Mech Platoon: CAB or ACR

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

The Plt Sgt would become systematically ill-trained in the dismount action, lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields - and where's your effective no.2 dismount leader?

Luckily none of that reflects reality. What do you do if both parachutes fail? What do you do if everyone dies?
a.) The Plt Sgt is a former Section Commander and has done the same training as the Platoon Commander.
b.) You can have reserve dismount commander.
If someone is "systematically ill-trained" then your training is very poor indeed.

[Fuchs]

Sometime ago I have apparently lost some confidence. Hence, since then I've always wished that plans and organisations are robust, keep going well after losing high quality components.


And next time, you should really exclude "lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields" from "Luckily none of that reflects reality." or I'll slap you with a load of statistics about the remaining life expectation of mechanised infantry lieutenants in war.

[Infanteer]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

For me there is no debate. He dismounts. The Plt Sgt looks after the vehicles. They are "fire support."
The Platoon Commander has got to lead by personal example. The vehicles follow the troops, and the troops follow the officer.

Originally Posted by Fuchs

The Plt Sgt would become systematically ill-trained in the dismount action, lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields - and where's your effective no.2 dismount leader?

Don't get me wrong; there is no question that the Platoon Commander eventually dismounts. In Canada, we have the "LAV Sgt", who is the third senior guy in the Platoon (usually). The Platoon 2IC will always be in another car (separate from the Pl Comd) while the Platoon Comd and the LAV Sgt may ride in his car with him. There are a few variations:
1. Pl Comd comds one car (to be replaced by a Jnr NCO when he dismounts), LAV Sgt comds another car (take control of the "Zulu" vehicles when the Comd dismounts) and the Pl 2IC rides in the back of a third car.
2. Pl Comd comds HQ car and his LAV Sgt rides in the back. They swap on the dismount.
3. LAV Sgt comds HQ car and Pl Comd rides in the back, ready to dismount when required.

I personally used all three, dependant on the mission. I would utilize the first configuration when commanding a "mech heavy" operation, usually at the combat team level, due to the amount of movement and the command and control required. I would use 2 or 3 when using vehicles to insert for dismounted missions. My replacement always used 3 and felt odd in the turret while my boss was a big believer in 1 - the difference in C2 between the turret (with its optics) and the air sentry hatch in the back are, in my opinion, substantial. I was bit in the ass a few times (luckily in training) while in the back lacking C2; my LAV Sgt was good, but sometimes time and space mean the comd needs to call the audible fast.

The other debate for us is when to do the "switch" in the HQ car. The LAV does not allow a swapping of commanders internally under armour (I think one can do this in a Bradley) so it involves getting up on the turret and jumping down in the back hatch. Obviously one doesn't want to do this in the middle of a fire fight, but using the other LAVs/tanks for cover allows it to be done in a relatively safe manner. This is alright as it allows the Sgts to dismount with the sections and get into the fight without having the officer running all over the place right away. Although a Pl Comd could theoretically comd an assault from the turret, he wouldn't want to for fear of not sharing the pain with his men. Some Pl Comds prefer to swap over on the Line of Departure while some do it on the Objective. Preference I guess (although I prefer the latter for the reasons listed above).

Of course, having a vehicle without a turret would largely eliminate this whole concept, but I'd be hardpressed to willingly give up 4 M242s....

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Sometime ago I have apparently lost some confidence. Hence, since then I've always wished that plans and organisations are robust, keep going well after losing high quality components.

I 100% agree with the sentiment, but you should not plan to be "badly trained."
Simplicity is the key, but doing very simple things well requires great skill. That is why war isn't engineering.

And next time, you should really exclude "lieutenants die like fleas on battlefields" from "Luckily none of that reflects reality." or I'll slap you with a load of statistics about the remaining life expectation of mechanised infantry lieutenants in war.

As resident of Israel and the product of a British Public School, I am extremely aware of the disproportionately high casualties among junior officers.
The reality I was challenging the idea that if that happens life grinds to a halt because the Platoon Sergeant is "systematically ill-trained."

[Tukhachevskii]

Originally Posted by TAH

and would add anothe MGS to ease the doctrinal issue at the MGS/tank platoon level.

