How To Stop IEDs

[SteveMetz]

How to stop IEDs

Gian P. Gentile

Friday, November 9, 2007

Want to stop Improvised Explosive Devices, or IEDs, from going off in Iraq and killing American soldiers and Marines? Then end the war.

This is not a political or policy statement on my part but a simple matter of fact based on my personal experience as a tactical battalion commander in west Baghdad in 2006 and on history. How did the warring sides in World War I stop the deadly artillery barrages that became endemic to that war? When the states involved agreed politically to end the war and the deadly artillery stopped...

[Jedburgh]

Originally Posted by GG

....For a combat soldier to be on a WWI battlefield, meant to be hit and killed by artillery. To be in Iraq, sadly, means American combat soldiers and Marines will be hit and killed by IEDs....

Wow, talk about lack of context and false analogies manipulated for effect. And this guy teaches history at the academy. Sad.

[Rob Thornton]

Even the best counter-insurgency tactics applied by competent military units have limits to what they can accomplish in a civil war. That's when I concluded that IEDs in Iraq were a condition of the battlefield that I could not completely stop.

I think he raises an important question here - when we treat everything as a problem with a solution we sometimes miss the bigger issues. I also think IEDs (of all flavors) will continue to figure prominently when we consider METT-TC from here on out. The types of insurgencies and civil wars we may find ourselves involved in will mean greater involvement of combatants equipped and fighting not as uniformed combatants, but as combatants seeking the advantages of fighting in a culture and environment where they can blend in and neutralize our strengths. IEDs generally play to their strengths and even if not employed directly against U.S. forces, still have effects against providing security and helping a host government work toward stability. Information technology and the media have made both the technical skills required to design, build and employ IEDs available to those who would use them, and the media has shown how their use effects us and the domestic will to achieve a political purpose. IT and media are also conditions in this regard.

This does not mean we should not work where possible to stay out in front in terms of mitigating the conditions in which we will operate given the political purpose. Technology can mitigate it some, TTP & Doctrine can mitigate it some, winning at the tactical and operational levels can mitigate it some. Consider that IEDs were not first encountered in Iraq - VBIEDs of various flavors have been employed for awhile - The Oklahoma City bombing, Khobar Towers were VBIEDs, the attack on the USS Cole was a type of Suicide IED and the 9/11 attacks on the Pentagon and the WTC were also a type of IED. Also woth noting that many a Vietnam veteran mad the early analogy to booby traps. While we have done our best and had some successes at mitigating and denying opportunities to employ IEDs of such large scale - we have not eliminated them - they are not a problem with a final solution because they fall under means and ways of achieving a purpose.

It does seem our ability to mitigate the IED as a condition corresponds to the environment in which takes place. The more unstable the environment - like a war zone, the less control we have over the conditions, and the less success we have in mitigating them. Because IEDs are employed where people live and because the fighting takes place in and amongst the population, our purpose for being there puts us at odds with avoiding IEDs. In the same ways insurgents are able to blend in with the population, so IEDs blend in with the environment around the population.

We've generated some success in distinguishing what belongs and what does not in Iraq - but when IED craters on the road start to look normal it creates problems in distinguishing what truly is a threat - and that is just one example. So - I agree - IEDs are here to stay - where ever the population will become the prize, and wherever the enemy can not stand up to us in a conventional sense we will see IEDs employed against us and our allies. TT and Frank Hoffman have done some good thinking on hybrid wars or what Terry referred to as complex Irregular Warfare where the enemy capabilities are blended and designed to be complimentary leaving us few choices but to be full spectrum - a hard thing to pull off, which may work counter to our achieving a given political purpose in a time period that makes the object in view worth the blood and treasure in the first place.

Our enemies have the luxury of only having to consider how to defeat us - and they are well versed in our strategic culture of how we address problems, and what lines we will not cross, and what happens to our political support when we do. This makes fielding a force capable of serving a political purpose a hard thing to accomplish, it may make it more expensive then we are willing to pay because either we choose not to acknowledge what a full spectrum force really is and what recruiting, retaining, training, educating and equipping really requires, or because we choose to not acknowledge that the enemy has the luxury of time, the advantage of home court, and the benefit of facing an enemy (us) who cannot agree on what are vital interests, and what is the cost benefit of securing them. No easy answers here, often just the best of some hard choices.

Eventually, it became clear that the only sure way to eliminate the IED threat in Iraq would be to end the civil war. The chances of that happening seemed remote, however, because the many warring sides had plenty of fight left in them.

Civil wars are the most uncivil of human activities; they take time to work themselves out through fighting and killing.

I also think he makes a valid point here. A question I heard once and stuck with me is why some wars take longer to resolve. Consider our own Civil War - Lee fought to the very end - there were several times where looking backwards through time, it appears obvious to us that he should have surrendered - but not to him, and often not to the men he led, the Confederate political leadership, or the people who lived there. Even when Sherman was demonstrating he was operating in the Confederate interior - away from the Union Navy, many in the South refused to believe he was imposing his will where he wanted. The political object in view to the South was so attractive (or the alternative so unbearable), and some of the events that had occurred in the first years of the war so convincing that the idea of defeat had to be demonstrated to the hilt, in order to show the outcome was inevitable.

