Iraqi Troops: The Thin Iraqi Line

[kaur]

http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies...RAND_CT277.pdf

[Michael Shannon]

I noticed both here in Iraq and Afghanistan several flaws in the creation of local forces. The first was the failure to build a local leaders cadre first. In both campaigns we'd have been better off creating junior officer training units with programs of instruction at least as long as the equivilant courses in the west (i.e. one year for an infantry platoon commander) than running 3-4 week basic training courses taught by foreigners through poorly skilled translators. These very short courses left the graduates under trained or even resentful of our efforts.

Secondly we under paid recruits resulting in too many village idiots joining the colours while the pick of the litter stayed at home guarding opium.
In Afghanistan we could have cornered the market on the best troops available if we had simply paid as little as $300 per month.

Lastly, there is a tendancy, not doubt because the trainers are usually infantrymen, to ignore logistics and communications at anything more than a rudimentary level. With hindsight the first unit formed in the Afghan National Army should have been the leadership battalion and the second a logistic battalion. The Iraqi Army like the ANA, has been formed of almost nothing but various types of infantry and couldn't support itself without MNFI backing. Under this condition how could the US ever leave? The IA will distintegrate as soon as the US departs.

[tequila]

Tony Cordesman's latest on Iraqi security forces: Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War.

[Jedburgh]

Originally Posted by kaur

Iraqi Security Forces: Defining Challenges and Assessing Progress

Olga Oliker is a RAND associate, but this isn't a RAND pub; it's a transcript of her testimony to the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on 28 Mar 07. Cordesman's report that Tequila linked to was also presented. Here's the other two:

Robert Perito, USIP: Reforming the Iraqi Interior Ministry, Police, and Facilities Protection Service

Frederick Kagan, AEI: Iraqi Security Forces: Status and Prospects

[Jedburgh]

Edit: Here's the latest (10 May 07) update to Cordesman's report:

The Critical Problems The US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Do the Job

Also, here are more House hearing transcripts; this time from the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Hearing on The Use of Contractors in Training, Equipping, and Sustaining the Iraqi Security Forces:

Anne W. Patterson, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

Bruce Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division

Joint testimony of Gary J. Motsek, Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support), and Colonel Anita M. Raines, Chief, Logistics Services Division, J4 Directorate, Joint Staff

Deborah Avant, Professor, Political Science and International Affairs Director, Institute for Global and International Studies, GWU

Doug Brooks, President, International Peace Operations Association

Gerald F. Burke, Major, MA State Police (Ret), Former Senior Advisor, Iraqi Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service

[slapout9]

Burke's report on the Police situation is absolutely outstanding!!

This is my friend Bubba and I have asked and asked and asked again for him to join the SWC but he is rather bitter about what he saw over there and the opportunities that were wasted. I can not speak for him, but what is in this report is almost a carbon copy of some of are conversations. This is a link to his resume and I think you will see he is pretty qualified.

http://www.mahaneylaw.com/page3.html

[tequila]

CNN report on Iraqi Army training.

...

This is Camp Besmaya, a training facility for Iraqi army volunteers outside of Baghdad. The bugle welcome is for the head of the Iraqi ground forces, Gen. Ali Ghiran-Majeed.

He and U.S. Brig. Gen. Dana Pittard, the commander of the Iraq Assistance Group, have come to watch final training exercises for 1,500 Iraqi soldiers, who within days will be deployed in Baghdad.

In teams of five, the Iraqis practice clearing houses of insurgents. They kick in doors and fan out through the rooms. Their eagerness fails to disguise a clumsy lack of practiced drilling.

Some of the men are gray-haired; some are overweight. But they do work together, a rare thing in a nation racked with murderous sectarian fault lines.

"It's definitely a motley crew," says U.S. Army Capt. Mark Tomola.

"I think these guys have more capabilities than we give them credit for sometimes," Tomola says. "At the same time, I'd say we need to make sure we aren't pulling out prematurely and leaving these guys without 'Big Brother' to back them up from time to time."

Trainer Jerry Massey, a 21-year U.S. Army veteran who now works as a civilian contractor, has a bleak view of the proficiency of his duties. To speed the soldiers into the field, they get less than half the time he thinks is ideal for his course. Still, it is better than nothing.

Iraq is on "the brink of anarchy," he says.

"If we leave, look at the guys who died here, who lost their limbs. What does it say about what they gave?" Massey says.

Some Iraqi troops don't get paid

There are about 330,000 trained Iraqi security forces, including 120,000 in the Iraqi army and 135,000 police force members, according to the U.S. Defense Department. But, according to a Defense Department report in March, "The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave and attrition."

