Engaging the Mosque

[goesh]

Kehenry1 in his introduction of himself as a new member set forth some challenges that are worthy of more discussion outside the parameters of the "Tell us About You" thread. He states:

"I think the answer to that, for instance, if the mosque is the power, is to identify its role in the power structure and its needs outside of ideological differences. One thing we should have learned is the role of the mosque in a community. It acts as an arbitrator, a job finder, a social networking system and general welfare system. It is one of the first things that the ideologists focus on in a community. It has resources and automatically confers legitimacy on those it supports. Ideologists tend to subvert these resources.

This fact we should be keeping in mind if we do need to engage the mosque (a big "woops" I think when the insurgency began; we kept trying to separate mosque from state and never got around to the "mosque and the citizen".

While I don't think we should engage in ideological discussions, I believe that we should have an effective strategy to engage the mosque if it is the de facto or primary power structure in the community. Assist it with its welfare programs, use it as a conduit, everything the ideologists does, doing it first while simultaneously avoiding ideologies (except maybe a little reminder about who is going to provide freedom of religion)."


Well said, timely and of critical importance, but allow me to start by asserting that the mosque cannot be readily engaged, literally and figuratively, from the outside. In areas where the mosque is used extensively as a social/economic resource, I think we have to involve ourselves, physically, on the inside of the structure. Simplicity can be painful for a complex, technically orientated culture. Men well conditioned to bearing arms and in a hostile environment become vulnerable entering the unknown without their boots on and carrying at least a sidearm. To go in to conduct business and schmooze, the boots must be removed, ablution performed and weapons left outside. That's not as easy to do as it sounds and on top of it, we come from a culture that maintains stringent borders between State and Religion and one's religious beliefs are often very private and not readily shared. We don't bring God to the fight and to the negotiation table and we can't send in the Chaplains. It remains an immense challenge not only in Iraq but all over the planet and as kehenry1 so aptly pointed out, "we kept trying to separate mosque from state".

Personally, I don't think ideologists subvert the resources and assets of the mosque, rather their force of interpretation rules out because Islam allows them their interpretation, destructive as it may be. In some places, the mosque provides these ideologists a ready made platform of operation from the get-go.

[Danny]

This could become a very interesting and fruitful discussion thread if respondents can think outside the box as it were. I would like to modify what goesh said by saying that we do not come from a society that separates religion and state so much as church and state. It is the mistake of many to see the church or mosque (and what is done in worship) as one and the same with "religion." It is not, and never has been. It is merely a very small part.

Religion is what is believed and practiced during the week away from worship, and it affects everything from how we vote to how we raise our children to what we value. It affects people in Iraq just like it affects Americans (perhaps Australia is secular enough that the affect is minimal, although one might call this secularism, just another religion). But the point is that we can and should engage the "Mosque" without ever entering the Mosque. There isn't any reason we cannot appeal to aspects of their world view in our counterinsurgency, have our Chaplains meet with their Imams (it has happened before), and in general understand these aspects of the population.

There is also a darker side. In my disputes with Kilcullen over religion and insurgency, I have always tried to appeal to moderation: "some" people fight with religious motivation, and "some" people probably oppose those fighters with force also because of religious motivation. Religion plays as much a part of forming their world view in Iraq as anywhere else in the world. It pays for us to understand the religion and culture enough to be able to identify players early on and align ourselves with those who would build the state and carefully watch those who would not. This approach might have saved us from letting the horrible Moqtada al Sadr go in 2004. Sadr might be the downfall of the COIN campaign in Iraq. Chalk that one up to Paul Bremer, who clearly didn't understand the culture.

This isn't holy war. This is just plain ole' common sense -- that frankly, isn't so common sometimes. Any country boy out hunting knows that you must know your terrain, and in counterinsurgency sometimes that terrain is made up of people.

[skiguy]

As far as engaging Mosques, why should Soldiers do it? Wouldn't it be better (less threatening) if civilians engaged? IMO, the only time Soldiers (except Chaplains) should engage is when they are invited or when fighters inside the Mosque are violating Geneva and Hague rules.
Respect for churches and others' religion in this country is waning. Let's not bring this attitude to countries who show more respect for their religion and places of worship.