There were no forgone conclusions for Grant and Lincoln either, hope yes, but right up to the end Grant thought Lee might make a run South, link up with Johnston and fight on - even when Lee's Army appeared broken and starving. The reason I bring up the Union point of view is to offer the possibility that even when one side appears to have sealed the conclusion, their mindset may be one of still doing everything possible to ensure it. Its one thing to discuss opponents who had religion and common experiences that might inhibit them from imposing a peace that would be unbearable, but maybe its another where the conditions that lead up to the war stem from distinct differences in religion & politics that have been heightened by favoritism or deprivation, violence, hatred, fears and sorrows that have have taken a life of their own.

These are also the conditions we will likely face in the future where we operate - we are not likely to find ourselves violently engaged in places where peace exists unless it is because a state belligerent has invaded or threatened a neighbor - these are not where insurgencies and civil wars occur. It seems more likely that we will either find ourselves involved in multi-ethnic/religious/tribal disputes that are destabilized from within, by a non-state actor, or by a state actor who has managed to dominate its own population while supporting/exerting a destabilizing influence on its neighbor. We may at times find ourselves facing more then one component of this description to include making a choice to employ violence against a subversive neighbor.

I appreciate the article - we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in. Its complex and enduring, and there are consequences. If we decide to employ military power to achieve our political ends, then we need to think about what we want to accomplish and what the enemy wants to accomplish, strengths and weaknesses (ours and theirs), and we need to recognize that the more populations are involved the messier it will be, and the greater the role chance and probability will play in the out come when our goals depend on the people who live in a given state or region sustaining a peace - since our strategic culture reflects our own values of free will and choice.

[Gian P Gentile]

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

...we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in. Its complex and enduring, and there are consequences.

Thanks Rob for the most thoughtful reply. The words you write above summarize the implicit point of the article perfectly which was the fundamental reason i wrote it. The piece started out at around 1200 words where i gave examples of World War 1 leaders devising very effective tactical innovations like German small group tactics and even the use of poison gas by the British and Germans but the editor for space constraints cut most of that out.

I remember sharing my views of IEDs as a condition of the baghdad battlefield with other battalion and brigade commanders when i was there and they agreed that it was that way.

As far as Jedburg's statement that i made a "false analogy;" ok, if that is how he sees it fine. However, when i was reeling from the effects of lethal ieds on my outfit and was trying to figure out how to deal with them in baghdad in 2006 accepting that they were a condition, by drawing on my sense of history and my understanding of World War I trench warfare, that i could never make them go away i think helped me to come up with realistic plans of action to deal with them.

Again Rob, thanks for taking the time to pen this response and thanks too to Steve Metz for posting this piece as a thread.

gian

[Jedburgh]

Rob, your exegesis of what he wrote was far more cogent and thoughtful than the original article. Your final point that we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in is well taken. Strategic IPB is absolutely necessary to drive effective planning for conflict; conventional or unconventional. Take a read of Ceasar's The Gallic Wars for a good historical example, or review Knowing One's Enemies, which I've linked to before. The administration that led us into Iraq failed miserably on multiple counts.

However, the original piece Steven linked to was written in a tone of frustration and defeatism, using multiple false analogies to reinforce points not put in an operational context and ultimately offered no recommendations or solutions, or than to leave Iraq. A simple opinion piece; yes, it made points, but it lacks substance.

[Rank amateur]

Originally Posted by Jedburgh

and ultimately offered no recommendations or solutions, or than to leave Iraq.

Mr. Gentile can speak for himself, but I didn't see any inference that the US needs to leave Iraq.

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Eventually, it became clear that the only sure way to eliminate the IED threat in Iraq would be to end the civil war.

If you believe we have a role to play in ending the civil war - and I don't see anywhere in the article where it says we don't - then we can stay.

I also agree with Rob that IEDs are here to stay and we'll see more if them; they're too effective, and too cheap for them to go away.

[Gian P Gentile]

Originally Posted by Jedburgh

A simple opinion piece; yes, it made points, but it lacks substance.

I don't want to appear arrogant and aloof here but do you think, Jedburg, you could do better with a 650 word limit? Right i certainly could have given more detail in a 6000 word piece, but then no oped page in the world would run it. With 6000 words maybe i could have changed Jedburg's mind of claiming that i used a "false analogy."

I am not a defeatist Jedburg, but a realist who has sadly had to talk on satellite phones with moms, dads, and wives after memorial services for soldiers in my squadron who had been killed by ieds and try to explain to them why it happened. Perhaps you should look into the mirror yourself and what you might see is an idealist who refuses to accept the fundamental cost of doing business in Iraq; dead American soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors from IEDs that are a condition of the battlefield. I am not at all saying that the cost is not worth it, but rather trying to point out what the cost actually means in blood and treasure for our continued presence in the land between the two rivers.

gentile

[wm]

Originally Posted by Jedburgh

However, the original piece Steven linked to was written in a tone of frustration and defeatism, using multiple false analogies to reinforce points not put in an operational context and ultimately offered no recommendations or solutions, or than to leave Iraq. A simple opinion piece; yes, it made points, but it lacks substance.

I am not as clear as to the author's ultimate intent in writing the piece. LTC Gentile has since given us a little more insight in his response to Rob's post. But what his intention was really matters little anymore, for at least two reasons.

