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| Doctrine & TTPs Enduring doctrinal principles, what really works now (or not), and the TTPs that deliver them. |
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#1 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Fort Bragg
Posts: 29
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#2 |
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Small Wars Journal
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Virginia
Posts: 3,956
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Tactics of the Crescent Moon...
H. John Poole and Ray Smith (foreword). "Tactics of the Crescent Moon comes none too soon for deployed U.S. service personnel. Little, if any, of their battlefield intelligence has been tactically interpreted. U.S. analysts are generally more interested in the enemy’s strategic or technological capabilities. Even if those analysts did want to tactically assess the information, most lack the infantry and historical background to do so. This book fills that void. It reveals—for the first time in any detail—the most common small-unit maneuvers of the Iraqi and Afghan resistance fighters. Its author is a retired infantryman and recognized authority on guerrilla warfare. He has traveled the world extensively and still trains active-duty U.S. units. Tactics of the Crescent Moon could save many lives (if not turn the tide of war) in the Middle East. It is a heavily researched, well-illustrated, and spell-binding account of how Muslim militants fight. While the book delves mainly into their tactical method, it also uncovers their cultural orientation. This nail-biting nonfiction covers events as recent as 15 September 2004." |
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#3 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: DeRidder LA
Posts: 3,949
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I just ordered the book and will read it and review it from a trainer perspective. It may be the 1st open source discussion of opposition tactics; I can tell you right now that it is definitely not the first.
That aside i am nost interested to hear what he has to say in blending culture with tactics. Best, Tom |
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#4 |
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Banned
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 167
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#5 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 73
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Afghanistan - The Bear Trap, by Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin comes recommended by an AD SF trooper (round the time of the invasion of Afghanistan).
It is written from a Pakistani ISI perspective, which makes also the way in which the author portray things interesting. Martin |
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#6 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: DeRidder LA
Posts: 3,949
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Here are some from FMSO at http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm:
Night Stalkers and Mean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas, by Mr. Ali A. Jalali and Mr. Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article was previously published in Infantry January-April 1999. Road Warriors of the Hindu Kush: The Battle for the Lines of Communication in the Soviet-Afghan War, by Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. Warning - This article is graphics intensive! Please be patient. High-desert Ambush: Hard Lessons Learned the Hard Way, by Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. Warning - This article is graphics intensive! Please be patient. This article was previously published in Red Thrust Star Jul-Oct 1995; Oct 1996. Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan, by Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. (CALL Publication #98-17) PDF Format ) This article was previously published in Field Artillery Journal May-June 1997 “Soft Log” and Concrete Canyons: Russian Urban Combat Logistics in Grozny, by Mr. Lester W. Grau and Mr. Timothy L. Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article was previously published in Marine Corps Gazette, October 1999. Something Old, Something New:Guerrillas, Terrorists, and Intelligence Analysis, by Lester W. Grau, Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article was previously published in Military Review July-August 2004. The Afghan War: The Campaign for the Caves: The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War, by Mr. Ali A. Jalali and Mr. Lester W. Grau, FMSO. This article was previously published in Journal of Slavic Military Studies, September 2001. The Battle of Grozny: Deadly Classroom for Urban Combat, by Mr. Timothy L. Thomas, FMSO. This article was previously published in Parameters, Summer 1999. There are many more worth the time to read. Best, Tom |
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#7 | |
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Banned
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 167
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Thanks, good stuff
Quote:
Last edited by GorTex6; 11-09-2005 at 06:07 PM. |
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#8 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: Fort Bragg
Posts: 29
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yes Mr Grau has written plenty of interesting articles and books. Two on Afghanistan one from the Russian the other from the Guerilla point of view. He wrote an interesting article on the Russian Armor experience in Chechnya which bears alot of relevance for American Armor in Iraq. A shame no one really paid attention before.http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/row/rusav.htm