At Camp Besmaya, Iraq's Ghiran-Majeed admits some of his soldiers don't even get paid.

The Iraqi army's administration has not kept up with its recruitment. Some units don't want to be deployed away from their home districts. On any day, one-quarter of the force is on vacation; soldiers get one week off in every four.

Also compared with a contracted, professional army, Iraqi soldiers are hired as if it's for any job, and they are free to leave whenever they wish. Many do, officials say.

In combat, without American forces present, the Iraqi soldiers have no medical evacuation capacity and no air support. They rely on the U.S.-led coalition for equipment, training and supplies.

...

In Sunni west Baghdad, Abdul Salaam criticizes a passing U.S. patrol, complaining the nearby patrol base has cut off electricity to his neighborhood.

"We have a lot of problems here," he says.

His neighbor complains that the additional U.S. troops in Baghdad mean he feels even more under occupation, but at the same time he reluctantly acknowledges his neighborhood feels more secure.

And as much as the majority of Iraqis say they loathe the American presence, they also fear its end.

Near a Sunni-Shia dividing line in northwest Baghdad, a U.S. patrol pays a visit to a small security hut at a power station. The guard, Jassim Mohammed, welcomes the Americans with glasses of sweet black tea.

He was once one of more than 40 guards at the site. Now all but two have fled and he and a comrade share rolling, six-hour shifts seven days a week. His protection is a battered AK-47 and a new blue British armored vest.

"If the Americans leave," he says, "it will be like this."

His hands make a gesture of powerful collision, the fingers interlocking.

...

Pittard is counted a rising star in the U.S. military, a thoughtful man devoid of swagger. His experience includes a year commanding troops in Diyala province, which has recently descended into bloody chaos.

He is frank in assessing the Iraqi military.

"The Iraqi Security Forces cannot take the fight to the enemy without our assistance at this point," he says.

He says an American withdrawal, like many in Washington are pushing for, "would cause a huge vacuum that the enemies of Iraq would take advantage of. We cannot leave Iraq in disarray."

"We came here in 2003. We cannot leave this nation as a failed state," he says.

A failed state is what almost everyone in Iraq predicts if the Americans go too early. It is one of the very few points of agreement here.

[roger29palms]

I've never been able to understand why what was once the 4th largest military in the world, as it was described before the Gulf War, cannot attract more recruits with prior experience. Especially since the employment situation is so dismal in Iraq.

[SWJED]

15 May NY Times - Iraqi Military Faces Hurdles in Its Quest to Take Charge by Alissa Rubin.

... General Pittard, who oversees training for the Iraqi Army, elite police and border guards, travels five days out of seven, tracking the progress of Iraqi forces as they prepare to eventually take charge of the country’s defense...

Of the Iraqi Army’s 10 divisions, eight are under Iraqi control. Only two, the Fifth Division in Diyala and the Seventh Division in western Iraq, are still under American control.

The Fifth Division is well equipped now and almost at full strength, but it has had a tough fight...

[SWJED]

9 June National Journal - The Thin Iraqi Line by James Kitfield.

Even to the trained eye, Iraq is a land of deep shadow and blinding light. And shades of moral ambiguity are as infinite as the ever-changing russet tones of the desert. Look closely past the bright smiles and pleasantries of some Iraqis in uniform and you will find dark deeds and blood-soaked hands, just as many a stern visage hides acts of courage and selfless patriotism. Each day, U.S. commanders in Iraq try to decide where between those extremes lies the true face of the Iraqi forces they are constantly training...

[davidbfpo]

Excellent description of the Iraqi 'thin line' and particularly the police. One sad part about two American advisers falling victim to an IED at a deserted Irqai Army checkpoint. Note, no recommendations or solutions made.

davidbfpo

[SWJED]

13 June Washington Post - Big Boost In Iraqi Forces Is Urged by Walter Pincus and Ann Scott Tyson.

A senior U.S. military commander said yesterday that Iraq's army must expand its rolls by at least 20,000 more soldiers than Washington had anticipated, to help free U.S. troops from conducting daily patrols, checkpoints and other critical yet dangerous missions.

Even then, Iraq will remain incapable of taking full responsibility for its security for many years -- five years in the case of protecting its airspace -- and will require a long-term military relationship with the United States, said Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, who until recently led the U.S. military's training effort in Iraq...

[Jedburgh]

The House Armed Services Committee's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee received testimony on the development of the Iraqi Security Forces on 12 Jun 07:

LTG Martin Dempsey, MNSTC-I

Mark Kimmitt, the Dpty Asst SecDef for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs also testified. However, the transcript of his testimony doesn't appear to be available.