First, the piece is no longer what the author submitted. As LTC Gentile noted, the editors of the SF Chronicle chose to evoke editorial privilege and gut his 1200 word article. (I have my suspicions about their reasons, and they have nothing to do with an interest by the Chronicle's editors in saving ink and newsprint.)

Second, I think it is very important to recognize that the written word, once released to the public, is freed completely of its author's intentions. I viewed the op-ed as an expression of the author's struggle to come to grips with the "mission-welfare of the force" dilemma. We see another intrepretation in the quotation from Jedburgh above. I suspect many other readers will take it as an argument for not continuing the fight and for avoidiing involvement in future conflicts that devolve into COIN battles.

I hope that those who choose to publish, particularly in the mainstream meadia, carefully weigh the possibilities of their words and intentions being greatly misconstrued. When we mistake the effects of what we do or say on others, we can end up with some horrendous results. By most accounts, WWI resulted from a gross miscalculatiuon on the part of the Austro-Hungarians to the reaction to their crossing into Serbia in 1914. In a much less horrible example, we have recently been witness to a range of reactions to the Countererpunch piece in which Price mistook the intention of the authors of FM3-24.

[Ken White]

and there is little question that the ending of the war would be in the best interests the Armed Forces elements now deployed in Iraq and probably of the Armed Forces as a whole. What is not addressed in that OpEd is whether that action would be in the national interest.

I believe that action would be far more detrimental to the US than it would be beneficial.

By extrapolation one can say that the killing of Soldiers and Marines by IED would not exist in Iraq were we not there. However, we are there. Whether we should be or not, whether all the ramifications were considered or not prior to commitment is really broadly immaterial at this point. One can also say with some justification that had several elements of the US government from the President through the SecDef and to include a number of agencies and the Armed Forces done their jobs a little better we might well not have an IED problem in Iraq at this time. Also immaterial. The issue is not how to stop IEDs, the issue is what actions best serve the national interest at this time.

While the recommended action would please many around the world on several levels and a large number of Americans would be quite happy, that action would leave a vacuum in the ME with even more uncertain effects than would our continued presence. It would also tacitly fulfill the expectations of many who would see it as a vindication of their belief that America has no staying power and is not to be trusted. That potential effect deserves even more thought that did the original intent to commit.

Rob eloquently makes many excellent points on the issue but I submit his final paragraph is the most critical in his comment:

"I appreciate the article - we need those who make major policy decisions to think about the environment that war takes place in. Its complex and enduring, and there are consequences. If we decide to employ military power to achieve our political ends, then we need to think about what we want to accomplish and what the enemy wants to accomplish, strengths and weaknesses (ours and theirs), and we need to recognize that the more populations are involved the messier it will be, and the greater the role chance and probability will play in the out come when our goals depend on the people who live in a given state or region sustaining a peace - since our strategic culture reflects our own values of free will and choice."

Arguably that analysis was not applied by many to the attack on Iraq and, regrettably, in the first couple of years to our actions and efforts there. That is history. The history of World War I is really analogous in the areas of bad decisions, bad tactics and death -- it is not all analogous politically and in the context of today's ease, visual effects and rapidity of communication or of todays battlefield where effects are not local but international in ways World War I could never have been.

Given the thrust of the OpEd as it appeared, one can pretty much be assured that the "end the war" desired is our withdrawal. If the rest of the piece is considered and further comments on this board are considered, one is left with the thought that we are intruding in a civil war and can only continue to provide targets, thus removal of the targets is desired.

I agree strongly with WM and Jedburgh. I'm not sure that the OpEd serves anyone well. Gian says his is not a political or policy statement -- that will be ignored and it will be widely used as a de facto political and policy condemnation.

No sane human wants the death and destruction that exists in Iraq, we all want it to end -- but to end it on the wrong note will only lead to more and possibly greater death and destruction. History tells us that. World War I emphatically tells us that; that is the true analogy between then and now...

[Danny]

I appreciate Lt. Col. Gentile's article. I also appreciate Rob's elucidation of the thoughts behind it and of his own. Allow me to weigh in.

I think Iraq is more complex than to call it a civil war, and leave it at that. There are aspects of that, indeed, just as there are aspects of Islamic jihad, and aspects of inteference by Iranian and Syrian elements (regional conflict), sectarian strife, indigenous insurgency, terrorism, etc. It is a complex affair. I believe these things not simply because of what I read in the MSM or even blogs written from the front. I have also extensively talked with Marines who have recently returned.

Rob and Jedburgh are right. I count myself as a conservative, but this administration failed us in too many ways to count. Rumsfeld's idea of fighting a war in Afghanistan with a few special forces operators, satellite uplinks for airmen as they guided bombs in on target, and indigenous fighters has been a failure. We needed force projection, and we got gizmos. He and Wolfowitz bullied Shinseki out of a job, and we got Iraq on the cheap. We needed force projection, we got gizmos.

