"Prime Candidates for Iraq"

[SWJED]

SWJ Blog - "Prime Candidates for Iraq".

Karen DeYoung, Washington Post, reports on a new US State Department intitiative; nay, order; that will see additional diplomats taking posts in Iraq next year because of expected shortfalls in filling openings, the first such large-scale forced assignment since the Vietnam War. As far as we are concerned this is a long overdue move by State to fulfill its end of the 80% political, 20% military counterinsurgency (COIN) fight in Iraq.

... On Monday, 200 to 300 employees will be notified of their selection as "prime candidates" for 50 open positions in Iraq, said Harry K. Thomas, director general of the Foreign Service. Some are expected to respond by volunteering, he said. However, if an insufficient number volunteers by Nov. 12, a department panel will determine which ones will be ordered to report to the Baghdad embassy next summer...

While we applaud (what we call “long overdue”) this move, we do acknowledge that State and other non-military departments and agencies lack the resources to fulfill its COIN obligations. It is time for Congress to get serious and ensure that our Nation has the capacity to deploy fully-trained and mission-capable personnel that truly represent all elements of national power.

Much more at the link...

[SWJED]

Have not done this for quite a while - but if you think this SWJ post is worth it - cast a vote at Real Clear Politics Reader's Articles. Again, only if you think worthy - much appreciated.

Dave

[SWJED]

... from Abu Muqawama.

... At the operational level, Killebrew argues that the "inter-agency" will never be solved in Washington. Instead we should let local commanders and ambassadors work out issues on the ground as part of a action-oriented country team. (Some see the Khalilzad-Barno days in Afghanistan as one model to emulate.) As one who allegedly teaches about the inter-agency, Charlie has deep sympathy with Killebrew on this front.

All of this begs the question as to what State's role is in COIN campaigns? Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more. This blogger is pretty sure that if those people existed, they'd volunteer to be on the first flights overseas (and to the extent that those skills do exist, those folks are true first responders). But the Foreign Service exists to represent US interests in foreign capitols. If we want an expeditionary State Department, we're going to have to (re)create one in much the same way we have to (re)create those capabilities in the Army and Marine Corps as well.

[Rob Thornton]

Charlie has heard military officers refer all too often to "civilian capacity" with the idea that the Foreign Service is chock full of experts on agriculture, water and electrical systems, tribal cultures, and more.

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

One way to refine these questions and get to some answers might be to set up something at DoS (if that is where the capacity is going to reside) along the lines of CALL (Center for Army Lessons Learned) to go out and collect on PRTs (Provincial Reconstruction Teams) across the board, and PRT like organizations operating elsewhere under similar conditions to document the challenges they face so that skill sets can be prioritized, recruited, trained, etc. Perhaps this could be an Inter-Agency venture between DoS and DoD? While there is already some good collection and analysis done on PRTs - I'm not sure its been analyzed in terms of providing the basis for an Inter-Agency understanding - nor if it is linked and justified to strategic documents as part of greater political objectives.

Whoever takes on this challenge is going to have to grow capacity, or trade capacity in other areas. They may also be taking on new roles for foreign commitments that reduce the ability to respond to domestic commitment.

Even if you are talking about double billing professionals by "affording" an Inter-Agency experience such as the opportunity to work else where in the government, get ACS (Advanced Civil Schooling) or attend military PME such as CGSC/ILE or the War College - it means a desk or task goes absent unless those agencies have a surplus personnel account that affords those opportunities.

Good people can make a difference, even if their skill sets/professions don't exactly match up - a language skill, or a cultural experience that at least allows them to empathize helps allot - relationships such as the types built at embassies that allow people to reach back and ask questions, or shed light on a problem are also valuable - but that should be seen as a temporary solution.

If the problem is only temporary, then a temporary solution is probably acceptable. If the problem is persistent and matches to our view of the next decade or two - then we probably need to allocate the resources toward a solution that matches the problem. Otherwise we just grind down our existing resources and you get into an attrition of the willing where you just place more and more burden on those who stick around. Lots of good folks in State and the Inter-Agency, but the system does not seem to be set up to allow them as much flexibility as the situation appears to require.