[kehenry1]

First, let me clarify that I am a "she". Not bothered by the male reference, but wanted to maintain that "truth in advertisement" thing.

Second, I believe that I am not talking about religious discussions, just recognizing the potential in certain communities that the mosque can take the place of other recognized secular power structures in a community.

As I once posited to an acquaintance, if tomorrow something catastrophic occurred, regular services desisted and the government was either non-existent, unable or unwilling to provide food, health, education and security, leaving your community isolated, what people or organizations would you look to or organize around in order to provide the same for your community?

My theory is that people will naturally gravitate towards existing organizational or power structures for guidance. In our community, we are outside of the "incorporated" city limits so our only "security" is the county sheriffs department. Our mayor is technically downtown, over 40 minutes away. In a catastrophe that limited or eliminated contact, he would be fairly unhelpful. We have a few people in community watch. We have a few people who are recognized in the community.

Organizations in our community that might be helpful are the five churches, the VFW, American Legion and a few other groups. That doesn't mean that all citizens in the community would gravitate towards these and there may be some overlap, but there are certainly groups that perform some organization within the community.

Recognizing that, in a small community there are formal and informal power structures. A Mosque might be one of these formal organizing structures.

What we have to determine is how much power or organizing force does the mosque exert in the community? Is there another formal or informal power structure within the community? Can we work with the mosque if it is the only formal power structure without engaging directly in ideological discussions? While we build secular power structures?

And, in terms of ideology, without directly engaging it, aren't we, by working with them and insuring their continuity, showing that we are the ones that will allow them to practice their religion (ie, freedom of religion in a democracy) as opposed to the extremists that will force their views on them? What better way to convey that than to insure it?

I would say that we should be careful in not propping up the mosque as a power structure if it is not and to not enforce it too much against our ability to set up a secular power structure.

I'm just saying, I don't think we should abandon it because it is too prickly.

[Tom OC]

It's my understanding that, historically, the role of the mosque is to be a place of learning and financial assistance. Madrassas have since come along for the former, and associations now prevent Muslims from begging in the streets. Looking at them as part of community power structure is interesting. For comparative purposes, I suppose that Christian churches support education and financial stability too.

[kehenry1]

yes, that is exactly what occurs. Mosques act as an official organizing structure. It isn't even necessarily the Imam that is the power or most noted leader at the mosque. As in Christian churches, there are always "members" who have the "voice of authority" or who are considered leaders.

Also, in a catastrophic situation in a small community, there may be no municipal buildings. People might naturally gravitate towards a church or mosque as a "meeting place". Historically, in the US, churches did serve as both a religious establishment and as a meeting place for local government functions.

In a similar situation in COIN, it would not be inappropriate to include the imam or any "elders" in a local meeting. The Imam probably knows a lot about the community. Who are the leaders? who operates local businesses? Who needs immediate medical or financial assistance?

Is there anything that the Mosque needs?

these are not ideological discussions. We listen and act appropriately in our function as outsiders and secular governing force without interfering in their activities. This, by the way, does not mean that we have to intrude on the mosque with "soldiers carrying guns, wearing their muddy boots". We invite to an outside meeting with appropriate respect (even if you suspect he's harboring miscreants).

Of course, the Imam may want to maintain the independence of the mosque and may not accept any outside assistance. That should not be looked upon as a negative. But, we should also be aware that, in doing somethings outside of the mosque, such as financial assistance and education, or even recognizing its role in judicial matters, etc, we may be causing friction with the organization by interfering with their traditional role.

[Tom Odom]

Just a brief note of clarification folks

First of all, mosques like churches, synagogues, and temples are not all the same. Cookie cutters don't work. A village mosque is but a room with a tower most likely. The Ummayyid Mosque is huge and like a Roman Catholic Church is rich.

