The Never Ending Airpower Versus Groundpower Debate

[AmericanPride]

I'm not certain there is a legitimate, on-going debate regarding military power. What I mean by legitimate is a debate regarding the principles of war and politics. There's certainly deep divisions on culture and tactics, but those are relevant only to specific cases. So we get arguments about which expression of power is more effective in which particular circumstances. Since all conflict is inherently political, we can find or create situations in which any combination of military power would be most effective. Selective case studies can write any branch, capability, or component into irrelevance.

What I'm more interested in is how (or if) airpower alters the relationship between the political object and military power. Is On War on AF reading lists?

Here's my reading of Clausewitz: War is political. The political object defines the nature of the conflict. Victory becomes the immediate goal and replaces the political objective. Victory is achieved by subduing the enemy's will or destroying his capabilities. Most wars are limited because the political object is limited. I think it's absurd to suggest, therefore, that any form of power is "decisive" if it is not ultimately capable of subduing the will of the enemy or destroying his capabilities. And the way to do that is to deny the enemy space. Land. People don't live in the sky or in the ocean -- they're just ways to get to other people's land. Blow up a man's house from the air and he'll build another house. But take away his land upon which his house is built, and he'll be homeless.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by AmericanPride

I'm not certain there is a legitimate, on-going debate regarding military power. What I mean by legitimate is a debate regarding the principles of war and politics. There's certainly deep divisions on culture and tactics, but those are relevant only to specific cases. So we get arguments about which expression of power is more effective in which particular circumstances. Since all conflict is inherently political, we can find or create situations in which any combination of military power would be most effective. Selective case studies can write any branch, capability, or component into irrelevance.

What I'm more interested in is how (or if) airpower alters the relationship between the political object and military power. Is On War on AF reading lists?

Whoah! - This is like the Rosetta stone of the entire point! Excellent point to bring up and excellent question.

IMO, there is clear blue water between politics and the military. Yes, all war is political, but military means can only be applied to military problems or security problems. The concept of "military influence" is verging on the absurd, if taken too far. Military force can only legitimately be used against military or armed forces.

If the problem is not a military one, then military force is a logically less than effective instrument.

Military force is about breaking will. It is the imposition conditions that the enemy resists. It is not useful to frame that idea in the concepts of "sending messages" or "influencing people."

The real problem with the air power weenies is there enduring quest to show that air power is an effective political or coercion/influence tool. We all know it is an historically indecisive military tool, and getting more and more limited in it's applicability.

[AmericanPride]

Military force is about breaking will. It is the imposition conditions that the enemy resists. It is not useful to frame that idea in the concepts of "sending messages" or "influencing people."

"Never do a light injury to your enemy." - Machiavelli

I suspect Machiavelli would be in agreement with your statements, and he wrote those words some 500 years ago. I think to test the claim of decisive airpower, it'd have to be done counter-factually in order to isolate it as a variable. What if the US did not commit soldiers and marines to the Global War on Terrorism?

[Entropy]

American Pride,

Count me with you as one who is skeptical whenever someone makes a claim that a particular piece of the warfighting pie is or was "decisive." This goes equally to the air power and ground power mafias. It's my belief that the "whole is greater than the sum of the parts" when it comes warfighting and even the most "decisive" single capability has dependencies without which it wouldn't be "decisive." In reality, the way one organizes and employs various capabilities what is truly decisive. For example, it wasn't the tank or airplane that made the German military in WWII so effective, it was how those capabilities were organized and employed. So I agree with most of your excellent comment, especially this part:

I think it's absurd to suggest, therefore, that any form of power is "decisive" if it is not ultimately capable of subduing the will of the enemy or destroying his capabilities.

The second part, however, requires significant caveats IMO:

And the way to do that is to deny the enemy space. Land. People don't live in the sky or in the ocean -- they're just ways to get to other people's land. Blow up a man's house from the air and he'll build another house. But take away his land upon which his house is built, and he'll be homeless.

I might agree that taking an enemy's land is probably the ultimate coercive tool besides killing but it is not always necessary nor desirable nor possible to do that. And it's not possible to do that in the vast majority of cases without air power (and naval power too). It seems to me that the most strenuous ground power advocates go too far in suggesting that taking land is not just the ultimate way, but the ONLY way.

As for "On War," yes, it is required reading in Air Force circles.

WILF,

The real problem with the air power weenies is there enduring quest to show that air power is an effective political or coercion/influence tool.

