Storming the Beach

[William F. Owen]

Starting this as I think this worthy of our collective attention rather than resting in the Blog.

See here.

IMO, I think EFV and V-22 are just bad ideas for a non-existent problem, created from an imagined reality. Yes amphibious Operations will be a necessary part of future warfare, but I have doubts that current ideas actually deliver that in a useful way.

...BTW, I have a lot of time for the Corps (USMC). Slightly odd chaps, but I actually believe the rest of the world can learn some useful things from the USMC if it is in any way serious about expeditionary operations.

[Fuchs]

Both are over-engineered for sure.

A modern marine corps would be an ideal choice for the airborne, swamp operations and river/lake crossing niches.
Too bad, the USMC is redundant with army formations (101st, 82nd, and army in general as demonstrated in WW2 amphibious operations in the European theatre).

It makes sense to give a marine corps an amphibious AFV, but that doesn't need to be a high seas or high speed design. A winch and good climbing ability are more important (many rivers are between rather steep hills).

[slapout9]

This was scheduled to go into actual production but Vietnam budget priorities intervened. Not the idea ducted fan version but still pretty good IMO.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=buh7_xLG4ZE

[Infanteer]

I remember reading how amphibious warfare had suffered due to Iraq and Afghanistan as the Marine Corps had to pay its toll for wanting 3 full up divisions with tanks - the toll being taking a share in sustaining deployments on counter-insurgency operations. As Iraq/Afghanistan reach their nadir, it shall be interesting to see how the USMC chooses to oriet itself.

There were a few articles written in the Australian Army Journal on Amphibious Warfare and such that were really good and layed the concept out well. The topic is one that has always interested me as it is probably one of the most effective ways of sustainable force projection.

However, Wilf raises a good point with "storming the beach". I had the oppurtunity to work with the USMC, including an amphibious exercise aboard an LHD. Amazing in the capabilities they provide. In the exercise, we tried for two days to execute and amphibious assault out of the well deck. Once we got the well deck and broken landing craft sorted out, the seas were simply too rough to deploy. Eventually, we just hopped on helicopters and assaulted the objective (6 CH-53s lifted an entire Rifle Company at once from the ship).

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't. Other than that, the Gators were impressive. Between LCACs, landing craft and helos, there was a good mix of insertion ability. The C2, logistical and medical support that the ship contained makes these abilities.

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by Infanteer

I remember reading how amphibious warfare had suffered due to Iraq and Afghanistan as the Marine Corps had to pay its toll for wanting 3 full up divisions with tanks - the toll being taking a share in sustaining deployments on counter-insurgency operations. As Iraq/Afghanistan reach their nadir, it shall be interesting to see how the USMC chooses to oriet itself.

There were a few articles written in the Australian Army Journal on Amphibious Warfare and such that were really good and layed the concept out well. The topic is one that has always interested me as it is probably one of the most effective ways of sustainable force projection.

However, Wilf raises a good point with "storming the beach". I had the oppurtunity to work with the USMC, including an amphibious exercise aboard an LHD. Amazing in the capabilities they provide. In the exercise, we tried for two days to execute and amphibious assault out of the well deck. Once we got the well deck and broken landing craft sorted out, the seas were simply too rough to deploy. Eventually, we just hopped on helicopters and assaulted the objective (6 CH-53s lifted an entire Rifle Company at once from the ship).

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't. Other than that, the Gators were impressive. Between LCACs, landing craft and helos, there was a good mix of insertion ability. The C2, logistical and medical support that the ship contained makes these abilities.

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

General Gavin thought and wrote that the mission of the Marine Corps should be to "Attack Across The Shore" not to just focus on beach landings.

[Pete]

The 6th of June is an auspicious day for starting this "Storming the Beach" thread. Today is the 66th anniversary of the Normandy landings. "Allies Driving Into France" is the headline for the lead story on the front page of my London edition of The Stars and Stripes for June 7, 1944, price 1D.

[Granite_State]

Originally Posted by Infanteer

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

I had the same thought after spending just one night aboard one during our quick Amphibious Familiarization Exercise at TBS two months ago.

[Chris jM]

Originally Posted by Infanteer

Enemy air defence can be dealt with, Mother Nature can't.

Amphibious/ ship-to-shore ops are very difficult, agreed. The thing to remember in the larger context of marine-type ops is that it's one thing getting ashore, it's another thing sustaining yourself once ashore.

Beach-heads and even established ports are a huge bottle-neck in the logistic support that needs to flow through, and tying up all your aviation assets in supply isn't an ideal solution if at all possible.

Further, as you stated, beach-heads are hugely vulnerable to both enemy action and mother nature. I've only had one experience of operating ship-to-shore and the fragility of the beach-head in anything other than near-perfect conditions is hard to believe. We had to have mass engineer recce and preparation of matting and berms so our vehicles could roll ashore - and this was in a completely uncontested, take-your-time environment. Once chance and friction comes into effect, I shudder to think of the difficulties.

[COMMAR]

Its important to keep in mind in all points of this discussion that Amphibious Ops are not relegated to loading troops on a AAV/EFV/LCAC & landing on a beach.