Best, Rob

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

It does raise the question - where should these capabilities reside? How do you build them, retain them, best employ them? How do they interact with other capabilities?

Many of them reside at USAID. However, in an era where so much of the specialist support in these areas is itself subcontracted from outside government, in-house technical capacity (regards development and institution-building) can be surprisingly thin in virtually all donor agencies.

It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

On a related side note, while the US is still the world's largest provider of ODA, it still provides relatively little development aid as a proportion of GNP, much of this is clustered in a small number of countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt), and is in many other areas is stretched surprisingly thin. In central Africa, for example--location of some of the bloodiest and most regionally destabilizing wars of the post-WWII era, the US is only the 6th largest donor in DR Congo, provides only $57 million a year for Rwanda, etc. Are these the appropriate levels of commitment, given the stakes? It would make for an interesting discussion.


OECD, US aid at a glance.

OECD, Aid recipient data.


Now, back to your regularly-scheduled discussion on the DoS...

[Rob Thornton]

Rex,

Could you go into more detail on this:

It does exist to a greater degree in some (certainly not all) of the UN and Bretton Woods agencies--UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, the World Bank, IMF, etc. I think a key question for US policy is to what extent it wants to reproduce those skill sets internally within USG agencies, or to what extent it wants to think about accessing external expertise more effectively (or, most likely, both).

in terms of:

-resident skill sets in those organizations & the roles those functions might be able to fill - maybe, what kind of model they might provide & maybe costs of doing so
-how we might access them more effectively (and if there are any problems in doing so)


I knew a guy in Ethiopia back in the 80s who worked for UNICEF - he was looking at soil samples to determine how the absence of key minerals effected pregnancy, infant and child development. Guys and gals like that would seem key to helping produce long term solutions. With all of our fears about pandemics, etc associated with globalization - I have become very curious about how the WHO is laid out and their importance.

I really think this is an important piece of the discussion - although the piece focused on DoS - I think what we're really talking about is more along the lines of capability as you describe.

Thanks, Rob

[Ken White]

multi-national agencies are prone to ask the US to do more while excoriating the US on many counts leads to a strong disinclination to support the use of those agencies in pursuit of US policy. Thus, I suspect we'll see little movement in that direction. Restoring USAID to its pre-Clinton size and mission would perhaps be a better plan.

There is little support for increased Government provided foreign aid from the US to developing nations due to beliefs that the money is often diverted to pockets of leaders, thoughts regarding the essential inefficiency of government programs (as witnessed by the flaws of many internal to the US) and the perception cited above -- that they'll take the money but don't appreciate it enough to avoid sometimes harsh criticism and actions that seem to be no more than "thumb your nose at the big guy." Pretty hard to get Joe Sixpack interested in supporting nations that routinely vote against you at the UN...

The counterpoint to that is that US private giving tops most everyone else; thus it is not stinginess nor a perceived lack of need; it is in the 'how to do it' pocket as opposed to what to do.

That is, of course my sensing of the national mood and I'm sure it bears little relationship to the consensus in the better watering holes. My sensing is also that mood encompasses, population wise, about 75%+ and the better watering holes account for <25%.

[MattC86]

In regards to DoS, it's helpful to remember Kilcullen's comment on Charlie Rose - DoS is absolutely minute in comparison to DoD. This raises a difficult question about unity of command and purpose - so insisted upon by COIN theorists (actually all military theorists) from Galula on forward, when many of the resources needed are outside the domain of DoD. Using multinational organizations or NGOs for the "civilian" or political side of COIN is risky when these groups do not report to a single commander, whether that's POTUS or SecDef. But the capabilities are not inherent in DoD, nor do I think the Pentagon is going to invest in a lot of agricultural development experts anytime soon (side note: I'm taking a class on the economics of agricultural development; interesting stuff). That means for a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em.

Matt

[Rob Thornton]

something larger then an "Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability" and something more along the lines of a Bureau of Reconstruction and Stability that would provide more of a say at the table, offer continuity, incentivize, etc.?

Or would it be better suited to the culture of AID - the one that existed back in the 80s in Africa and S. America - I met some guys and gals in that line of work while in Addis as well who were smart and did not mind getting dirty?