I might suggest that military power in general is not a particularly good coercion/influence tool regardless of what limited sphere of "power" it comes from - at least before military operations commence.

We all know it is an historically indecisive military tool, and getting more and more limited in it's applicability.

Historically indecisive except when it isn't - the Battle of Britain and Midway being the most obvious examples.

More limited in its applicability? Please explain that - in what areas is air power no longer applicable where it previously was? When did air power "peak" in terms of applicability? I think, if anything, air power is more applicable today than ever before, especially in the realm of conventional conflict.


American Pride,

I think to test the claim of decisive airpower, it'd have to be done counter-factually in order to isolate it as a variable. What if the US did not commit soldiers and marines to the Global War on Terrorism?

One can ask a related, but opposing question: What if the US did not commit air power at all? For instance, how would we be doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?

So again, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The ground power and air power weenies (to use WILF's term) would have you believe the other is merely incidental which is not the case at all IMO.

[Entropy]

BTW, the Rand monograph linked in Tom's opening post to this thread was revised and updated. Here's the new link to Learning Large Lessons, The Evolving Roles of Ground Power and Air Power in the Post-Cold War Era

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Entropy

Count me with you as one who is skeptical whenever someone makes a claim that a particular piece of the warfighting pie is or was "decisive." This goes equally to the air power and ground power mafias. It's my belief that the "whole is greater than the sum of the parts" when it comes warfighting and even the most "decisive" single capability has dependencies without which it wouldn't be "decisive." In reality, the way one organizes and employs various capabilities what is truly decisive. For example, it wasn't the tank or airplane that made the German military in WWII so effective, it was how those capabilities were organized and employed.

We can agree on that.

I might suggest that military power in general is not a particularly good coercion/influence tool regardless of what limited sphere of "power" it comes from - at least before military operations commence.

However, I disagree on this. It can be an excellent coercive tool, even without actual application if the strength and, far more importantly, the previously demonstrated will to use it if necessary is present.

It's on the latter aspect that military power too often fails as a coercive instrument. I could make a strong case for the fact that virtually every US war occurred because an opponent thought the US was too lazy, introspective or hedonistic to respond to a provocation. Contemporarily, I'd go even further in pointing out that our current military operations are the result of four Presidents from both parties over a period of over 30 years -- and since 1979 in particular -- failing to show some will and responding not at all or very halfheartedly.

Historically indecisive except when it isn't - the Battle of Britain and Midway being the most obvious examples.

Probably not the best examples to bolster your case. Both are battles 'won,' not the greater war in which they occurred. Both were responsible for short circuiting attempts that probably would not have truly been able to impose a strategic victory by the opponent, thus they aided in speeding the Allied victory but neither was in and of itself a truly decisive event -- which takes nothing away from the bravery and effort of the participants. Nor does it deny that both were pivotal battles.

One can ask a related, but opposing question: What if the US did not commit air power at all? For instance, how would we be doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?

Interesting question. How are the opponents doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?

So again, the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. The ground power and air power weenies (to use WILF's term) would have you believe the other is merely incidental which is not the case at all IMO.

On that we can agree. Both are necessary, both contribute however, particularly in conventional conflict, it still boils down to the three exhausted and grubby Grunts left out of that nine man squad occupying ground.

[reed11b]

in conventional conflict, it still boils down to the three exhausted and grubby Grunts left out of that nine man squad occupying ground.

Ken is dead on again. Regardless of how much of a "force multiplier" air power is, it requires well trained and equiped soldiers, especially marine and army infantry, in decent numbers to make long term changes. Sometimes I wonder if a single "defense force" concept would not be better then the sepperate branches, though I know that is not the best answer either.
Reed

[AmericanPride]

Originally Posted by Entropy

It's my belief that the "whole is greater than the sum of the parts" when it comes warfighting and even the most "decisive" single capability has dependencies without which it wouldn't be "decisive." In reality, the way one organizes and employs various capabilities what is truly decisive.

Agreed.

I might agree that taking an enemy's land is probably the ultimate coercive tool besides killing but it is not always necessary nor desirable nor possible to do that. And it's not possible to do that in the vast majority of cases without air power (and naval power too). It seems to me that the most strenuous ground power advocates go too far in suggesting that taking land is not just the ultimate way, but the ONLY way.

