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Thread: Gun Control in Counterinsurgency

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  1. #1
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    Quote Originally Posted by jcustis View Post
    What is truly odd is the fact that these same villagers complain about being strong-armed and intimidated by the Taliban, yet have never reported a single instance where they used weapons to defend themselves.
    Is this odd at all? Unless village action is collective, large-scale, and sustained to the point that it deters future intimidation, using a personal weapon against the Taliban seems likely to result in larger-scale retribution. Indeed, from an insurgent point of view, it would be essential to make the point that "resistance is futile." Unless counter-insurgent forces have sufficient presence and response time to prevent it, the insurgents control the "escalatory ladder." (This is probably why some of the more successful cases of village self-defence in Afghanistan occur near colaition forces or where there are embedded SF teams... think of it as the Magnificent Seven effect.)

    This is potentially a very different situation from defending oneself from criminal activity, where the perceived cost-benefit structure is rather different from the criminal's perspective, and where criminals are likely to focus on the easiest pickings.

    On a larger note on the gun control issue, it very much depends on the context. If we're talking rural Iraq or Afghanistan where gun ownership is longstanding and widespread, there may be little point (and indeed, some dysfunctional effects) of attempting civilian disarmament. Conversely, if the area is one where gun ownership (especially military small arms ownership) has been rare, growing civilian gun ownership can escalate small local conflicts over grazing rights, etc. into much larger, violent, and bloody confrontations than used to be the case (a growing problem, for example, in Kenya).
    They mostly come at night. Mostly.


  2. #2
    Council Member jcustis's Avatar
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    Default The response to an incursion is simple...

    How long would it take for groups of Taliban to start frisking farmers? And one of two things will happen, they'll either come up with a pistol or an empty holster, neither of which indicates long-term survivability for the local.
    Hopefully they'll come up with a pistol to their temple. This is the whole point of allowing the common man to be armed. All the farmer need do is present the weapon to said Taliban center-mass areas, pull the trigger, rinse, and repeat as necessary.

    I agree though, it requires collective response. We get collective complaints when patrols stop by to conduct engagement...perhaps it is best the collectively address the issues of knuckleheads encroaching on the perimeter of their village.
    Last edited by jcustis; 07-28-2010 at 09:01 PM.

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