Yemen: all you want (2011-2013)

[davidbfpo]

A sombre assessment by Kings College London-based ICSR is on the attachment; these 'Insights' are emailed out and take a few days to appear on the ICSR website. It did appear on WSJ, but only a summary is provided without registration etc.

I was particularly taken by:

At its core are 100 veteran jihadists, who escaped local prisons in 2006 and 2011. The group also counts on 11 former Guantanamo detainees, who returned to terrorism after undergoing "rehabilitation" programs in Saudi Arabia. Their combined experience is greater than that of all other al Qaeda affiliates taken together.

Then:

Unlike al Qaeda in Iraq, which alienated entire tribes with barbaric and indiscriminate violence, AQAP's policies have allowed it to cultivate local sympathies.... Immersed in the population and protected by the tribes, AQAP is free to raise money and train fighters. CIA drone strikes against its operatives, in turn, are more likely to kill civilians.

My query is if AQAP gains more within the Yemen, extending it's control not cultivating or immersion, there would be an advantage to portray its actions as a local struggle and so curtail attacks on the 'far enemy'. Now whether the USA would curtail it's drone attacks is clearly unlikely. IMO doing more than drones becomes more problematic and with declining local acceptance.

[AdamG]

Sanaa, Yemen (CNN) -- A suicide bomber dressed in a military uniform killed at least 101 soldiers Monday at the central security headquarters in Yemen, Interior Ministry officials said.

More than 70 were injured, with some in critical condition, authorities said.

The blast targeted a military parade rehearsal in Sabeen Square in the capital Sanaa, said Mohammed Albasha, a spokesman the Yemeni Embassy in Washington.

He said that it was too early to know who was responsible but that suicide attacks are "the hallmark of al Qaeda."

http://edition.cnn.com/2012/05/21/wo...html?hpt=hp_t3

[davidbfpo]

Yemen seems to have receded from the foreground, although the suicide bomber attack on a Central Security Forces (CSF) parade, which killed one hundred did get a mention - missing that the commander of the CSF is a Saleh family member.

The Lowy Institute draws attention to a week-old Frontline report, which has several key sections and ends in a town which has rejected AQ - after they killed a tribal chief - and only the locals fight off AQ's attacks, the army isn't interested. One wonders if this replicates the rejection of AQ in Irag?

Link:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sJtbhFimI8c

Hat tip to Leah Farrell's reactivated blogsite:http://allthingscounterterrorism.com/

The film is highly commended by a US academic expert, Gregory Johnsen, of Waq al-Waq, on the Yemen and I have linked the Q&A after the film was broadcast and this passage struck me:

Over the past two-and-a-half years the US has managed to kill several mid-level commanders within AQAP, but at the same time it has also killed several civilians. In December 2009, AQAP had roughly 200-300 members and controlled no territory. Today it has over 1,000 members and controls significant amounts of territory in Abyan and Shabwa. This begs a very simple question: Why has AQAP grown so strong in such a short time? Now, I don’t think US drone and airstrikes are the only reason for the rapid growth of AQAP – one also has to consider the collapse of the Yemeni state in 2011 – but in my view it is certainly one of the key factors.

Link:http://bigthink.com/ideas/frontline-...yemen?page=all

The Australian analyst, Sarah Phillips, provides some context and touches upon the very murky aspects:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...y-to-fail.aspx

There's also a short interview with her:http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/...wo-videos.aspx

Want more to read, there's a pointer to this US journalist's blogsite:http://armiesofliberation.com/

[ganulv]

Jeremy Scahill, best known for his book about the LLC formerly known as Blackwater, did a prescient interview on Fresh Air four days before the 21 May attack in Sana'a. I know a lot of people write him off because of his politics (he’s quite the lefty), but as someone who has a real respect for investigative journalism he seems to me to know a lot more about how and why the sausage is made than most contemporary members of the Fourth Estate.

