Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations

[Gian P Gentile]

Here is an excellent and insightful essay by scholar Richard Kohn on the future of American Civil-Military Relations looking toward the aftermath of Iraq.

Coming Soon: A Crisis in Civil-Military Relations

[Rob Thornton]

I don't know. I certainly respect the author, but some of the better points and recommendations were hard to separate from emotion - and for an article that indicated the need to bring the military back to being more apolitical in its relationship with elected leadership there was a bit too much drama for me.

I would like to highlight this point:

The next administration will need to establish a precedent for strict civilian control from the outset, all the while spending political capital on national defense and boosting the morale of what will likely be an anxious force.

bold added by RT

There are different ways to interpret the implementation of that recommendation. Secretary Rumsfeld had a perspective on how to maintain civilian control, and while there should be an unequal dialogue, there must be dialogue.

The best way to exercise civilian control over the military in my opinion is to lead - to inspire confidence, to make smart decisions about the employment of military power and recognize it limitations to achieve political ends, to show wisdom regarding direction and the development of domestic and foreign policies, to publically articulate the congruencies between the two, to impart trust where it is earned, and to eschew demonstrating control just to make a point.

I'd agree that in terms of selecting civilian and senior military leadership, a potential president is far better served to consider temperament, candidness, ability, and personality to serve in those positions, rather then selecting them based off advocacy, sycophancy, nepotism, etc. It will take a strong leader indeed to separate out natural bias and resist temptation of serving personal or political agendas vs. serving the nation.

I think our military culture will scrutinize potential leaders more on their personal beliefs & commitments (meaning how they reflect those beliefs held closest by the military) and how they demonstrate them, vs. their allegiance to one of the two parties.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

He blows hot and cold on the topic.

LINK.

LINK.

[John T. Fishel]

Generally, the best predictor of events at t+1 is what happened at t and t-1. While this incremental understanding isn't always correct it is correct much more often than not. I suggest that we view t as today, t-1 as the the Rumsfeld era, and t-2 as the Clinton Presidency.

One of my friends who worked in the Clinton era OSD complained that the Joint Staff ran roughshod over OSD because it was simply better prepared and better organized. Under Rumsfeld, OSD generally bullied the Joint Staff and the Service Chiefs. My sense was that civil military relations were far more tense than they had been in both the Clinton and Bush 41 presidencies. (I was at NDU from Dec 1997 thru June 2006.) But there was also significant tension within the Rumsfeld OSD so it was not only a civil military issue.

Currently, it appears to me that Secretary Gates has moved things back toward a more reasonable equilibrium.

Structurally, both OSD and the Joint Staff are represented on the NSC committees from the sub-PCC level to the Principals Committee. Indeed, as a flag officer said (during the Clinton Admin) in my presence, DOD usually has two votes on every issue and if we coordinate in advance we can often get what we want. Doesn't sound like a crisis in CMR to me. Moreover, I would argue that that did not change regardless of who was SECDEF or POTUS.

I would also argue that those who think there will be a crisis in CMR in the next administration should consider that the major discord is most likely to be between DOD (both civilian and military) and other institutions. There was a crisis (and still is) in the nature of the relationship between DOD and other departments with national security responsibilities. particularly DOS. Not because of different values and policy positions so much as because of the differential that exists in terms of resources. It is that which is in many ways the real obstacle to effective dialogue.

Bottom line: No crisis, some tension - perhaps more, perhaps less depending on who is POTUS and who is SECDEF and who staffs OSD. True regardless of the Party in the White House.

Cheers

JohnT

[Ken White]

about it but as an ancient, I've seen this in various guises off and on since 1948. There will always be tension but there are too many logical and sensible pressures to allow it to reach crisis proportions.

Kohn makes several questionable assertions:

Fast forward to 2008. The president elected in November will inherit a stinking mess, one that contains the seeds of a civil-military conflict as dangerous as the crisis that nearly sank the Clinton team in 1993.

Obviously he and I define 'conflict,' 'crisis,' 'dangerous' and 'sank' quite differently. That Gays in the military issue of 1993 was a minor kerfluffle, nothing more, to most of the nation -- and he forgets that while the Armed Forces did object and so state (while saying that if ordered, they would do what they were told), the Congress went ballistic over it; they're the folks that caused Bill to back off. Hyperbole and omission does little to appeal to reason.