The intelligence was poor. I was never impressed with the whole WMD argument (chemical weapons aren't as effective as conventional ordnance), and was in fact opposed to the whole idea of OIF to begin with, excepting the possibility of the nuclear option (which again, was poor intelligence). But I am in that category who believes that once started, losing is the worst of options (unless we intend to lose it - discussed below). Michael Ledeen and Victor Davis Hanson, both of whom have been incorrectly criticized over this forum, are also in that same category. Neither one supported the idea to begin with, but once started, found no option except success to be acceptable.

If my view is correct, many tens of thousands of foreign fighters who would have otherwise fought us elsewhere (Afghanistan, or even U.S. soil) have died in Iraq. My son has killed some of them. The unintended consequences of OIF is that it has become a killing field for al Qaeda, Ansar al Sunna, and other anti-American fighters. This is positive, along with the possibility that if we take the region seriously, Iran might be couched between what can become two stable states with U.S. presence as a deterent for their aspirations.

As to IEDs, I see the problem as tactical and local, but not simply as local. Rumsfeld's bold new vision for the region and our naive belief in the healing powers of democracy caused us to ignore the advice from Israel who had already encounted the IED and created V-Hull technology. Hence, we were surprised on a tactical level when, upon stupidly running an AAV down a desert road in Iraq with 14 recon Marines, it exploded into a pile of rubble and twisted metal in August of 2005, losing every Marine aboard.

http://www.cnn.com/interactive/us/05...t.exclude.html

We could have done better, and our leadership is to blame. And it IS THAT SIMPLE. I have advocated dismounted patrols as better for COIN at my little blog, but in the end, Lt. Col. Gentile is right. IEDs are here to stay, and will become part of the landscape into the future.

My own view is that we have made advances, but there are more necessary before we can call this finished. The JAM must be taken on and finished, and Syria and Iran must be dealt with. If Syria and Iran are dealt with (and I am not talking about talky-talk and "negotiations" with them), my opinion is that this will get a WHOLE . HELL . OF . A . LOT . EASIER.

If we are not goint to take all of this seriously, if we are engaged in order to keep this from appearing as a loss, or if things start to deteriorate towards a high level civil war where we refuse to take on Sadr and the Badr forces directly, then it is time to withdraw.

I think that the frustration with a large portion of the public has more to do with the lack of will to win than it does anything else. I see the public every day, I work with them, I talk with them, unlike many in the professional military. Releasing Sadr, supporting a regime in Iraq (Maliki) which is secretive and completely inept (and beholden to Sadr, Sistani and Iran), the refusal to take on the JAM, and all of the things that lead to the continuing violence, contribute to the perception that we are simply there being blown up, in the middle of a fight we didn't start and cannot control.

Not that anyone in a position of authority listens to me, but I don't want my son to go for a second combat tour under these conditions. If we continue to argue for more troops in Europe and continue to deploy forces along the DMZ to allow South Korea to pursue its childish "sunshine diplomacy" while troops in Iraq are doing 15 month deployments, and ignore the EFP factories in Iran while Carriers with aircraft and ordnance sit in the Persian Gulf unused, then bring all of our boys home, and immediately.

Yes, IEDs are effective, and cause the public to see the campaign in a negative light. But who is to blame for this, when we ignore the counsel of Israel years back on V-Hull vehicles, we won't shut down the factories in Iran, we allow Sadr to remain unmolested, and troops train with German and South Korean forces rather than Iraqi forces?

http://www.captainsjournal.com/2007/...egic-thinking/

Point? The failure is at the HIGHEST LEVELS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP, and always have been.

[Rob Thornton]

Balance and Consistency awhile back (I can't remember the thread) got me over a hump (Ken is good at planting seeds that way). Terry telling me about what he and Frank Hoffman discussed (and then Frank's piece on the blog recently) speak to our evolving thinking on current and future threats, how they will structure themselves and what tactics they might use against us.

With all the discussion on organizational structure and doctrine in terms of our perspective, I lost sight of what I'm always saying people should not lose sight of - war is a social phenomena and as such we eventually fight where we live and live where we fight. I'm not trying to be confusing, but that helps me remember that people are involved and always have been. Perhaps because military history is not taught in the context of an engine of social change, it often is reduced to binary content where we only examine civilians in minor roles and concentrate instead on those things clearly identifiable with the combatants - until we started conducting counter-insurgency, then it became undeniable. I'm not saying that military history is devoid of such work, only that in our desire to examine military historical significance we tend to isolate it from its social roots. This is why I like reflections done where the author or theorist considers war within the context of society. I think this is important given the probabilities and possibilities of war, our political objectives given our perspective on why what happens in other places matters to us domestically, and our evolving understanding of what constitutes a threat and the social environments which create those threats (from the horrific events of 9/11 to the possibilities of pandemics and beyond).

I think this is important in considering IEDs - not only because they reflect the tactics and organizational structure of those employing them, but because they are telling of the enemy's political objectives and their will to continue its pursuit.

One side must decide that its no longer worth the effort to continue the pursuit of the original objective - either because new objectives have replaced the old ones, the original objectives have been met to some degree, or because the conditions and assumptions which gave rise to the original objectives are no longer valid.

