War is War is Clausewitz

[Michael C]

Last time I posted a thread on this forum, the response was fantastic. Though I asked a simple, yet innocuous question (who believes war is war) the responses were awesome and got into the issues of defining war, war's nature and the character of war/insurgency/civil wars etc.

Since I am continuing the series on my blog, I want to ask a corollary question. I have found time and again that the far and away master of military theory is Carl von Clausewitz. Many commentors on this forum love Clausewitz, I know that. My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Here are my two last posts on the "war is war" topic. The first is "War is War is Clausewitz" and the second is "Killing, Fighting, Death, Destruction War is War"

I also want to thank everyone who commented on the last post I put up. I am working on a personal definition of war, and many of the comments had new and original ideas I hadn't heard.

[Bob's World]

Michael, Michael, Michael...chumming the waters of the Small Wars Journal with your bloody questions!

Ok, as the first shark on the scene, let me just say "YES."

Clausewitz offers much for those who seek to understand warfare; where we get into trouble is when we determine that becuase we are good at Clauswitzian warfare to make every problem warfare and and wage it as such.

The proplem is not CvC, it is our over-application of his teachings to things that (while oft violent) have little to do with warfare at all. Consider this excerpt from a post a made a few minutes ago regarding COIN and Afghanistan.

http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/201...-here/#c014650

1. Why are soldiers rather than politicians having these conversations? Insurgency is politics, but it is the type of politics born of the failures of the current crop of politicians, so they pass the problem to the military to solve on their behalf, and the military then (not surprisingly) makes the problem one of war and warfare. Politicians leave warfare to soldiers. (Mission passed, mission solved…)

2. Why politicians remain on their hands: It’s a war now, with a General in charge. Once the General “wins” or “loses” either one, the politicians and diplomats will then be able to get back to doing what they do. This is a natural mindset, but it is equally a crippling one. COIN is a civil emergency for the host nation government; for the intervening government it is best seen little different than our approaches to an Indonesian tsunami or Bangladeshi flood. The military is a wonderful reserve of excess capability and capacity to help a civil government turn the corner on an overwhelming emergency. Last in, first out. Not our emergency and certainly not our “war.”


Best of luck with your blog!

Bob

[slapout9]

CvC was half right in his definition of War. I use the SBW definition. It is the use of Force or Fraud to achieve the objective. Fraud can be thought of as Subversion or Psychological Warfare combined with or substituted for Physical Warfare.

[J Wolfsberger]

Originally Posted by Michael C

My question is, does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

Not enough in the sense that the principles he was developing (remember that Vom Kriege was an incomplete first draft published after his death) haven't really changed.

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

[Firn]

Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

Drop thermonuclear questions much?

I think both too much and not enough.

Too much in the sense that, as Bob points out, CvC wasn't addressing the elements of conflict that lie more in the area of political and social relationships and maneuvering. (For that, see Machiavelli.)

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal

His most important point in this regard might indeed be that as war is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with the inter-mixtion of other means one should also take a good hard look at that pesky Politik. Fighting a war does not mean politik stops and other means disappear. In this case a good reading of him should open minds and ways and not close them down. It is quite ironic that the man which blasted others for trying to ignore the political context of military problems should be a problem in this regard.

Given that the inner tendency of war tends to spiral out of control, as he observed, to heavy military means might not be in the interest of a country which wants to limit violence to be able to withdraw while reaching most of it's political objectives. As usual doing the right thing in this difficult context was the hard part. In Anbar it seemed to work.

Firn

[M.L.]

Michael C-

I posted this on your blog, but here are my thoughts:

Two points. You said on your blog:

"The most common definition of war--Clausewitz’ definition--is that war is the continuation of politics by other means. War has two parts: the political and the violent. His definition doesn’t specify which should be primary--the politics or the violence--but from what I understand, he views politics, or grand strategy, as the most important factor in war."

First, Clausewitz defined war as "an act of violence to compel the enemy to do our will" He also said that warfare has three elements, not two. Those elements are policy (or the nation), violence (or the military) and the people. He said these three elements were a "paradoxical trinity" and that a theory which ignores any of the three isn't much of a theory. Clausewitz said any one of them might be the most important at any given time, but that they all play a part.