He also states

It follows that no candidate will be elected without promising some sort of disengagement (from Iraq)

Pure speculation on his part -- as is much of his article.

I'm reminded of Dunlap's Parameters coup tale...

[John T. Fishel]

In the words of Bill O'Reilly, "pithy" (is good).

Cheers

JohnT

[max161]

What does the constitution envision as civilian control? Rhetorical question I Know. It is the President as CINC and Congress. It did not envision OSD and all the civilian political appointees controlling the military. Even the National Security Act of 1947 and Goldwater Nichols still give the Chairman and joint chiefs as the military advisors to the President and all the service chiefs and combatant commanders still testify before congress. The civilian political appointees while important are not the ones, in. My humble opinion who provide civilian control of the military. That authority and responsibility lies with the President and Congres.. V/R Dave

[Bill Moore]

Four problems, in particular, will intensify the normal friction: the endgame in Iraq, unsustainable military budgets, the mismatch between twenty-first century threats and a Cold War military establishment, and social issues, gays in the military being the most incendiary.

As the author stated the tension between the natin's civilian leadership and their military forces is healthy "IF" it encourages open debate. That didn't happen under LBJ, it didn't happen under Bill Clinton, and it didn't happen under the current administration. It isn't a political party issue, it is a leadership issue. If the next President and his/her administration are encouraged to debate behind closed doors to develop a consensus on the best way ahead (after all voices were heard and seriously considered), we'll do fine as a nation.

The author mentioned key four trouble areas quoted above:

1. The endgame in Iraq. Let's face facts, military leaders are divided among themselves on the best course of action, as the author stated the next administration will inherit a mess, where there may not be any good answers, but rather some will be less bad. In my opinion, the scary part is that the democratic candidates are using withdrawing from Iraq as a platform to win votes. That may mean that they have already made a decision, so there will be a complete absence of the healthy debate and joint problem solving methodology mentioned earlier. However, will be any worse than the discord between the administration (when mr Rumfield was SECDEF) and the military in the 03-07 period?

2. Unstainable military budgets. First off, the reality is we will have to pay a fair price to refit our equipment regardless of the war status. Exactly where will the cuts be? The Air Force (I hate to admit it) needs more money to modernize their aircraft. I'm not sure where the Navy is with their funding. I think the funding challenges that the Army and USMC face are well known. I'm not sure the next administration can afford to cut the military budget much. They may reallocate priorities, which may need to be done. The final comment on this is that Congress often directs military spending. If I recall the article correctly a Sen from one of our southern States directed that the Navy buy submarines they didn't want or need. Regardless of the specifics, DoD spending is a cash cow for Congressmen to generate jobs and investment in their locales. It always has been.

3. Cold War Military Institution. I think this comment is a little dated, the military has generally been doing a good job of adjusting to projected threat environments, but I also think we still need to maintain some of our Cold War capabilities to deter emerging threats from Russia, China, and elsewhere. Light strike forces won't deter certain foes, but strategic bombers and missiles will.

4. Social Issues: The military has led the way many times in promoting social change based on directives from our national leadership, which by the way generally reflect the mood of the nation. We all know we have gays in our ranks, and most of us don't care if we're not confronted with it. I am sure I can find quotes from the past that the Army will be destroyed if we integrate the races. The debate over gender still rages on, as there are some real issues, not simply bias, that need to be resolved, but none the less women are enjoying more responsibility on the front lines now than ever. Obviously that wasn't true, nor are a number of other myths out there. If some Generals want to resign over a directed social change, then that is their right, but the military will still be here.

I think the article is off base. Four years from now we'll have different challenges, different issues we'll debate, but most importantly we'll still be effectively defending our nation.

[SteveMetz]

Dick is a brilliant guy and I find his work useful, but he's been predicting a "crisis" of civil-military relations for more than a decade now.

[Ron Humphrey]

There would seem there may be a crisis of some sort related to interactions between the military and civilians in one way. That would be education.

What happens if you have Organization a: who's job is to defend
Now whenever a defends they know they have to do other things like rebuild, train, etc and thus they dedicate large amounts of time and money to ensuring their members are well prepared and educated to understand how to do this.

In a democracy ORG a: recieves its guidance to perform from Org C: and is generally directed and provided financing by ORG C: thus ORG a: tries very hard to communicate well with ORG C: personnel.

(Now here comes the crisis)

Because ORG a: dedicates its resources to making its members capable of doing its own job and also understanding how ORG C: jobs are performed so there will be less misunderstandings.