I would say that certainly depends upon how the political object defines the conflict, which then returns us to the original problem of the debate in which any scenario can be imagined by which we can justify or condemn any aspect of military power. But the relationship between land and military power is such that any belligerent, regardless of his own intent, cannot wage war without effectively occupying some kind of space of his own from which to operate. Even while airpower and sea power are necessary in particular circumstances, this is only in consideration in how that power relates to the occupation of land or in other circumstances, how that relates to the desired political end-state. I will not claim that the occupation of land is the only way because as I stated earlier, wars depend upon the political object sought, and therefore, as you stated, it is not always necessary or desirable to occupy the enemy's land to defeat him. Nevertheless, I think we should be careful not to confuse ends and means, because the occupation of land is simply the means to disarming the enemy (which is the means to annexing his land ); and I think as war moves to its extremes it is revealed that the occupation of land is what places the enemy in a position of the most disadvantage therefore more likely to accept the terms of our demands. I assert that airpower is a secondary capability (which is relative term as I do not mean to imply ineffectiveness) on the basis that it cannot deny space to the enemy and therefore force him to disarmament.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Entropy

I might suggest that military power in general is not a particularly good coercion/influence tool regardless of what limited sphere of "power" it comes from - at least before military operations commence.

Yes, all military power is limited unless it's actually used.

Historically indecisive except when it isn't - the Battle of Britain and Midway being the most obvious examples.

There has never been any solid evidence that a destruction of the RAF was a required condition for the invasion of Birtain. They did however need to destroy the British Fleet, and this was something the Luftwaffe felt unable to do guarantee.

Midway was platform wacking. Something air power is good at.

More limited in its applicability? Please explain that - in what areas is air power no longer applicable where it previously was? When did air power "peak" in terms of applicability? I think, if anything, air power is more applicable today than ever before, especially in the realm of conventional conflict.

In simple terms fighters exist to shoot other fighters, aircraft and bombers down. If the enemy lacks that which you can legitimately use airpower against, then I submit it is of limited applicability. The ability to successfully employ the air environment is and always will be useful, but that is not always dependant of "air power" or air forces.

The ground power and air power weenies (to use WILF's term) would have you believe the other is merely incidental which is not the case at all IMO.

While the use of the word "weenies" may seem unnecessarily disparaging, I see Land and Sea power theorists as being fairly confident as to their worth, and knowledgeable of thier limits. I have yet to see this from the air power theorists, who seem to constantly over state their case and effectiveness.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

from today's USA Today:

http://blogs.usatoday.com/oped/2008/...-hearts-a.html

While I don't consider USA Today to be a paragon of military analysis there are some key observations made:

"Killing innocents with bombs is, of course, a disastrously ineffective way to compete with the Taliban for the hearts and minds of beleaguered Afghan civilians, which makes it infuriating that U.S. forces continue to make such mistakes." (first part true, second part a bit over emotional)

"The Taliban, like other brutal guerrilla forces, deliberately puts civilians at risk to provoke just such disasters, which it tries to capitalize on no matter how they occur or how many civilians die." (while this may seem like stating the obvious I think some in the US military don't get the point)

"An unnamed U.S. official quoted in The Washington Post said Taliban forces have figured out how to plant false intelligence and lure Americans into making airstrikes that kill civilians." (that's a pretty smart tactic, if true)

"It's all one more reminder that if the war in Afghanistan is to be won — no lock in any circumstances — that it won't be won from the air but with troops on the ground."

Sometimes I feel that airpower enthusiasts ignore the truth in the second and third quote. While I agree that airpower is a terrific force multiplier if I were the TB or AQ I would always make sure my leadership get togethers were under the guise of some other large gathering. That way should a nice PGM arrive at the meeting there would be plenty of dead women and kids lying around for propaganda purposes. Hey, but that's just me...

[ODB]

I was one of the lucky ones who got to clean up the pieces after a pilot claimed self defense and dropped a 500 pounder on the Canadians conducting training at Tarnak Farms. He called it in numerous times and was told not to drop it. His self defense claim was because of the tracers from their M240 machine guns. See if I remember right, tracer burnout is 900 meters. Kind of short range in comparison to 10,000 feet. This was the incident that brought about the Amphetamine use claim. I fully understand making bad decisions but this is an example of how different things look from 10,000 feet and the way they look from the ground.

[Entropy]

However, I disagree on this. It can be an excellent coercive tool, even without actual application if the strength and, far more importantly, the previously demonstrated will to use it if necessary is present.

