Lawrence and his Message - by Robert Bateman @ the SWJ Blog

[Rob Thornton]

I thought Robert Bateman's latest blog had some good insights - it is all too often that we take what sounds like a good piece of advice from its proper context and apply it liberally to whatever ails us.

However, I think he basically uses the same the same type of bias in his closing paragraph:

From Blog:

If Lawrence were still around, working as a strategist for the Iranians, for example, he would certainly be advocating this position. After all, so long as the greater part of the land combat power of the United States is consumed in attempting to squelch violence in Iraq, those forces cannot be used elsewhere. He would, as he did along the Hejaz railway, recommend calibrated support to agitated elements inside Iraq. His advice to his higher command would be that they never allow the pressure to drop so much that we withdraw after declaring a victory, nor raising the pressure so high that we actually quit the place. Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina.

I think its wrong to assume Lawrence would try and advocate the same position as though the political context of his time could be laid down upon the current one. The Iraqis are not the Bedu, Iraq is not Arabia as Lawrence knew it. The Americans are not the Ottomans or the Germans. Iran is Iran, and the political context of today is different for a number of reasons. Iran may or may not view its interests as keeping a large U.S. presence in Iraq, from our standpoint we are strengthening Iran's neighbor who also happens to have been a formidable enemy in the not too distant past. Our presence there and our commitment to regional allies could also be seen as standing in the way of Iran extending its influence.

I think a legitimate argument could be made that if Iran continues to foment distrust against its Arab neighbors across the Gulf, and if it continues to threaten Israel, and if it continues to support terrorism, and if it continues to support proxies, and if it continues to pursue a nuclear program that seems geared toward nuclear armament, then it will create a political context that put it at odds in the region and possibly with regard to much of the West.

If Iraq gains strength militarily, economically and politically (and I believe it will) - it alters the context further. With its oil revenue, Iraq stands to be a different state then it was under Saddam. Its a combination of its how it is reforming (yes it is slow, and it is violent - political transformation usually is) and its economic potential that stand to make it among the most powerful states in the region. Its alliance with the United States - and yes I call them an ally, and the process which have grown its institutions will make it a formidable regional player.

My point is the same one that Robert Bateman used in developing the argument - context matters. The conditions and all the possibilities must be considered. I'm not so sure that:

His advice to his higher command would be that they never allow the pressure to drop so much that we withdraw after declaring a victory, nor raising the pressure so high that we actually quit the place. Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina.

is sound advice to Iranian leadership, we are not just sitting idly by allowing ourselves to be strategically fixed - there is more to our end then extracting ourself from Iraq. There is also the question of crossing a threshold you did not intend to cross by upping the ante with regard to "keeping up the pressure" and triggering an event you did not anticipate, or wish to happen, after all, this an environment where chance often influences policy in unanticipated ways.

Best, Rob

[SWJED]

... the link.

[Ken White]

"Iraq, through the eyes of Lawrence, is our Medina."

Cool. Except the issue is how we see it. Besides, Lawrence is dead...

[Tom Odom]

As a historical metaphor. Rob, I have used Lawrence twice in the past 5 years to illustrate what was happening with the insurgency in Iraq via my history lessons.

The problem with Bateman's sourcing is that he would have been on much safer ground had he done the same. Seven Pillars of Wisdom is a turgid, wandering, and very much self-promotying memoir that has been effectively challenged with regards to accuracy.

You can read a better essay by Lawrence here at The Evolution of Revolt

My last use of this essay is introduced in the attachment.

Tom

[JJackson]

While I know little about Lawrence beyond a bit of general knowledge, Bateman’s post and that film the conclusion – if not the route taken to get there - seems valid.
The conclusion being this part from Rob’s original post.

After all, so long as the greater part of the land combat power of the United States is consumed in attempting to squelch violence in Iraq, those forces cannot be used elsewhere.