TAH

Sir,

It would seem I must beg your forgiveness for so out of hand dismissing your statement HERE. It does seem that, according to FM 3-20.96 / FM 17-96, The RSTA Squadron (p. 6-145) at least (in its initial draft format that is), the MGS platoon was to have four vehicles. Somewhere along the way it lost one! I don’t know why but I surmise one or a combination of the following reasons;

1) Weight. Losing three MGS (one from each platoon of each company) per battalion reduced the overall airlift requirements of the SBCT.

2) Cost. (self-explanatory)

3) Delay in fielding the said beasty led to manning requirements having to be tweaked once the vehicle came online.

4) I also suspect the true tankers (!) didn’t like the vehicle and, still bitter over the cancellation of the M8 AGS- for which they even wrote a new FM no less (FM 17-18 Light Armour Operations)- refused to allow them to be used as ersatz tank(ette)s.

My comments were based on the assumption that, doctrinally at least, the MGS was an infantry intimate support weapon meant to be attached directly to platoons rather than employed as a manoeuvre element in its own right. Personally, I think the minimum number of tanks should be four for a platoon (USMC tank platoons had five until recently IIRC) although I personally would prefer six, in two sections of three, thus allowing for three tubes providing overwatch while the other three manoeuvre. I would also have two platoons plus two more tanks in Co. HQ and a SPM section of 2 twin-barrelled 120mm AMOS per company so there would still be 14 tanks in a UK tank squadron (but that’s for another thread!); I know NORFOLK may disagree (he has written a pretty good examination of the issue on the Sinodefence blog). The very concept of a three tank platoon conducting alternate overwatch makes my eyes water which see the picture below fromFM 3-20.151, The Mobile Gun System (MGS) Platoon (p. 3-8). AFAIK the US is the only NATO country to have platoons of four tanks; UK platoons/troops have three although formation reconnaissance regiments have platoons of four Scimitars.

[Fuchs]

This bounding overwatch thing always strikes me as odd when it's about movement from height to height such as in that graphic.
Tanks & AFVs are supposed to move like water flows - not over ridge lines.

[gute]

Originally Posted by Tukhachevskii

As for the first question the following book is a useful place to start:

W. Blair Haworth, Jr., The Bradley and How It Got That Way:Technology, Institutions and the Problem of Mechanised Infantry in the United States Army(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1999)

Just finished reading this good book. This book answered my question about the limited dismount capability - the 2-man turret. The Army decided not to pursue a one man turret for the M2 and two man turret for the M3 due to cost. Congress and the GAO were skeptical of the vehicle and its role. Former Senator Gary Hart asked the Army why they did not get an APC in the same weight range as a MBT.

Other interesting tidbits from the book:

a War College paper written in the early 70's proposed going away from armor and infantry specific battalions to combined arms battalions of two tank companies and two infantry companies.

Wass de Czege made the case that there are three distinct subgroups of infantry:

armored
regular
light

NCOs argued that the M3 was not suitable for cavalry reconnaissance missions because it is too big, too heavy, too heavely armed and the five man crew is too large. Most importantly, the cav scout should rely on stealth to obtain infomation. Midlevel officers countered and argued that the vehicle had to be heavy to counter the heavy armor threat in Europe. Also, an experienced NCO will not put his crew in a position to be outgunned.



I guess the next step is a Merkava like Combined Arms Tank. A 21st Century MBT-70 that also transports 4-6 troops.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

This bounding overwatch thing always strikes me as odd when it's about movement from height to height such as in that graphic.
Tanks & AFVs are supposed to move like water flows - not over ridge lines.

I fought a losing battle in the US Army for well over thirty years trying to convince people that flawed art work in manuals would get people killed. The reality should be and usually is what you say, not what the pictures always show -- however, those flawed pictures do lead some astray. The practice of stopping training for administrative lunches and then trying to resume tactically oriented thinking is the same sort of thing.

We as an Army do the big things well, however we are too frequently really pathetic at the little things. The flawed pictures and writing in our doctrinal publications are a big part of that. The problem is that most of the artists are civilians and opt for clear portrayals and 'clean graphics' as opposed to accurate representations of what should occur. We did better toward the end of WW II but that fell by the wayside as experience levels dropped and we moved to a system of mixed snowbird / blackbird and civilian authors instead of doctrine and experienced military training oriented writers ...

