Small Wars in the "new" cash strapped Western economy

[davidbfpo]

The predicted, if not actual "crunch" on public spending in the West has appeared in other threads, but SWC have IIRC not considered what the possible impact will be on Small Wars.

An occasional SWC reader posed these questions:

I was talking this morning to someone about the future of countering extremism world wide considering we are broke. More information operations? Retrenchment? Let the Chinese "carry the can"?

Abu M has touched upon this question IMHO in this:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam....html#comments

I hate scenarios normally as being too hypothetical and need a PPT. So imagination on for a moment please.

The 9/11 attack happens today, would the USA and allies embark on the follow-on Afghan campaign? I think not. Imagination off.

Is there such a concept and practice of cheap Small Wars? British Imperial history IMHO offers some examples, air power in Iraq between the wars and limited punitive campaigns in the NWFP / FATA up to 1947.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Is there such a concept and practice of cheap Small Wars? British Imperial history IMHO offers some examples, air power in Iraq between the wars and limited punitive campaigns in the NWFP / FATA up to 1947.

Destroying the enemy can be done for comparatively cost. It's not hard. Worked in Oman, and could be done almost anywhere.
"Nouveau-COIN" cannot be done cheaply as it is entirely predicated on spending money on aid, and having the force level to "protect the population."

What the RAF did in Iraq could not be done today. The idea that it was even successful has recently been questioned, and not without reason.

[Chris jM]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Destroying the enemy can be done for comparatively cost. It's not hard.

Perhaps a wrong choice of words?

Destroying an enemy such as the Taleban and AQ is proving to be an extremely difficult and expensive undertaking, unless you have a different reading/ view of the situation than I do.

Defeating them could be done at far less a cost.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Chris jM

Perhaps a wrong choice of words?

Destroying an enemy such as the Taleban and AQ is proving to be an extremely difficult and expensive undertaking, unless you have a different reading/ view of the situation than I do.

Defeating them could be done at far less a cost.

Chose my words with care. The action of destroying creates the effect of defeating.

[Chris jM]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Chose my words with care. The action of destroying creates the effect of defeating.

Makes sense, then, so I'll stand the semantic police down on this one...

... but I will have my logic cops probe a little further, out of curiosity's sake.

Doesn't your complete reliance on destruction limit your options? If you can defeat an enemy through deterrence, then that is legitimate is it not? Is there any meaning behind your insistence on 'destroy' that you would choose it above the more holistic, all-encompassing term of defeat?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Chris jM

my logic cops probe a little further, out of curiosity's sake.

I bet you say that to all the girls!

Doesn't your complete reliance on destruction limit your options? If you can defeat an enemy through deterrence, then that is legitimate is it not? Is there any meaning behind your insistence on 'destroy' that you would choose it above the more holistic, all-encompassing term of defeat?

It is only a reliance because that is what armed forces do.
I can only deter him, if I do stuff that does actually deter him.
Killing - and specifically killing - is a very necessary part of that. Capture also works if the period of detention is long enough to deter as well.

"Own KIA" is the most powerful policy driver I know of. That was why the US left Vietnam, the Lebanon, and Mogadishu. It was why the Soviets left Afghanistan.

You will not win if you kill/capture one bad guy a month. You have to kill in numbers and with a frequency that causes the breaking of will. I strongly believe that is it far from impossible and actually more doable than we wish to admit, because we wish to focus on being "a force for good," instead of the instruments of destruction to set forth policy.

Do not kill the population. You need to make sure the only folks doing that are the bad guys, and yes you can differentiate the population from the bad guys. It requires skill and intelligence. It has been done many time before. .
The population will support the winning side. They always do.

Yes, make alliances and allies, IF that helps you find and kill the enemy -

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Chose my words with care. The action of destroying creates the effect of defeating.

Wilf, I always new you were a secret believer in EBO.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

..."Own KIA" is the most powerful policy driver I know of. That was why the US left Vietnam, the Lebanon, and Mogadishu...

True but all those departures were due to an (IMO) unreasoned -- and in hindsight, unnecessary -- fear of domestic political defeat by policy makers. That does not negate your point, it amplifies it and allows me to point out that domestic politics in all nations drive international actions.