My sense of history is that the benefits reaped from successful coercion gained primarily through the threat of military force are transitory and at some point down the road will result in war on less favorable terms. There are many historical examples where one side will accommodate the other in response to a threat only to buy time - in fact I think that's the most common response to military coercion which is why I don't consider it a very good coercive tool.

However, I think it can be useful when combined with other forms of coercion and influence - IOW as part of an overall strategy that uses all appropriate forms of influence while recognizing that adversaries have "red lines" that even credible threats of military force will not budge.

You're right to point out the problem of will, but I think that is a "feature" of democracy we will have to live with.

Probably not the best examples to bolster your case. Both are battles 'won,' not the greater war in which they occurred.

Well, that all depends on what level of warfare you're talking about. If your scope is "WWII" then you may be right, but in that case it could be argued that every battle was simply a "battle won" that, by itself, could not "impose a strategic victory" or be decisive by themselves.

I'm not arguing that air power is decisive at the grand-strategy level of warfare. In my view, to say that air power can/can’t win wars is a foolish argument to begin with. It's like claiming that the naval component can win a war by itself. And even the land component. My view is that, for the US at least, the Civil War is over and we aren't going to face a situation where one service/component is going to do it all on its own. We succeed because we can integrate our forces that goes beyond "combined arms."

At the tactical and operational and even sometimes at the strategic level, the various elements can be decisive factors and that includes air forces IMO. In that context, I believe air power was the most decisive factor in the two cases I put forth.

Interesting question. How are the opponents doing with no aircraft of any type in Afghanistan?

You got me there, though we both know those opponents have advantages we do not and never will posses.

On that we can agree. Both are necessary, both contribute however, particularly in conventional conflict, it still boils down to the three exhausted and grubby Grunts left out of that nine man squad occupying ground.

I don't disagree. People in LPC's in dangerous and unpleasant places will be an enduring feature of warfare. I do think, however, that air power can be the difference between three exhausted and grubby grunts left out of a squad and three left out of a company.

American Pride,

I would say that certainly depends upon how the political object defines the conflict, which then returns us to the original problem of the debate in which any scenario can be imagined by which we can justify or condemn any aspect of military power.

Agreed and the rest of your comment is excellent. In the example of Kosovo, one of the problems in assessing the efficacy of air power is the incongruity of the political objectives. Here's a pretty good essay on the subject.

Wilf,

There has never been any solid evidence that a destruction of the RAF was a required condition for the invasion of Birtain. They did however need to destroy the British Fleet, and this was something the Luftwaffe felt unable to do guarantee.

Yes, they needed to destroy the British fleet. The only way that was going to happen, given the smaller German naval force, was through the establishment of air superiority to allow combined naval and air attacks on the British fleet. The claim there's "no solid evidence" seems amazing to me in light of the historic record and German war-planning. One could argue the odds of successfully conquering Britain WITH German air supremacy may have been small (a point of some debate), but the odds were were nil without it.

Midway was platform wacking. Something air power is good at.

"Platform wacking?" Yes, that is largely the point of naval warfare. That air power is good at it would seem to buttress my point and not detract from it.

In simple terms fighters exist to shoot other fighters, aircraft and bombers down. If the enemy lacks that which you can legitimately use airpower against, then I submit it is of limited applicability.

Again, I'm missing your argument. Air power is not limited to fighters. Even if it was, all US fighters (USAF, Navy, Marine) are multirole aircraft except the F-15C.

The ability to successfully employ the air environment is and always will be useful, but that is not always dependant of "air power" or air forces.

I don't think I ever claimed it was always dependent, but most of the time it is highly desirable at a minimum. For the US it's almost always. Even in the unlikely event the Army ever goes off by itself, it's still going to have it's UAV's and fixed and rotary wing aircraft which are elements of air power as much as an F-22 is.

Umar,

Sometimes I feel that airpower enthusiasts ignore the truth in the second and third quote.

Agree with your comment, but keep in mind that the air component does not conduct independent operations in either Afghanistan or Iraq. IOW, these operations are driven by or in support of ground or SoF force requirements and operations or are JFC-directed. The people at the CFACC are actually quite cautious and have, at times, denied requested ground force strikes for fear of civilian casualties.

And claims in the article about the 90 civilians killed look to be propaganda.

[reed11b]

Air power is not limited to fighters. Even if it was, all US fighters (USAF, Navy, Marine) are multirole aircraft except the F-15C.

