China's Expanding Role in Africa

[Sage]

Poole's latest book, The Terrorist Trail, goes into into detail about a Jihadist/African/China nexus that has been developing for a period of time that I find to be very interesting and credible.

It would seem that the author's new book, Dragon Days, evaluates this relationship in greater detail. From his site (emphasis mine)...

Within Dragon Days are two studies: (1) how a rising superpower may be encouraging Islamic insurgency to screen its own Maoist expansion; and (2) what America must do to curtail either. Ostensibly, that power also provides foreign aid to the affected countries. But, the corporations involved are little more than extensions of its army. Thus, those countries are obviously at risk. The U.S. military is ill-prepared for so subtle a confrontation. Instead of occupying such countries or training their armies, it must start to deploy "foreign aid workers in the law enforcement sector." Then, by the thousands, specially trained squad-sized units could anchor widely dispersed Combined Action Platoons. Their mission would be to help indigenous police and soldiers to reestablish local security. Without that security, there can be no viable counterinsurgency or operating democracy. Part Two of this book shows what U.S. infantrymen must know about criminal investigative procedure. Part Three contains the unconventional warfare (UW) tactical techniques they must practice. The latter are new to the literature and not covered by any U.S. military manual. They should allow tiny contingents of GIs to slip away unhurt whenever they get cut off and surrounded. Without this new kind of training, their only hope would be massive bombardment in, and forceful extraction from, heavily populated areas. Such things do little to win the hearts and minds of a population. This book provides the training and operations blueprint for winning an unconventionally fought world war. It also points to a hidden adversary.

Given the quality of The Last 100 Yards, Tiger's Way, and Gunny Poole's other works, I'm looking forward to reading his thoughts on this subject.

[Mark O'Neill]

It would seem that the author's new book, Dragon Days, evaluates this relationship in greater detail. From his site (emphasis mine)...



Given the quality of The Last 100 Yards, Tiger's Way, and Gunny Poole's other works, I'm looking forward to reading his thoughts on this subject.

You are joking right? China encouraging Jihadists in Africa? What planet did this idea come from?
I have lived in sub-saharan Africa, operated there, and undertaken years of post grad study on Africa. Some facts that do not sit well with your post:

1. Zimbabwe is not an Islamist nation - over 90 percent of the population are practising Christians, the rest subscribe to 'traditional beliefs'. Chinese influence on the Indian Ocean littoral has nothing to do with Islam and everything to do with trade and access.

2. China is far more worried about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism than the US is - China has significant Muslim ethnic minorities that are actively pursuing seperatist agendas. The idea that China would seek to encourage the spread of Islamic fundamentalism is, frankly, ridiculous. They have more to lose, literally, than many other nations .

3. China's interest in Africa essentially distils down to a couple of compelling imperatives:
a) energy security,
b) sourcing minerals to keep their economic boom 'booming'; and
c)denying Taiwan diplomatic access / recognition.


I would strongly recommend that your paragon spends some time researching some facts before he writes more inaccurate drivel.

[Tom Odom]

You are joking right? China encouraging Jihadists in Africa? What planet did this idea come from?
I have lived in sub-saharan Africa, operated there, and undertaken years of post grad study on Africa. Some facts that do not sit well with your post:

1. Zimbabwe is not an Islamist nation - over 90 percent of the population are practising Christians, the rest subscribe to 'traditional beliefs'. Chinese influence on the Indian Ocean littoral has nothing to do with Islam and everything to do with trade and access.

2. China is far more worried about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism than the US is - China has significant Muslim ethnic minorities that are actively pursuing seperatist agendas. The idea that China would seek to encourage the spread of Islamic fundamentalism is, frankly, ridiculous. They have more to lose, literally, than many other nations .

3. China's interest in Africa essentially distils down to a couple of compelling imperatives:
a) energy security,
b) sourcing minerals to keep their economic boom 'booming'; and
c)denying Taiwan diplomatic access / recognition.