Many of you have significant military backgrounds and I have none but it seems to me looking at it from the position of an Iranian military strategist this would make perfect sense.
That it would be in Iran’s interests to keep the US forces occupied elsewhere would seem obvious. The one recent occurrence most likely to influence their thinking would have been the NIE report - which knocked the wind out of some of the more hawkish sails and so will have reduced their fear of attack. As seen from an Iranian standpoint up until the NIE report a quick clean Phase III to Phase IV transition – a la Rumsfeld, Feith & friends – would have left the US with troops free to deal with another axis-of-evil target. A little aid to those in a position to keep those forces otherwise engaged would seem to be a cost effective solution.
Faced with a similar problem in Afghanistan the US supplied the insurgents in the same way – training, weapons. As they were militarily and diplomatically fire proof they were unconcerned about the source of supply being traced back to them, they also supplied MANPADs. One suspects that a traceable supply of man-portable anti-amour or air-defence would, in this context, be enough to provoke an attack on Iran.

[Steve Blair]

I just replied to this one...spurred on more by Gian's little snip than Bateman's entry, honestly. He does take the example out of context, and like Tom I've seen many serious questions raised about the Seven Pillars and indeed the overall impact of Lawrence in the area. There's good points there, to be sure, but I think the conclusion is a bit shaky.

JJackson, I moved my original reply to better deal with the points you raised. While the situation may look similar on the surface, there are in fact a great many differences both in terms of the overall strategic situation and the makeup of the groups involved. For the Ottoman Empire, Arabia was a weak flank - menaced by a sizable British force in the bargain. They lacked the manpower and transportation infrastructure (which they had in common with all WW I powers) to deal with multiple threats, and Lawrence's activities posed major problems for them in this regard. The Ottoman army was also a fairly weak reed in this theater, and it was facing an invigorated command under Allenby. Given the WW I framework, abandoning the region wasn't an option for them.

That said, in realpolitik terms the US has more options than the Turks did when facing Lawrence. Currently we do have a large number of ground forces in Iraq, but they aren't tied there by the same considerations that kept the Turks locked in place. Remember, I'm not talking from the morally right or wrong standpoint here, but what could be considered international 'reality.' The US could easily declare victory and leave, or taper off the ground force presence under a pretext similar to that used in South Vietnam (where we pulled out and stayed out in terms of ground forces in the face of two major attacks on our ally).

And, as Rob points out, since this isn't taking place against the backdrop of a major world conflict, there are many variables that Lawrence didn't have to consider. Since the situation hasn't escalated yet (at least in "world war" terms), both sides have to consider the possibility that it could jump into areas neither want to go to.

Interesting article, but again I think he's taking history out of context.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve, Well said:

Since the situation hasn't escalated yet (at least in "world war" terms), both sides have to consider the possibility that it could jump into areas neither want to go to.

I think it comes down to misunderstanding the stakes for one side or another (or as Clausewitz said "the object in view"), and the lengths that a side is willing to go to secure those ends. It would be a mistake for anyone to assume that because the bulk of our land power (meaning that which we use to compel others through through displacement and occupation of the same space) is involved in Iraq and Afghanistan that we are unable to employ the military element of national power toward a political end.

Its worth considering that any state that has an economy such as Iran has plenty of fixed site assets, and plenty that must be mobile to exert influence or fulfill their function, and as such they are at risk. Having said that, the damage done in terms of disrupting energy resources to other states who import from Iran; the risk that the military action will not wholly succeed; that it might engender other military reactions (both by Iran and others); that the action might risk other objectives; or the risk of creating conditions within Iran where instability is likely because we destroy its security and C2 assets are examples of possibilities that must all be weighed as risks against the use of military force to achieve a political objective. Its an environment where chance and the unknown are competitive.

Keeping that in mind, the value and attraction of the object in view - be it success in Iraq and the risk to U.S. military members, the risk of a nuclear armed Iran, or the possibility of a military empowered Iran that unduly influences the flow of world energy resources from the Persian Gulf - or any combination thereof - creates the opportunity for misjudgment and misinterpretation that leads to a new set of interactions.

A Iranian strategy that seeks to prolong the U.S. involvment in Iraq by supporting insurgency must be weighed against the possibilities that it by itself, or in combination with some other act (such as going nuclear, or some other action) may then require a reaction on the part of the U.S. that the other elements of policy (DIE) can no longer achieve.

In this context, I think there is a great deal of risk for Iran in adopting such a strategy. It doesn't mean that Iran has not done so - their actions would seem to suggest either they have adopted some policy aimed at supporting Shiite insurgents/groups, or it could be that the central authority does not have complete control, or that they have not considered alternatives for whatever reason -e.g. they may believe its a question of regime survival, or it may be that they believe they are somehow immune. If its the former, then diplomacy may work over time. If its the latter, sooner or later diplomacy will be ineffective. At that point its a question of how long before the two sets of political ends must be reconciled in some other fashion. Either side could come to that conclusion erroneously or at a different time then the other - but once they do, and once they act, it changes the nature of the interaction and stakes again. It stays this way until one side abandons, or modifies its end to a point that is acceptable by the other.

