What does the Military do in COIN?

[William F. Owen]

OK, so the clue is in the title.

a.) I am extremely sceptical of the “80% political” aphorism applied to so-called COIN.
b.) I do not believe – and my short time on this board is reinforcing this view, - that COIN is a valid area of worthy of discrete study, and separated from conflict in general. It’s like talking about policing from a purely counter-narcotics or traffic viewpoint.

So, I submit that the military contribution to what we choose to call COIN is primarily providing security for the activities (government, police, normal commercial and social activity/reform/change) and facilities that the insurgency chooses to target, as part of their campaign aims.

I would welcome views that contrast or conflict with my own.

[Ron Humphrey]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

OK, so the clue is in the title.

a.) I am extremely sceptical of the “80% political” aphorism applied to so-called COIN.
b.) I do not believe – and my short time on this board is reinforcing this view, - that COIN is a valid area of worthy of discrete study, and separated from conflict in general. It’s like talking about policing from a purely counter-narcotics or traffic viewpoint.

So, I submit that the military contribution to what we choose to call COIN is primarily providing security for the activities (government, police, normal commercial and social activity/reform/change) and facilities that the insurgency chooses to target, as part of their campaign aims.

I would welcome views that contrast or conflict with my own.

Military doesn't "do" COIN only in the sense that an insurgency is against a government and thus the government does COIN. Now if we look at the tools of government then very easily that translates down to political, social, physical interactions and thus a military just like local, state, and govt police must be the counter insurgent.

In this sense I agree

My stove doesn't "cook" food I do but without it I probably wouldn't get much cooked. Over-simplification I know but I do love OS'ing stuff

Now as to the validity of studying it in context I think I must respectfully disagree. To say that it doesn't require discreet, and /or distinct study separate from that of large scale warfare is I submit placing all ones eggs in one basket.

I would assume were one to speak to most those who specialize in Traffic or Counter-narcotics they would informed quite heartily of how different those jobs really are.

Running a restaurant requires both a Shef and a manager but I'm pretty sure those two and what they have to study to be effective are worlds apart as well.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

Military doesn't "do" COIN only in the sense that an insurgency is against a government and thus the government does COIN.

..and that is one of the most useful statements I have seen here! I am sure it may have been said before, but that is the clearest and simple explanation I have seen.

Thank you.

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

..and that is one of the most useful statements I have seen here! I am sure it may have been said before, but that is the clearest and simple explanation I have seen.

Thank you.

However, the military is an arm of the government, and thus does "do" COIN if it is directed to do so (and the preponderance of historical evidence suggests that it will be so directed no matter what its wishes may be). And providing the security for other governmental functions clearly does require a different skillset than conventional conflict. That alone, and understanding the limitations of military involvement (and the limitations of other government functions in COIN), clearly requires study. This is especially true for a country that lacks a national police force or some of the skills required for what might become paramilitary policing.

And for Ron's restaurant comparison, if you think a chef can also manage, watch a few episodes of "Kitchen Nightmares" sometime.... And I also suspect that a few of our LE members would argue that there is a distinct difference between counter-narcotics and traffic policing...at many levels.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

And providing the security for other governmental functions clearly does require a different skillset than conventional conflict.

But how is that different from saying Offensive Ops require different skills from defensive Ops? Security Operations may require a distinct skills set, but I do not see that it requires any form of specialisation.

...and yes, COIN needs to be studied, but my point is that it cannot be studied in isolation. Perhaps medicine would provide a better analogy than restaraunts or LE. All Surgeons are doctors. Not all doctors are surgeons. No one studies surgery without being a doctor.

...so, I can't see how someone can study COIN without studying military thought/science/doctrine in general. COIN at least has more credible credentials than those who claim to be "Terrorism Experts."

[Ron Humphrey]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

However, the military is an arm of the government, and thus does "do" COIN if it is directed to do so (and the preponderance of historical evidence suggests that it will be so directed no matter what its wishes may be). And providing the security for other governmental functions clearly does require a different skillset than conventional conflict. That alone, and understanding the limitations of military involvement (and the limitations of other government functions in COIN), clearly requires study. This is especially true for a country that lacks a national police force or some of the skills required for what might become paramilitary policing.

Exactly my point

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

But how is that different from saying Offensive Ops require different skills from defensive Ops? Security Operations may require a distinct skills set, but I do not see that it requires any form of specialisation.