Second the religion using those mosques are not out of a cookie cutter, either. A Shia mosque will have more interaction and greater tendancy to be what we would call "activist". A Sunni mosque is less so but that is not absolute.

Third the role of the religious leaders in that mosque has many variables tied to points one and two as well as tribal, national, and linguistics. A mosque in a non-Arab country (meaning non-Arabic speaking country) generally does not import a large contigent to run it; again that can vary,

If that sounds simplistic, it is usually quite simple to point out complexity. I have not seen anything that proscribes interaction with local religious leaders regardless of sect or status. What I have seen are cautions in doing so and rightly so. Committing a faux pas with a tribal leader is not a good thing; doing so and depending on the degree of the error, it can be devestating to local relations. My guidance to anyone is if you must do so, do so gently and carefully. If not, go even more slowly and do your homework ==and I mean specifically on the mosque and community as well as general studies.

Best

Tom

[kehenry1]

If not, go even more slowly and do your homework ==and I mean specifically on the mosque and community as well as general studies.

I think this is why I posed it as a "power structure" or "organization" of the community issue. Noting consistently, that we should identify its role in the community to determine what exactly we should do to engage.

One point I made on the blog post on the subject and will now make here:

Whatever its role in the community, by not engaging the mosque, even if it is not "activist" like a Shia controlled mosque or religious leaders, we are leaving space in the "human terrain" of the community for the enemy to exploit.

Regardless of whether it is "activist" or not, the church/mosque/temple etc has a voice of authority in communities among a large portion of it.

I am reminded of a few situations:

Hanifa Mosque in Baghdad that routinely broadcast Anti-American messages from the loudspeakers, housed insurgents and cached weapons. We were so fearful of engaging there that we let that go for several years before they finally arrested the Imam (I believe that is what happened, though he was eventually let go).

Secondly, Ramadi and Fallujah both report that the enemy either coerced or convinced the mosques there to do the same.

did we leave exploitable human terrain because of that fear? and, how many of our men and women paid the price for that? (Not to be confrontational, but you see where I am coming from; this isn't all academic, philosophical sociology here; it has a direct impact).

Caution, yes. Dread, no.

[SWJED]

Small Wars, No Small Debate via SWJ Blog.

[Tom Odom]

Caution, yes. Dread, no.

The issue of exploiting, approaching, interacting with, and understanding how the particular mosque in the particular city, and inside the particular sect of Islam is complex. I would use the word enlightened with intensive study.

Regardless of whether it is "activist" or not, the church/mosque/temple etc has a voice of authority in communities among a large portion of it.

No it does not. That is a cookie cutter. Even taking Islam alone, mosques in one country playa different role than they do in another. Although there is change underway in Turkey, authority as I believe you are using the word does not apply. In Egypt it is more complex and depends on the mosque itself and the neighborhood, village, or region.

did we leave exploitable human terrain because of that fear? and, how many of our men and women paid the price for that? (Not to be confrontational, but you see where I am coming from; this isn't all academic, philosophical sociology here; it has a direct impact).

Not to be confrontational, as a FAO with a good bit of on the ground experience in Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Sudan I don't believe that I am speaking with a purely academic background although I have a Masters in Mid East Area Studies. I am speaking from much practical experience as an operator and as an operator who has translated what "exploitable human terrain" means in terms doable.

Best

Tom

[Chiropetra]

I believe it is important to keep the various roles of the mosque separate, in part because there are some roles, such as the purely religious, where we don't really want to engage and there are others, such the social and economic where it's important in COIN to engage them.

As Tom pointed out there is no such thing as a cookie cutter mosque. However you can say broadly that every mosque has a social and economic component -- with the amount of influence in the community varying widely.

We need to understand what we are engaging, but we need to engage with most mosques in COIN areas.

A lot of COIN operations go against a warfighter's grain. But that doesn't make them any less important.

[Tom OC]

One would think that a mosque, just like any organization, would have rules and regulations that constrain or control ideological behavior. It seems encouraging self-control is our best bet, or perhaps there is some kind of mosque council or association which "accredits" individual mosques. One of the things that always bothered me was the looseness by which practically anybody could step up and become a "worship leader." A shame that so much relies on small group peer pressure.