I would strongly recommend that your paragon spends some time researching some facts before he writes more inaccurate drivel.

In one word, agreed.

Tom

[carl]

During the time I was in Chad and the DRC, we rarely saw the Chinese. We knew they were around doing many things, but we rarely saw them. The only Chinese I saw were the owners and some staff at Chinese restuarants, and the staff at a Chinese army hospital in Kindu and a Chinese navy base near Bukavu. The army and navy people I never saw outside the confines of their perimeters.

We went to a Chinese restaurant in N'Djamena and the owner and some of the waitress' were Chinese. N'Djamena is pretty close to nowhere, but there they were. I was impressed.

[Stan]

In one word, agreed.

Tom

Sage, welcome aboard and please take a moment here and here.

I fully concur with Mark, Tom and Carl...Bogus comes to mind. I'll bet my 10 years in Sub-Sahara (7 countries).

[Sage]

You are joking right? China encouraging Jihadists in Africa? What planet did this idea come from? ...I would strongly recommend that your paragon spends some time researching some facts before he writes more inaccurate drivel.

Ignoring the Aussie frankness in your post as well as the grade school foreign policy lesson, I actually tend to agree with you regarding China's role in Africa and, as I've communicated to the author, am not yet convinced that China is waging a war by proxy there or elsewhere. My main interest in the text is the author's focus on integrating law enforcement skills with traditional soldiering in such regions.

A few points, however:

1. The author, I believe, focuses on northeast Africa. Specifically, the role played by Islamists in Sudan and Somalia, as well as the various factions that have been established in that region since the early 90's. There is no mention of Zimbabwe.

2. Some might make the case that declaring, quite simply, that there is a single demonstrable Chinese foreign policy is about as rational as declaring a single European foreign policy. China's leadership is a motley crew of different interests and organizations, not all of whom are on the same page or working from the same play book. While I'm not yet convinced of its existence, it would be naive to believe that encouraging a proxy war in North Africa is wholly beyond the realm of intellectual possibility. The PLA and CMC, many argue, have entirely different goals than the NPC.

3. The author in question, John Poole, is a well-respected retired NCO whose books are often forwarded by this forum's very own "paragons," including Bill Lind and Bruce Gudmundsson. He is one of the men directly responsible for integrating maneuver warfare theory into Marine Corp doctrine, and his books, The Last 100 Yards and Tiger's Way are considered by many to be the best texts on small unit tactics published in quite some time. None of which makes him an expert on Africa, but it would be disrespectful to describe him as a man given to proffering "inaccurate drivel."

In addition, the man's probably spent more time in the regions discussed than you and I combined, so, while dubious of his assessment of Chinese foreign policy, you'll forgive me if I'm not as comfortable dismissing his analysis so quickly. I'd prefer to read the book first.

Sage, welcome aboard.

Thanks for the welcome, Stan.

[tequila]

1. The author, I believe, focuses on northeast Africa. Specifically, the role played by Islamists in Sudan and Somalia, as well as the various factions that have been established in that region since the early 90's. There is no mention of Zimbabwe.

I'd like to see any evidence at all of Chinese involvement with jihadist groups in either Sudan or Somalia, unless you want to make the rather questionable leap of identifying the Bashir government as jihadist in orientation (an appellation dubious to most Sudanese groups, but probably better fitting the Darfuri Justice and Equality Movement given its brief alliance with Hassan al-Turabi than the Sudanese government).

With regards to Somalia, I think the Somali Islamists and indeed most Somalis probably look rather askance at the Chinese, given Chicom support and investment in their archenemy Ethiopia, which has already fomented ethnic Somali backlash in the Ogaden.

To call China's policy in the Sudan or in the Horn a "proxy war" or an alliance with the jihadis requires a rather profound leap of the imagination. I respect Gunny Poole's work, but that doesn't mean I buy into all of it (especially those clipart illustrations!). For instance his amalgamation of all of non-Western warfare into a single culturally-based clump reflects the worst generalizing impulses of Victor Davis Hanson and his ilk, just from the opposite vantage point (VDH despises all non-Western warfare, while Poole tends to valorize it --- both oversimplify to the point of uselessness --- but Poole at least has valid tactical concepts and insights).