Maybe the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stability should be moved under AID and used to provide structure to those capabilities?

If you want

a unified, consistent effort, those assets will have to come from State, and if we don't have 'em, we need to find 'em.

as Matt says, then that means something along the lines of what the military reflects as DOTLMPF type impacts and that requires willingness to change and resources ($$$) to do so.

As for the watering holes - there is going to be a good one down at Sines on the 30th and I hear Rex has shifted his "free beer" commitment to some reporter

[skiguy]

If I'm wrong, someone please tell me. It seems the problem is not only the agency's (State) operations, it's the people who are employed by State. Do they have the experience but aren't volunteering for foreign service? That's kind of what I'm getting from reading much of this.

if an insufficient number volunteers

Not to be snarky, but if you got hired as a FSO, where do you expect to work? From home?
It just appears half, or perhaps more, of the problem is that the people who are needed most just aren't volunterring to go.

Like I said, if I'm wrong or completely misunderstanding this, tell me.

[Ken White]

problem is that we're just a kinder and gentler America. A lot of the PRT guys in Viet Nam were not volunteers and most had been through a three or four month course on the job that included some language training.

I imagine that in the intervening years, the culture got to the point where we expected folks to volunteer --or get paid mega bucks -- to go to unhealthy places. Far as I know the SecState has always had the authority to order any FSO to any station. I do not know what training they're given now but given the standard US ploy of skimping on training (at great cost in the long run), I bet they aren't getting three or four months.

None of which answers the obvious question; why wasn't this done three or four years ago...

[John T. Fishel]

FSOs, neither does AID, and we lost more than another bureaucratic HQ when we amalgamated USIA with State. In addition, State and AID have gone to outsourcing at least as much as DOD with the same kinds of problems.

It is interesting to note that Civil Affairs was cionceived by General Marshall in WWII as an organism that should be transferred, lock, stock, and barrel, to State after the shooting stopped. didn't happen and maybe it could not have but it would have given State the capability that many are calling for now.

[skiguy]

Some questions:
Why does DoS and AID have a shortage?
Why are the standards so high (PhD)for HTTs, and I believe as far as civilians go, PRTs as well? IMHO, someone with a lowly BA in Middle Eastern Studies, who already knows at least intermediate Arabic is not going to be in the way and would likely be quite helpful.
How many universities are on board with this? My UG degree program at AMU is intensive as far as Middle Eastern culture/history/etc courses go, but I don't see much in the way of actual training/education that prepares me to work for a government agency like State.
And what does the training consist of? One can learn all he wants about Iraq or what it will be like working in a conflict zone, but the individual doesn't really know until he actually goes there.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by John T. Fishel

FSOs, neither does AID, and we lost more than another bureaucratic HQ when we amalgamated USIA with State. In addition, State and AID have gone to outsourcing at least as much as DOD with the same kinds of problems.

It is interesting to note that Civil Affairs was cionceived by General Marshall in WWII as an organism that should be transferred, lock, stock, and barrel, to State after the shooting stopped. didn't happen and maybe it could not have but it would have given State the capability that many are calling for now.

dumb shortfall for a lot of folks to share. Between Jesse Helms, the Reagan, Bush 41 and Clinton admins (and I won't even go into the emasculation of the CIA and DIA by every one from Nixon forward, a related batch of stupidity) at a time when the future need should have been obvious, the US elected to do its usual "post war dividend" act and slice needed capabilities at the behest of a number of Congresses so that said squirrels could buy votes with more "entitlements." Yes, I know that's simplistic and to an extent unfair -- but not by much.

Almost as bad as "We fight the nation's big wars..."

Iraq and Afghanistan both are in dire need of police trainers. Germany was supposed to pick that up. They have not, so we cobble something together three years after we knew that Police trainers were an urgent need, that the Germans were not going to do it and that failure to act was simply because of fears in several quarters that the ideal folks to do this, the MPs, should not be so used due to (fill in the blank based on parochial concern).

Aargh!!! You not only hit my last nerve, John, you stood on it....

No bets on, say, five to seven years from now.