IEDs I think offer a range of options commensurate with their type and effects. SVBIED types where 2 x dump trucks and an assault element designed to destroy a fortification, inflict mass casualties, gain public attention through the media, challenge resolve on different levels and deny the public a sense of security are high risk, high yield operations. As such they are planned out more, and if possible the enemy mitigates his own risk by conducting near simultaneous operations with his available means to diffuse our attention and create opportunities at the target. One of the best ways to target this operation I've seen is to disrupt it by desynchronizing his effort and increase his risk- and while there are ways to accomplish this, its not a given - you can do everything right, and sooner or later if they are committed enough they are going to get through to a target - unless the object in view no longer secures the commitment of the people required to carry it off, or those still committed are no longer available or no longer have the means to execute it.

As means become easier to come by and alternative ways offer similar effects at less risk, the level of commitment across the broader spectrum is easier to come by. So maybe the SVBIED into the IP station is no longer doable, but a directional EFP type IED with a high probability command detonation system in terrain that offers high yield/low risk is still a doable means of achieving the political goal even if the enemy lacks larger scale public support.

Its also important in considering how what has for sometime been one of our strengths, our ability to develop and field technological solutions to tactical problems, have been challenged by greater lethality in small packages that are hard to keep pace with, and further strain our ability to operate in the "away games". The evolution of the IED challenges the physics of deploying and sustaining a force big enough to meet the demands of securing a populace at price tag that is hard to beat. I'm a fan of the MRAP because I have no choice but to be - I want the best tech available to mitigate the easier to come by/easier to employ IEDs that result in MTBI and the BB in the beer can effect - I've seen guys in Buffaloes, Cougars, and RGs walk away from big VBIEDs and SVBIEDs where I've seen whole 1114/1151 five person crews killed and/or severely wounded.

We should absolutely do everything actively and passively technologically possible to provide the means by which our soldiers and marines can gain tactical and operational advantages. This is a long chain of stuff that includes ISR assets, force protection and Command & Control technologies - but these technological advantages are not silver bullets - they are only as good as the people who employ them, communicate through them, and analyze the information made available by them.

Technology quickly becomes dated, and because it is produced by people, its advantages are quickly identified by the enemy who will take the required steps to mitigate it. Only through agility and adaptiveness can we extend its shelf life. The shelf life might be sufficient if the objective is more military and less political, but if the objective requires greater political solvency as in the case with civil wars and popular insurgencies, then the longer the enemy will have to counter our technologies and increase both the physical and political strain on us - physical in the sense of fiscal means, R&D, production throughput on logistical burdens - political in the domestic strains which change the value of our original objectives. This is how I interpret the impact of IEDs and like technologies and tactics on the wars of today and tomorrow.

As if that were not bad enough, Frank and Terry have taken it to the next level - a smart state with sufficient resources is going to take advantage of the full curve either by developing the organic capability or through proxy and alliances. They will have a significant conventional capability while at the same time laying the ground work for a speedy transition to an Insurgency with all the middle ground covered - this all the while we question the value of our object in view (fear/honor/interest rationale) and the greater body politic exerts its own pressures. It should be understandable by the discussions we've had here how difficult it is for us to develop a force with military capabilities that counter that without a 3-5 year learning curve and strains that force us into other undesirable choices at home elsewhere around the globe.

With so much at stake I don't believe we can roll over, or become apathetic, but we must start looking at the problems differently, and making choices that provide the best long term flexibility and offer us the opportunity to be consistent in our goals through a balance we can sustain. It ain't easy, and I think we have a ways to go (maybe it never stops).

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

I am not at all saying that the cost is not worth it,

It's interested that if someone mentions the cost of the war, many assume that the individual must be opposed to the war.

Originally Posted by Rob Thornton

I lost sight of what I'm always saying people should not lose sight of - war is a social phenomena

If I've learned anything in my brief time here, it's that war is a very human endeavor.

[Schmedlap]

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

I don't want to appear arrogant and aloof here but do you think, Jedburg, you could do better with a 650 word limit? Right i certainly could have given more detail in a 6000 word piece, but then no oped page in the world would run it."

There is no disrespect or other uncivil motive intended in asking this question, but what message in this oped was so important to convey that it was worth the highly likely risk that the article will have unintended or incorrect interpretations trumpeted by the likes of moveon.org and other fringe groups? While the disclaimer at the end of the article makes it clear that the views presented are only those of the author, it nonetheless seems obvious that the authority of the author's view (by virtue of being an LTC with command experience in Iraq) will give the interpretations of this article greater credibility to be exploited by groups that have a purely political agenda.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Danny

I appreciate Lt. Col. Gentile's article. I also appreciate Rob's elucidation of the thoughts behind it and of his own. Allow me to weigh in.

At the risk of getting even further off thread, while I disagree with you on several points, most of them like Afghanistan and the admittedly inexcusable treatment of Shinseki are not at all germane to this thread. Let me address one factor you emphasize that is slightly less off thread.

"Point? The failure is at the HIGHEST LEVELS OF SENIOR LEADERSHIP, and always have been.

That is, IMO generally correct. I suggest there have also been failures at intermediate levels as well. However, those at lower levels have several reasons that led to many of their failures (they also recovered far more rapidly). You cited one, very poor intelligence at the national level and both Langley and Bolling are to blame. Another is that which Rob mentioned, a failure prior to commitment to address the potential battlefield and problems realistically. The latter is indeed directly attributable to poor performance by the senior leadership. So is the possible greater failing by earlier senior leaders -- poor training.