I think that would be the point. Why are they multi-role? Not becouse they are the best platforms for the job, but to keep the AF "relevent". If all fighters are multi-role, then why the big push for manned bombers? Do they want manned bombers becouse of the continued belief that they can win wars on there own? Are any other services asking for more big manned bombers?
Reed

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Entropy

...
However, I think it can be useful when combined with other forms of coercion and influence - IOW as part of an overall strategy that uses all appropriate forms of influence while recognizing that adversaries have "red lines" that even credible threats of military force will not budge.

You're right to point out the problem of will, but I think that is a "feature" of democracy we will have to live with.

True on both counts.

Well, that all depends on what level of warfare you're talking about. If your scope is "WWII" then you may be right, but in that case it could be argued that every battle was simply a "battle won" that, by itself, could not "impose a strategic victory" or be decisive by themselves.

With only a few caveats, that's essentially true. Lot of evidence of many 'won' battles leading to a lost war.

...We succeed because we can integrate our forces that goes beyond "combined arms."

True again.

At the tactical and operational and even sometimes at the strategic level, the various elements can be decisive factors and that includes air forces IMO. In that context, I believe air power was the most decisive factor in the two cases I put forth.

Since both were effectively air battles, well, yeah.

You got me there, though we both know those opponents have advantages we do not and never will posses.

Many of which could be removed but that 'will' thing gets in the way again.

I don't disagree. People in LPC's in dangerous and unpleasant places will be an enduring feature of warfare. I do think, however, that air power can be the difference between three exhausted and grubby grunts left out of a squad and three left out of a company.

Sometimes yes, sometimes no. Lot of variables. Still, mostly that's a good statement.

We can agree it takes everyone and there is no one-service takes all situation (Except maybe in mid-ocean... ).

[Entropy]

Originally Posted by reed11b

I think that would be the point. Why are they multi-role? Not becouse they are the best platforms for the job, but to keep the AF "relevent". If all fighters are multi-role, then why the big push for manned bombers? Do they want manned bombers becouse of the continued belief that they can win wars on there own? Are any other services asking for more big manned bombers?
Reed

Both the US and Navy have transitioned from "one trick pony" aircraft in the last 20-30 years. As aircraft procurement and operating costs grew, and with shrinking budgets in the 1990's, the USAF and Navy could no longer afford to field and especially maintain and operate a large force of single-role aircraft. In addition to cost savings, many of the legacy systems were designed to counter specific Soviet threats that no longer existed (The F-14 and Phoenix missile combination, for example). So with end of the cold war it made sense from a capabilities standpoint to go multirole as well. The trend is not even limited to aircraft - the Navy retired many classes of ships in favor of standardized multirole vessels. There may be examples in the Army as well, though I can't think of any offhand.

The culmination of this trend in aircraft design is the F-35, which is both a joint and international program and is intended to replace a handful of existing multirole aircraft from the USAF/Navy/Marines and allies, and service that diverse set of missions with one basic airframe. I'm somewhat skeptical that putting all those eggs in one basket will work in the end without serious compromises, but we'll see.

Of course, there are some roles that require more specialized platforms - Aircraft carriers, aerial refuelers and, to a certain extent, bombers to name a couple. Multirole fighters simply don't have the range, payload and endurance to fill the bomber role in many cases. Recently there has been talk of a new bomber for the AF with a target IOC as early as 2018 - a date which is wishful thinking at best (the Navy UCAS multirole unmanned bomber program is already in development and won't be fielded until 2020 at the earliest).

[Entropy]

Ken, when we come to agreement it really does make me feel smarter than I should. I know you get a lot out of it too, but this forum is very lucky to have you here.

Since both were effectively air battles, well, yeah.

Why do you think I picked them?

We can agree it takes everyone and there is no one-service takes all situation (Except maybe in mid-ocean... ).

I guess you haven't heard about the new effects-based Air force submarine program!

[Bill Moore]

I find it odd we never talk about sea power, but I guess that is because the Navy never made the false claim they could win the war alone like some in the Air Force.

First, the question posed about how our opponents are doing without any form of air power was an excellent question to make one pause and perhaps lead to a paradigm shift, well done.

Now just to be contrary I'll defend other than ground power, because I think the discussion is to limited and unnecessarily black and white. I have the view that we're always in conflict and we're always vying for some sort of advantage (strategic shaping) to prevent that conflict from escalating into war, and if it does, then being in a position to dominate if it does.

