New AF COIN Doctrine

[Jesse9252]

The Air Force wasn’t thrilled about the Army-Marine Corps counterinsurgency document, which the service said gave short shrift to airpower’s capabilities, as proved in the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Maj. Gen. Allen G. Peck, commander of the Air Force Doctrine Center at Maxwell AFB, Ala., said he had seen the doctrine penned by Petraeus and Amos, and said that it reflected “a very two-dimensional view of how to fight a counterinsurgency.” If airmen had written it, it would be “different,” Peck observed.

The Air Force provides “maneuver” capabilities by backing up ground troops with kinetic and nonkinetic means, Peck noted.

The Air Force is working on its own COIN doctrine and is proposing to the Pentagon that a joint doctrine be developed. The Air Force version is on a fast track to be finished in August. The service is simultaneously pushing for a joint doctrine.

When that process is under way, “it will be helpful for us to have our Air Force doctrine in hand,” he said.

USAF agrees with Petraeus and Amos that air mobility is a powerful “asymmetric” capability and certainly endorses the view that ISR—air and space-based systems alike—are critical.

However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrine’s tendency to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM 3-24 does “probably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential for collateral damage,” because the Air Force exercises great care in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible to achieve the desired effect.

Full article can be found here http://www.afa.org/magazine/march2007/0307watch.asp

Just curious what the experts think...

Thanks for any replies.

[Old Eagle]

There is no doubt that the USAF needs to play in the development of Joint COIN doctrine. We/they still haven't figured out how best to use their firepower capabilities. Dropping 2x2000lb bombs on a farm house that may or may not have had insurgents in it doesn't produce collateral damage, it produces more insurgents. (carefully selected targets -- minimum explosive force)

[Stan]

Hi Jesse !

I've been Army all my life, so don't take this to heart if you are/were AF

Going to the Air War College's site can be amusing (for the Army types):
www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-lesn.htm

But better yet, Air & Space Power's Spring 06 Journal hits home:

"The Air Force's Missing Doctrine: How the US Air Force Ignores Counterinsurgency"

CONSIDERING THAT THE U.S. military has extensive experience
in using airpower against insurgents, and that the United States
will almost certainly be involved in fighting insurgents and terrorists
and will no doubt assist other nations in their own fights
against irregular opponents in the future, the lack of attention in military
colleges and in doctrine regarding this subject is scandalous. The U.S. Air
Force in particular, has tended to ignore and downplay air operations in
small wars in its education system and in its doctrine.”

more here on page 27:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/a...pr06/spr06.pdf

To a large extent, the Air Force has ignored insurgency as much as possible,
preferring to think of it as little more than a small version of conventional war.

Regards, Stan

Perhaps Old Eagle is right, better late than never !

[John T. Fishel]

On seeing these posts I recalled discussions in the 1980s with and air force officer whose name I forgot about the use of the RAF in Iraq COIN in the 1920s. A Google search turns up quite a bit of stuff but it doesn't support and optimistic use of airpower as a primary direct action weapon. Even smart bombs do have a tendency to blow up more stuff and people that we desire.

[Jesse9252]

Stan, no worries as I am a USMC officer candidate heading down to PLC this summer.

Better late than never? The article reads as though the AF brass is suddenly paying attention to COIN because FM 3-24 got all sorts of press, the guy who wrote it is now commander of MNF-I, and when they actually sat down to read it it said horrible things like: "Air strikes are probably too blunt an instrument to be of much value, and ground commanders should think twice before asking for them."

Do the experts here think the AF is going to sit down and produce a thoughtful, nuanced COIN doctrine? Or will they try and protect their turf by overemphasizing the role of airpower and muddy the waters when all the services have to sit down and come up with a joint document?

Maybe their criticisms of FM 3-24 are valid?

The views in FM 3-24 reflect a limited knowledge of airpower’s true role in the current operation and suspicion that airpower can all too easily prove counterproductive.

[Loggie]

Funny, COIN wasn't a real hot AF topic until FM 3-24 was written...

My fear is that the Air Force counterinsurgency doctrine will be penned by guys who grew up in the ACC (old SAC/TAC) community. While the Air Force is great at delivering ordnance in target, and ISR is a no-fail mission, effective COIN requires so much more than that.

The AF Special Operations community is making great strides in developing a more robust FID capability (teaching the indigenous population to fish today keeps us from buying them a fish later), and their AC/MC-130 platforms provide highly effective support to the trigger-pullers for the type of ground combat we're encountering today (and likely tomorrow); much more so than the fast-burners...(Mobility platforms moving humanitarian supplies play a key role in developing stability as well.)

Air superiority is a wonderful thing, but specialized airpower brings more capability to the ground fight. At least until the insurgents get EuroFighters wry:

[Bill Moore]

The Air Force provides “maneuver” capabilities by backing up ground troops with kinetic and nonkinetic means, Peck noted.

The Air Force is working on its own COIN doctrine and is proposing to the Pentagon that a joint doctrine be developed. The Air Force version is on a fast track to be finished in August. The service is simultaneously pushing for a joint doctrine.