Problem 1 - Military are increasingly more proficient in not only war but also diplomatic and reconstruction efforts as well as fiscal and social considerations within that spectrum. They are recieving more training then ever on just this not to mention the experiences from current operations.

They depend on government entities to provide the diplomatic and social support personnel, (as it should be in the long run).

More often than should be those military members have better educational background and experience in those very areas then the personnel they are working with from other govt. entities.

The underlying question is whose fault it is that those charged with fulfilling these roles in coordination with the military have not been given the opportunities for training and education in those areas.

(NO dig at any one person or institution but more a review of what the realities are of what needs to be addressed)

The military has recognized this and has done what they can towards integrating training but what efforts should be taken by the other govt entities in order to facilitate it further.

[selil]

Originally Posted by SteveMetz

Dick is a brilliant guy and I find his work useful, but he's been predicting a "crisis" of civil-military relations for more than a decade now.

I think you especially could make a case that we're in the midst of a crisis currently, but those living history rarely realize the significance of the moment.

I'm thinking about things that you've said about political realities (accepting the way things are versus they should be). That supports a thesis that things are broken on some side of the equation. Other off hand comments (and in depth discussion) such as the political turmoil of tactical decision making, micro management from the highest levels, officer retention, recruitment, and so much more suggest a larger problem.

Dunlaps article on the coming coup discusses the extension of the military into traditionally civilian missions, private military contractors, the advancement of war into societal problems (drugs, poverty, etc.), retention of good officers, and the over politicization of the promotion process. All issues we've discussed here on SWC/SWJ.

People who lived through the great depression had no idea what was going on. The often referred to it as "hard times". Could we be living through the genesis of a new era in military and civilian relations?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by selil

I think you especially could make a case that we're in the midst of a crisis currently, but those living history rarely realize the significance of the moment.

If that's true, then we've been living in one since 1946. I've seen disconnects far worse than anything today from the Admiral's Revolt through Uncertain Trumpet, Viet Nam and its aftermath and the Clinton years.

I'm thinking about things that you've said about political realities (accepting the way things are versus they should be). That supports a thesis that things are broken on some side of the equation. Other off hand comments (and in depth discussion) such as the political turmoil of tactical decision making, micro management from the highest levels, officer retention, recruitment, and so much more suggest a larger problem.

My old man was in the Navy, I initially enlisted in 1949 so I've been paying attention to those factors you cite and more since about 1944 -- they all have always been a problem of one magnitude or another. I don't know the exact figures for the Officer shortage in the early '60s but it was significant. I don't see how an Army could not have a recruiting problem with a war going on. Micro management has always been around, it got severely exacerbated during the McNamara and Viet Nam era for totally understandable reasons (and what's been done can be undone...)

Dunlaps article on the coming coup discusses the extension of the military into traditionally civilian missions, private military contractors, the advancement of war into societal problems (drugs, poverty, etc.), retention of good officers, and the over politicization of the promotion process. All issues we've discussed here on SWC/SWJ.

True. All problems, too. No one ever promised we'd get really smart politicians -- or flag Officers -- that would run problem free environments. Dunlap lives in a dream world, in a sense; he wants things done his way. Unlikely.

People who lived through the great depression had no idea what was going on. The often referred to it as "hard times". Could we be living through the genesis of a new era in military and civilian relations?

We do communicate on a vastly greater and far more rapid scale now as opposed to then. That's a mixed blessing. We're better informed -- add to that we're also more reliant, dependent even, on the government -- and thus more ready to see the sky falling...

It isn't.

Edited to add:

On a relook, the above sounds more dismissive than I am or meant to be. There is a tension, no question -- however, I believe that such tension between the armed forces and the society from which they come is a truth in any society and that said tension is amplified in a relatively free and open democracy. That tension isn't just here, a quick glance at media outlets around the world show that all the western democracies have the tension and have compatability or support problems of one form or another. The Brits are having a rougher a go than we are and the Germans with no war to speak of aren't much better off...

As a nephew of mine said of his cousin, then in Afghanistan, "Well, I'm glad he and some other guys are willing to do that so I don't have to -- but I think they're nuts."

That tension has a long history in this country; witness the turmoil over the Order of Cincinnatus in its early days. Only for about a generation after the mass Armies of the Civil War and WW II has that tension eased a slight bit and even then, it flared on occasion. The drives of a military organization and an open society are at odds with each other.

