Anthropologists and a True Culture War

[SWJED]

A True Culture War – Richard Shweder, 27 October New York Times Op-Ed.

Is the Pentagon truly going to deploy an army of cultural relativists to Muslim nations in an effort to make the world a safer place?

A few weeks ago this newspaper reported on an experimental Pentagon “human terrain” program to embed anthropologists in combat units in Iraq and Afghanistan. It featured two military anthropologists: Tracy (last name withheld), a cultural translator viewed by American paratroopers as “a crucial new weapon” in counterinsurgency; and Montgomery McFate, who has taken her Yale doctorate into active duty in a media blitz to convince skeptical colleagues that the occupying forces should know more about the local cultural scene.

How have members of the anthropological profession reacted to the Pentagon’s new inclusion agenda? A group calling itself the Network of Concerned Anthropologists has called for a boycott and asked faculty members and students around the country to pledge not to contribute to counterinsurgency efforts. Their logic is clear: America is engaged in a brutal war of occupation; if you don’t support the mission then you shouldn’t support the troops. Understandably these concerned scholars don’t want to make it easier for the American military to conquer or pacify people who once trusted anthropologists. Nevertheless, I believe the pledge campaign is a way of shooting oneself in the foot...

[Gian P Gentile]

Anthropologists should not fool themselves. These Human Terrain Teams whether they want to acknowledge it or not, in a generalized and subtle way, do at some point contribute to the collective knowledge of a commander which allows him to target and kill the enemy in wars like Iraq.

I commanded an Armored Reconnaissance Squadron in West Baghdad in 2006. Although I did not have one of these HTTs assigned to me (and I certainly would have liked to) I did have a Civil Affairs Team that was led by a major who in his civilian life was an investment banker in New York City and had been in the area I operated for about 6 months prior. He knew the area well and understood the people and the culture in it; just like a HTT adviser would. I often used his knowledge to help me sort through who was the enemy and who was not and from that understanding that he contributed to I was able to target and sometimes kill the enemy. So to anthropologists like Ms McFate should stop sugarcoating what these teams do and end up being a part of; to deny this fact is to deny the reality of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

I am in favor of this program of HTTs and see great utility in it for combat commanders. I understand the debate too between these field anthropologists who are part of the HTTs and academia as this oped point outs. I think academia is wrong to chastise these people for being a part of the HTTs. But I also think that these anthropologists who make up the HTTs should call a spade a spade and accept the reality of the effects that these HTTs produce.

[tequila]

Agree 100% with LTCOL Gentile. If anthropologists weren't helping commanders figure out who to detain/kill, they wouldn't really be all that much use.

The alternative that anthropologists in opposition should understand is that that American troops without local knowledge will possibly detain/kill many who don't deserve it.

[John T. Fishel]

The article is interesting for several reasons. First, it represents a mainstream anthropologist who is takig a reasonable approach to the role of his discipline in war, unlike the hysteria that is often revealed in Savage Minds. (We've seen much of that debate in this forum with our own MarcT taking a leading role "on the side of the angels." ) Second, while I didn't hear McFate's interview on the Rehm show, she has called a "spade a spade" in print and makes no apology for her role (nor did the author of the op ed suggest she did). And, third, most immportantly, the anthoroplogists (some) are at last really debating their roles as citizens and giving some thought to it rather than simply spewing anti-military, government, capitalist cliches. We will all be better off for this because, Lord knows, we really do need the skills they bring to the fight, as LTC Gentile points out. Fortunately, not all anthropologists ever fell into the ideological trap. I remember teaching in the Army FAO Course in 1985 and 86 (Yes, Virginia, there once was a 6 month Army FAO course and 18/48 was a common specialty combination.) where one of my colleagues was an academic anthropologist (we were all hired from civilian academic institutions under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act).

[Beelzebubalicious]

I don't think LTCOL Gentile was writing that Anthropologists directly help commanders figure out who to kill/detain. He did use a personal example that involved a CA Major, which was probably misleading in that there's a world of difference between a civilian anthropologists and a Major in the US Army with at least 6 months in Iraq under his belt.

I think it's misleading to talk about the mission of the HTT in this way. There's no way a civilian anthropologist is going to be able to advise a Commander about who to kill or not to kill, even if they were willing to, which is another far stretch.

To say that an Anthropologist could contribute to a Commander's knowledge of the local culture/populace and that Commander could use that knowledge to better target the enemy, that's certainly plausible. If the Anthropologist is trying to understand the relative level of poverty (see Marcus Griffin's recent blog entry) so that the Army can better target and support the most vulnerable segments of the population, what happens, if he/she happens to see something suspicious in the course of his research? He would be obliged to report it, I imagine. And what if that piece of information leads to the successful targeting and killing of an insurgent?

[J Wolfsberger]

I think it's a mistake to focus on "kill/detain." The HTTs do lot of good just making troops aware that it's a bad idea to have male soldiers searching the women's quarters.

If "hearts and minds" is more than just a buzz phrase (and I think it is), then it has to be about obtaining active civilian commitment to the Iraqi government. That won't come about until we understand the Iraqi culture(s) and reflect that understanding across the board in our speech and behavior. That understanding won't happen without the support of the anthropologists.