When that process is under way, “it will be helpful for us to have our Air Force doctrine in hand,” he said.

USAF agrees with Petraeus and Amos that air mobility is a powerful “asymmetric” capability and certainly endorses the view that ISR—air and space-based systems alike—are critical.

However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrine’s tendency to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM 3-24 does “probably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential for collateral damage,” because the Air Force exercises great care in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible to achieve the desired effect.

Many Air Force General Officers have a tendency to present themselves more as corporate defenders than defenders of their nation. Perhaps the author's intentions are well intentioned, but the tone of this article indicates otherwise. While I agree that the Air Force does play a critical role, and could do more, especially on the non-kinetic side, this article reads like a plea to justify their continued budget on kinetic capabilities (I support that too, but not using COIN to justify it). To accuse a muddy boots officer who was on the front lines as a division commander of ringing his hands over collateral damage clearly marks the words of someone who doesn't understand the principles of COIN, and is clearly attempting to undermine the author of the doctrine.

Hopefully the Young Turks coming up through the Air Force ranks will eventually transform a service that is badly in need of reform. This reminds me of the same mentality that General Motors's management displayed when they ignored the new competition and changes in the market, and they simply tried to discredit the truth until they were ousted.

[120mm]

Using Air Power against insurgents does more than create collateral damage and more insurgents. Using Air Power delegitimizes our efforts to fight and beat the insurgents. In the minds of the folks who want to defeat us, our use of Air Power means that we are too chickenshit to close with, and defeat them. It leads them to believe that THEY are the morally and tactically superior fighters, who, once it AGAIN appears as if they are "kicking our butts", we turn tail, like the soft, western infidel cowards we are, and call in an airstrike to save our craven butts.

To defeat the insurgents, we must defeat them politically and militarily, in terms that they understand. Failure to do this, makes airpower a recruiting tool for insurgents. Whether Airpower creates "collateral damage" or not, it serves as a recruiting tool and a disincentive to give in to the "cowardly west".

Perhaps if the insurgents valued airpower, it would be useful in a COIN fight. Or their fear of airpower exceeded their motivation for fighting.

I don't think it's necessarily a personal thing, but the best thing the AF could do is to "man up" and just support the fight in the best way they can.

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by Old Eagle

There is no doubt that the USAF needs to play in the development of Joint COIN doctrine. We/they still haven't figured out how best to use their firepower capabilities. Dropping 2x2000lb bombs on a farm house that may or may not have had insurgents in it doesn't produce collateral damage, it produces more insurgents. (carefully selected targets -- minimum explosive force)

AMEN

See my article (when it comes out) on collateral damage

Tom

[LawVol]

However, Peck said he was concerned about the doctrine’s tendency to low-rate the value of force applied from the air. He said FM 3-24 does “probably a bit too much hand-wringing over the potential for collateral damage,” because the Air Force exercises great care in selecting targets and uses the minimum explosive power possible to achieve the desired effect.

I fear this means the "new" AF COIN doctrine will be more of the same. It will likely extoll the virtues of lethal airpower and largely ignore non-lethal roles. Flying small Cessna-type planes just isn't sexy.

This quote alone shows a complete ignorance of what works in a COIN environment.

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by LawVol

I fear this means the "new" AF COIN doctrine will be more of the same. It will likely extoll the virtues of lethal airpower and largely ignore non-lethal roles. Flying small Cessna-type planes just isn't sexy.

This quote alone shows a complete ignorance of what works in a COIN environment.

Agreed.....

"Hand-wringing?"

See the SENLIS Report posted here by Marc Tyrell some months ago to get a sense of what "hand-wringing" really means.

Tom

[LawVol]

I'm just getting the overwhelming sense that, with the forthcoming "AF COIN Doctrine," the job of changing the AF mindset will become even more difficult. Hopefully I'm wrong, but I anticipate some form of an air control theory with a new name.

[Loggie]

Originally Posted by LawVol

I'm just getting the overwhelming sense that, with the forthcoming "AF COIN Doctrine," the job of changing the AF mindset will become even more difficult. Hopefully I'm wrong, but I anticipate some form of an air control theory with a new name.

Hence my concern that this "doctrine" will be written by fighter/bomber jocks with advanced degrees in Airpower Studies as opposed to guys who cut their teeth working FID/SOF missions out of Hurlburt Field.

Speaking as an Airman with a Marine Corps background, I'm consistently surprised by the lack of awareness the Air Force possesses, not only of the other services, but of the changing nature of warfare. For those of you out there with boots on the ground, are you more in need of an air superiority fighter, or a C-130? Which will have the most impact on achieving the objectives of the "Long War?" While I am concerned that China is increasing their military spending 18% over the next year, I just can't help but believe that by the time they acquire an air superiority fighter in any appreciable number our F-22s will be obsolete. Our mobility fleet is limping, our special operations fleet should be doubled, and we're buying fighters.

As Charlie Brown used to say: "Good Grief."