The Amphibious Assault is the most complex of military maneuver & involves alot of moving parts in a very fluid environment. It can flow from reconnaissance & sabotage to company sized clandestine raid for further sabotage/softening to vertical assault to beach head landing. In no particular order or necessity.

The flow from Beach Head to Build Up to Break Out is more Art than Science & is taught to the level of understanding to all from Colonel to Squad Leader. This is one of the major reasons the USMC stresses training for it.

Why is this Important?

Take the studies done on the Operation in Grenada. Subsequent studies showed that although all forces suffered serious set backs to initial assault plans, all forces eventually landed & began to build forces.

But it was the Marines understanding of Build Up to Break Out; Break Out-stresses sucking the Enemy/Attackers in during the Build Up phase to swell forces at their weakest point using that momentum to "Break Out" & fuel your Counter-Assault, that led to 400 Marines taking 80% of the Island.--Fluid.. Art not Science.

The 2 Coys fr/the 22nd MEU's role was initially very small; lead a Helo Raid to seize Port Pearl for potential Civ Evac to ARG. But were ordered to seize the rest of Island when the Main assault force was pinned down at Port Salinas.

Although this was not a classic Amphibious Assault all elements trained for proved essential in this & all other assault/raid type Operations. Its like training for the Decathlon b/c you don't which event you may be asked to run, training for Amphib Ops is nearly all encompassing.

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by COMMAR

The Amphibious Assault is the most complex of military maneuver & involves alot of moving parts in a very fluid environment. It can flow from reconnaissance & sabotage to company sized clandestine raid for further sabotage/softening to vertical assault to beach head landing. In no particular order or necessity.

OUTSTANDING! need to send that to Uncle Bob (SECDEF) cause I don't think he gets it. That is also what AIRBORNE warfare is all about, as JCUSTIS said a while back there is no difference. As the future becomes more unpredictable we MOST likely to need more Amphibious capabilities not less.

Also, remember Haiti!!!

[Entropy]

Originally Posted by Infanteer

I'm curious as to what is worse, 6 months in Afghanistan or 6 months afloat - after 3 weeks I was going stir crazy in those things.

Since you ask and since I've done both (the benefit, I suppose, of being in two services), I'd say afloat is better. Keep in mind that I was a fobbit (though not by choice) so your mileage may vary. The reason I give the advantage to an afloat deployment is the port calls. I got to see Australia several times, Hong Kong, Singapore, Japan, Dubai, etc. You get to drink in port. You get to interact with women. That makes up for a lot of tin-can induced craziness which is, admittedly, pretty bad. But as I guy who loves to travel I thought the Navy was a pretty sweet deal.

[Entropy]

I'm reminded of something. When I was in the Navy during the 1990's we and the Marines had an expeditionary raiding mindest. We didn't do campaign-level planning - that was something left to the Army and Air Force. I've been out of the Navy for a while now and wonder if raiding is still a part of the culture and skill-set.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Entropy

I'm reminded of something. When I was in the Navy during the 1990's we and the Marines had an expeditionary raiding mindest. We didn't do campaign-level planning - that was something left to the Army and Air Force. I've been out of the Navy for a while now and wonder if raiding is still a part of the culture and skill-set.

and was convinced it was wise and an excellent strategy. I've heard, read or seen nothing in the past 60 years to suggest different. My sensing it is that it is not part of the skill set and I believe that is highly regrettable as well as a major shortfall in capability. In the Army, Airborne units also once had that as viable skill set and I know it's lost there. That technique is apparently not looked upon favorably by many today. Fortunately, not all agree...

We lost the bubble due to political games in DC IMO. Political games, political correctness and lack of political will...

[Fuchs]

Funnily, that's exactly what I expected to happen after 9-11: A few raids (I thought of rangers, though), a few snatch ops, but staying out of the civil war.

Simply taking on the responsible individuals directly and making any overt infrastructure ("terror camps") unfeasible.

I was quite surprised about the invasion (although afaik the invasion was an effort with marginal own personnel permanently on the ground until the Marines took Kandahar airport).

And then imagine my surprise when it became clear that the Westerns were there to stay...*insert board-incompatible language here*.

[COMMAR]

Originally Posted by slapout9

OUTSTANDING! need to send that to Uncle Bob (SECDEF) cause I don't think he gets it. That is also what AIRBORNE warfare is all about, as JCUSTIS said a while back there is no difference. As the future becomes more unpredictable we MOST likely to need more Amphibious capabilities not less.

Also, remember Haiti!!!

Now we're back to chiding what we don't understand for the sake of a pissing contest.

Its not on my word that calls Amphibious Warfare the most complex of all modern military maneuvers, just everything that's written on the subject. And its not that Gates doesn't know or understand this.

He's not saying, How is Amphibious Warfare relevant..?, but convince me how YOUR vision of (future) Amphibious Operations is relevant to MY vision of where I want to take the DOD.




But... this is not the 1st time Gates & the Corps have been at odds over the way Gates envisioned something & he challenged the Corps to change his mind; and they did.