[goesh]

- it boils down to the mindset that refuses to believe the Military is interested in peace and stability, that willfully chooses to see military personnel as knuckle dragging sociopaths, despite the abundance of evidence in total contradiction to such ignorant beliefs coming from such educated people....blah, blah, blah

[marct]

Hi Folks,

Originally Posted by Beelzebubalicious

I think it's misleading to talk about the mission of the HTT in this way. There's no way a civilian anthropologist is going to be able to advise a Commander about who to kill or not to kill, even if they were willing to, which is another far stretch.

Definitely a stretch. Right now, it is pretty much unthinkable by, I would guess, most Anthropologists.

Originally Posted by Beelzebubalicious

To say that an Anthropologist could contribute to a Commander's knowledge of the local culture/populace and that Commander could use that knowledge to better target the enemy, that's certainly plausible. If the Anthropologist is trying to understand the relative level of poverty (see Marcus Griffin's recent blog entry) so that the Army can better target and support the most vulnerable segments of the population, what happens, if he/she happens to see something suspicious in the course of his research? He would be obliged to report it, I imagine. And what if that piece of information leads to the successful targeting and killing of an insurgent?

That is a really nasty question. At the moment, at least to my understanding of it, Anthropologists have a "partial shield" on reporting "suspicions". It's closer to the clergy model than, say, that of a social worker. In most cases, we go out of our way to try and make sure that we don't see anything "suspicious" to avoid the legal problems.

In the case of the HTTs, the observations will have an effect that will, IMO, inevitably lead to deaths. The moral crux, at least at the operational level, is on whether these will be a reduced number of deaths from the number that would have taken place without the HTT. Note that this is totally different from a refusal to work for the HTTs because of the strategic moral crux, i.e. whether or not the war in Iraq is a "just war".

Originally Posted by J Wolfsberger

If "hearts and minds" is more than just a buzz phrase (and I think it is), then it has to be about obtaining active civilian commitment to the Iraqi government. That won't come about until we understand the Iraqi culture(s) and reflect that understanding across the board in our speech and behavior. That understanding won't happen without the support of the anthropologists.

Personally, I think there is an inherent problem with the Hearts and Minds approach as it is currently used - it isn't about "obtaining active civilian commitment to the Iraqi government" at the operational level, it is about obtaining allies and supporters for the US troops currently in Iraq. The problem stems from the observation that the Iraqi government is not able to exercise sovereignty within their own borders even to the point of excluding private companies from operating there. I doubt if this was thought out fully, but who are the Iraqis going to see as the benefactor: the Iraq government or the US? As a hint, look at how the Anbar sheiks referred to the US....

Originally Posted by goesh

- it boils down to the mindset that refuses to believe the Military is interested in peace and stability, that willfully chooses to see military personnel as knuckle dragging sociopaths, despite the abundance of evidence in total contradiction to such ignorant beliefs coming from such educated people....blah, blah, blah

Sure some of it does - no question. Some of it, however, also comes down to looking at the strategic problems and thinking "why don't we get asked to try and solve some of them"? Look, Goesh, I support the HTTs even though I have some serious reservations about them (mainly the part in the original plan to turn over the databases to the host nations). I think they can make a major difference in how both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts play out. At the same time, I am really bothered about how the politicians are muddling around in areas they really know nothing about be that local cultures or military matters.

Marc

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by marct

Hi Folks,
. . .

... At the same time, I am really bothered about how the politicians are muddling around in areas they really know nothing about be that local cultures or military matters.
Marc

another nation???

[marct]

half a dozen of the other, Ken .

And lest you think I wasn't including Canadian politicians...

[Ken White]

great indicator of why World Government should be diligently avoided. At least a large number of gaggles of politicians will do less damage than one big gaggle...

[marct]

Originally Posted by Ken White

At least a large number of gaggles of politicians will do less damage than one big gaggle...

Oh, I don't know... If they were all in the same place at the same time, there are some great possibilities .

[Norfolk]

Originally Posted by Ken White

great indicator of why World Government should be diligently avoided. At least a large number of gaggles of politicians will do less damage than one big gaggle...

Ken, I believe that you and marc are describing Distributed Operations, using politicans instead of infantry. I'm certain the enemy in the GWOT would just tremble at the sight of such a mighty show of force and demonstration of resolve...

I find myself rather disinclined towards the HTT concept. While I am not entirely averse to a small research presence in-theatre, I'm not certain that HTT's would result in benefits that would outweigh the risks of putting anthropologists and other researchers in situations where the natives, so to speak, might get a little restless. And even if the HTT's had military escorts, even some of the time, this might just aggravate certain sensibilities, on both sides.

Officers should develop a practical grasp of local life, culture, and conditions; that many may not, never mind the Other Ranks, is a problem that can only be addressed at home, in the education system, which seems to serve admirably to atrophy and close the minds of the young. If anything, I would recommend that a few of the better minds on the HTT's tour around Military Units providing a little practical guidance on ethnography to the officers and men. It's not much, but maybe a little more useful and a little safer, than going out to survey a society still at war.

And a good time was had by all! Well, most.