Second point. Clausewitz first defined war (as stated above) within the context of "total war." In other words, what is the true, unconstrained nature of war? It is violence and death to the last man. However, he later defines war as a "a continuation of policy" as an acknowledgment that war always serves a political objective, and is therefore constrained. Clausewitz stated that defining the political objective was the first and most important question to be answered before starting a war, however, that doesn't mean that politics is the most important part of the "paradoxical trinity."

So, back to the central question, what is the nature of war? Its pure nature is violence and death to the last man. However, we constrain war to serve political objectives. Discussions of armed social science, ROE, et. al, are questions of how far we constrain war to meet political ends.

[Michael C]

I have gone away from using/reading forums, but one of the best parts of discussion boards like this is using them as a sounding board for one's ideas. So thanks again everyone for the comments.

@Bob-I'll agree that Clausewitz himself isn't the problem. Like all philosophies or dogmas that are overused, the founder is often not the problem so much as the disciples who put too much faith into one solution. And I agree that our political system way too often passes the buck to the military, then lets them fail in situations that are politically impossible, or at least really, really difficult.

@Slapout- I plan to use that definition of warfare in a future post on defining war(fare). I hadn't heard it before the last post, and I think it raises interesting problems and arguments.

@J Wolfsberger- I mentioned that On War was unfinished at CvC's death, and I think that fact is undermentioned when it comes to CvC.

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

[Global Scout]

I'm a big advocate for expanding our view and doctrine for conflict, but to be frank I have been very disappointed with all the new ideas since 9/11 that have gotten us no where (it takes a network to defeat a network, human terrain, you have to change their political system, we have to develop their economy, then they'll stop fighting, etc.). All of these views and many more have simply distracted us from our objective of defeating the enemy.

We tend to hold up several of these ideas as validated principles for COIN and small wars, even though we continue to suffer set back after set back when employing them. I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Global Scout

I don't alway agree with Wilf, but I do agree there have been very few great military theorists since Clausewitz.

If Wilf gave that impression, then he was having one of his less useful days....

Actually I would submit though CvC is the Gold Standard, there are others of notable merit, but you have to be pretty widely read to make an effective judgement.

What tends to set the high standard amongst most of the useful theorists, is that they all start from Clausewitz, or come back to him eventually. The test is when you have to translate the THEORY into PRACTICE. Clausewitz's guidance on critical analysis still provides one of the best routes to do that. - IMO.

[Firn]

Originally Posted by Michael C

@ML- I got your comment but haven't responded to it. As I cautioned in the CvC post, I am no expert on CvC. While I bemoan the simplification of CvC's ideas in the post, I also participate and simplify his ideas for our readership. Thanks for the clarification and I will try to incorporate that into anything I write on Clausewitz in the future.

After reading your first blog post I have to agree. M.L gave a pretty good quick primer. Perhaps you should go to the www.clausewitz.com page and read some of the introductionary stuff before going further.

"War is the continuation of Politik (polity, politics, policy) with [the inter-mixtion] of other means" is a very subtle description. Economy, Culture, Technology, Religion do all shape both politics and military matters in many many ways but only through political (and social) intercourse will the military means be organized and inter-mixed. War has especially due to those specific military means it's own ruleset or grammar, but not his own logic. That social and human logic permeates all human existence.

[Taiko]

Some helpful tips for reading CvC:

1. Understand that his work was unfinished. He had discovered the theory that war is a continuation of politics rather late in his life and was in the process of rewriting his thesis when he died.

2. Make a clear distinguishment between what CvC wrote about 'war' and 'warfare'. CvC's writing on 'war' is universal and still relevant today. CvC's writing on 'warfare' is context specific and subject to time and space. Hence, war never changes, but warfare constantly changes with time and space. If we do not learn to adapt to those changes then we will surely be at a disadvantage in shaping the conflict environment.

3. Be very weary of what 'commentators' say about CvC. He is subject to constant misinterpretation and can be taken grossly out of context. Detractors such as Martin Van Creveld are a classic example. CvC advocates are also guilty of taking what CvC wrote out of context with Helmuth von Moltke being another classic example.

