Indirect and Direct components to strategy for the Long War

[Rank amateur]

Yes - I'd pointed to a few earlier in the thread - put a "trans" in front of almost anything and you have a potential enabler or accelerator for instability - this just means that if you add more of something - it creates more things the HN government must contend with. Refugees crossing the border, nomadic influences, crop infestations, cyber-hacking/crime/espionage, human migrations, climate changes, crime, terrorism, foreign investment that attracts more of something else or creates something new, the use of ungoverned spaces as safe havens, etc. - you could really go for awhile I think.

I was thinking more along the lines of religious/ethnic/economic divides. In Iraq, for example, three religious/cultural groups and two sources of oil wealth is an obvious source of instability. "Breathing space" maybe necessary for a revenue sharing agreement, but I'm not certain that it is sufficient. (Many of the things Marc mentioned are relevant here. Establishing trust, transactions, leadership etc. aren't necessarily going to happen across cultures simply because we build capacity.)

Also, as long as opium makes up a huge percentage of Afghanistan's GDP, there is going to be corruption. (The demand for corruption will be huge: supply will expand to meet the demand.)

On the other hand, when a bunch of narco terrorists take over a remote town, a single platoon might be able to restore stability quickly and all government functions can return in a very short period of time. (Showing past examples is much easier than writing a predictive theory, but that's the direction I'm heading down.)

[selil]

On the other hand, when a bunch of narco terrorists take over a remote town, a single platoon might be able to restore stability quickly and all government functions can return in a very short period of time. (Showing past examples is much easier than writing a predictive theory, but that's the direction I'm heading down.)

So, I have a question.

How does this model fit when the "terrorist" organization isn't ideology bound, but the result of corporatism?

Religious ideology as root of terrorism and war is only supplanted by war in the ever present battle for profit. What happens when the insurgency is the result of corporatism like Shell Oil being attacked in a proxy war by Standard Oil? What happens when the battle is selective termination of key players on the South Eastern Asia Continent plantations by rival crop producers? As the scope expands historical examples such as the East Indian Trading Company preying on other smaller companies.

The reason I ask isn't that I think this is the "big" deal of the future, but I've read several articles (Economist, ARS, CSIS, a few others) recently pointing out that companies have full on intelligence capability, basically small armies, and have recreated most of the tools of governance.

Then that begs the questions are the tools and strategies (models) being created capable of being used in a corporate warfare environment?

[Rank amateur]

I'm either on to something, or Marc and I are both out in left field, but I coined - pun intended - the term "counterinsurgency physics" about 10 minutes ago.

The basic idea is that "inkspots" are attracted to and repelled from each other by various forces: religious/economic/cultural/historic etc. BPC can efficiently create stability by removing insurgents who are preventing the connections, but it requires enormous energy to force together inkspots that are naturally repelled. Such forced connections are temporary. Yugoslavia is a good example. It was held together by secret police but exploded along religious/cultural/ethnic lines when the "energy" was removed.

[Ken White]

Professor 'Iggins -- I think you've got it...

All politics is local. Multiculturalism is a dichotomy. Liquids of differing viscosities and ionization attract or repel each other. The monolithic State is an unnatural state (pun intended).

Add those four facts of life together and one comes up with a dispersed and loose federal structure of governance allowing considerable autonomy downward as societies seek peace and equilibrium. Stability occurs through cooperation and mutual respect; like morality, it cannot be dictated and any effort to attempt to force it is a waste of time.

Unfortunately, that's a smack in the face to the progressive worldview.

[marct]

Unfortunately, that's a smack in the face to the progressive worldview.

Too true, Ken. Then again, you can't blame the poor "progressives" - after all, they have been told that material reality (including biology) has no effect on human free will .

[Ken White]

Too true, Ken. Then again, you can't blame the poor "progressives" - after all, they have been told that material reality (including biology) has no effect on human free will .

They have less experience with alcohol or Rob's "two heads" phenomena than most...

[marct]

Hi RA,

I'm either on to something, or Marc and I are both out in left field, but I coined - pun intended - the term "counterinsurgency physics" about 10 minutes ago.

Okay, you an have "counterinsurgency physics", but I'm claiming Quantum COIN !

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Eden,
A good point with regard to Afghanistan - and maybe this gets to the observation Marc made both here, and I think we talked about on the Stability vs. IW thread, about a biological vs. a Newtonian perspective on the idea of stability.

We're struggling with not only the idea of stability within what we might geographically define as a state, but the activities and opportunities offered within the geography for others to operate to influence not only what goes on internally to those boundaries, but externally through the use of improved means - the convergence of technology, freedom of action (in its many forms) and ideas. While the Taliban's activities were repugnant to us prior to 9/11, they took on new context as a base of operations and operational support for Bin Laden with the event of 9/11. The idea of vulnerability caused us to reconsider how we think about security.