Let me provide some boring background. The US army was sent to Viet Nam. For seven long years under the command of Paul Harkins and William Westmoreland, the Army tried to fight a land war in Europe. Those two commanders had such a war as their formative war and they tried unsuccessfully to emulate it. Fortunately, another WW II in Europe graduate was smarter and Creighton Abrams turned Viet Nam around. Too late; the politicians, more concerned about their reelection than the nation pulled the plug. Many of today's politicians would cheerfully do the same thing for the same reason -- reelection over national aims -- they do not need to be encouraged

Contrary to much common wisdom, the politicians were not the cause of the loss in Viet Nam (other than in their hubris and failure to understand what they were doing prior to commitment) -- nor were the Media (who like to credit themselves with that...). The Army blew it. The politicians do what they will always do, take the easy way out. The Media do what they will always do, credit themselves with far more clout than they really have.

The point of all that -- the Army allowed the pols and the media to share the blame and set themselves to the task of rebuilding the army to fight a land war in Europe. They did that in spite of all evidence that such a war was unlikely. Thus, the Army got to skate because their failings were obscured.

That's important because some will try do the same thing again if they can. You correctly point out that the senior leadership failed. What you do not point out is that the mid level leadership compensated and pulled us back from the so-called brink. What you do not point out is that most -- not all (and that is important and germane to this point and the entire thread) of the senior leadership has done a course correction and is trying to repair the damaged legacy their predecessors bequeathed. That is unfair on your part.

No question the flaws in intelligence and leadership need to be cited so that those errors are corrected. We failed to learn the lessons of Viet Nam -- we better not fail to learn the lessons of this one because it's far more important. There should also be no question that stating the problems as knowledgeably, accurately, concisely and fairly as possible is important.

Back to the thread. You say:

"Not that anyone in a position of authority listens to me, but I don't want my son to go for a second combat tour under these conditions. If we continue to argue for more troops in Europe and continue to deploy forces along the DMZ to allow South Korea to pursue its childish "sunshine diplomacy" while troops in Iraq are doing 15 month deployments, and ignore the EFP factories in Iran while Carriers with aircraft and ordnance sit in the Persian Gulf unused, then bring all of our boys home, and immediately."

To use your term, I am not "professional military" though I once was; I've been a civilian, disregarding my first 17 years, since 1977, thirty years and I too interface with civilians from all walks of life on a daily basis. Like you, I have a serving son though mine has three tours and is more than ready (not eager, but ready) to go back again and again if necessary.

Unlike Gian and unlike you, that son and I are quite convinced that the all sentiments you express in that last quote I provided and in particular the "...bring our boys home, and immediately" sound bite is badly misguided. It's in the interest of the serving and it's in the interest of the institution(s) which will try to protect itself (or themselves) at any cost -- it is not in the national interest. That trumps.

As an aside, I'm over 75, so a lot of people are boys to me -- the men and women in Iraq and all over the world in the Armed forces are not.

[Schmedlap]

There is another way to stop IEDs - used successfully in OIF III: make the cost of emplacing them prohibitively high. I'll err on the side of OPSEC and omit the city and nitty-gritty details, but the basic gist of it is that we flooded the city with small teams whose sole purpose in life was to observe, report, and kill anyone emplacing an IED. The going rate for digging in an IED went from $25 to over $500 because the imminent threat of death resulting from IED emplacement become so apparent to the populace. Now, this is not a strategy to defeat our enemies, but it was an approach that stopped IEDs and enabled us to get the IA and IP into the city with their unarmored vehicles with a greatly diminished threat of them incurring mass casualties.

Also, I take issue with one assertion in the article:

"But it seems clear that the necessary condition that has lowered IED attacks was a political agreement between the tribal sheikhs in Anbar and the Americans to stop fighting each other."

I think this is an incorrect assessment of what occurred - or at least a significantly incomplete assessment. The violence in Anbar was much more than simply US forces fighting against Anbar tribes. Al-Qaeda in Iraq and other terrorist groups were killing US troops and intimidating the Anbar tribes. The necessary condition was not for the US forces and Anbar tribes to stop fighting one another. The necessary condition was to convince the Anbar tribes to drive al-Qaeda in Iraq out of the province.

[Danny]

Ken, the sound bite you cited is just that in the way you cited it. It needs context to understand it. It's context is the question whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right. Without context, it is a mischaracterization and mere (to use your words) "sound bite."

I am certain that your position isn't that "regardless of whether we are nationally committed to the mission let's leave our forces deployed." This would be an irrational position to take.

I am supposing that you are arguing simply for garnering the national commitment for doing it right. That said, it isn't clear how you would intend to do this since you don't say.

Finally, my somewhat rambling prose is related to the subject in that IEDs must be seen in the larger context of the commitments we have across the globe. With a different strategy from the beginning, listening to the Israelis who had already dealt with IEDs, and force projection, the IED problem would not have been what it is today and has been for four years.

Point? I am blaming the magnitude of the problem on senior leadership.

[Gian P Gentile]

Originally Posted by wm

I am not as clear as to the author's ultimate intent in writing the piece...First, the piece is no longer what the author submitted. As LTC Gentile noted, the editors of the SF Chronicle chose to evoke editorial privilege and gut his 1200 word article. (I have my suspicions about their reasons, and they have nothing to do with an interest by the Chronicle's editors in saving ink and newsprint.)