Gute:

a War College paper written in the early 70's proposed going away from armor and infantry specific battalions to combined arms battalions of two tank companies and two infantry companies.

That push has been around since WW II -- it always got stalled by Branch parochialism more than anything else. My solution has always been to do away with Branches...

Wass de Czege made the case that there are three distinct subgroups of infantry: armored, regular, light.

I don't agree with him on many things but he got that right. Solve the Branch problem by making the Armored dismount guys Dragoons...

NCOs argued that the M3 was not suitable for cavalry reconnaissance missions because it is too big, too heavy, too heavely armed and the five man crew is too large. Most importantly, the cav scout should rely on stealth to obtain infomation. Midlevel officers countered and argued that the vehicle had to be heavy to counter the heavy armor threat in Europe. Also, an experienced NCO will not put his crew in a position to be outgunned.

The NCOs were right (and not putting your vehicle in a position to be outgunned is just sensible...). FWIW, as someone peripherally involved in the Bradley debacle, at the time, the LTs, CPTs and most MAJs agreed with the NCOs, the other MAJs and the LTCs were ambivalent but leaned toward the heavy solution mostly because the COLs were the ones who were Europe oriented and adamant about the Red threat -- actually, it was all about speed; those guys didn't want to wait for stealthy recon, they wanted to just slam out and get in fights. It is possibly noteworthy that the guys who would actually go out opted for light and stealthy while those on Staffs opted for somebody just to go out and get in a fight ...

[gute]

Gute:That push has been around since WW II -- it always got stalled by Branch parochialism more than anything else. My solution has always been to do away with Branches...I don't agree with him on many things but he got that right. Solve the Branch problem by making the Armored dismount guys Dragoons...The NCOs were right (and not putting your vehicle in a position to be outgunned is just sensible...). FWIW, as someone peripherally involved in the Bradley debacle, at the time, the LTs, CPTs and most MAJs agreed with the NCOs, the other MAJs and the LTCs were ambivalent but leaned toward the heavy solution mostly because the COLs were the ones who were Europe oriented and adamant about the Red threat -- actually, it was all about speed; those guys didn't want to wait for stealthy recon, they wanted to just slam out and get in fights. It is possibly noteworthy that the guys who would actually go out opted for light and stealthy while those on Staffs opted for somebody just to go out and get in a fight ... [/QUOTE]

Ken,

I was hoping you would respond - thanks.

Something else I've found interesting. Some cav recon squadrons went two a 3/5 platoon organization - three tanks and five M3 vehicles. I believe the makeup of the ARS today is the same except the M3 has replaced the tank and the hummer has replaced the M3.

[82redleg]

Originally Posted by gute

Something else I've found interesting. Some cav recon squadrons went two a 3/5 platoon organization - three tanks and five M3 vehicles. I believe the makeup of the ARS today is the same except the M3 has replaced the tank and the hummer has replaced the M3.

I, too, recall seeing something about 3 M1s and 5 M3s, but I don't know where.

On page 153 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...scouts_out.pdf
it shows a ROAD divisional cavalry squadron platoon of 3 M551 Sheridans, 4 M114s and 2 M113 (I think, it simply says "APC" for the mortar section).

On page 167, it shows a L-series cavalry troop of 2 platoons of 4 M1s and 2 platoons of 4 M3s- I never tracked that organization, only the 2 platoons of 6 M3s, but I was never a heavy guy.

Figure 77, on page 264 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...eron_fight.pdf is a picture of a mixed M48/M114 platoon. On page 305-306, it describes tests of mixed M3/HMMWV platoons (6 HMMWV & 4 M3).

On page 319, it refers to a 3 M1/5 M3 platoon (in Europe, elswhere it was 2 M1/3 M3) as part of the transition of divisional cavalry squadrons from 2 pure M3 troops to the 3 mixed troops of 2 x 6 M3s and 2 x 4 M1s (as in the regimental squadrons).

On page 320, table 4 shows the different configurations of the Army scout platoons deployed in OPN Desert Storm. It addresses a 3 M1/5M3 platoon again on page 321, referencing Haworth's book, as an experimental design employed by one or two units (but not addressed in table 4).

[gute]

Originally Posted by 82redleg

I, too, recall seeing something about 3 M1s and 5 M3s, but I don't know where.