3yrs ago CMC Gen Conway said Anbar is pacified, my Marines are bored, & within a year I would like to begin shifting Our Marines from Iraq to Afghanistan.

Gates publicly chided Conway & said there NO plans to shift the Marines to A'stan & that the Marines will stay in Anbar until the end of our involvement in Iraq.

Gates & Conway tactfully went back & forth in the media for months w/Gates finally laying down the Gauntlet in Dec '07 saying the Marines have presented no viable plan for shifting forces to A'stan.

The opportunity came in Jan '08 when NATO fell 5,000 troops short of the goal set by Gates. The Marines presented a plan to insert 3500 Marines in 3mths along with a new strategy for their area.

1yr later Gates was convinced & there were 10,000 more Marines in A'stan & 10,000 less in Iraq.


Gates is simply telling HQMC, We don't see eye to eye on whats relevant (in both Strategy & Procurement). He's challenging them to convince me.

[Valin]

Originally Posted by Granite_State

I had the same thought after spending just one night aboard one during our quick Amphibious Familiarization Exercise at TBS two months ago.

That's why I joined the Air Force. Although there were times when the cooks served red wine with fowl....yet somehow we managed to survive.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Funnily, that's exactly what I expected to happen after 9-11: A few raids (I thought of rangers, though), a few snatch ops, but staying out of the civil war.

capabilities in the 80s, the then senior leadership in DoD fought it to a standstill due to risk aversion. USSOCOM grabbed the ball when the Pentagon wasn't looking and convinced a lot of folks that such missions should be theirs and they developed minimal capabilities (not large or robust enough in my view -- plus large raids shouldn't be their job) but every attempt to employ those capabilities (and there were some) was stymied by DoD or the NSC.

Thus the 'invasion' occurred more due to a lack of other capability than for other reasons.

And then imagine my surprise when it became clear that the Westerns were there to stay...*insert board-incompatible language here*.

Heh. You were not alone...

Hopefully, we'll get smarter in the future and develop both the capabilities for strategic raids and the political will to employ them.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by COMMAR

He's not saying, How is Amphibious Warfare relevant..?, but convince me how YOUR vision of (future) Amphibious Operations is relevant to MY vision of where I want to take the DOD.

It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22.
The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

In fact, it's not just the USMC vision, but ideas about the capabilities of future regular threats in general that always seem to default to "this is how we would like them to be, to justify our equipment program."

[Tukhachevskii]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

It is the USMC vision that concerns me - thus my reference to EFV & V22.
The justification for these platforms always comes back to some very contestable assumptions.

In fact, it's not just the USMC vision, but ideas about the capabilities of future regular threats in general that always seem to default to "this is how we would like them to be, to justify our equipment program."

Building a better mousetrap: The Unnecessary Capability of the EFV from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College (link may be fernickity)

Yet the overwhelming impetus driving the development of the EFV is operational maneuver from the sea [OMFTS]. The vision behind the EFV is one in which a group of vehicles move from apmphibious shipping twenty-five nautical miles from the shoreline and then travel at a high speed to a littoral penetration point to come ashore and seamlessly complete some tactical mission.
The layout and construction of the EFV have been optimised for that high speed movement over water. but this is not a reasonable focus. The mission profile guidance originally given to the EFV (then the AAAV) team was for a 20% operational time in the water and 80% on land. Since then, the mean operational time in the water for all envisioned EFV missions has been revised to 8.2%[!]. Thus the Marine Corps predicts the EFV to operate eight out of every one hundred hours of vehicle operation in water.
If the Marine Corps had fielded the EFV in January of 2001, the high water speed capability would not have been used in either Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation IIraqi Freedom both expeditionary operations by any standard. (p.9-10)

Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq from the Centre for American Progress.

It [the EFV] is significantly faster on water, slighty faster on land, and has betetr armor and firepower than the AAV. On land, the EFV is also larger, more powerful, and has betetr communications than other armored personnel carriers, including the Army's Bradley. It only lacks increased armor protection, which the Marines have readily sacrificed for greater mobility. Even though the cost of the EFV has jumped to more than $12 million per vehicle....(p.14)

That last statistic made my eyes water, was a time when you could buy a JAS 39 Gripen fighter for that much (c. 1995-ish). Talk about inflation. If I'm not mistaken an M1A1 costs about $5million?


The Marines' Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV): Background and Issues for Congress from the ever informative Congressional Research Service

Twenty years ago when the EFV was conceived, some defense officials suggested that the fleet could operate 20 to 30 miles from the shore, debarking EFVs for amphibious operations, but with the advent of these new weapons [anti-ship missiles, mines, small fast attack craft, etc.] and tactics, this is no longer possible. Instead in order to sufficiently protect the large amphibious ships that transport Marines and EFVs, it has been suggested that the fleet might need to operate at least 100 miles from shore - beyond the EFV's range.(p.7)

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by COMMAR

Gates is simply telling HQMC, We don't see eye to eye on whats relevant (in both Strategy & Procurement). He's challenging them to convince me.

So, is he questioning the ideas and equipment or just the cost? Meaning you can do what want to do but you have to find a cheaper way?