Simply put my intent for writing the piece was to state my observation that IEDs in Iraq are like artillery in World War I: conditions of those two battlefields that tactical or technological innovations could not completely do away with save a political agreement to end the fighting.

Next I take full responsibility for what i said in that piece. The editor of the paper sent me a revised version with parts taken out and she allowed me to review it make any other changes i wanted as long as i could keep it close to the word limit she had given me. The portions that were taken out to save space did in no way compromise the thrust of the piece. There was no left leaning "moveon.org" motive behind the paper's editor to shorten the piece but only to do just that, shorten it.

Finally, i do believe Iraq is in Civil War and it is more than just an insurgency. I believe it is important to make this point so that we can see the war for what it actually is and devise policy and operational approaches to suit it.

[Rob Thornton]

it allows us to consider how IEDs (and other like conditions) effect all 3 levels of war. It also allows us to consider that the enemy must also overcome chaos and friction, often suffering directly and indirectly from actions occurring elsewhere as well as creating conditions which afford us opportunities provided we can recognize their significance and capitalize on them. This is not to say that this was a coordinated effort where task and purpose nested nicely with operational objectives and strategic ends - few planned things ever work out so well because the future is unpredictable and the attraction of linearizing things after they happen is strong; however the effort to make the linkages and take full advantage of them should not be understated - it is the art of recognizing potential, arranging resources and exploiting possibilities. It provides a model that military CDRs and planners along with policy makers and their advisers should consider when contemplating complex problems.

There is another way to stop IEDs - used successfully in OIF III: make the cost of emplacing them prohibitively high. I'll err on the side of OPSEC and omit the city and nitty-gritty details, but the basic gist of it is that we flooded the city with small teams whose sole purpose in life was to observe, report, and kill anyone emplacing an IED.

Overwatches/Ambushes along with patrolling and a QRF built on an understanding of the enemy through good reporting, debriefs and small unit AARs are good tactics - the enemy is more vulnerable here and for him to have an effect he must come to where he will find his enemy. This hits the enemy at the tactical level, but can also disrupt his operational goals - an example would be his attempting to increase OPTEMPO in an outlying city in order to get us to shift forces out of the capital or to try and operationally fix forces required in the capital.

The going rate for digging in an IED went from $25 to over $500 because the imminent threat of death resulting from IED emplacement become so apparent to the populace.

Depending on the flexibility of funding ascribed to a group or cell - raising the price of IED emplacement or the activity which supports it (dropping of supplies, recon, digging a hole, etc.) drains operational funds which might go to other activities such as material procurement, paying of government officials and informants, recruiting new members, training, movement, housing and food, etc. If this is a small group it may force them into criminal activity or some other activity which de-legitmizes them, slows their OPTEMPO, causes cell friction, or causes them to get sloppy and killed for example. If it is a part of a larger group it may drain funds from elsewhere disrupting those operations, force communications which allow us to understand and target them, and sew discord which exacerbates existing problems. Combined with other Lines of Effort which offer choices to those who supported IED networks - could be becoming an informant, could be a new line of work - the cost/value equation takes on a new perspective. For the politically committed this may be something to be waited out, but their network requires a certain amount of environmental facilitation - as that dries up, its harder for them to operate.

Now, this is not a strategy to defeat our enemies, but it was an approach that stopped IEDs and enabled us to get the IA and IP into the city with their unarmored vehicles with a greatly diminished threat of them incurring mass casualties.

Enabling the Host Nation security forces to operate in an environment where the enemy has been deprived of a tactic and weapon which afforded him an advantage has multiple benefits - it increases the amount of forces available to secure the populace and deny the enemy physical and moral freedom of movement, maximizes the natural advantages obtained by being a security force that is representative of the culture it operates in, and its often the first physical representation of the government which can lead to establishing legitimacy. Once the HN SecFor has established itself, US/CF assets/resources/units can be redistributed or redeployed -This is an exponential increase - and is a solid linkage to the operational and strategic levels of war through tactical operations.

The necessary condition was not for the US forces and Anbar tribes to stop fighting one another. The necessary condition was to convince the Anbar tribes to drive al-Qaeda in Iraq out of the province.

This is changing the nature of the political objectives/conversation by some of the belligerents through recognition of shift in conditions. In the captured letter between AQ leadership and AQIZ leadership great concern was expressed about the wanton carnage and tactics employed by AQIZ against Iraqis - it was recognized by AQ as jeopardizing the political objectives they were after - in fact the letter recommended that AQ expend more effort in its political operations then its military ones. There have been documented horrors as well as violations of familial and tribal honors which may have occurred partly as a result of impatience, frustration and stresses as AQIZ's vision of the battlefield failed to be realized - partly through tactical and operation successes by US, CF and ISF - which were partly enabled through freedom of movement - which means mitigating the effects of IEDs along MSRs and ASRs. This probably had some effect on how the Anbar Sheiks viewed the evolution of their political objectives from one where they were more aligned with the interests of AQIZ, to one where they were more aligned with us (and the HN).