[Tom OC]

OK, a naive comment on my last post. I have zero experience in engaging a mosque. There probably is no accreditation authority, but maybe there's some way to put pressure on them from above. I dunno. However, I do find the cultural sensitivity issue interesting, or perhaps the "taboos in the mosque" issue fascinating. In hopes of redeeming myself, let me quote Shusta et. al. (2005). Multicultural Law Enforcement, 3e. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall -- p. 232 "Officer safety, of course, comes before consideration of differences."

[SWJED]

Originally Posted by Tom OC

OK, a naive comment on my last post. I have zero experience in engaging a mosque. There probably is no accreditation authority, but maybe there's some way to put pressure on them from above. I dunno. However, I do find the cultural sensitivity issue interesting, or perhaps the "taboos in the mosque" issue fascinating. In hopes of redeeming myself, let me quote Shusta et. al. (2005). Multicultural Law Enforcement, 3e. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall -- p. 232 "Officer safety, of course, comes before consideration of differences."

I guess many of us are naive about this issue - hopefully a discussion here will, at the very least, turn on some lightbulbs in our brain-housing-groups...

[skiguy]

Originally Posted by Chiropetra

I believe it is important to keep the various roles of the mosque separate, in part because there are some roles, such as the purely religious, where we don't really want to engage

Why not? You can't nor would you want to change the way they worship God, but it would be a good idea to understand their religion and what they believe. Not everyone is interested in religion, so not everyone should be involved. Religion is just one of the many aspects of COIN, maybe just a small part or perhaps it's a big part that's being ignored too much - I haven't figured that out yet...experience needed. But, IMO, engaging in more inter-faith dialogue is a good idea.

[Tom Odom]

I guess many of us are naive about this issue - hopefully a discussion here will, at the very least, turn on some lightbulbs in our brain-housing-groups...

In this matter I strongly recommend that best approaches are through host nation government, local, and military figures rather than direct, regardless of relative depth in Islam and local culture. I would also say that this is not something that we turn to the Chaplains--who do great work regardless of faith--as they will be judged by their uniforms and their faiths. Indeed this is a subject of great debate within Chaplain circles as a possible conflict with their mission of religious support. The last thing I would ever recommend to a commander is to send military envoys/patrols into the mosques as an entree for engagement. I have been in mosques in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Turkey. All were famous and the mosques were used to seeing non-Muslim visitors. We were, however, always escorted.

Back to the indirect approach, the best way if you seek to engage the mosque leaders is to draw them into discussions outside the mosques and again that means with local contacts, tribal, government, security, etc.

Best

Tom

[skiguy]

There are several reasons for religion’s ability to shape
the battlefield:
• Religion answers the big questions in life, death and
war. It is germane to all conflict.
• Religion adds a higher intensity, severity, brutality and
lethality to conflict than do other factors.
• Religion offers a stronger identity to participants in
conflicts than other forms of identity, such as nationality,
ethnicity, politics or language.
• Religion can motivate the masses quickly and cheaply,
and it often remains outside the view of nation-state
security forces.
• Religion offers an ideology — or a platform for a political
ideology — that resonates stronger than other forms
of propaganda.
• Religious leaders are often the last leaders left when
states fail, and they offer a voice to the disempowered
or oppressed.
• Religious leaders are often the first to seek peace and
reconciliation after conflict.
• Religious factors are fundamental to conflict resolution
and conflict management.
• Religious nongovernmental organizations supply a major
portion of support to humanitarian efforts in military
missions.1
Given the nature of SOF missions, understanding religious
factors is critical to predicting the human response
to ARSOF operations. One definition of religion is “the
human response to the perceived sacred.” As a human
response, it can be negative or positive. Understanding
the positive and negative aspects is critical to explaining
the human response. Trying to win the hearts and
minds of local populations without understanding their
souls deprives our efforts of one of the greatest avenues
of approach. Combatting religious insurgents without
understanding religious factors limits ARSOF’s abilities.
While we are not engaged in a religious war, we must
understand religious factors if we are to gain a clear view
of the battlefield.

http://www.usafa.edu/isme/ISME07/Bedsole07.pdf

[VirgilAlbert]

This could become a very interesting and fruitful discussion thread....