...and yes, COIN needs to be studied, but my point is that it cannot be studied in isolation. Perhaps medicine would provide a better analogy than restaraunts or LE. All Surgeons are doctors. Not all doctors are surgeons. No one studies surgery without being a doctor.

...so, I can't see how someone can study COIN without studying military thought/science/doctrine in general. COIN at least has more credible credentials than those who claim to be "Terrorism Experts."

One would have to think it is immensely different. To use a medical analogy the study of medicine is mainly about living longer and maintaining health as such all doctors are alike in some way. Yet it is the diseases which occur which determine what type of treatment must be applied. In order to understand how to approach each one must take all factors into account and then address the root causes.

Viral vs Bacterial-
A bacterial infection can be addressed through application of certain meds, and some dietary considerations.

A viral infection many a times requires much more. Although medicine may not be effective directly against the virus itself it may be required to deal with the side effects of the virus. The flu is a good example in that you may have to put a lot of stuff into your system to keep hydrated, fever down etc. but in the end only time and rest can allow your own defenses to overcome that which is in you. Its a long hard painful process but thats just the way it goes.


In the end all conflict is conflict but it is the how's why's and what's that differentiate and those must be studied and understood in order to be of use

[Steve Blair]

I mentioned LE because it was in your original post.

...and yes, COIN needs to be studied, but my point is that it cannot be studied in isolation. Perhaps medicine would provide a better analogy than restaraunts or LE. All Surgeons are doctors. Not all doctors are surgeons. No one studies surgery without being a doctor.

Equating COIN with subsets of conventional warfare completely misses the point when it comes to the level of political oversight and allowable violence that comes with COIN. An army that's tailored and doctrinally conditioned to having everything its way once the first bullet flies is going to create more problems than it will solve in a COIN setting where bullets are not always the way. Ignoring that isn't going to make it go away, and dismissing it because you don't like it won't have any effect, either. It's been tried before....

Obviously studying COIN requires the understanding (at least at an advanced basic level) of other subsets of military activity. The same applies to history. But as a military historian I would not claim to also be an environmental historian or women's studies expert because I have mastered the basics of research and documentation. There are nuances and levels of learning in those fields that I haven't mastered, and by the same token most experts in those subsets don't have the depth to deal with military history (no matter how much they might think they do).

I have never claimed that one should study COIN to the exclusion of other areas. But by the same token I feel that excluding or marginalizing COIN because one simply doesn't like it is the wrong course of action. One size fits all warfare is much like one size fits all infantry. It makes a nice concept, but it just doesn't wear well in the field.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

Equating COIN with subsets of conventional warfare completely misses the point when it comes to the level of political oversight and allowable violence that comes with COIN.

I am not equating COIN as a subset of conventional warfare. I view COIN as conflict that is merely delineated, form any other, by aims and means.

I am very well aware of how armies keep messing up. My point is, that given that the differentiation between so-called "Conventional" and COIN, is primarily ones of aims and means, why do we insist on viewing either part as special or distinct?

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

I am not equating COIN as a subset of conventional warfare. I view COIN as conflict that is merely delineated, form any other, by aims and means.

I am very well aware of how armies keep messing up. My point is, that given that the differentiation between so-called "Conventional" and COIN, is primarily ones of aims and means, why do we insist on viewing either part as special or distinct?

Because it is quite often that differentiation between aims and means that makes particular operations distinct. The inability to make that distinction is what leads to the problems. Vietnam is one of the better-known examples of this, especially the period between 1965 and 1968, but there are other historical examples as well. I can think of a number of examples from the Indian Wars, although they tie mostly to the inability of commanders to shift from one operational framework to another.

Marc is better qualified to deal with the metaphysical factors, but I feel that one reason we do make the differentiation is to increase our ability to understand components of one of the most complicated of human activities. While at the end of the day it may come down to the pointy end of the stick, the many roads to that pointy end involve the shadings and complications that we study.

But be that as it may. I suspect we'll be agreeing to disagree quite soon.

[Rank amateur]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

why do we insist on viewing either part as special or istinct?

Because in conventional warfare killing the enemy is almost always a good idea, in COIN it can be counter productive.

Because attrition works in conventional warfare, but it doesn't in COIN, since the enemy can control his loss rate.