[Smitten Eagle]

Originally Posted by Loggie

Hence my concern that this "doctrine" will be written by fighter/bomber jocks with advanced degrees in Airpower Studies as opposed to guys who cut their teeth working FID/SOF missions out of Hurlburt Field.

Speaking as an Airman with a Marine Corps background, I'm consistently surprised by the lack of awareness the Air Force possesses, not only of the other services, but of the changing nature of warfare. For those of you out there with boots on the ground, are you more in need of an air superiority fighter, or a C-130? Which will have the most impact on achieving the objectives of the "Long War?" While I am concerned that China is increasing their military spending 18% over the next year, I just can't help but believe that by the time they acquire an air superiority fighter in any appreciable number our F-22s will be obsolete. Our mobility fleet is limping, our special operations fleet should be doubled, and we're buying fighters.

As Charlie Brown used to say: "Good Grief."

I deployed with a couple (Marine) Harrier pilots in 2005 to IZ. Good dudes and great guys they are, but even as Marines they lacked the understanding of what a hinderance CAS can be to a long-term COIN campaign. I recall a conversation I witnessed.

Friend of mine: "So, what are you going to do when you deploy?"
Harrier Pilot: "I'm going to pick a fight, that's what!"

The harrier pilot had a warrior's mindset, but probably not the right temperment.

If I need to fight, I'll be honored by an invitation to brawl. But otherwise I doubt the utility of deliberately and bombastically looking for ways of starting said fights. We're fight to end the fight, not begin more.

For more on this, see Chuck Spinney (@ d-n-i.net):
http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/successful_...n_lost_war.htm

Spinney's attitude is a bit too caustic, but I think he makes some good points.

[Bill Moore]

Ask Tom what an EC-130 could have done to mitigate the genocide in Rwanda. The hate/kill message was propagated primarily from one radio station.

Lift is almost always the biggest shortfall when it comes to AF support for this ground pounder.

For COIN we have sufficient fire support, I would like to hear more ideas on non-lethal fire support that the AF could provide. We won't hear it from their generals, nor will see it on their budget proposals, unless they intend to put it there to get Congressional support, then shift it to bombers and fighters later.

[LawVol]

Air Force leaders feel airpower can and should be more effectively used in the irregular warfare and counterinsurgency fights in ways other than supporting ground power.

"We need to espouse our views of airpower, to include capabilities to operate in the air, space and cyberspace domains, in this type of fight," General Peck said. "We've proven airpower can effectively support other agencies combating counterinsurgency, but can also operate in a supported component role. It doesn't always have to be about having lots of 'boots on the ground.' Airpower brings asymmetrical advantages to the fight that can be effectively leverage by joint force commanders in counterinsurgencies, support for insurgencies, and other forms of irregular warfare."

If you had any doubt about how the new doctrine will shake out, read this quote from an AFNEWS story. The key phrase is "operate in a supported component role." Air control anyone?

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Ask Tom what an EC-130 could have done to mitigate the genocide in Rwanda. The hate/kill message was propagated primarily from one radio station.

Lift is almost always the biggest shortfall when it comes to AF support for this ground pounder.

For COIN we have sufficient fire support, I would like to hear more ideas on non-lethal fire support that the AF could provide. We won't hear it from their generals, nor will see it on their budget proposals, unless they intend to put it there to get Congressional support, then shift it to bombers and fighters later.

To answer: tremendous effect. I spent hours on the phone in Goma--after the genocide was supposedly over (it was not in the French zone) and aside from beating the drum for water distrubution I raised the IO war repeatedly. And we never got it right--or better said we could never get across just how critical it was.

For me as a boots on the ground guy in Africa--it was airlift. And Special Ops airlift and collection assets were in second place. It was largely the same in the 1960s--although much was made of "COIN" ground attack aircraft (T-28s, T-6s, and A26s) in the Congo in 1964. Those were used as straight interdiction and limited CAS assets--there was no "COIN" as we know it in the Congo then. We--the US, Belgians, mercenaries, and the Congolese--beat the Simbas into submission or extinction. And a key tool was air support.

Even as recently as Somalia--airpower advocates get confused about what is COIN and what is straight interdiction and CAS. AC130s were most definitely needed in Mog; we were not doing "COIN". We were seeking to beat the warlords into submission and we went in like we were doing a simple support operation. TF Ranger was not winning hearts and minds. Even in the support operation we were not trying to win hearts and minds--we were trying to make sure the Somali warlords knew we would seriously hurt them if they tried to disrupt the feeding.

One of the key indicators that the French intent behind Op Turquoise in Rwanda was less "humanitarian" than advertised was their dispatch of Jaguar ground attack aircraft to the AO. How Jaguars were going to stop genocide remains unanswered.

Tom

[JAK]

Recent White Paper from HQ AFSOC:

http://smallwarsjournal.com/document...cept-may07.pdf


Cheers,
jak

[SWJED]

Air Force Doctrine for Irregular Warfare - The US Air Force recently (1 August) signed off on its latest doctrinal publication - AFDD 2-3 Irregular Warfare...