Best, Rob

[JJackson]

Steve I had read your blog post and am in complete agreement re the limited scope for escalation then – as opposed to now – and off course the obvious adjustments Lawrence would have had to make to is math if he had had satellite surveillance, UAVs, instant radio communication and supersonic air support to contend with. From Rob’s post

e.g. they may believe its a question of regime survival, or it may be that they believe they are somehow immune. If its the former, then diplomacy may work over time. If its the latter, sooner or later diplomacy will be ineffective.

what I was trying to argue was that – regardless of any lessons we could learn from Lawrence – Iran may well have viewed the situation at the end of OIF phase III as ‘a question of regime survival’. Iran and the US have obviously not learnt to play nicely together and the level of mistrust and propaganda is very high leading to an increased risk of escalation by miscalculation.
I went back to the blog to re-read the comments before writing this and found three new comments: Zenpundits (always worth reading), Ken’s (pithy and astute as usual) and this one which rather makes my point for me.

arifJAA :
Excellent article, excellent points.

With the Iranian youth largely anti-regime why we can't do the same to them eludes me. It's more than justified.

I have a confession...when I came back in 2003 I thought Iraq was the toehold and we were going to sweep the region...at least Iran and Syria. As the Iranian youth rose in spontaneous revolt at the time of the 2003 invasion I may not have been as foolish as I feel now, or perhaps I was not the only one fooled.
Anyone else care to share?

"*The American Army's seduction over Galula
*The Straight line drawn between Generals Abrams and Petraeus"

If LTC Gentile wants to draw eerie parallels to Vietnam...one of my early mentors was a SF Advisor in 1965. He said at the time of LBJ's major infusion of troops the Army officers of Company and Field Grade rank thought they would drive into North Vietnam. We know what happened instead.

[the bold is mine - JJ]

Leaving aside the reliability of “With the Iranian youth largely anti-regime”.
Also leaving aside the legality/moral legitimacy of The ‘Democratic Crescent’ dream arifJAA refers to it was prevalent at the time and it, along with, axis-of-evil status, calls for regime change, claims of WMD production and the carte-blanche afforded by the pre-emptive use of force doctrine combine to leave Iran with little choice but to view the US threat as existential. I would further argue that the US has, in its GWOT response to 9/11, ‘re-assessed’ its position on a large number of hitherto generally accepted norms of international behaviour (extraordinary rendition, treatment of prisoners (detention without trial & ‘enhanced interrogation’), the whole issue of State Sovereignty & fragile States and the aforementioned pre-emptive use of force). This combination has left other State and non-State actors– myself included – confused as to where the US stands and how it is likely to react in any given situation. Which leads me back to Rob & Steve’s point re escalation; how can any state now assess the likelihood of escalation, and if they can’t reliably, will they not default to planning for a worst case scenario: massive military build up and more nuclear weapon states.
Pre 9/11 I would have accused anyone who told me that within five years the US might think it had the right to march an army through the Middle East, replacing regimes it did not like as it went, a paranoid lunatic – I wish I could say the same today.

[Ken White]

"This combination has left other State and non-State actors– myself included – confused as to where the US stands and how it is likely to react in any given situation."

I am quite convinced that's a feature, not a bug; i.e it is by design.

It has also been long and is now quite true and should be borne in mind by all...

[Rob Thornton]

While the reaction can be seen as rational in the context of the moment that created it, it might not be seen as such before it occurs, - or after the fact when additional information has borne out that the reaction might have either been inappropriate or generated consequences we'd have preferred left in the bottle.

Those non-linear outcomes are in keeping with the nature of complex interactions where fear, honor and interest are at stake, and where the cost of military inaction is seen as too high (see Colin Gray's "The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration" for a good discussion).

As Ken said, it is a feature - its simply a more visible feature when the stakes are perceived as higher and the mutual understanding between enemies/competitors is lower with regard to the stakes.


Best Rob

[JJackson]

Originally Posted by Ken White

I am quite convinced that's a feature, not a bug; i.e it is by design.