When the Fresh Air host puts the “Well, what would you have us do about AQAP?” question to Scahill his reply amounts to 1) stop acting as if al-Qaeda is an existential threat to the United States 2) stop outsourcing our HUMINT to the Saudis and 3) stop pretending more and better technology can obviate HUMINT. However his politics may shade what is presented in the interview, I found the discussion beginning at 41:49 of the role which attending khat chews played in his reporting to be indicative of a real respect for the sort of work that absolutely has to be done in investigative journalism, ethnographic fieldwork, or intelligence gathering worth calling such. And in the excerpt below he throws out an observation which in my experience is quite indicative of the lack of respect American foreign policy types have for that sort of work.

And I would not have gotten access to the places I went, I wouldn’t have been able to talk to the people that I did, I wouldn’t have been able to travel as freely as I did in Yemen if I wasn’t going to those khat chews and negotiating permissions or talking to people and listening to them. And the reason that I’m so struck by that experience is because the United States bans its employees in Yemen from chewing khat.

[davidbfpo]

I am unconvinced that chewing khat is the way to learn in the Yemen (or Somalia) and several of the authors who appear in this thread I have m' doubts would need to chew khat. Sipping tea, talking and have empathy before making gains is an art that takes time to gain.

Perhaps the US Embassy has banned sipping tea?

[ganulv]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

[T]alking and have empathy before making gains is an art that takes time to gain.

From a tiny bit of first-hand knowledge and several second-hand accounts I’m lead to believe that there are quite a few FSOs with a real aptitude for what you are describing but that the structure of and priorities at State are such that it is hard for that aptitude to count for as much as it could.* They’re as a rule on a rotation schedule, for example. I’m sure there are good reasons for that but to keep to it as a rule for that line of work seems absolutely boneheaded to me…

Scahill’s mention of khat chews being off-limits to the embassy staff immediately brought to my mind an interview I had seen with Pik Botha in which he was discussing the negotiations leading to the Tripartite Accords. In his narrative the breakthrough came at the hotel pub when he and Jorge Risquet happened to be taking their board at the same hour. In passing Botha mentioned that the Americans had made the hotel pub off-limits to their contingent from day one of the talks.

*My impression based upon the little that I know is that the good listeners and empaths amongst the FSO corps tend to gravitate towards the positions that deal with aiding Americans in distress abroad.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by ganulv

Scahill’s mention of khat chews being off-limits to the embassy staff immediately brought to my mind an interview I had seen with Pik Botha in which he was discussing the negotiations leading to the Tripartite Accords. In his narrative the breakthrough came at the hotel pub when he and Jorge Risquet happened to be taking their board at the same hour. In passing Botha mentioned that the Americans had made the hotel pub off-limits to their contingent from day one of the talks.

I can see the point in the khat-chewing. Back when I was wearing the journalist hat I got way better information on the local military (as one example) by wallowing in rotgut booze and assorted other vices with a bunch of NCOs than I ever did by interviewing generals. Had more fun, too. Of course the pastimes of the freelance journalist are not always seen as appropriate for embassy staff, no matter how effective they may be.

Is there any place in the world where embassy staff actually go out in the streets and interact with ordinary people... even in the cities, let alone out in the countryside? It would be unthinkable here; their morass of security regulations wouldn't begin to allow it.

Originally Posted by ganulv

*My impression based upon the little that I know is that the good listeners and empaths amongst the FSO corps tend to gravitate towards the positions that deal with aiding Americans in distress abroad.

In the places I'm familiar with American Citizen Services is typically staffed by the youngest of the young. It seems like it's a post nobody else wants, thus pushed off on the least senior as a necessary rite of passage on the way to bigger and better things.

[ganulv]

Originally Posted by Dayuhan

In the places I'm familiar with American Citizen Services is typically staffed by the youngest of the young. It seems like it's a post nobody else wants, thus pushed off on the least senior as a necessary rite of passage on the way to bigger and better things.

Is American Citizen Services the same as Consular Affairs? I should try and learn about the workings of the State Department but their employees make me uneasy in the way that dentists do most other people. It’s a legacy of having lived in Central America in the early ’90s, where public opinion of the U.S. Department of State was neck–in–neck with that of the CIA.