[John T. Fishel]

Skiguy--

I can only take on the first question at this point. It has to do with downsizing and doing more with less. We went from 800,000 people in the Army to around 400,000 in the last 20 years. We cut State's FSOs from avout 16,000 +/- to 6000 and 2000 in AID. That 6000 includes the folk who were in USIA before 1999. As far as AID is concerned, we outsource much more than we did before. In the mind of the government (Reagan, Bush I, Clinton, and Bush II) the private sector can do the job cheaper and better. In this, we followed the lead of Maggie Thatcher's UK but she didn't automaticly assume that the private sector would be more efficient - the Brits made govt and private agencies compete for govt contracts (and some went ot govt entities). So, it's a combination of ideology, pragmatism, and simply being cheap! IMHO

Cheers

JohnT

[John T. Fishel]

having been involved with police training in Panama (we had to call it advising to stay legal) and police training (peripherally in El Salvador - there we had to call it training to stay legal), we are not well organized to do that job. Since we have no National Police we make do with cobbled togther contractors from local police or MPs or the FBI (active and retired)and wish we had the capability of the RCMP or the Italian Carabinieri. Part of the problem with providing police from the outside - whether to do policing or as trainers - is that few police units in the world have the redundancy of the military. Police tend to train on the job and surge by going to 2 shifts from 3. if they really need a surge, the call in the military - in the US the order is police from other jurisdictions, National Guard, regular military (see the LA riots of 1992 for example). So, the problem is a tough one even if we were better equipped to do it than we are but we keep relying on others even when it is obvious that we need that sort of capbility ourselves.

One interesting story from Panama: We had an offer from the Georgia State Police to provide the training for the Panama National Police - an organization that was much mor capable than the FBI because its mission was more like that of the PNP. ICITAP (then part of both DOJ [FBI] and State) rejected the offer and it took them a full 6 months to get a decent training program functioning...

Fun, ain't it?

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

some of that, mostly because I was still working and our hotshot Garrison MP Company commander went down with some of her troops on a rotation shortly after the dust settled.

Our ability to reinvent pentagonal wheels when the round variety is right in front of us never ceases to amaze me.

With no Federal uniformed Police (except the Park Service; not counting the essentially security crowds here and there), training a Reserve (not ARNG) MP Battalion or two as a police instructor cadre to be augmented by other MP (or AF Scty guys and gals) as required seems like a no-brainer to me -- but then, I'm just a dumb ridgerunner from Kentucky...

[John T. Fishel]

SOUTHCOM's Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) we used to call ideas like yours the "almost obvious" - that is they should have been obvious to anyone with half a brain but were not until somebody actually stated them!

As an old Reserve guy, that is one I should have seen, but didn't. A USAR MP unit with the mission to train foreign police in both a constabulary and community policing role makes good sense and could be tailored to include a significant interagency component like ICITAP and various state and local police organizations.

then we get to the practical: Where would it be based? How would it drill? who would be recrutied to staff it?

sounds like fun!

[Ken White]

the problems that cropped up in DS/DS was that their absence put a lot of small departments in a real hurt.

Many of these guys and gals are already in MP units. Given the tendency toward non-violence (was that well worded or what ) and a desire to help others in the NE and on the West coast plus the large number of big cities; seems like those would be ideal locations.

The units could cater to the older guys; that lends maturity and experience to the unit and gives the older folks a slightly less stressful active duty job. Plus, being from the larger cities, they'd be used to dealing with a diverse population (and a weird bureaucracy ).

One of the many benefits the RC folks bring to work is the wide variety of skills from their civilian life; that and a willingness to do missions the AC won't do or want to do because they 'know better' or fear the task will not be career enhancing.

If we don't tap into that for the Advisory mission, we're nuts. You want builders? Farmers? Electrical power supply experts? Paramedics? Paralegals? Transportation specialists? Bankers? Hospital Administrators? Cops? The Reserve and Guard are full of 'em.

All it would take to do that is breaking a few Rice Bowls...

[John T. Fishel]

we worked with a jury rigged system we called RC Cops. What later became USACAPOC pulled in civilian cops who were in SF, PSYOP,and CA units for 30 day tours - they were teamed with AC SF teams. Worked well but didn't catch the cops from other types of units.

I certainly agree that it is worth a shot or 3 and all it would do is break a few rice bowls!!!!