It has also been long and is now quite true and should be borne in mind by all...

Ken: By design?
I was thinking more unintended but not unwelcome side effect. Although I am sure there is someone out there writing their book who will remember it differently. For it to be a design feature some prescient US foreign policy wonks on Sept. 12th must have 'felt the force' flowing through all those non-linear outcomes until they clearly saw the confusion a disproportionate response would sow in their enemies. Just a shame they could not have foreseen a few other things while they were at it.
And there was I thinking you were a cynic rather than a true believer.

Rob thanks for the link, I am about half way through (finding him slow to get to the point) and suspect I am not going to agree with his premise when I am done but we shall see.

[Hacksaw]

Ken et al,

Whether the ambiguity we have sown (regarding likely US response to other State and non-State actions) was by design or not, I think it is an incredibly important/dangerous development.

I think we can all agree that surprise is a good thing when applied to military activity (except of course when we surprise ourselves... hello this isn't the enemy we planned for... that is a not so good surprise).

An analogy (please bear with me)...

However, surprise is not so good when your girl friend's father comes home early and finds his baby naked and in your arms... However, you can deal with this surprise if you had some reasonable expectation of his reaction (e.g. throws you out of the house and tells you not to return).

If, however, his response is cut off your package, break both your knees, and drop you off naked in the middle of the country... well that is a rather bad surprise.

If there was this much ambiguity there would be very little dating and our supply of warrior babies would drop to a dangerously low level.

From Grand Strategy point of view we want and need to be predictable... one way or another... its the only way to maintain some semblence of global stability.

I vote for Fathers with a more predictable response...

Unless of course it involves my two teenage daughters... That blade is well honed

Live well and row

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by JJackson

Ken: By design?

That doesn't mean it was a major issue, merely a synergistic side effect.One of many such small benefits if the operation succeeded but that would not be too harmful should it not succeed.

I was thinking more unintended but not unwelcome side effect. Although I am sure there is someone out there writing their book who will remember it differently. For it to be a design feature some prescient US foreign policy wonks on Sept. 12th must have 'felt the force' flowing through all those non-linear outcomes until they clearly saw the confusion a disproportionate response would sow in their enemies.

Eminently possible, we'll find out some day. Maybe.

Just a shame they could not have foreseen a few other things while they were at it.

We can agree on the thrust of that if not the wording. It was foreseen, those who foresaw were simply ignored.

And there was I thinking you were a cynic rather than a true believer.

Unsure what you mean by that. If it is that I am a supporter of the way things are being done, you're quite wrong. I have said before I wouldn't have done a lot of things the way they're being done. Wasn't my call. I do agree that some response above Afghanistan was long overdue and that Iraq makes strategic sense. Things don't have to be done my way to be work.

Though it would usually be helpful to all if they were done that way .

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Hacksaw

Whether the ambiguity we have sown (regarding likely US response to other State and non-State actions) was by design or not, I think it is an incredibly important/dangerous development.

I think we have historically acted erratically in this sense. Most of our wars over the last 200+ years began,as did this one, because someone believed the flaky Americans would not react. Always a bad mistake.

We're busy worrying about Britney and what designer beer to buy and we do not have time for this esoteric 'war' B.S. -- so some idiot starts one and all we want to do is go in there and wreak death and destruction and get back to our navel contemplation.

Thus I contend that we ARE, historically, unpredictable in the depth and extent of our reaction. I have long (since 1979) contended that Carter could have backed Iran down on the hostages without war and that his failure to do so, followed by Reagan's, Clinton's and Bush 41's failures to react in the ME were an invitation to disaster.

Carter, in particular, acted unpredictably -- but down stream instead of of over reacting. So did the next three under react with bad consequences. Had any one of overreacted, it would've been simpler and easier than the position we are now in. A position we are in very much due to the fact that someone thought we had become predictable.

Quite wrongly. Fortunately...

I think we can all agree that surprise is a good thing when applied to military activity (except of course when we surprise ourselves... hello this isn't the enemy we planned for... that is a not so good surprise)...

True, and if it's not the enemy we planned for, whose fault is that? Sounds like poor intel and / or poor planning to me. In any event, I suggest some Diplomatic uncertainty can preclude having to resort to military surprise...