On page 153 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...scouts_out.pdf
it shows a ROAD divisional cavalry squadron platoon of 3 M551 Sheridans, 4 M114s and 2 M113 (I think, it simply says "APC" for the mortar section).

On page 167, it shows a L-series cavalry troop of 2 platoons of 4 M1s and 2 platoons of 4 M3s- I never tracked that organization, only the 2 platoons of 6 M3s, but I was never a heavy guy.

Figure 77, on page 264 of http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...eron_fight.pdf is a picture of a mixed M48/M114 platoon. On page 305-306, it describes tests of mixed M3/HMMWV platoons (6 HMMWV & 4 M3).

On page 319, it refers to a 3 M1/5 M3 platoon (in Europe, elswhere it was 2 M1/3 M3) as part of the transition of divisional cavalry squadrons from 2 pure M3 troops to the 3 mixed troops of 2 x 6 M3s and 2 x 4 M1s (as in the regimental squadrons).

On page 320, table 4 shows the different configurations of the Army scout platoons deployed in OPN Desert Storm. It addresses a 3 M1/5M3 platoon again on page 321, referencing Haworth's book, as an experimental design employed by one or two units (but not addressed in table 4).

On page 141, paragraph two, of the book The Bradley and How It Got That Way, the author writes that the first unit to be equipped was the 3/4 Cav and the organization was reminiscent of the final H-series platoon mix of M60 and M113.

I also finished the book The Human Face of War by Jim Storr. I wished I would have read these books before I started askin all kinds of dumb questions (and I do believe there is such a thing as a dumb question).

In Chapter 6 of The Human Face of War, Storr goes into detail about corps, divison, and brigade organization. He based his conclusions mostly on actions in WWII, but also the six-day war to name a couple.

division - two brigades, 18-24 companies
brigades - two battalions
battalions - two companies
recon squadron at division
majority of fires at corps
small reserve force of maybe a battalion in the division
does recognize 3 battalion, 3 company structure popular and successful.
one engineer company per brigade with a reserve company
3-4 truck companies commanded by Lt. Colonel
about same number of maintenance and medical companies
too much info leads to bad decisions
HQS too large - takes too long to issue orders.
division HQS of 20 troops, Corps 30-40.
company level is the highest level where 1 man can C2 a large organization

A lot of what he describes looks like a current HBCT or SBCT.

He did not go into detail about companies, platoons and squads, but did write about span of control (2,3,5 subordinates, but usually two in combat).

This has been discussed before and I will search it later, but if two subordinates is max span of control for combat, then the infantry squad should be a squad leader with two fire teams of three. A platoon would be smaller or the PL would oversee two sections made up of two squads each. I guess the company would work the same way. Company CO commandes to sections of two platoons.

[TAH]

Originally Posted by Ken White

I fought a losing battle in the US Army for well over thirty years trying to convince people that flawed art work in manuals would get people killed. The reality should be and usually is what you say, not what the pictures always show -- however, those flawed pictures do lead some astray. The practice of stopping training for administrative lunches and then trying to resume tactically oriented thinking is the same sort of thing.

We as an Army do the big things well, however we are too frequently really pathetic at the little things. The flawed pictures and writing in our doctrinal publications are a big part of that. The problem is that most of the artists are civilians and opt for clear portrayals and 'clean graphics' as opposed to accurate representations of what should occur. We did better toward the end of WW II but that fell by the wayside as experience levels dropped and we moved to a system of mixed snowbird / blackbird and civilian authors instead of doctrine and experienced military training oriented writers ...

Gute:That push has been around since WW II -- it always got stalled by Branch parochialism more than anything else. My solution has always been to do away with Branches...I don't agree with him on many things but he got that right. Solve the Branch problem by making the Armored dismount guys Dragoons...The NCOs were right (and not putting your vehicle in a position to be outgunned is just sensible...). FWIW, as someone peripherally involved in the Bradley debacle, at the time, the LTs, CPTs and most MAJs agreed with the NCOs, the other MAJs and the LTCs were ambivalent but leaned toward the heavy solution mostly because the COLs were the ones who were Europe oriented and adamant about the Red threat -- actually, it was all about speed; those guys didn't want to wait for stealthy recon, they wanted to just slam out and get in fights. It is possibly noteworthy that the guys who would actually go out opted for light and stealthy while those on Staffs opted for somebody just to go out and get in a fight ...