[Ski]

One of the dichotomies I've noticed with both Iraq and Afghanistan is the call for bigger armies, police forces, security forces, etc...

It would be interesting to see the desertion rates from the beginning of the Afghan National Army and the Iraq Army by year to date, and then extrapolate the size of these two forces would be without any desertion or miniscule desertion rates, like 5%. I'm sure it's all classified...

But both armies would probably be quite large without the desertions. So calling for larger forces is somewhat of an exercise similar to pissing in the wind...

[Tacitus]

Gentlemen,
Is the problem really training at all? Is it not that there is no loyalty to a central government above their clan, tribe, or sect? It just feels like nobody really wants to fight for the Iraqi government.

Sort of like the Weimar Republic, the people who are really willing to fight--Freikorps or Spartacist League--they've got something else in mind if they are going to risk their necks.

I have zero ideas on how to build Iraq allegiance to the Maliki government. If you do, there is a job waiting for you in the White House.

[Granite_State]

Originally Posted by Tacitus

Gentlemen,
Is the problem really training at all? Is it not that there is no loyalty to a central government above their clan, tribe, or sect? It just feels like nobody really wants to fight for the Iraqi government.

Sort of like the Weimar Republic, the people who are really willing to fight--Freikorps or Spartacist League--they've got something else in mind if they are going to risk their necks.

I have zero ideas on how to build Iraq allegiance to the Maliki government. If you do, there is a job waiting for you in the White House.

Here's my question: is this true? Virtually everything I've read leads me to believe it is, the words of two friends who have served there (one USMC, one PMC) seemed kind of ambivalent. Would love to hear from guys who are or have been over there recently on this, it's probably the central question of the whole war.

[SWJED]

25 June NY Times - U.S. Generals Doubt Ability of Iraqi Army to Hold Gains by Alissa Rubin.

Iraq faced more troubles on the military and political fronts on Sunday: some American commanders expressed doubts about the ability of Iraqi troops to hold the gains made in areas north of the capital last week, and two Sunni Arab blocs boycotted a Parliament session, demanding the reinstatement of the speaker...

The American commander in Baquba, Brig. Gen. Mick Bednarek, and his counterpart south of Baghdad, Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, pointed to a variety of problems with the Iraqi forces, including a shortage of trained troops and a lack of basic supplies like ammunition, radios and trucks.

“They’re not quite up to the job yet,” General Bednarek said in an interview with The Associated Press in Baquba.

American troops are at the forefront of the offensive in Diyala Province, north of Baghdad, which has become a haven for Al Qaeda. Baquba is the provincial capital. But the understanding has always been that Iraqi troops would hold the ground as the Americans leave.

Commanders have repeatedly voiced concerns that there are insufficient well-trained Iraqi troops and say that many units remain undersupplied...

[SteveMetz]

Apologies if this has already been linked, but here is the HASC report on building Iraqi security forces. I just killed half a forest printing it.

[Jedburgh]

GAO, 31 Jul 07: DOD Cannot Ensure That U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces

As of July 2007, DOD and MNF-I had not specified which DOD accountability procedures, if any, apply to the train-and-equip program for Iraq. Congress funded the train-and-equip program for Iraq outside traditional security assistance programs, providing DOD a large degree of flexibility in managing the program, according to DOD officials. These officials stated that since the funding did not go through traditional security assistance programs, the DOD accountability requirements normally applicable to these programs did not apply. Further, MNF-I does not currently have orders that comprehensively specify accountability procedures for equipment distributed to the Iraqi forces.

DOD and MNF-I cannot fully account for Iraqi forces’ receipt of U.S.-funded equipment. Two factors led to this lapse in accountability. First, MNSTC-I did not maintain a centralized record of all equipment distributed to Iraqi forces before December 2005. At that time, MNSTC-I established a property book system to track issuance of equipment to the Iraqi forces and attempted to recover past records. GAO found a discrepancy of at least 190,000 weapons between data reported by the former MNSTC-I commander and the property books.....

[tequila]

Lack of equipment hampers Iraqi Army - LATIMES, 28 Aug.

Although Washington has made the readiness of Iraqi forces a key benchmark of progress, the Baghdad government is still failing to supply Iraqi commanders in this northern city with adequate equipment to go it alone, U.S. commanders say.

Equipment shortages are a major concern in Mosul and other areas as U.S. offensives in Anbar province in the west and belts of cities surrounding Baghdad drive Al Qaeda in Iraq fighters and other militants north.

"Bottom line, things are just not getting here," said Lt. Col. Stephen Twitty, commander of the 4th Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division ...