However, surprise is not so good when your girl friend's father comes home early and finds his baby naked and in your arms... However, you can deal with this surprise if you had some reasonable expectation of his reaction (e.g. throws you out of the house and tells you not to return).

If, however, his response is cut off your package, break both your knees, and drop you off naked in the middle of the country... well that is a rather bad surprise.

If there was this much ambiguity there would be very little dating and our supply of warrior babies would drop to a dangerously low level.

Heh. We can really disagree on that. Teenage hormones and danger are like steak and cheese in Philly. There would be more, not less hanky panky. What would really happen is that the number of unwed mothers would drop slightly, not an overall bad thing.

From Grand Strategy point of view we want and need to be predictable... one way or another... its the only way to maintain some semblence of global stability.

Semblance is a good word. because that's what it is -- stability and the semblance thereof are two different things. I do not fully agree that predictability, one way or the other is desirable, much less necessary but I will say that if we had to go that route, I'd be inclined to go the route of the Great Khan. The meek may someday inherit the Earth but for the next couple of centuries they're more likely to just get buried early.

I vote for Fathers with a more predictable response...

Unless of course it involves my two teenage daughters... That blade is well honed.

Having three sons and a daughter plus three Grandaughters, two in their 20s, do keep that blade honed. And do be alert. You'd be amazed at how fast these kids can get their clothes on and be ten feet apart...

Oh -- on the tell 'em to depart and never return bit? They'll just meet elsewhere. Trust me on that one, been there, had that done.

Oldest son is a cop, always made a point to be cleaning his firearms when a new male arrived at the house for the first time; annoyed the Granddaughter but it kept her (him???) straight...

Point there is that one can do what you suggest -- and what T.R. suggested; "Walk softly and carry a big stick." The key is that you cannot be hesitant in using the big stick. That's where the unpredictability has historically come from (including recent history)...

[Ron Humphrey]

There is one factor that will always be predictable,

Unpredictability

The key seems to be to Hope for the best, expect and plan for the worst and in the end generally things come out somewhere in between

That said as long as there is an accepted end state your aiming for it should be much easier to keep from getting thrown to far off track along the way no matter how confused things get.

North is always north the trick would be making sure we know which way north is from the start

[Rank amateur]

Originally Posted by Ken White

"Walk softly and carry a big stick." The key is that you cannot be hesitant in using the big stick. That's where the unpredictability has historically come from (including recent history)...

With respect, the key is that using the big stick can lead to disaster, therefore you need to really understand the cost/benefits/risks of using the big stick. You need to recognize that using the big stick too often makes you a bully. Finally, need to use the big stick properly, thus the importance of your choosen profession.

The question of whether or not the people who hired Rumsfeld and Feith have learned enough about the nuances of using the big stick is an open one. I am optimistic, but frankly don't believe that they've earned the right to walk up to the brink. As opposed to - I'll be non partisan - Kennedy and Reagan who'd I'd trust in a game of brinkmanship.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Rank amateur

With respect, the key is that using the big stick can lead to disaster, therefore you need to really understand the cost/benefits/risks of using the big stick. You need to recognize that using the big stick too often makes you a bully. Finally, need to use the big stick properly, thus the importance of your choosen profession.

the cost of not maintaining it or not using it at all can be even more disastrous. I suggest one with a big stick will not use it too often else there would be no need for the preceding phrase "walk softly..." I also suggest that if you have a big stick and use it no matter how carefully some -- many -- who do not possess such an instrument will call you a bully and the person it's used against is almost certain to do so.

The question of whether or not the people who hired Rumsfeld and Feith have learned enough about the nuances of using the big stick is an open one.

I think your concern is misplaced, those people will soon be gone. I suggest concern might be better directed to those incompetents who will replace the current crowd of incompetents.

... I am optimistic, but frankly don't believe that they've earned the right to walk up to the brink. As opposed to - I'll be non partisan - Kennedy and Reagan who'd I'd trust in a game of brinkmanship.

We can agree on the first statement and disagree quite strongly on the last. Kennedy used the big stick to get involved in the wrong way at the wrong time in Viet Nam and SEA in an effort to show he was tough and boost the economy. Reagan OTOH used the stick marginally well in Libya but blew it totally in Lebanon by NOT using it, thus aiding and abetting Carter before him and Bush 41 after him (note my also non partisan stance ) in failing Brinkmanship 101. Washington attracts incompetents...