An old cav guy once told me that the good thing about M2/M3 was that the enemy would not be able to easily tell if they had run into an element from an ACr, a DIV CAV sqdrn, a Bn/TF scout platoon or a Mech infantry Platoon buy just looking at the vehicle itself. A scout/recon specific vehicle will telegraph that.

[TAH]

Originally Posted by gute

Just finished reading this good book. This book answered my question about the limited dismount capability - the 2-man turret. The Army decided not to pursue a one man turret for the M2 and two man turret for the M3 due to cost. Congress and the GAO were skeptical of the vehicle and its role. Former Senator Gary Hart asked the Army why they did not get an APC in the same weight range as a MBT.

Other interesting tidbits from the book:

a War College paper written in the early 70's proposed going away from armor and infantry specific battalions to combined arms battalions of two tank companies and two infantry companies.

Wass de Czege made the case that there are three distinct subgroups of infantry:

armored
regular
light

NCOs argued that the M3 was not suitable for cavalry reconnaissance missions because it is too big, too heavy, too heavely armed and the five man crew is too large. Most importantly, the cav scout should rely on stealth to obtain infomation. Midlevel officers countered and argued that the vehicle had to be heavy to counter the heavy armor threat in Europe. Also, an experienced NCO will not put his crew in a position to be outgunned.



I guess the next step is a Merkava like Combined Arms Tank. A 21st Century MBT-70 that also transports 4-6 troops.

Think there is a dis-connect between too big, 5-man crew and stealth. A 3-man crew like would have been on the XM800 would not have provided any dismount capability.

This discussion also over looks somewhat the role that Cavalry was/did play. That of the Security Force fight (Screen, guard, cover) and economy-of-force. Same unit was expecetd to be able to do both. And I think they could/did.

[TAH]

Originally Posted by gute

division - two brigades, 18-24 companies
brigades - two battalions
battalions - two companies
recon squadron at division
majority of fires at corps
small reserve force of maybe a battalion in the division
does recognize 3 battalion, 3 company structure popular and successful.
one engineer company per brigade with a reserve company
3-4 truck companies commanded by Lt. Colonel
about same number of maintenance and medical companies
too much info leads to bad decisions
HQS too large - takes too long to issue orders.
division HQS of 20 troops, Corps 30-40.
company level is the highest level where 1 man can C2 a large organization

A lot of what he describes looks like a current HBCT or SBCT.

He did not go into detail about companies, platoons and squads, but did write about span of control (2,3,5 subordinates, but usually two in combat).

This has been discussed before and I will search it later, but if two subordinates is max span of control for combat, then the infantry squad should be a squad leader with two fire teams of three. A platoon would be smaller or the PL would oversee two sections made up of two squads each. I guess the company would work the same way. Company CO commandes to sections of two platoons.

An 18-24 company division is a big Brigade of 6 maneuver battalions.

A single engineer company per brigade (even of just two battalions) is not enough. Need a company per maneuver battalion. That's why US divisions went to an Engineer Regiment/Group back in the 90s. Moves uits from Corps down to division.

agree with the comments about too much info and staffs that are too big.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by TAH

An old cav guy once told me that the good thing about M2/M3 was that the enemy would not be able to easily tell if they had run into an element from an ACr, a DIV CAV sqdrn, a Bn/TF scout platoon or a Mech infantry Platoon buy just looking at the vehicle itself. A scout/recon specific vehicle will telegraph that.

It's not totally mythical but it's close. That misidentification will last for only seconds in any contact. The actions of the occupants of the vehicle will quickly tell the opponent who and what he's facing -- not that he's likely really concerned with that, his concern will be to react to it, who or what it really is can come later if at all...

Think there is a dis-connect between too big, 5-man crew and stealth. A 3-man crew like would have been on the XM800 would not have provided any dismount capability.

Depends on whether you waste a space on a Gunner or not. Having scouted for a number of years, in combat and out, with three man crews, Veh Cdrs man guns (or dismount) the third man, a Scout, dismounts (or mans the weapon). Which dismounts is METT-T dependent (the 'C' factor generally has nothing to do with it). Four is overkill, five is ridiculous.

Part of the logic for three man scout crews was to keep the numbers up front down in a dangerous job to keep casualties lower...

