Detention operations and COIN

[PhilR]

Looking for any and all information that may relate to detention operations in COIN. I've gone through FM 3-24 and Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare. I am also aware of the recent article in Joint Force Quarterly.
What I am looking for goes beyond the TTPs of detainee treatment, how to interrogate, etc. I'm looking for anything that describes how detainee policies were used for IO effect (selective and general release programs, differing cultural perspectives on insurgents being detained vice being killed, etc.).
To my mind its the recognition that a counterinsurgent's COIN battlespace extends "behind the wire;" Its not just from the intelligence that may be gathered, but from the actual fact of detainees being held from a community and how their status may be used in the overall COIN battle. I think it must go beyond the law enforcement impetus to get bad guys off of the street (espeically if the community does not necessarily recognize them as "bad" guys).
Thanks.

[bismark17]

Check your email.

[JeffWolf]

Hi,

I got all three of these by googling "Chieu Hoi." The first two seem somewhat on-point, the last less so. Hope these are helpful.

Regards
Jeff

http://www.rand.org/commentary/082505NYT.html

http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniont...e26jenkin.html

http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_me...6/RM4830-2.pdf

[Mike in Hilo]

Phil: For post-release treatment so attractive as to be tailor-made for IO, and successful IO exploitation of this fact (granting of land titles to the former insurgents), you may wish to check out the EDCOR op in the Philippine Huk insurgency. MG Lansdale offers a couple of melodramatic (as was his wont) anecdotes in his book, In the Midst of Wars, but more useful details are likely available on the net. I'd be hardput to see direct Iraq applicability, but at the least it's a potential footnote for your project.

As you no doubt know from the literature, the undeniably (see the numbers!) successful Chieu Hoi project missed the boat on post-release follow up---Some ralliers were enlisted in the allied effort (scouts, propaganda team members, PRUs), but most of the 100K plus were left to sink or swim, sans monitoring, after release from the Chieu Hoi Centers.... In retrospect, the potential use of this manpower in, say, an expanded RD Cadre force composed of ralliers instead of urban draft dodgers, could have raised interesting possibilities...

(I mention this hypothetical alernative because I suspect this is the kind of thing you're looking for, if I've correctly understood your query. Such a return of the Hoi Chanh to their villages as an organized force didn't happen, though.)

Cheers,
Mike.

[Jim Rodgers]

It's not too detailed, but this is an account from the CO of the 306th MP BN -

http://www.wood.army.mil/mpbulletin/...dfs/Hussey.pdf

[Jedburgh]

Originally Posted by JeffWolf

....I got all three of these by googling "Chieu Hoi." The first two seem somewhat on-point, the last less so. Hope these are helpful....

You will find a tremendous amount of primary material on the Chieu Hoi program running searches in the Virtual Vietnam Archive, an outstanding resource.

Originally Posted by Jim Rodgers

It's not too detailed, but this is an account from the CO of the 306th MP BN....

Previously posted on SWC.

...also previously posted, but containing some discussion of the subject under discussion, both direct and tangential, is last year's reprint from RAND of Counterinsurgency: A Symposium, April 16-20, 1962

[JeffWolf]

Hi,

I came across this list on Amazon: PSEUDO-TERRORIST OPS: Deep Cover Military Sting Operations

Both this - How collusion was built into the system, and this - DOUBLE BLIND: The untold story of how British intelligence infiltrated and undermined the IRA, <Teague, Matthew, Atlantic Monthly Apr 06, Vol. 297, Issue 3> - deal with Northern Ireland.

This title sounds promising - From Coercion to Consent: Selective Amnesty and Reward Programs in COIN

Finally, I came across: Ramakrishna, Kumar. 2002. “‘Bribing the Reds to Give Up’: Rewards Policy in the Malayan Emergency.” 9 War in History 332.

Regards,
Jeff

[JeffWolf]

Hi,

I forgot to post this title:

The Dirty War: Covert Strategies and Tactics Used in Political Conflicts.

<http://www.amazon.com/Dirty-War-Strategies-Political-Conflicts/dp/041592281X/ref=si3_rdr_bb_product>

Regards
Jeff

[davidbfpo]

I'd recommend a closer look at the Northern Ireland situation, where it is commonly agreed jailing terrorists had a remarkable political impact and there was more pressure from prisoners on the political process than those outside exercised. Similar effect in South Africa. Indeed there is traffic in expertise between the two since peace.

Less well known here (in the UK) is the experience in Italy, with the Red Brigades and Spain, with ETA.

From a different angle the study of women suicide bombers held in Israeli jails has some lessons, best source I can readily find is:

http://www.labat.co.il/

Set up by an Israeli academic, Yoram Schweitzer.

davidbfpo

[Rank amateur]

From Mao's little red book. Pretty interesting, because he wasn't exactly a democrat. I read somewhere that it worked pretty well. His policies might be worth researching.

"Our policy towards prisoners captured from the Japanese, puppet or anti-Communist troops is to set them all free, except for those who have incurred the bitter hatred of the masses and must receive capital punishment and whose death sentence has been approved by the higher authorities. Among the prisoners, those who were coerced into joining the reactionary forces but who are more or less inclined towards the revolution should be won over in large numbers to work for our army. The rest should be released and, if they fight us and are captured again, should again be set free. We should not insult them, take away their personal effects or try to exact recantations from them, but without exception should treat them sincerely and kindly. This should be our policy, however reactionary they may be. It is a very effective way of isolating the camp of reaction."

"On Policy" (December 25, 1940), Selected Works, Vol. II, pp. 446-47.*

[PhilR]

I appreciate everyone's response. It has provided some leads and additional material to look at. I think this is a relatively understudied point. For many tactical commanders, it seems like once the intel has been pulled out of a detainee, the attitude is that they are now out of the picture and that is a good thing (I know this is probably an unfair generalization).
However, the detainees still count in the minds of the populace. Unless they are considered bad actors by the general populace, detaining them is not percieved as an action to protect the populace. This all plays into long term reconciliation and amnesty considerations.

[gh_uk]

Two additional sources:

Fran Lisa Buntman, Robben Island and Prisoner Resistance to Apartheid. Cambridge University Press (2003)
http://www.amazon.com/Robben-Island-...28/ref=ed_oe_p

Kieran McEvoy, Paramilitary Imprisonment in Northern Ireland: Resistance, Management, and Release, Oxford University Press, (2001)
http://www.amazon.com/Paramilitary-I...5717446&sr=1-2

The Buntman book is excellent and develops a theory of prisoner resistance (referred to as a 'continuum'); i.e. the different motivations and means by which 'political' prisoners exist in prison; it is also a useful account of how the ANC leadership prepared for its eventual move into government.

The McEvoy book is a slightly different book, not developing quite such a high level set of conclusions, but I don't think there is a single better detailed examination of PIRA's (and others) activities in prison.

[Rank amateur]

Originally Posted by PhilR

I appreciate everyone's response. It has provided some leads and additional material to look at. I think this is a relatively understudied point. For many tactical commanders, it seems like once the intel has been pulled out of a detainee, the attitude is that they are now out of the picture and that is a good thing (I know this is probably an unfair generalization).
However, the detainees still count in the minds of the populace. Unless they are considered bad actors by the general populace, detaining them is not percieved as an action to protect the populace. This all plays into long term reconciliation and amnesty considerations.

Good luck. Happy Thanksgiving. I know you're busy over there, but if you get a chance, let us what you've learned. (There's lots of very smart people here, thinking about their next deployment.)