That seemingly obvious point is important for strategic and operational planners who often either forget that factor or overemphasize it without attempting to counter and obviate it and thus provide policy advice or plans that are flawed...

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Ken White

That seemingly obvious point is important for strategic and operational planners who often either forget that factor or overemphasize it without attempting to counter and obviate it and thus provide policy advice or plans that are flawed...

I may even have to quote you... with due attribution!

[Steve the Planner]

Wilf:

Thought it was interesting that at no time did you mention shoveling billions of unaccountable aid to "friendly" political allies, building roads, schools, etc...

Just killing bad guys, using intelligence (and perhaps wisdom) as a discriminator between good and bad guys. What an interesting new concept for cost effective small wars.

First off, however, there is an army of contractors to feed. What does your concept have to do with them?

Second, both Churchill and Saddam decided that the best way, for example, to cost effectively deal with the Kurds was to gas them, bomb them, and machine gun them from the air.

Their "enemy" was not a bad guy or group of bad guys in a sub-population, but the sub-population itself. Isn't the bad guy to be killed defined by the problem you are trying to solve?

So, isn't the first cost effective step to figure out how to keep the military's role in complex problems limited until you can identify a particular problem, and problem definition, to which costly military solutions can be applied effectively.

Saving money in small wars, in my book, would be by better focusing solutions to fit the problems presented rather than throwing costly solutions on the ground to then seek out problems they could solve.

Examples: Using local, indigenous, or closely related (language, religion, custom) civilian, governance and policing folks to solve as many problems as possible, backed up by relentless military retaliation if they are screwed around with, or something goes bad. That was how the Brits and Pakistanis, for example, had traditionally controlled tribal areas in and around the Durand.

Distilled down, it is not unlike what the Central Highland strategies were all about in Viet Nam (not the whole war).

How did we get into this bewildering situation of pouring billions in cash into countries to, in effect, create much of the problems that we then try to overcome by billions of more dollars, and, in the end, try to tens of thousands of soldiers into to try to unscramble.

Cost effectiveness and targeted killing of bad guys are not synonymous with COIN, nation building and large deployments. Are they?

[William F. Owen]

Steve The Planner Not sure if we agree, but in rough order>

a.) Yes, I want to kill bad guys and not the good guys. The discriminator is their actions. Their armed opposition to your policy.
b.) No contractors, and certainly not western ones. At best as few as possible, because there may be some requirements for them, for logistics.
c.) If there was not a problem, the Army would not be there. You do not deploy until you have a mission. You should not deploy in the hope of finding one. It isn't complex.
d.) Absolutely use indigenous and local assets and resources, across the board. Absolutely invest in your allies.

All this does require wisdom and skill. Building schools, conducting social work, and "Nation building" are not things that win wars. They are things you do once the war is won and it is done by folks that are not soldiers.

....but you can conduct some activity to alleviate suffering, and gain allies, but it has to be selective and it has to have a military purpose, so you do if for mutual benefit. You do not go around handing out rice that the locals will give to the bad guys.

This stuff really is Warfare 101. Nothing original or insightful.

[Steve the Planner]

Right. Warfare 101.

If only, in Afghanistan, we could unscramble all these folks with bold, interesting transformational political visions from the core problems---then solve those.

The latest perplexing interpretation I recently read as the basis for COIN was that since it is politically incorrect to challenge AWK and central government corruption and ineffectiveness, we should, instead, strengthen local governance so it can demand regional and national transformation. Sounds like a long, complex, and costly way around the barn. Whatever the problem is, COIN can solve it, I guess.

Of course, the Afghan consultative jirga (whatever that exactly is) resulted in a central government commitment to hold the "olive branch" to the "angry brothers" who, on paper, the US seems to think are the "bad guys." This followed by key anti-Taliban Defense/Intel dismissals, and plans to create amnesties and opportunities for the "brothers."

Brothers, Bad Guys...So hard to keep track.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

a.) Yes, I want to kill bad guys and not the good guys. The discriminator is their actions. Their armed opposition to your policy.

Again there seems to be a sort of reflexive assumption that anyone who opposes our policy is a bad guy who should be killed. What if people are opposing our policy because our policy is stupid? Is there any one of us who is prepared to say that our policies are by definition smart?