Because in conventional warfare the terrain is physical, in COIN it's human.

[Ken White]

And do that with each new generation???

a.) If by skeptical of the 80% you mean that any fixation on a specific number or even range is suspect, I agree. The political involvement can range from 0 to 100% and the old METT-TC bit applies. Target fixation is dangerous and led to a number of the military screwups mentioned above...

b.) It isn't worthy of discrete study -- but it is worthy of integrated (and integrating) study. Basic combat skills are universal. To successfully conduct a withdrawal under enemy pressure at night requires additional skills; to successfully conduct a day attack of a defensive position by infiltration requires a slightly different set of added skills. To conduct a conventional attack in a built up area requires yet other skills and to successfully employ force in a tailored fashion for a COIN operation still other skills. All require practice as well as study -- if, for no other reason to insure the practices home on the proper and needed skills.

Rank Amateur was on the right track (if a bit simplistically because neither his first or second points are always true). Then he got to his last bullet, that one ain't nearly that simple and even if it was, that human terrain is exceedingly complex and can lead one astray.

Gotta watch that target fixation syndrome...

And that's why COIN really isn't to be separated from conflict in general but must be integrated as merely one set of a number tactics, techniques and practices in a total training and employment of force regimen aimed at the application of armed force in conflict.

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

But be that as it may. I suspect we'll be agreeing to disagree quite soon.

Nah. I'm always on the look out for answers. I just like testing the limits of an argument! I may be autocratic and didactic but I try not to be stupid!

[Hacksaw]

Wilf,

Thanks for asking the question, its one we deal with on a daily basis in my office/activity.

I agree that the 80% - 20% "truism" is less than informative when interpretted literally. As an example, I'd challenge anyone to tell me which 80% of operations in theater a commander can expect someone from state or aid to come in and do for their unit in their operational space. However, I think it is useful if you bend the saying a bit and rephrase as "usually 80% of what is important in a COIN situation involves those things that the average person expects a functioning govt to provide." That rings more true, and would remind a commander to broaden his aperature when examining his operational space.

As a general rule, I tend to agree with Wilf - I don't think that essential leader skills/traits are all that different between a COIN and conventional environment. Thinking, adapting, and courage (physical and moral) are still critical... so long as we continue to produce leaders with those traits we are in good shape.

I think the most critical distinction between COIN and other combat actions involves how a leader thinks about his environment. In a conventional fight a leader is far more intent on changing the situation by shaping the environment, in a COIN operation it is more about changing the situation by understanding and leveraging the environment. A nuanced but distinct difference. This requires a change in mindset as well as TTP. It is still a mixed bag out there in BCT land.

As a side note, we were discussing in the office what is the true "takeaway" beyond OIF/OEF. Is it that we need to maintain COIN competencies? Maybe, but we certainly will not/should not maintain the same level of competenciy (full spectrum requirement). Is it that we need a seperate advisor and/or COIN corps? again probably not, will need to accept risk somewhere...

We continued our mental master... until we arrived at this as the best expression of what we've learned (and it applies across the spectrum).... If we've learned nothing else it is that we need to empower tactical leaders, encourage initiative and well considered risk taking, and underwrite honest mistakes, The training spectrum pendulum will swing back and forth and that is OK based on the flavor of the decade, but we cannot/should not return to a micromanaging/staff focused Army. That is exactly the Army we had when we tipped the "port'o'pot" otherwise known as Iraq (this is really the pot calling the kettle black).

That's my $.02 from the cheap seats

Live well and row

[Ken White]

Or irreverent. Or both.

Originally Posted by Hacksaw

...
As a side note, we were discussing in the office what is the true "takeaway" beyond OIF/OEF. Is it that we need to maintain COIN competencies? Maybe, but we certainly will not/should not maintain the same level of competenciy (full spectrum requirement)...

I'm not sure what you mean here. If you mean that we should train for all spectrums of combat and realize that by so doing, none will be at optimum or the highest level of competence level and that is acceptable because we will always have to tweak depending upon METT-TC -- then I agree and suggest that history is on my side, the Army has in fact done that before and did it fairly well...

...Is it that we need a seperate advisor and/or COIN corps? again probably not, will need to accept risk somewhere...