IMO, they should be at odds with each other and that is no bad thing; indeed, it's healthy, I think.

[Rob Thornton]

Ken,

I initially enlisted in 1949 so I've been paying attention to those factors you cite and more since about 1944

When I initially read that the theme from "Happy Days" kicked in - then I realized I was really thinking "swing", "big band" and "crooner" tunes

Hard not to think about that line from Sam Elliot in "We were Soldiers.." too - "One of you sunzabitchez calls me Grandad and ...."

[Ken White]

Unlike Sam's character in the movie, Basil Plumley (who probably didn't say that) I don't much care what I'm called, particularly if it's sort of irrelevant to what I said.

When they were filming the flick at Benning, Sam went up to Dahlonega on his own and spent a day with the troops to get a feel for the nuances. The son was an RI then and the troops appreciated the effort and liked Sam.

Cole Porter IS better than Coldplay, though...

[sandbag]

(enough lurking; time to post!)

I have to admit that I feel sad when one of my former commanders publicly comments/becomes involved in politics. I think Marshall was right.

[ipopescu]

Four problems, in particular, will intensify the normal friction: the endgame in Iraq, unsustainable military budgets, the mismatch between twenty-first century threats and a Cold War military establishment, and social issues, gays in the military being the most incendiary.

I am not persuaded that the problems mentioned by Dr. Kohn (save for a catastrophic result in Iraq) would lead to a significant new crisis in civ-mil relations, but I believe there is one other more worrisome aspect worth mentioning. I believe we do not yet have a clear theoretical understanding of how civilian and military leaders ought to interact outside traditional state-on-state warfare. Huntington's division of labor model (recently discussed favorably by Michael Desch in Foreign Affairs) looks to me to be hard to apply in most modern day situations. There are at least a couple of situations I could think of when the traditional model is less than helpful.
-When you are involved in COIN, it's unreasonable to expect the military to win the war simply by virtue of their professional expertise, due to the many non-military aspects involved. Thus, the political leaders should not expect that they could just make the decision to launch such a campaign and then wait for the military to accomplish all the political results and deliver "victory" as they would do in a traditional war.
- Regarding the Fallon controversy, the more I keep trying to figure out why we ended up in the situation of having to lose such a valuable commander, the more I believe it's also due to a lack of understanding of how civ-mil relations ought to be conducted in our strategic environment. The Combatant Commander position to me looks much closer to that of an ambassador than that of a theater commander. And to the best of my understanding, the duties and responsibilities of a COCOM are very different than those of high-level generals throughout (modern) history. Fallon seemed to be much more involved in diplomatic and strategic matters than in planning or executing military operations. Thus, I don't think it is at all clear that the old model of civ-mil can be successfully applied to the relation between a COCOM and the President.
I don't have any clear solutions to these issues, but I am curious to see what others may think...

[Old Eagle]

A coupla points

1. The piece is provocative, as I'm sure it's meant to be. Great points to ponder.

2. There's a little too much hyperbole for me, but I'm old and set in my ways.

3. He's not one of us. Sorry, but he really doesn't understand how we interact with our civilian bosses. The military, left to its own design would not be nearly as innovative as we pretend. By the same token, we don't routinely mutiny against each new idea/concept/agenda. We're much more stable, but open minded than the civilians (including defense academics) give us credit for. Seven Days in May?

4. Our pol-mil system is about as balanced as any I've seen in many years and in many countries. In one country I was in, all military officer positions, battalion commander and above were apportioned by party membership. Not a good system. Gives new meaning to the term "Clintonista generals" whereby somebody thinks that anybody promoted to/within the GO level between 1992 and 2000 has left-leaning tendencies. At the other extreme, there is the British civil service, where the long term professionals are virtually impervious to change. If you haven't seen the BBC series, "Yes, Minister", it's really worth a look. In our system, we import political appointees only at the higher levels. The military and civilian bureaucracy soldiers on, but in response to the political guidance of the new administration. If it weren't this way, there would be little reason to elect new administrations. The changes promised by the various candidates would be even more meaningless, because there would be no method of impacting the system.

All that said, the civ-mil crisis is not the one outlined by the author.

More on that later.

[Hacksaw]

IPOPESCU,
I must caveat that I am not a scholar regarding the role of a COCOM CDR, but I did serve in close proximity to one for 6 mths. Based on that limited experience...