Coming up with analogies or models to contemplate what is very complex, and very interactive, and very non-linear in terms of the possible future actions it produces is tough - no single model gets to it, multiple models often contradict each other. I think that every effort to implement is going to (and probably should) differ based on the context of the conditions, historical relationships that have shaped those conditions, and the potential future relationships that we see emerging. So you can have some broad Ends, Ways, Means and both a Direct and Indirect component to provide flexibility, and suitability, but when it comes to implementation or operationalizing it, you are going to have to do some framing that keeps you on course, and adaptable to way things evolve.

Marc had mentioned that Clausewitz was influenced by Newtonian physics - I think that is a good assumption based on much of the language. However, there are also instances of Art and Social influences - so I think he recognized the limitations of science in describing a political activity. There is something in Book 1 I think where he notes and I'll paraphrase greatly - "the outcome should not be a slave to the original political objective because things change and to limit yourself would be to deny options and realities" - if I think about it I'll go back and find it later, but maybe John F could find me something close.

I think the discussion on entity based vs. Westphalian based control mechanisms is an important one - but it quickly gets into the question of accountability, and participation. If you move to use military force (or any force) against an entity based control mechanism - what are the implications?

Part of the reason I put this discussion under "Strategic Compression" is because you quickly get into some prickly areas where ideas and perspectives lead to more challenges, or overturn existing mechanisms that seem to work, or at least not work against goals and objectives that all can generally say would be worth achieving. Choices made or not made have some type of effect in this environment for much of the reasons Marc had alluded to with the ref. to biological systems; this is a competitive environment where niches not filled don't stay vacant for long.

Best, Rob

[Rob Thornton]

Too true, Ken. Then again, you can't blame the poor "progressives" - after all, they have been told that material reality (including biology) has no effect on human free will .

I am reminded of the MSG who said during our safety briefing on the deck of the LHA Belleau Woods prior to going on Libo in Subic Bay (and from which I stole shamelessly for my safety briefs almost 15 years later "Gents, before you go down range, let me impart some biblical wisdom, God told Adam, "Adam I got some good news and some bad news. The good news is that I'm giving you two heads, the bad news is that I'm only givng you enough blood to run one of them at a time!"

Well worth remembering - but also that immediately following the brief we tore ass for Magsaysay, and in the following days many were lined up for a shot of the wonder drug - which back then killed most everything. Today, most everything is resitant to the wonder drug, and many of those things have also morphed and might even kill you.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

... Today, most everything is resitant to the wonder drug, and many of those things have also morphed and might even kill you.

bacteria, cancers and social afflictions do morph...

People -- not so much.

All goes back to Robert Fulghum; be careful what you want, you may get it. Seems to me that defining two things; (a) the National Interest; and (b) as Marc said "The point I am trying to make is that the ideology / symbology - what we stand for - must transcend any individual national interest." is the first step and that it is a quite difficult if not impossible step. Still, if one succeeds in doing that, then one must reconcile the two -- even more difficult.

Add to that the fact that one must do that under a governmental system that is, by design, prone to significant changes of course every four or eight years and one is confronted with the fact (IMO) that only an extremely significant and truly existential threat is going to prompt a coherent, stable long term strategy. One is further confronted with two more facts today; (1) the attention span and knowledge of history required to implement anything over the long term is in short supply; and (2) competing visions in a broadly egalitarian society are many and an overarching vision is generally selected by 600 pound Gorillas (or the loudest squeaking Wheels) on the basis of personal preference and only rarely on a logical needs.

All this leads to me saying what everyone already knows. The life of a Strategic Planner is not easy. Such planning is needed, no question but I also believe that it should aim for an achievable solution as opposed to the most desirable solution and, to get back to the 'people don't change much' meme, should be strongly influenced by the culture and history of the target and less so on what 'we' want or believe desirable.

Strategic planning must also accept the reality that is our political milieu (both in and out of uniform...) and should be aimed at inculcating the 'plan' from the bottom up over a long time as opposed to attempting a top down "fix this problem today" approach. The swamp / alligator tale applies...

IOW, to tacticalize the strategizing, it's not one up, two back, hit 'em in the flank and feed the troops a hot meal; rather one up, two back, infiltrate and don't feed the troops until they get the job done...

[marct]

cuts through the verbiage to the heart of the issue .

All goes back to Robert Fulghum; be careful what you want, you may get it. Seems to me that defining two things; (a) the National Interest; and (b) as Marc said "The point I am trying to make is that the ideology / symbology - what we stand for - must transcend any individual national interest." is the first step and that it is a quite difficult if not impossible step. Still, if one succeeds in doing that, then one must reconcile the two -- even more difficult.

Absolutely. Actually, I think that such an ideology / symbology is rather simple to build since most of the base ideas are already floating around in various forms. As I see it, it can be structured around the basic idea of a convention between sovereign entities (BTW, not limited to nation states) along the loose confederate lines Rob mentioned at a global level. As long as it also includes guarantees of internal sovereignty within minimal agreed upon limits, including the right of departure, it should work. Of course, negotiating those limits and the conventions would be a freakin' nightmare .

[Rob Thornton]

Of course, negotiating those limits and the conventions would be a freakin' nightmare .