4. As per usual, one reading of CvC is simply not enough to understand how he interposes an ideal of war and warfare with the reality of war and warfare. To fully appreciate CvC, and ensure that you do not misinterpret what he has writen, you will need to understand the theoretical methodology of the time. For this Kant is your best starting point.

Good luck with unraveling the mind of the best western militery theorists of all time.

[jmm99]

Back from an extended vacation ?; or

were you lost in the Outback doing anthropology ?; or

did you become engrossed in studying this device:



which has something to do with trinities (IIRC) ?

Agree, of course, with your four points re: studying CvC.

Regards

Mike

[Taiko]

Originally Posted by jmm99

Back from an extended vacation ?; or

were you lost in the Outback doing anthropology ?; or

did you become engrossed in studying this device:



which has something to do with trinities (IIRC) ?

Agree, of course, with your four points re: studying CvC.

Regards

Mike

I wish it was option three, unfortunately no more scholarship = no more thesis, thus, joining the real world of customer service I miss my strategic theory...

[jmm99]

so you will adapt, improvise and overcome - of that, I've no doubt.

Regards

Mike

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Taiko

Some helpful tips for reading CvC:
....................

Good luck with unraveling the mind of the best western militery theorists of all time.

I generally agree (as I would!) BUT - beware! 90% of what is useful about Clausewitz can be explained in a quite a brief way. Also 90% of the discussion and argument about Clausewitz is concentrated on about 20-30% of his writing. Books 4,5,6 and 7 are rarely.... if ever discussed or commented on.

Given deep understanding, a lot of what Clausewitz said, IS quite simple and thus accessible. What most folks here need to avoid is the "Literary Criticism" school of thought, that strays far from practical application.

To apply Clausewitz in a useful and practical way, you don't even have to know how to spell "Kant."

[Taiko]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I generally agree (as I would!) BUT - beware! 90% of what is useful about Clausewitz can be explained in a quite a brief way. Also 90% of the discussion and argument about Clausewitz is concentrated on about 20-30% of his writing. Books 4,5,6 and 7 are rarely.... if ever discussed or commented on.

Given deep understanding, a lot of what Clausewitz said, IS quite simple and thus accessible. What most folks here need to avoid is the "Literary Criticism" school of thought, that strays far from practical application.

To apply Clausewitz in a useful and practical way, you don't even have to know how to spell "Kant."

True, I should have qualified the reading of Kant to theoretical methodology only rather than his works on ethics. Understanding CvC methodological framework helps to avoid mistaking his proposition of the ideal of war, "war on paper", to war in reality. While Book 1's framework, which he considered finished, is fairly straight forward in understanding CvC's interposition of reality with ideal. Some of the nuance in the rest of the Books can be lost if you make the mistake of misinterpreting the ideal with the reality.

But I agree, it is very easy to get bogged down in a purely methodological argument of CvC's work and miss the forest for the trees. Unfortunately, the critics of CvC miss this basic point and end up with a reading of CvC that is totally out of context.

Case in point:

As an example, I don't think CvC helps arrive at an understanding of the Anbar Awakening. The Prince, on the other hand, helps a great deal.

CvC's paradoxical trinity is a far superior theoretical explanation of the Anbar Awakening than Machiavelli's Prince. The application of Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity is pivotal in explaining the role of cause and effect in determining the nature of a war and understanding the changes in the level and intensity of violence between and within wars. It effectively captures the whole relationship of policy and violence in terms of the push and pull inherent in the laws of cause and effect and its regulating principles which policy must accommodate in conducting a war (Echevarria II 2009). The validity of the paradoxical trinity, and its utility, as a useful theoretical framework can be seen in understanding the origins and application of the ‘surge’ in Iraq.