[Sage]

I'd like to see any evidence at all of Chinese involvement with jihadist groups in either Sudan or Somalia...

So would I.

Most of the "suspicious" relationships presented in the author's Terrorist Trail are extremely subtle and based on both old alliances of ideological convenience (such as China's training of the ANC, FNLA, and others in the 70's) and new alliances of economic convenience (such as the CNPC's interest in Sudanese oil refineries). And I, like you, am inclined to believe that the latter alliances are simply natural by-products of a nation attempting to address future energy needs. However, my experience with the Chinese is not as colorful as the author's, so perhaps he sees something that I do not.

I respect Gunny Poole's work, but that doesn't mean I buy into all of it.

As I thought I made clear, I haven't been convinced of anything. Nor am I taking an apologist position for the "Jihadist/China/Africa nexus" theory. I was simply advising a previous poster, one who expressed interest in Poole's thoughts on said theory, that the author's latest work supposedly deals with the topic in greater detail.

That's why I used the

quote

function in my post.

[Mark O'Neill]

Ignoring the Aussie frankness in your post as well as the grade school foreign policy lesson,

A few points, however:

1. The author, I believe, focuses on northeast Africa. Specifically, the role played by Islamists in Sudan and Somalia, as well as the various factions that have been established in that region since the early 90's. There is no mention of Zimbabwe.

2. Some might make the case that declaring, quite simply, that there is a single demonstrable Chinese foreign policy is about as rational as declaring a single European foreign policy. China's leadership is a motley crew of different interests and organizations, not all of whom are on the same page or working from the same play book. While I'm not yet convinced of its existence, it would be naive to believe that encouraging a proxy war in North Africa is wholly beyond the realm of intellectual possibility. The PLA and CMC, many argue, have entirely different goals than the NPC.

3. The author in question, John Poole, is a well-respected retired NCO whose books are often forwarded by this forum's very own "paragons," including Bill Lind and Bruce Gudmundsson. He is one of the men directly responsible for integrating maneuver warfare theory into Marine Corp doctrine, and his books, The Last 100 Yards and Tiger's Way are considered by many to be the best texts on small unit tactics published in quite some time. None of which makes him an expert on Africa, but it would be disrespectful to describe him as a man given to proffering "inaccurate drivel."

Sage,

In rebuttal, the 'grade school foreign policy lesson' was offered in response to the 'preschool' assertions offered about China in your original post (and, to my mind, continued in your reply). I believe that if you want to stimulate 'graduate level' discussion it is probably best if you start off at that level, so people who do not know you at least have a hint that is the level you wish to discuss things at. Of course, this requires far more factual rigour than the assertions in your post either supplied or implied.....

Secondly, I am unaware of any 'paragon' list at SWJ. I would be grateful if you could illuminate my ignorance and direct me to the appropriate link. I suggest that your sweeping generalisation about whom SWJ members are 'fond' of is wildly inaccurate. My time here has suggested that our membership views are wide and varied. By way of example, I hold no great / positive view about the wide spread application of the works of either the gentlemen you refer to.

Thirdly, the fact that the author you cite is a widely respected former SNCO is neither here nor there with regard to his ability to write with authority or accuracy on wider geo-political issues. What exactly is your point in making this claim? I know literally hundreds of excellent serving and former SNCO, their innate ability as a soldier has no causal relationship with any ability as an international relations analyst. If someone presumes to claim authoritative knowledge of a subject it is reasonable to ask and examine on what basis the claim is made. As a rule, being a respected SNCO does not cut the mustard in establishing expert credibility across any subject you may care to name. This, of course, does not preclude your author from being such an expert - it merely establishes that he is not one simply because of the fact that he was a 'respected SNCO'.