[davidbfpo]

In Part 1 in The Frontline video report there was a short clip of Yemeni town that was defending itself from AQAP, IIRC it was Lawdar.

Al-Jazeera has a good summary piece 'Making sense of Yemen's feuding factions' and refers to such self-defence activity:

Local Popular Resistance Committees, made up of tribal militia fighters from various southern regions, are also fighting al-Qaeda in the current offensive. They have been attributed with successes against the group, using their local knowledge and warfare tactics. Not much is known about these groups, as most announcements on the war are made by Yemeni authorites. Some of the groups may be made up of southern seccessionist fighters, who, although seeking independence from the northern government, are also opposed to al-Qaeda.

In such a complicated environment I am not surprised that such groups are not supported by the divided Yemeni state. Should others engage with them? Yemen is not Afghanistan nor Iraq, if these groups multiply, we would be mistaken not to have links with them - a "bottom up", people-based approach COIN advocates wish for.

[davidbfpo]

An optimistic commentary by a "boots on the ground" observer; which starts with:

Although the GCC supported transitional regime has not turned Yemen into a revolutionary state, by comparison with what is happening elsewhere, the situation at the moment shows more positive signs than could have been expected: the forces of the uprisings are working to participate in the national dialogue, the transitional regime is working to weaken and remove most of the remnants of the previous era and is preparing for a new and hopefully more democratic future.

I liked this - hence emphasis, even if without details:

Secondly, thanks to the new military leadership which is seriously committed to putting an end to the fundamentalist insurrection, the rebels have been dislodged from their stronghold in Abyan Governorate, pushing them back into Shabwa which was their main base for a number of years. Immediately after this achievement last week, moves have started in Shabwa and already some of their strongholds are falling, thanks to the establishment of local ‘popular committees’ who are ‘encouraging’ them to leave.

Link:http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-l...to-be-followed

[davidbfpo]

CWOT and his colleague have returned to this issue, which is within the wider, global debate over the use of drones and the US strategy to pursue terrorism.
SWC has a long running thread on drones 'Using drones: principles, tactics and results': http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=7385

Building on their past work on Yemen and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Watts and Cilluffo revisit the use of drones in Yemen, offering context to ongoing debates about U.S. counterterrorism strategy as well as recommendations regarding the way forward. The authors review what drones and Special Operations Forces (SOF) have accomplished over the past year, explore why AQAP has continued to thrive, and explain what critics of drones misunderstand about operations in Yemen. Watts and Cilluffo go on to urge continued improvement of intelligence to better the accuracy of drone strikes, and argue in favor of greater transparency and accountability in drone operations. The authors recognize that "drones alone cannot entirely defeat AQAP," and call for the development of "a larger, long-run strategy...for pursuing U.S. counterterrorism objectives in Yemen."

Link:http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/iss...208_Drones.cfm

[davidbfpo]

Helen Lackner returns with a "boots on the ground" assessment of the situation in the Yemen:http://www.opendemocracy.net/helen-l...hose-interests

Rightly she lauds the critical role of non-government factors in defeating AQAP in the southern provinces; yes, once again tribes came to the fore. Her wider cautionary remarks on the weakness of the Yemeni state are familiar, although I expect the West and other friends downplay what the Yemeni people wants are.

In parallel there is a less optimistic, external factors first review on SWJ:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...esolution-2051

[davidbfpo]

After watching the Yemen from afar this will not come as a great surprise. The article's sub-title is:

Ali Abdullah Saleh's government colluded with al Qaeda and duped the West. Has anything changed since his ouster?

It ends with:

It's the highest-level leaders, who don't actually believe in the preachings of Ansar al-Sharia, but who manipulate them to remain in the government or bring a particular party to power.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...n_on?page=full

[davidbfpo]

Thanks to CWOT on Twitter for this AEI PPT, twelve slides and you know far more:

This slide deck provides information on AQAP’s leaders, both current and former, and their networks.