The ‘surge’ in Iraq, otherwise known as the “Joint Campaign Plan 2007-2008” that began in 2007, was driven primarily by the American military as a “shift in operational methods” in response to the various insurgency’s strategies of 2003-2006 (Kilcullen 2009: 133, Metz 2008: 185, Molan 2008: 345). Applying Clausewitz’s trinity to explain the ‘surge’, the role of the regulating principles can be seen as:

US: (Violence) chance and probability, purpose, hostile feelings/intensions -Policy- (Politics) military, people, government

Iraq: (Violence) hostile feelings/intensions, chance and probability, purpose- Policy- (Politics) people, military, government

In identifying the political cause that set the ‘surge’ in motion all three of the regulating principles play a role, with the military at the lead. Its origins can be attributed to General David Petraeus who assembled a team of twenty-four military, governmental and civil experts who were to make up the Joint Strategic Assessment Team that was tasked with developing an integrated civil-military plan to address the level and intensity of violence used by the insurgencies in Iraq (Kilcullen 2009: 133). The result of this meeting of minds was a new American doctrine for counterinsurgency (COIN) titled Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24). In conjunction with pressure from the American people and Congress, who both wanted to see an end to the war, this new doctrine lead to a change in policy of the Bush administration (Metz 2008: 185, Ricks 2009: 155).

The original policy of the Bush administration was centered on a ‘top-down approach’ that focused on regime change and the introduction of a democratic government at the national level (Bush 2005: 1). FM 3-24 shifted this policy to a bottom-up approach “based on confidence building measures and improved security” for the population of Iraq at the local level (Kilcullen 2009: 133). In identifying the effect of this policy and the subsequent reduction in violence in Iraq, all three of the regulating principles set out by Clausewitz play a role, with chance and probability at the lead. The chance of the “Anbar Awakening” and the Sunni Arab populations rejection of al Qa’ ida in Iraq was an important turning point for the war (Kilcullen 2009: 141, Metz 2008: 185). This occurrence was further exploited by the probability of success used in the development of FM 3-24 and the introduction the new COIN doctrine in addressing the insurgency’s strategy in Iraq. The purpose of FM 3-24 was to “give the Iraqi political leaders breathing space to address the root causes of the conflict” (Metz 2008: 185). This, in theory, would eventually reduce the level of hostile feeling and intentions direct towards the American forces on the ground, and between Sunni Arabs and Shiites. With a subsequent reduction in violence the political objective that set the war in motion can be realised.

In applying Clausewitz’s paradoxical trinity to the ‘surge’ the validity of his propositions on the nature of war are still apparent. As has been shown, Clausewitz’s regulating principles on the cause and effect of the level and intensity of violence in war provide a powerful explanatory conceptual framework from which to understand the nature of the war being fought and critically analyse the conduct being undertaken in a war. The ‘surge’ provides compelling evidence of Clausewitz’s proposition that while politics exerts a subordinating influence over war for the purpose of realising its goals, its influence runs up against, and is in turn reduced or elevated by, the play of chance and probability, and the force of hostile feelings and intensions. It also explains the interrelationship between the regulating principles of violence and political power in relation to the government, the military and the people in Iraq and America and its effect on policy. By applying the trinitarian definition of war to the broader case studies of Iraq and Afghanistan it will show how these regulating principles can be used to understand the various phases of both wars and critically analyse how they have been and are being conducted.

(Back to flipping burgers )

[Taiko]

The answer the OP’s question: does Clausewitz have too much influence?

Short answer is no.

Why you may ask? I’ll start from the beginning and try to cut down on the academic jargon. In CvC’s book On War he seeks to answer one question: Why does the level and intensity of violence change within the life time of a war and between different wars in different time periods?

CvC arrived at his answer rather late in his life. CvC reasoned that the intensity and level of violence within and between wars is determined by the ‘policies’ that set a conflict in motion. By arguing that war is a continuation of politics by other means CvC sets up a causal relationship:

Policy (cause) Violence (effect)

However, CvC does not stop there. In order to test his answer he goes on to develop a theorem (yardstick for measuring the intensity and level of violence within and between wars), which he called the paradoxical trinity. In setting out the paradoxical trinity CvC identified a number of primary and secondary regulating principles (dependent, independent, intervening variables), that can be used to measure and explain the intensity of violence within and between wars, the main primary regualting principles are:

Policy (the main regulating principle that determines the level and intensity of violence in the life time of a war, it also influences politics, and, is in turn influenced by politics and violence during the various phases of a war)

Politics (primary regulating principle that influences policy)

Violence (primary regulating principle that influences policy)

The reason CvC called this trinity a paradox is because while policy determines the level and intensity of violence in war, policy is itself influenced by the level and intensity of violence and politics of the time. The relationship is not a static one, but rather a dynamic one that can change during the course of a war and between different wars. In some cases violence itself is the dominate regulating principle that determines the level and intensity of violence, in others policy or politics will be dominant while the others are subordinate regulating principles.