Finally, I find your comment about Aussie 'frankness' stereotypical and inappropriate. I believe that unwillingness to swallow inane assertion or ignorance is not something unique to me or my countrymen. I have found it to be to be a trait that is shared by many of friends from the USA, UK and Africa....

Mark

[Jedburgh]

The Jamestown Foundation's China Brief, 31 Jan 08:

Feeding the Dragon: China's Quest for African Minerals

While much of the attention on China’s emergence onto the global economic stage as an industrial powerhouse has focused on the accumulation of its massive trade surpluses, most Western observers probing Beijing’s interest in Africa’s rich natural resources have concentrated on the Middle Kingdom’s seemingly insatiable appetite for energy resources. Africa currently contributes 12 percent of the world's liquid hydrocarbon (oil) production. In 2013, African oil production is projected to rise to 10.7-11.4 million bpd, and by 2018 to 12.4-14.5 million bpd. In 2007, African oil constituted more than 22 percent of the United States' total usage and 28 percent of China’s—the latter case including approximately 60 percent of the Sudan's oil export—compared to the 2006 figures of 9 percent for China, 33 percent for the United States and 36 percent for Europe.

A less mainstream but perhaps more significant issue for Sino-African relations is China’s growing interest in Africa’s rich mineral resources—where Beijing’s shopping list literally runs the gamut, from aluminum to zirconium. Considering China’s dynamic economy and robust growth, its interest in African minerals may well prove in the long run more strategically important in its grand strategy than African oil—especially if China's deals with Central Asian energy exporters prove successful. The minerals sought by China affect every aspect of its economy, from the minerals like titanium needed for producing military aircraft to the iron ore needed to fuel its export of consumer goods, to its surging diamond trade for the country’s growing appetite for luxury items.....

[Jedburgh]

Chatham House transcript of 22 Feb 08 remarks of Chinese govt special rep on Darfur, Ambassador Liu Guijin: Darfur and Sino-African Relations

China's historic engagement in Africa has strengthened in recent years and with that the complexity of its relations with African nations has increased. From a focus on Darfur, Ambassador Liu expanded to speak about China's role in Africa. Ambassador Liu presented on China's perspective on Africa, how it views its own position vis-à-vis Africa, and its policy priorities.....

[Jedburgh]

Three papers from CSIS, 4 Jun 08:

China in Nigeria

....This paper focuses on how various stakeholders in Nigeria view China’s engagement. The study is based on interviews with a wide array of actors, including Nigerian government officials, businessmen, academics, and residents of Chinese extraction who have lived and operated in Nigeria for many years. Other groups interviewed for the study include Chinese diplomats in Nigeria, Chinese traders and leaders, and Chinese project teams.....

Angola and China: A Pragmatic Partnership

....With 2008 marking the 25th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral relations between the two countries, this paper takes a fresh look at the issue of Angola and China’s partnership. The study benefits from fieldwork carried out in Angola in September 2007 and January 2008 and includes numerous interviews with Angolan officials. Chinese embassy personnel in Luanda declined to comment on the report....

Economic Relations Between Kenya and China, 1963-2007

....It begins with the backdrop to contemporary economic relations between China and Kenya by revisiting the hostile relations between the two countries in the Mao Zedong era, over the relevance of a socialist revolution in Kenya. In the wake of Deng Xiaoping’s “four modernizations,” that hostility gradually mutated into a fruitful phase of interaction between China and Kenya. From the evidence presented by this paper, economic interaction between China and Kenya—particularly after 2002—derogate from the received wisdom of a predatory China let loose among hapless Africans (at worst) or a calculatingly benign Beijing out to gain more from the deals than its African partners (at best). It also brings into center stage, the power of agency, demonstrating that African states are indeed capable of making choices that benefit them in the intensified phase of trade and investment in cooperation with China. It concludes that Kenya’s case may not be as exceptional as it seems at first blush.....