All of these things combined create and compound operational problems for insurgents that flow in both directions, gain momentum at various points and can create new opportunities for us and the HN to be exploited.

Danger - this is not to say that the lines are clearly drawn - I don't think we can do that given the infinite variables that may have been introduced - but I do believe them related enough to use for considering the complex social conditions that occur in war and which IEDs represent.

Even though events unfolded as they did, there was no guarantee that they would -its more like we assembled the various pieces with some common frame of reference (and we're not done yet) - so policies which might create the conditions cannot guarantee the desired outcome - just because we'd like to imagine it as a linear series of events between the start point and the end point - doesn't make it that way (its more akin to guessing how the cards will land and which cards are under the others in 52 pick up then lining up dominoes). What we can do I think to maximize our chances of coming relatively close to the desired strategic outcome is attune ourselves to changes and opportunities and have the resources available to make the most of them while remaining flexible and adaptive at the tactical and operational levels.

We are not done in Iraq, not done in Afghanistan and the odds are that in some places they are designing and/or cranking out and caching Insurgent capabilities such IEDs that are far better then the ones we've seen so far, and training cadre and training documents that allow them to mix types of warfare and transition from different types of operations and retain the initiative. These UW capabilities will probably not be used solely for Internal defense but as in the past, used to foment insurgency, terrify and destabilize, possibly combined and coordinated with conventional GPF to achieve broader regional political objectives.

Best, Rob

[Rank amateur]

Originally Posted by Schmedlap

what message in this oped was so important to convey that it was worth the highly likely risk that the article will have unintended or incorrect interpretations trumpeted by the likes of moveon.org and other fringe groups?

Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile

Finally, i do believe Iraq is in Civil War and it is more than just an insurgency. I believe it is important to make this point so that we can see the war for what it actually is and devise policy and operational approaches to suit it.

Another thing I've learned is that when the truth about Iraq is distorted, no matter what the reason, it is the trigger puller who suffers the most.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Danny

Ken, the sound bite you cited is just that in the way you cited it. It needs context to understand it. It's context is the question whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right. Without context, it is a mischaracterization and mere (to use your words) "sound bite."

That may be the question but I don't think you posed it in your first comment on this thread. Thus, lacking that context, you reaped. I'd also submit that whether we are committed to supplying the resources to do the job right is possibly not a good question. Within reason, all the services have for several years gotten pretty much what they asked for. Thus if the resources are not right, the requests from the field weren't right. Perhaps a better question is 'are we as a nation adequately committed to doing this job.' I suspect the answer to that question is very much perspective dependent and I suggest there is no correct answer.

I am certain that your position isn't that "regardless of whether we are nationally committed to the mission let's leave our forces deployed." This would be an irrational position to take.

I believe the current Administration and the bulk of those who might form the next administration are in fact committed to the mission; thus the nation is both de facto and de jure committed to the mission. I realize there are those in the adminsitration, in Congress, in the Armed Forces and across the nation who wish to not be committed to the mission but my guess is they will not have their wish granted because that would be inimical to the national interest and most people realize that. The politics of the issue are more appropriate elsewhere. This is a practices and methods, not a political board.

I am supposing that you are arguing simply for garnering the national commitment for doing it right. That said, it isn't clear how you would intend to do this since you don't say.

That would be the second incorrect supposition on your part. No 'national commitment' is required, merely the government's intention to continue the mission. I'll note that having been around since the very early '30s, I have yet to see a war in which we have been engaged that had a true 'national commitment.' WW II came very close but even it required a degree of State single-mindedness and coercion that has not existed since and is unlikely to lacking a war of national survival. Each subsequent war has had decidedly less -- and increasingly less -- 'national commitment.' That has generally been political and not necessarily practical.

Finally, my somewhat rambling prose is related to the subject in that IEDs must be seen in the larger context of the commitments we have across the globe. With a different strategy from the beginning, listening to the Israelis who had already dealt with IEDs, and force projection, the IED problem would not have been what it is today and has been for four years.

Being vaguely aware of those global commitments I believe I can see the broader context, certainly glimmers of it...

You say with a different strategy the IED problem would not be what it is. That means we would not be in Iraq as that is the only relevant strategic decision. Obviously true.

If you perhaps meant a different thrust operationally, that's possible. if you meant with different tactics, it is also possible. Note the latter two levels only provide a possibility of a lesser problem.

I believe that listening to the Israelis early on (late '03 and '04) at the behest of the then DepSecDef was done at some length. Doesn't seem to have helped much. You do know, I suppose, that the 'V' hull technology is South African, that we had been aware of it for years before the Israelis found out Hezbollah was just as smart as they were?

I'll also note that the US Army has dealt with IEDs for many years; from the Schu mines and off-route Panzerfausts of WW II and Korea through 105 and 155 shells and 500 and even 1,000 pound bombs buried in Viet Nam all cunningly emplaced and detonated by various means. They even did a few EFPs, a technique that also dates from WW II. We know how to deal with many things -- we just let egos get in the way and refuse to use our experience and apply lessons we learned with difficulty and unnecessary casualties. It's the American way.

Point? I am blaming the magnitude of the problem on senior leadership.

Magnitude of what problem? IEDs? If so, by magnitude do you mean the size, capability or quantity?