CvC introduces an additional number of secondary regulating principles (intervening variables) into this dynamic relationship to explain why in the course of a war the level and intensity of violence can rise and fall.

Policy

Violence: chance and probability, hostile feelings/intensions, purpose

Politics: people, government, military

It is very important to take into account that both the primary and secondary regulating principles are dynamic and subject to change within and between wars. Up until his death CvC was in the process of determining how the different regulating principles influenced the level and intensity of violence within and between wars. This work still remains to be done! However, the framework of the paradoxical trinity is in place and is one of the best explanatory tools that can be used to explain, for example: why the Cold War did not get hot, why the level and intensity of violence in small wars can and does fluctuate, and why the level and intensity in both World Wars came close to absolute.

In addition, I would argue that the paradoxical trinity can also be used as a strategic framework that can shape the conflict environment and dictate the level and intensity of violence used within both large and small wars. The goal being to achieve zero levels of violence and a cessation of the conflict through the application of the paradoxical trinity. The regulating principles can be just as easily applied to COIN and counter-terrorism. This is why CvC does not have too much influence.

So, if you want to understand war read CvC, if you want to understand warfare read Sun Tzu. But that is a story for another day.

[jmm99]

We have the politics (the political process - one meaning of Politik) that leads to the policy (another meaning of Politik) which drives "war" as Politik's continuation via other means. As you say, we have more or less violence depending on how these factors interact and feed on each other. That concept applies to the military struggle (a wrestling match).

Moving beyond CvC's main focus on the military, we also have the political struggle (not entirely non-violent and scarcely electoral politics in one's favorite riding). While this may be also called "politics", it is not the same "politics" as in the political process (Politik1) that leads to the "policy" (Politik2). What is called "politics" in the political struggle is also not exactly the same as the "policy" (Politik2), of which the political struggle is another continuation.

That difference is demonstrated by the manipulation of slogans (and programs) during the political struggle - e.g., the political struggle slogan of land reform via individual peasant ownership, where the long-range policy (Politik2) calls for collective farms as a (not publicized) end result.

Similarly, the political process (Politik1) - e.g., a "United Front for Liberation" which does not reflect a long-range policy (Politik2) of One Party Rule as a (not publicized) end result.

Of course, it is possible for all these "politics" to be the same or at least not conflicting.

My take is that the various "politics" involved (which should be distinguished) are more complicated than the military aspects (obviously well covered by CvC).

Regards

Mike

[Taiko]

All true Mike, but I think this is why CvC includes the secondary regulating principles. So in understanding the casual effect of politics on policy and violence we need to take account of the relationship between the government, people and military before and during the various phases of a war. To understand the political climate before and during conflict CvC provides a form of measurement via the secondary pricinples.

So, we ask who is in control of power (politics) that will be in a position to influence policy and the level and intesity of violence, is it the military, the people or the government? And, how does who is in control of power (politics) effect the policy/politics/level and intensity of violence in the various phases of war.

Specifically, when CvC is looking at secondary regulating principles of politics my reading of it is that he is looking at the power relationship between the people, the government and military. Who holds the power to determine the policy of the political group as a whole, and how does this effect the level and intensity of violence in the various phases of a war.

The primary and secondary regulating principles are the basic framework from which you can identify the centre of gravity in a war. It is useful in understanding how dynamic the centre of gravity is, and can be, and why there can be a variation in the level and intensity of violence during a war. For example, you can use the regulating pricinples to understand how A'Q/UBL go about planning for attacks in different regions of the world. The countries they are operating in all have very different centres of gravity, the regulating principles are different for both violence and politics, and they need to plan operations accordingly otherwise they run the risk of creating an Anbar Awakening.

[William F. Owen]

We should not confuse "Politics" with being just what Politicians do. This would be incorrect. Politics is "Power over People (thus land and resources.)"

War is essentially the actions to alter the distribution of power via violence. Non-violence is thus politics. That may include legal and illegal means, but it ain't "War."

...and additionally, Clausewitz doesn't need to be defended, or even really explained. What really needs doing is to teach what he sought to taught, in an accessible way.