True in broad measure, certainly not an advisory corps. However, a small crew at CAC and in the field -- ala the TMAAG concept -- would be wise and prudent. What we emphatically should not do is try to bury the unpleasant monster again; we saw how well that worked.

We continued our mental master... until we arrived at this as the best expression of what we've learned (and it applies across the spectrum).... If we've learned nothing else it is that we need to empower tactical leaders, encourage initiative and well considered risk taking, and underwrite honest mistakes, ...(emphasis added /kw)

Target. Out.

You guys do good work...

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Ken White

What we emphatically should not do is try to bury the unpleasant monster again; we saw how well that worked.

And this is where my historical cynicism kicks in. The US military has an unfortunate history of burying the monster...only to regret it a handful of years later. To its credit, the system has done a better job of reorienting this time around than it has in the past, but I would prefer to avoid such "growing pains" in the future.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Steve Blair

... I would prefer to avoid such "growing pains" in the future.

So would the potential unnecessary WIA and KIA caused by refusal to face reality, I suspect...

[Hacksaw]

Quick answer to Ken's question is yes, I meant that the pendulum can and should swing back to account for a broader range of missions than we currently train to today, and that's OK so long as the training flavor du jour is the most likely as opposed to our favorite form of gunnery...

We are trying hard out here in CAC-land to get those niche things like TMAG-F and TT training into the future correct (right-sized) and the COIN Center is trying to get at the integration/implementation of the body of knowledge found in 3-24 and as a minimum capturing the most relevant aspects of the monster just so we don't forget which is the dangerous end...

Think what it would mean for the future if the Army became known as the employer of choice for the college graduates who want to be empowered, trusted, challenged, and adventurous.... Some of us would like to think that is our Army's reputation because we like to view ourselves that way... but if we are honest we'd admit that most of our less-informed relatives were more likely to ask us why we still hung out in the Army and swallowed our pride "yes siring" our way through life.

That's an Army I'd like to serve in...

Live well and row

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Hacksaw

Quick answer to Ken's question is yes, I meant that the pendulum can and should swing back to account for a broader range of missions than we currently train to today, and that's OK so long as the training flavor du jour is the most likely as opposed to our favorite form of gunnery...

Gunnery has METRICS, it's objective, it's concrete...

The foregoing said with tongue firmly in cheek.

Side note, I've seen more than a few tracks clobbered by poor gunnery and good tactics by the opposition who defeated superior gunnery and no tactics by us. Just because it's subjective doesn't mean it should be avoided (and yeah, that over simplifies the problem. But...)

We are trying hard out here in CAC-land to get those niche things like TMAG-F and TT training into the future correct (right-sized) and the COIN Center is trying to get at the integration/implementation of the body of knowledge found in 3-24 and as a minimum capturing the most relevant aspects of the monster just so we don't forget which is the dangerous end...

Works for me -- and will for thousands of others...

Think what it would mean for the future if the Army became known as the employer of choice for the college graduates who want to be empowered, trusted, challenged, and adventurous...

Been my dream for over 50 years - and it is achievable! Go for it.

...Some of us would like to think that is our Army's reputation because we like to view ourselves that way... but if we are honest we'd admit that most of our less-informed relatives were more likely to ask us why we still hung out in the Army and swallowed our pride "yes siring" our way through life.

That's too close to today's reality for comfort but it doesn't have to stay that way. You guys have brought in a lot of needed change. Keep on pushing.

Thanks for the response.

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

...and yes, COIN needs to be studied, but my point is that it cannot be studied in isolation. Perhaps medicine would provide a better analogy than restaurants or LE. All Surgeons are doctors. Not all doctors are surgeons. No one studies surgery without being a doctor.

An LE example is just like your Doctor example and one of the main advantages that a police force would have. Everybody is a Cop first, doesn't matter if you fly a plane or a water patrol boat or land on foot or car, motorcycle, horse back, etc. There is another thread on here discussing who should control UAV's the Air Force or Army those types of turf battles would be not happen in a police department, because like I said everybody is a Policeman first, what vehicle you drive or what medium you patrol air,land,sea makes no difference. You use whatever you need in whatever environment to catch the bad guy.

[William F. Owen]

So, if as an Army-armed force, I seek to address either a domestic or non-domestic insurgency by Protecting

a.) the civilian population
b.) the Police
c.) those activities that allow and create functioning local government

...what am I doing wrong? At the simplest level, what else is there to do?