Your assumption regarding the COCOM as more ambassador than warfighter is partly right. For the most part a COCOM CDR is the diplomatic face of the US Govt with regard to his assigned REGION. Ambassadors look inside borders -- COCOMs look across borders. As such they often carry more diplomatic clout than any single ambassador and they must be in sync with the executive branch. Often the more thornier issues are the actions of an ambassador and the cross-border implications for dealing with the region. My read is that ADM Fallon found it increasingly difficult to remain in sync with policies of the exec branch, and rightly excussed himself from service.

As for your concern about losing ADM Fallon's service... I wouldn't be. As a general rule these guys don't drop of the face of the earth (see GEN Zinni) they just move into a new role. Plus the bench is not exactly empty, we just might have to dig down into the two-star ranks to find the right fit.

However, I think you miss the mark if you disregard the COCOMs role as military commander. As much as the services like to be perceived as playing nice together--it is at the COCOM level that this type of integration actually occurs. COCOMs definitely have a role in campaign design and force composition--they just fill the other (mil-dip) role as well.

just more stray voltage for consideration--Live well and row

[Norfolk]

Originally Posted by selil

I think you especially could make a case that we're in the midst of a crisis currently, but those living history rarely realize the significance of the moment.

I'm thinking about things that you've said about political realities (accepting the way things are versus they should be). That supports a thesis that things are broken on some side of the equation. Other off hand comments (and in depth discussion) such as the political turmoil of tactical decision making, micro management from the highest levels, officer retention, recruitment, and so much more suggest a larger problem.

Dunlaps article on the coming coup discusses the extension of the military into traditionally civilian missions, private military contractors, the advancement of war into societal problems (drugs, poverty, etc.), retention of good officers, and the over politicization of the promotion process. All issues we've discussed here on SWC/SWJ.

People who lived through the great depression had no idea what was going on. The often referred to it as "hard times". Could we be living through the genesis of a new era in military and civilian relations?

Rather agreed. The potential difference here is that the military is not only engaged in very many "non-military" roles and tasks, and for many years now, but will be doing so for at least several more. Since the the 1990's, an increasingly large proportion of the military's operations have been OOTW, and with Afghanistan and Iraq, like operations have become, in practice, its bread-and-butter. This is due in no small part to the more or less effective (though not necessarily always physical), absence of other Government agencies in strength in OOTW, and of course, the military finds itself forced to delve deep and long into "non-military" matters, such that the officer corps and the soldiery can't help but be affected by it.

And this state of affairs is not going to end in the near future; indeed, depending upon both future events and the next administration, the military's over-committment to OOTW may well continue beyond the foreseeable future. Then we will be into new territory, and at that point we may find ourselves with some solid cause for worry.

[Van]

1st:

When Bill Clinton won the presidency in November 1992, few could have anticipated that his first crisis would be a full-blown clash with the armed forces

LMAO. Pres. Bush Sr. set Pres. Clinton up. Not necessarily deliberately, but set up regardless. G.H.W.B. got us into a humanitarian operation (Somalia) that was insanely risky at the end of his tenure (because of the pressure from political left). Bush Sr.'s mistake was the belief that you could have a 'neutral' deployment (it wasn't neutral, we were favoring the people that the warlords didn't want fed). Still, he could have recovered as he had a clear timeline for withdrawal, and a clear, limited scope of operations. If W.J.C. had followed the plan laid down by Bush Sr. there wouldn't have been anywhere near the problem. Clinton got (misguidedly) altruistic and expanded the scope of the operations, trying to negotiate with thugs. In the process, he (Pres. Clinton) placed State Dept and the Military in a more-than-than usually advisarial relationship.

At the end, the Democratic party walked away feeling that the military didn't listen to civilians (when the soldiers were irreconcilibly confused by conflicting guidance), and that the Republicans would do anything to make them look bad.

The

full-blown clash with the armed forces

was self-inflicted (and only got worse when Pres. Clinton ordered U.S. forces into what was fundamentally a European problem- Yugoslavia- in '95).

Norfolk said:

Since the the 1990's, an increasingly large proportion of the military's operations have been OOTW

Ummm... Since the 1990s, we have returned to the reality that OOTW and Small Wars are the norm, and the big dramatic mid-to high-intesity fight is the exception that we have to be ready for. Other than that, I agree with Norfolk.