If one nation wants to occupy another nation (Iraq occupies Kuwait, Japan occupies the Philippines, etc.) it may take an Army after the fact to oust them out, but in "theory" naval and air power could have prevented them from projecting their force in the first place. The same applies for projecting our shores, our air and sea power is critical. Is that decisive? Depends on how you define it, if it prevents an attack in the first place is it decisive? (I'm talking conventional not asymmetric).

Several nations have long range weapons, we can launch nukes from submarines and silos and obliterate our nation state enemies. That serves as a real deterent if our enemy believes we have the political will to use those weapons. If a certain country presented serious threats to our nation, would the credible threat of destruction by strategic weapons be enough to alter their behavior without occupying their ground with troops? Of course credible implies we would use the weapons if they didn't comply; Japan as an example.

Our naval, air and strategic weapon superiority has forced our enemies to adapt to what we generally call asymmetric approaches/tactics to achieve thier objectives. We haven't found a way to effectively use the powers that has caused this shift to counter asymmetric threats. Some members of the Air Power community seem to think this is possible through EBO where technology will allow us to be all knowing and all seeing so we can reach out from the sky and eliminate all the bad nodes. Maybe I'm a dinasour, but I think that is rubish. On the other hand, I think our air and naval power is absolutely critical to our national defense, and for more reasons than I addressed here.

[Ken White]

Entropy; you're too kind but the check is in the mail (and I think I learn a whole lot more here than I impart).

Nope. I missed the news flash on the EBS (don't go there... ) but I do know about B52 mine capability and a couple of other AF tricks in the ocean in motion...

Bill Moore: Well said -- as you aptly point out it's a whole lot more complex than tactical application. Your comments on strategic deterrence and this:

On the other hand, I think our air and naval power is absolutely critical to our national defense, and for more reasons than I addressed here.

totally accurate summation are spot on.

ADDED, inadvertently truncated:

I said this earlier about military force as a policy instrument:

""However, I disagree on this. It can be an excellent coercive tool, even without actual application if the strength and, far more importantly, the previously demonstrated will to use it if necessary is present.

It's on the latter aspect that military power too often fails as a coercive instrument. I could make a strong case for the fact that virtually every US war occurred because an opponent thought the US was too lazy, introspective or hedonistic to respond to a provocation. Contemporarily, I'd go even further in pointing out that our current military operations are the result of four Presidents from both parties over a period of over 30 years -- and since 1979 in particular -- failing to show some will and responding not at all or very halfheartedly."

I'd add an interesting thought. In most of those earlier wars, our military unpreparedness was almost always a major factor in the opponents miscalculation; that was a possibly a larger concern than our will.

Since 1955 or so, our military preparedness has certainly been commensurate with the various threats -- now our will is suspect. Thus, this comment by Bill Moore is important:

in "theory" naval and air power could have prevented them from projecting their force in the first place. The same applies for projecting our shores, our air and sea power is critical.

No question Entropy is correct on the problems with 'will' in a democratic society but the problem just illustrated seems to me to say we should have a better and more firmly entrenched policy on the use of force.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

Charlie Dunlap was op-eding down south:

http://www.ajc.com/opinion/content/o...aped_0917.html

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by Umar Al-Mokhtār

Charlie Dunlap was op-eding down south:

http://www.ajc.com/opinion/content/o...aped_0917.html

...and I rather liked the pithy reply by John Robinson:

Airstrikes not answer to war in Afghanistan
By JOHN A. ROBINSON
Thursday, September 25, 2008

The U.S. military does not target innocent civilians. Period. I realize this assertion should restate the obvious for most Americans, but when the number-two ranking lawyer in the U.S. Air Force implies otherwise, I can not allow the potential ambiguity to go unanswered.

Last week, Major Gen. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., the Air Force deputy staff judge advocate, penned a personal piece in the AJC that urged unfettered airpower in the war in Afghanistan. His message about civilian deaths: you can’t make an omelet without breaking a few eggs. Civilian eggs, that is.

After seven years of mostly unconventional warfare, you’d think “airpower first” advocates such as Dunlap would have learned the strategic lesson that General David Petraeus recently summarized: “You don’t kill or capture your way out of an industrial-strength insurgency.”

...

John Robinson is a military targeteer and an Army chief warrant officer based in Atlanta. He has served as chief of ground targeting in Afghanistan and the Army’s targeting liaison to the Air Force headquarters supporting both Afghanistan and Iraq. These are his personal views.

Someone needs to get Robinson on SWJ/C!