The Cav 'problem' didn't exist from WWII until the stupid Bradley came along.

Scouts scouted (stealthy recon / economy of force efforts / screens), the Tanks and / or Infantry fought for info and did the delay, cover and guard msns supported by the Mortar and Scouts. It worked -- so we reinvented it so that it did not work.

[gute]

Originally Posted by TAH

An 18-24 company divisiion is a big Brigade of 6 maneuver battalions.

A single engineer company per brigade (even of just two battalions) is not enough. Need a company per maneuver battalion. That's why US divisions went to an Engineer Regiment/Group back in the 90s. Moves uits from Corps down to division.

agree with the comments about too much info and staffs that are too big.

I believe that would be two brigades with three battalions each - 18 companies (based on three company battalions).

One of the major complaints about the BCT in Iraq was the insufficient engineer forces, but the complaints about too few military police, engineers and arty all have to do with a design based on offensive operations, but used for stablity operations to increase the number units available for deployment.

So, taking recommendations from Storr and your opinion, how about a brigade with three maneuber battalions, each with one tank, one infantry and one engineer company, one fires battalion, signal company, small brigade HHC.

[82redleg]

Originally Posted by gute

I believe that would be two brigades with three battalions each - 18 companies (based on three company battalions).

One of the major complaints about the BCT in Iraq was the insufficient engineer forces, but the complaints about too few military police, engineers and arty all have to do with a design based on offensive operations, but used for stablity operations to increase the number units available for deployment.

So, taking recommendations from Storr and your opinion, how about a brigade with three maneuber battalions, each with one tank, one infantry and one engineer company, one fires battalion, signal company, small brigade HHC.

I'll have to check out Storr's argument, but I'm inclined to disagree. I like big, robust units. It allows commanders to rotate units out and have a flexibility to keep a reserve, guard a base camp, a LOC, detach a unit for a special mission, etc, without breaking a sub unit. If you send a company from a 2 company BN, that BN is now broken. If you send a CO from a 4 company BN, that BN is simply slightly less flexible, especially if it has 4 + a weapons/CSC, not 4 including a weapons/CSC.

Large units also inhibit staffs from micromanaging- a BCT staff will be more involved with the operations of its subordinates if there are only 2 than if there are 4.

[Tukhachevskii]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

This bounding overwatch thing always strikes me as odd when it's about movement from height to height such as in that graphic.
Tanks & AFVs are supposed to move like water flows - not over ridge lines.

True, but flowing water taks predictable routes(mobility corridors/avenues of approach). Those will more than likely, assuming some degree of intelligence on the part of the enemy, be either mined, covered by abnti-tank missile sacks and be pre-ranged for artillery fires (or all three). When that happens, at some point, you'll need to move over ope terrains from cover to cover.

[TAH]

[QUOTEThe Cav 'problem' didn't exist from WWII until the stupid Bradley came along.

[/QUOTE]

Ken, can you please expand on your definition of the "Cav Problem".

At the start of WWII, we had the same situation we had until recently, flawed doctrine that restricted Mechinized Cavalry units to recon only. Found in North Africa it didn't work. Open terrain, impoper training, out-gunned etc.

I would ask anyone interested in some of the roots of the CAV/Recon to read the following

ETO General Board Report #49 on Mechanized Cav

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/eto/eto-049.pdf

CSI Study Scouts Out

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/cs...scouts_out.pdf

CSI Study Fight for Information

http://cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/cameron_fight.pdf

Lou Dimarco's Thesis on WWII Cavalry

http://etd.lib.fsu.edu/theses/availa...302004-164302/

While there are others, these give good background/backup info on how we got here.

[TAH]

Originally Posted by gute

how about a brigade with three maneuber battalions, each with one tank, one infantry and one engineer company, one fires battalion, signal company, small brigade HHC.

For a total of:
1. Three tank Companies (one Bn) OK
2. Three Mech Inf Companies (One Bn) Not enough need at least three more companies.
3. Three Engineer Companies For two manuever Bns too much, up to another Mech Inf Bn of CAB (2X1) then OK.

Having served with both, prefer 4 (square) over 3 (triangular) units. Moer flexible, greater ability for sustained combat.

The addition of the four company under DIV86 was what made it "better" not the extra 4 tanks.