You know Marc, the other day I got asked to brief a foreign attaché on JCISFA. There was a set of slides to go over as a kind of info brief. The most wonderful thing happened - technical difficulties arose and caused a pause. The pause allowed a real, no fooling conversation to take place. In that brief time I found out he'd already gotten a similar info brief not 6 months ago. At that point we were both relieved and nixed the slides and talked about what was on his mind with regards to SFA, and many of the other subjects we've discussed in this thread and others. We probably talked for a good hour - and I believe we all got infinitely further then any set of slides could go.

So the key I think is the interaction, the discussion, the negotiation. I think up front, although terribly unpopular as it does not hold "solution" like answers that can be filed away as another win in time to hold up as one more reason to elect or re-elect. This gets to the reconciliation that both Ken and you mentioned between what you want and what you can realistically achieve (for whatever reasons), what you want and what your partners want (or believe to be more in their interests), how it plays in one place vs. somewhere else, etc. None of those things are easy because they are conditional and that means unless you are willing to roll the dice and be able to live with comes up, then you are going to have to bring appetite and stomach into balance. That our political cycle is what it is does not engender itself to that reality, but it does not stop us from perpetuating the fiction that there are easy wars either.

So we're back to the nightmare that is, and the guy who gets sent forward to do the best that he can, be he a soldier or civilian advising foreign forces or bureaucrats, or the guy getting off a Blackhawk as part of an AASLT to seize some key piece of terrain to extend the Line of Operation.

One of the things I'd mentioned early on is that I don’t consider the genesis of this thread as something novel - if anything it is an attempt to synthesize what I think we're already doing in many ways (and many have done before us), just maybe in a disconcerted manner. Putting it in the format that I did just helps me to frame the strategic and perhaps operational contexts as I contemplate where SFA fits, be it as part of BPC in an Indirect sort of way, or be it in post conflict operations following a Direct application of military power. This is one of the reasons why the SFA slide showing breadth and depth in an attempt to consider its scope was upfront.

I think of the two approaches (Direct and Indirect) as complementary. Indirect, for many of the reasons Ken mentioned and I think I brought up early on is hard, and from a military standpoint (if not a political one), somewhat contrary to our nature. However, I also believe we have to have an indirect component to fight a long war, particularly one in which just access can be so critical to be able to be direct at times and places more (not completely) on our terms. We could quickly exhaust ourselves in terms of domestic will, international political capital, and military means by trying to unilaterally pursue a direct approach. The other thing about framing it into direct and indirect components is it helped me consider where the broader inter-agency, multi-national partners, IOs and maybe even NGOs might work together to better achieve (or achieve out right) what military power may not be able to accomplish in and of itself. To me its about better positioning ourselves to take advantage of things as they are vs. how we’d like them to be, then when we realize they are not so, we reach for military power applied in a direct manner, because that is the only element we developed, and the only manner we have time for.

As stated over and over, t’aint easy.
Best, Rob

[Ken White]

...
Absolutely. Actually, I think that such an ideology / symbology is rather simple to build since most of the base ideas are already floating around in various forms. As I see it, it can be structured around the basic idea of a convention between sovereign entities (BTW, not limited to nation states) along the loose confederate lines Rob mentioned at a global level. As long as it also includes guarantees of internal sovereignty within minimal agreed upon limits, including the right of departure, it should work. Of course, negotiating those limits and the conventions would be a freakin' nightmare .

Taking the last (and most difficult) first; very much so -- but that also leads one to your three earlier points; the ideas are out there; confederations; and guarantees.

All those fall afoul of human foibles and perversity:

The "... but it's not MY idea..." syndrome.

To quote Eisenhower "This world of ours... must avoid becoming a community of dreadful fear and hate, and be, instead, a proud confederation of mutual trust and respect." I see little evidence that his admirable desire is on the horizon. I believe that mutual trust and respect have been ruined by a short sighted, immediate gratification view of national interest (on the part of virtually every nation, not just the US). The Politicians are at fault -- but we elect them...

Add that, as R. Reagan said of guarantees, "Trust but verify" as an innate human trait and you have an admitted encapsulation of some of the obstacles to a better world order.

I think those human factors are what make the agreements so very difficult and are also those which most confound today's strategic planning.

More germane to this thread. I see three points:

Strategic planning is difficult at best, more so in the politico-military environment of the US and, indeed, the world today. The very factors that make it difficult are the same factors that make it imperative that it be done.

Both direct and indirect approaches will be required; the indirect to bypass some problems; the direct to confront those that cannot -- or should not (not always the same thing) -- be circumvented. This requires great flexilbility, a willingness to innovate (and for the powers that be to accept, even encourage, innovation), knowledge not only of own aims but of target goals and aspirations as well as an acknowledgment of those and a willingness to be pragmatic and accept what is achievable as opposed to what is desired (while preparing stepped plans to over the long term* arrive at the desired end state). That's a terribly long way of saying we must break the habit of trying to get everything done on one person's watch; that has crippled us since the early 60s.

Such planning in the mass and immediate communication environment of today must balance conflicting demands but due simply to the fact that everything always comes out should always emphasize simplicity, transparency and total honesty (OPSEC contingent on the last two items, of course).

* Not one of our strong suits. In fact, I'm not even sure we have that suit...