Link:http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen...tember-27-2012

Interesting comment by Leah Farrell on Twitter, which asked whether any analysts from way back in the early 1990's were still in government service who'd recognise the names and the networks.

[davidbfpo]

An excellent article on this forlorn country, by Gregory Johnson's new book 'The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia' and an excerpt is on FP Blog:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...emen?page=full

A details a country that under President Saleh appeared to effortlessly pull the right levers with the USA and so he ends with:

After more than a decade of on-again, off-again aid to Yemen, the al Qaeda branch in Yemen is stronger than it was on September 11, 2001. The money the United States has spent in Yemen has enriched dozens and the missiles it has fired into the country have killed hundreds -- and yet AQAP continues to grow.

There is an excellent contrast on Clint Watts blog, with several linked articles by others:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=817

Has AQAP retreated under pressure from the state's security forces or the tribal militias? What have drone strikes done? More than stopping AQAP's use of vehicles.

[davidbfpo]

Clint Watts blogsite has a detailed, review of Gregory Johnson's new book 'The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia':

It is clearly the best book available on AQAP in Yemen..... the best-written book on al Qaeda I’ve read since Lawrence Wright’s The Looming Tower.

A little more:

Young Saudi foreign fighters have been the largest portions of recruits and leaders for years supplying one jihad after another. With the decline of Iraq, Saudi foreign fighters flowed into Yemen and today I imagine AQAP in Yemen is now competing with Syria for the collection of fresh recruits. Having read Greg’s book, I see the influx of Saudi foreign fighters, the failures of rehabilitation programs and repeated prison escapes as the driving factors in AQAP’s recent heights.

Link:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=823

Link to book:http://www.amazon.com/The-Last-Refug.../dp/0393082423

A book to add to my Christmas list!

Two podcasts, short on PRI (6 mins):http://www.theworld.org/2012/11/yemen-al-qaeda/ and a longer discussion @ Brookings:http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/11/13-yemen

[davidbfpo]

Via Twitter a recommendation, even if not updated since June 2012:

Interactive: Fractured Yemen
Guide to the various factions involved in the ongoing conflict in the troubled Arab state.

Link:http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/int...233575914.html

[AdamG]

According to Gregory Johnsen, a journalist who has covered Yemen and Islamic insurgency in the Middle East extensively, al-Qaida's presence has tripled in size within Yemen over the past three years. Johnsen charts this growing influence on the country in his new book, The Last Refuge: Yemen, al-Qaeda, and America's War in Arabia.

http://www.npr.org/2012/11/27/165936...da-and-the-u-s

[davidbfpo]

Good catch AdamG.

Gregory is rather direct in his observations. I draw attention to this, slightly edited portion:

On the issues with on-the-ground intelligence gathering in Yemen

"The U.S. soldiers, the U.S. operators that we have are trained particularly well. They are some of the best in the world at what it is that they do, but all of this is dependent upon the human intelligence on the ground and this is where the U.S. seems to do very bad both in the special forces in the shadowy part of the world where they are attempting to collect intelligence for targeting purposes, as well as on the political and on the State Department side where they're attempting to get out and speak with a lot of people and find out what's actually happening on the ground so that they can inform policymakers in Washington. ...

"[T]he Achilles' heel for the United States in Yemen is that too often it just doesn't know what's taking place on the ground. The CIA doesn't know what's taking place, it doesn't know who is in a particular car, it doesn't know who is really a member of al-Qaida...... So both the CIA and policymakers in Washington tend to be operating more on assumptions than on hard facts... "

[davidbfpo]

Twitter has been alive with pointers to events in Yemen, a re-organisation of the Yemeni security forces and of late a suspected US drone strike that was "off target" hence the FP headline:

Anatomy of an Air Attack Gone Wrong: In rural Yemen, a botched attack on a terror suspect kills 12 civilians and destroys a community

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...dead?page=full and a CFR article:http://blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012/12/2...-war-in-yemen/

Moderator's Note

This thread was till today called 'The End in Yemen? Thread for 2011-2012' and has now been re-named for 2013 as 'Yemen: all you want (2011-2013)'.