of smokestacks. The Germans also seem to have a reasonably working health care program, which I suppose has its roots in the Bismarck era.

Still surviving are such pioneers as Deutz AG (the successor to Otto's engine factory, the first in the world - use full screen view - F11 - to scroll though pages); and new amalgamations such as Otto GmbH & Co KG, the world's largest mail-order company (second largest online IIRC). Some bias in favor of those two companies because I know one of their directors; but they exemplify both tradition and adaptation which have served German businesses well.

[Fuchs]

The core of the German economy are the SMEs (small&medium enterprises) - many of them date back to the 1950's reconstruction era while many large companies have their roots in the Bismarck era. The larger ones need the SMEs as innovative suppliers because most large companies lack innovative power or have only innovative power in areas that require huge investments for progress (like pharmaceuticals).

The quantitative economic comparisons among countries become even more interesting if you look at the goods production only (ignoring the services).
Or - really hardcore - look at the production sector in terms of purchasing power parities.

A comparison of economies in PP in general is also interesting.

I did a quick table.

http://www.filefactory.com/file/a0ahg2c/n/G9_pdf

About Germany and great power; it's true in a European context (Germany can essentially move the EU if it teams up with France - and did so many times already), but global ambitions are limited to conference halls.

[Surferbeetle]

From the Economist, 17 September 2009, Germany's election: A change of partners?

SAARLAND, the smallest German state without the excuse of being just a city, is a thumbnail caricature of Germany. It was here, among the woods and hills, that Goethe in 1770 claimed to discover that “passion for reflection on economic and technical matters” that occupied much of his life. For decades the thick coal seams underneath it made Saarland a pawn in the power-games of Germany and France. And because of that history, the sort of industry that Germany is known for—cars, steel and machines—looms even larger in its economy than in the rest of the country.

Yet the election will not be a coronation. The main choice voters face is whether to extend Ms Merkel’s cranky partnership with the SPD or to heed her plea for a change of coalition: she would rather govern with the smaller Free Democratic Party (FDP). That would not be a trivial change. The SPD and FDP stand almost at opposite poles of Germany’s political spectrum. The SPD preaches “solidarity”, which entails strong worker protection, minimum wages and robust social welfare. The FDP champions “freedom”, which goes along with sharply lower taxes, less regulation and friendliness to private enterprise. Ms Merkel ’s CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, stand uneasily in the middle. All four accept the tenets of Germany’s “social market economy”. Both the Social Democrats and the Liberals have mellowed, which means that the next government is unlikely to bring in radical change, no matter what its makeup. But a government with liberal leanings is more likely to keep Germany vigorous as it ages, and is what Ms Merkel says she wants.

[Igel]

Partners changed. But propably no change in Germanys GWOT Operations.

Few foreign policy shifts expected from new German coalition

Things are unlikely to change, however, as both Merkel's conservatives and Westerwelle's liberals support Germany's involvement in Afghanistan. Westerwelle himself has made it clear that he opposes widening the role of German troops deployed against the Taliban, a consistent irritant to US military planners who regularly called on the previous government to commit Bundeswehr troops to combat operations. It is therefore unlikely that the new coalition will cave in to increased calls from the US and other NATO partners to move German troops into more dangerous areas of Afghanistan.

Though I disagree with this statement:

"In fact the new government will find it marginally easier to pursue the policy of the previous government. The Afghanistan mission is widely unpopular within the German electorate and it was particularly hard for the Social Democrats with their pacifist traditions to defend Germany’s involvement. It should be easier for the CDU/CSU-FDP coalition government to sustain Germany’s engagement even if it remains a position which is unpopular at home and with a large part of their own electorate."

If the socialdemocrats move to an anti-war position it will be much harder to pursue the current GWOT policy. An anti-war stance by the SPD would give a large part of the german electorat a more serious voting alternative to end the mission than the far-left "Linke". Depending on how the war in Afghanistan develops, rising election chances of the SPD could force the new goverment to be even more reculant about the fighting deployments of the german troops, to put more pressure on NATO to end the mission or could even lead to a retreat of the german troops.
Then again this is a rather big "if" and I would hardly describe the SPD as "pacifist". In any case after that defeat the SPD will have its hands full with internal party politics for quite a time.