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#9 |
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Banned
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 167
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#10 |
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Banned
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 167
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#11 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: DeRidder LA
Posts: 3,949
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Folks,
I said I would order this book, read it, and offer some thoughts so here goes: Is it worth reading? absolutely in that it offers an interesting perspective on counter-insurgency set in the context of today's operations. Weaknesses: a. Style of writing. The book suffers much from poor editing. it reads in may cases like a power point slide show run rampant. While it is a legitimate technique to repeat key ideas, Poole at times takes repetition to extreme. That also comes across in poor organization; chapters, sections, and paragraphs do not flow. Given the repetition of ideas, I felt like a hamster on a mental ferris wheel going round and round with no progress. b. Exaggeration of certain key ideas. On this I would point to the role of Hizballah and its sponsor, Iran, especially the Iranian Sepah. Poole states that Hizballah is the main threat to the West and goes to great length to support that contention. Unfortunately his sourcing is poor and not--at least to me and I served in Lebanon and lost friends to Hizballah--convincing. I agree the Hizballah model and method are dangerous and difficult to counter; I don't see them as a universal model. A related issue is his insistence that Asian military culture permeated into the Middle East over the ages. Again it is an interesting idea but one hindered by poor sourcing and superficial analysis. Strengths: a. Poole focuses on the root elements of any counter-insurgency, the insurgents and the security forces who fight them. What I really liked about the book was his call for a more capable, more highly trained infantry with offensive infantry maneuver capabilities versus fires dominated thinking. b. Related to a. is Poole's other key point, that tactical victories based on such a firepower dominated military modely are NOT victories for the forces engaged in COIN. His key point--at least to me--was that civilian collateral casualties in COIN must be given equal or even more weight that friendly casualties. Now this is not something new; the same point has been debated many times. But it is still a point worth considering. c. Finally I liked the linkages Poole makes between culture and military operations. Some as I have already said were overstated to me. Still he does apply a logic that makes sense in understanding how a diffent culture with a different model for success can develop tactics to achieve that success--and how another culture may foolishly discount that success. Using an Amazon rating of 1-5 stars, I would give it a 3. Tom |
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#12 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Jan 2006
Location: Richmond, Missouri
Posts: 94
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Tom, thanks for the review. Though I am a big "Gunny" Poole fan, I think I agree with you - overall very good on content but at times the writing style seems a bit choppy.
I suspect you already have Militant Tricks (ISBN: 0963869582) on your to-read list. Its on mine. I look forward to your review of that one.
__________________
Mark Discuss at: The Irregulars Visit at: UW Review "The true soldier fights not because he hates what is in front of him, but because he loves what is behind him." - G. K. Chesterton |
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#13 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Chicago
Posts: 74
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Quote:
__________________
"The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and its consequences are final." - Paragraph 1-1, FM 3-21.8: Infantry Rifle PLT and SQD. - M.A. Holzbach |
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#14 |
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Small Wars Journal
Join Date: Sep 2005
Location: Virginia
Posts: 3,956
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CPT H - I see your "location" has changed - welcome home...
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#15 | |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Chicago
Posts: 74
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Quote:
__________________
"The Infantry’s primary role is close combat, which may occur in any type of mission, in any theater, or environment. Characterized by extreme violence and physiological shock, close combat is callous and unforgiving. Its dimensions are measured in minutes and meters, and its consequences are final." - Paragraph 1-1, FM 3-21.8: Infantry Rifle PLT and SQD. - M.A. Holzbach |
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#16 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Feb 2006
Location: MCB Quantico
Posts: 119
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Ok, I literally just finished it. I definitly agree with your review, Tom, and Poole's assessment of our tactical deficiency in regards to COIN. Now the question is, what are we going to do about it? Is there a concerted effort within the military to change our doctrine or is the prevailing attitude one that mirrors President Bush's "technology will win us the war" idea?
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#17 | |
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Moderator
Join Date: Oct 2005
Location: Montana
Posts: 3,074
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