If we're going to address small wars from the perspective of economy, shouldn't the first and most necessary step be to review the policy?

To start with... in any given case, what are the objectives of the exercise? Are they clear, immediate, achievable, practical, and above all are they absolutely necessary? Are they sufficiently compatible with local objectives and beliefs that we aren't going to find ourselves fighting a whole pissed off populace who just doesn't want to be messed with?

If the answer to all of the above isn't a clear and unequivocal "yes", we can save a lot of money and trouble by just not going there, or not staying there, as appropriate..

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Again there seems to be a sort of reflexive assumption that anyone who opposes our policy is a bad guy who should be killed. What if people are opposing our policy because our policy is stupid? Is there any one of us who is prepared to say that our policies are by definition smart?

Huh? OK, it is their violent opposition to your policy that requires the application of armed force, and why would you set forth policy you know is stupid? Did anyone ever do that? Did anyone ever sort forth policy they knew or believed to be "un-ethical?"

Yes the policy maybe stupid. So what? Run for office and get elected.
They, the enemy, would not be opposing it if they thought it a good idea would they?

My concern in the setting forth of policy, via violence because the policy is violently opposed. If my policy maker says this is not a military problem, then why are we discussing it? The question has to be predicated on the need to set forth the policy and that policy is violently opposed.

Yes, I agree, you can save lots of money by simply doing nothing. How does that provide anything useful or any insight?

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

why would you set forth policy you know is stupid? Did anyone ever do that?

Revise the question slightly: did anyone ever set forth stupid policy?

Corrolary question: has anyone ever burned extraordinary quantities of money, time, lives, etc in pursuit of stupid policy?

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

If my policy maker says this is not a military problem, then why are we discussing it?

We're discussing it because policy makers don't always make smart policy, and the first step in the pursuit of policy is to assess the policy to be sure it makes sense. If our policy is to stick our head in a hornet's nest and kill all the hornets who want to sting us but not the ones who don't, then we don't need to find the most economical way of killing only nasty hornets. We need a new policy.

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Yes, I agree, you can save lots of money by simply doing nothing. How does that provide anything useful or any insight?

You can also waste a lot of money trying to do something that you don't need to do and probably can't do.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

You hit on it in the last line: What is it that can be done on a budget and schedule that is in the process of a radical downward shrink.

Since 9/11, there was a holiday from economic reality, and the cost is catching up.

How to do the most important things with that limited pie, in the places where it will have the most effect is a very different problem than: we are here so we must do something with the tools we brought.

Jonathan Alter's book covers the recent Obama review of Afghanistan, where Gen's Petreaus and McCrystal promised that if he committed to the COIN strategy and troop build up, they would be done before the start of the next Presidential election cycle. That was a civilian policy maker reacting to a military promise (Cross my Heart and Hope to Die), which he has now staked his political future on, rightly or wrongly... and the promise and plan keeps shifting like the sands.

I have always seen Afghanistan in the context of a confrontation of the new world to a very old vendetta based local culture whose time may or may not be done. Either way, surrounding development, population, and geo-political pressure continues to drive inexorably the conflict.

One obvious alternative is to substantially boost the Non-Pashtun population, and let it crush the Pashtuns and disable them after some ten or so years of crushing hardships (stop investing, stop aid, kill whenever you can). But that result is obviously undesirable, so we get dazzled with the idea of remarkably transforming things as if, like the US, everything turns on a dime. Just doesn't work that way.

Sure, it is the tenth year in Afghanistan, but most of that was low-intensity, low-commitment. Now, we want to do everything fast, including curing years of emerging defects in our strategy. Why? Because domestic patience, and other demands are all catching up. What to do?

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

Corrolary question: has anyone ever burned extraordinary quantities of money, time, lives, etc in pursuit of stupid policy?

Of course, but again I submit no one has ever set forth policy they know to be stupid. People do what they see benefit in doing. Policy is always predicated on a pursuit of benefit to ones self/party/people/nation. LBJ did not embroil the US in Vietnam because he thought it was a dumb thing to do. Hitler did not invade Russia thinking "This is stupid," and nor did the Japanese attack Pearl Harbour in the belief that it made no strategic sense to do so.