[John T. Fishel]

Personally, I have no problem with HTTs, anthropologists and other social scientists at the operational level so long as their efforts are focused on trying to reduce casualties among the innocent. (Boy what an oversimplification but you get my drift.) On the strategic level, each individual must decide whether he sees the war as just or not - if, not then resign or don't join up. (I realize that a soldier is somewhat more limited regarding thos kinds of choices but not completely.)

In the 80s, I ran into a card carrying anthropologist who was a CIA employee working psychological ops for El Salvador. He was the author of the anti-landmine theme that was expressed in the most effective propaganda poster I ever saw - a beautiful little girl dressed in a white formal dress on crutches because her lower leg had been blown off by a mine. The caption read, "And her human rights?" ("Y sus derechos humanos?") He was certainly on the side of the angels, in my book and his postercontributed indirectly to the success of the anti-landmine treaty - an unintended consequence, perhaps.

[marct]

Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

Personally, I have no problem with HTTs, anthropologists and other social scientists at the operational level so long as their efforts are focused on trying to reduce casualties among the innocent. (Boy what an oversimplification but you get my drift.) On the strategic level, each individual must decide whether he sees the war as just or not - if, not then resign or don't join up. (I realize that a soldier is somewhat more limited regarding thos kinds of choices but not completely.)

Yeah, I do get your drift. And, on the whole, I agree with the way you have framed it. I have some, hmmm, tactical/operational level problems with the original HTT proposal - it was those databases with real names that got to me). I have no problems with them trying to reduce casualties by identifying specific "at risk" groups in terms of poverty, demographics, etc. I would also have no problem going armed if I was over there . Then again, unlike a lot of my confreres, I actually do know how to shoot and use a blade.

In addition to the strategic level moral decision, I think there is also a pragmatic moral crux. In the case of the Iraq war, I, personally, believe it to be an unjust war. At the same time, there are many things happening in the world that I believe to be unjust, and that doesn't stop me from playing Don Quixote to them . We don't live in a perfect world, and that means that we have to clean up the excrement politicians leave lying around at times before more people die. I would have volunteered for the HTTs already (if they'd take me ), but it looks like they only want red-blooded US Type Americans - prejudice I tell you .

Marc

[John T. Fishel]

Isn't that enough?

I agree with you on the databases with real names. Pragmatically, over the long haul it doesn't help the war effort to maintain that kind of database. different story for intel types but theirs are more selective anyway (or should be).

Ceaning up after politicos seems to be an occupational hazard on these pages: Malcom Nance (aka Abu Buckwheat), Stu Harrington, John Nagl, Dave Kilcullen, and all the gang in the Small Wars Council. But without some good politicians all our cleanup efforts would be in vain.

Cheers

JohnT

[marct]

in the ongoing culture war...

A CounterPunch Special Investigation
Pilfered Scholarship Devastates General Petraeus's Counterinsurgency Manual

* Core Chapter a Morass of "Borrowed" Quotes
* University of Chicago Press Badly Compromised
* Counterinsurgency Anthropologist Montgomery McFate's Role Under Attack

By DAVID PRICE


Editors' note: This expose of the stolen scholarship in the Army's new manual on counterinsurgency to which General David Petraeus has attached his name also runs in our current newsletter sent by US mail or as a pdf to our newsletter subscribers. Normally material in our newsletter does not run on the CounterPunch website. In the belief that David Price's story merits the widest and swiftest circulation, not only as regards the "borrowings" from unacknowledged sources but also the prostitution of anthropology in evil military enterprises we re making an exception in this case. AC / JSC

Full article here.

[Steve Blair]

Sad to say I didn't see much of an expose here...more just a collection of innuendo and invictive. Ah, well.....all in a day's unbiased research, I guess....

[marct]

Hi Steve,

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

Sad to say I didn't see much of an expose here...more just a collection of innuendo and invictive. Ah, well.....all in a day's unbiased research, I guess....

Well, if you check ut the very end, you will see the case for plagiarism in detail. I do have some problems with it, mainly the old "common knowledge" rule seems to have been forgotten. I think what truly bugs me is that the references didn't have to be taken out - they could easily have been left in, especially for the Chicago edition!

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by marct

Hi Steve,



Well, if you check ut the very end, you will see the case for plagiarism in detail. I do have some problems with it, mainly the old "common knowledge" rule seems to have been forgotten. I think what truly bugs me is that the references didn't have to be taken out - they could easily have been left in, especially for the Chicago edition!

I agree about the Chicago edition...and did find the lack of notes odd (especially when compared to the Marine Corps' Warfighting books that contain good notes). They certainly could have done a better job there. Not sure if I'd hang the bones for that one on sloppy editing on the part of the military (some GO didn't like the look of endnotes or footnotes) or a style guide suited for standard FMs and not up to the task of this one. Or just someone(s) being stupid....

But it just gets my hackles up when attacks like this come out against a military publication while the same 'academic sources' remain silent regarding cases within their own ranks (Ward Churchill springs immediately to mind, but there are others...Ambrose for another). Been a long Tuesday already, and that just spiked the ol' blood pressure and triggered the "need beer" sensor....