[Bob's World]

Religious leadership is fundamental to the governance of the populaces of the middle east, and also to the interpretation of events and information in general. To ignore or avoid these men is clearly not the way to go.

We are hamstrung by both our current interpretation of what "Separation of Church and State" has come to mean in our own Constitution; as well as by the spin that our own ideologues have placed on the current conflicts in the Middle East as being caused by "Extremist Muslim Ideology."

Once you can separate the causes of insurgency (poor governance) from the tools of insurgency (ideology, leadership, external powers conducting unconventional warfare, networked operations, etc) you can begin to effect solutions tailored to the proper problems.

Instead of working to keep religion out of the changes of governance that the U.S. has enabled in Iraq and Afghanistan most recently, but throughout the Middle East over the past 65 years; we might want to consider a different interpretation:

For example, so long as Jerusalem, or at least the holy core of Jerusalem, belongs to any one state, it will remain a justification for conflict. Would a Vatican City model be appropriate to help reduce this tension? A council led by three equal governors representing Muslim, Christian and Jewish faiths, and secured by a neutral force?

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has little hope of ever evolving its own horribly flawed system of governace that is giving rise to so much of the violence, both in the region and directed at the U.S., so long as they are also burdened with being the keepers of Islams holiest sites? A Muslim city-state encompassing Mecca and Medina led by equal Shia and Sunni leadership would, I believe, open a floodgate of Muslim governmental reformation.

We fear substantive change so much, or at least change that we know we cannot control, that we end up inserting ourselves in questionable ways to either stem or cause change that we believe we can control. Control comes with some nasty burdens and secondary effects. My vote is for a complete reassessment of policy and approach to the region, with the going in position being to simply attempt to create conditions to enable and stabilize the changes that the local populaces want. Ultimately this will happen anyway, I just prefer to do it on terms of our choosing, as opposed to those forced upon us.

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

For example, so long as Jerusalem, or at least the holy core of Jerusalem, belongs to any one state, it will remain a justification for conflict. Would a Vatican City model be appropriate to help reduce this tension? A council led by three equal governors representing Muslim, Christian and Jewish faiths, and secured by a neutral force?

This was not only envisaged in the original 1947 UN partition plan (under which Jerusalem would become a corpus separatum under international control), but was also discussed with regard to the Jerusalem holy places (although not the broader city) in final status negotiations in 2000-01 and 2007-08. My own personal favourite was the serious proposal to declare the Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount under the sovereignty of God, with a "caretaker" international committee to administer it in his/her absence. Clever politics, that.

Originally Posted by Bob's World

Similarly, Saudi Arabia has little hope of ever evolving its own horribly flawed system of governace that is giving rise to so much of the violence, both in the region and directed at the U.S., so long as they are also burdened with being the keepers of Islams holiest sites? A Muslim city-state encompassing Mecca and Medina led by equal Shia and Sunni leadership would, I believe, open a floodgate of Muslim governmental reformation.

The Saudis certainly don't see the holy cities as a "burden," and would regard any effort to end their control as a fundamental, and indeed near-existential, security threat. I'm also not clear on how this would promote reform in Saudi Arabia (I can actually see it strengthening Wahhabi Salafism within the kingdom), or the broader Muslim world. It is hard to imagine Sunnis as a whole agreeing to any Shi'ite role in administering the cities—its rather like proposing that the Vatican share St. Peter's with the Mormons.

On the challenges of multi-religious administration of a holy site, it is both informative and amusing to look at the problems associated in the sharing of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Church of the Nativity between Christian denominations. Squabbles at the former regularly involve the Muslim caretakers or Israeli police being called out to separate battling monks, while disputes at the latter helped spark the Crimean War.