We're discussing it because policy makers don't always make smart policy, and the first step in the pursuit of policy is to assess the policy to be sure it makes sense.

OK, but those are all things that take place in terms of formulating policy. Its part of the policy making process. The job of soldiers is to set it forth. This creates two basic questions.
a.) Can this be set forth using violence?
b.) What is the cost of doing so? - for cost, read negatives. Things that would undermine the policy.

Soldiers have a duty to point out that the policy may not be achievable via the military instrument. That's it. The second you bounce around with soldiers suggesting policies that might be possible, you end up with the mess we have today of soldiers not being able to tell the difference between strategy and policy. If you doubt me, go and watch the videos of the last big SSI conference.

You can also waste a lot of money trying to do something that you don't need to do and probably can't do.

So you write the report saying that. The Policy maker probably doesn't care about your opinion. He has a policy.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Of course, but again I submit no one has ever set forth policy they know to be stupid.

Ok, so we agree that policies are sometimes stupid. That's a start. Of course the people making the decisions didn't know at the time that they were stupid, but that's often not because they couldn't know, but because they chose not to know.

One way to assure bad policy decisions is to stop questioning decisions and to stop challenging the assumptions behind policy.

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Its part of the policy making process. The job of soldiers is to set it forth.

Fine. Are you a soldier? I am not, and I see no reason not to question policy. Nor do I see any reason not to point out that the first step in making our war-making practice compatible with financial constraints is to apply decisions that call for the application of military force to a great deal more scrutiny than recent decisions appear to have received.

If we are mucking about in a foreign country in pursuit of a policy, and the populace or a substantial portion thereof finds that policy objectionable enough to warrant violent resistance, are you not prepared to even consider the possibility that the policy is the problem?

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

The Policy maker probably doesn't care about your opinion. He has a policy.

I know very well that the policy makers don't care about my opinion, or yours. Neither do those who make strategy or tactics. We are amusing ourselves here, not exerting influence.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

One way to assure bad policy decisions is to stop questioning decisions and to stop challenging the assumptions behind policy.

No argument there. You should care about politics, because politics does care about you.

Fine. Are you a soldier? I am not, and I see no reason not to question policy.

Not a soldier anymore and a remarkably mediocre one when I was. As I say, you should question policy - BUT - you are entering the realm of political argument. Arguing about politics is, to my mind, a pretty fruitless exercise.
My concern is "strategy and tactics." Tis what I study and write about. It stands entirely separate from my political beliefs - which I take care not to inflict on other, unless forced, as in denied a legitimate status.

If we are mucking about in a foreign country in pursuit of a policy, and the populace or a substantial portion thereof finds that policy objectionable enough to warrant violent resistance, are you not prepared to even consider the possibility that the policy is the problem?

OK, but those are entirely political opinions. What actions make the US more or less safe is not a set of objective conditions. It is opinions based in political belief. Strategy and tactics stands apart from that.

We are amusing ourselves here, not exerting influence.

My comment was about policy makes in general and not your or my opinion specifically, but I concur. Neither of us is going to alter the price of bread in Khandahar anytime soon.

...but I do know that some of what gets written here does make serving men think, and some influential people do read this. Be assured, I do not delude myself as to the merit of anything I write. I use SWJ as a mental running track, to hone arguments and ideas, and am very grateful to those who challenge me in a useful way.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

you are entering the realm of political argument. Arguing about politics is, to my mind, a pretty fruitless exercise.
My concern is "strategy and tactics." Tis what I study and write about.

I study and occasionally write about policy. Entirely pointlessly, as far as I can tell: to the best of my knowledge nothing I've written has ever had a vestigial shred of impact on actual policy.

I'm not sure that strategy and tactics stand apart from policy. If policy is not sensible, doesn't discussion of strategy and tactics become sort of pointless? Policy is where it starts: if we get that wrong, we're going to have a damnably difficult time getting anything else right. "Assume a policy" seems to me a rather shaky basis for the sort of discussion that goes on here.

If we've entered a situation and things are not going as we planned and expected, doesn't it make sense to start our reassessment with a review of policy?

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I use SWJ as a mental running track, to hone arguments and ideas

As do I, though realistically to no end beyond my own amusement.