Afghan National Army (ANA) thread

[BNopsSgt]

As the war and reconstruction efforts move forward the time for security reconstruction is here. The ability to train ANSF to handle there own security is paramount to successful reconstruction efforts. This is also not simple task and requires close interagency coordination. I would be interested in hearing some expierences and theorys on this topic. As we move forward from Iraq through Afghanistan and onto somehwere else the lessons we learn may help. We must apply lessons learned rather than relearning them. Interagency coordination also seems to be a hot topic lately (Killcullen, three pillars of Counter-Insurgency) (USG Counter insurgency Conference, Sep 2006).

V/r

Bryan

[Vic Bout]

Stumbled upon this earlier today. On the mark, though much has improved since my 2003-2004 ANA experience. Interesting to note that the ANA STILL cannot unilaterally funciton in terms of CAS and log support, though I understand that some progress has been made toward an independant Afghan rotory wing aviation contingent.

[Ron Humphrey]

Originally Posted by Vic Bout

Stumbled upon this earlier today. On the mark, though much has improved since my 2003-2004 ANA experience. Interesting to note that the ANA STILL cannot unilaterally funciton in terms of CAS and log support, though I understand that some progress has been made toward an independant Afghan rotory wing aviation contingent.

where the author suggests that the ANA need to be tested soon. Although they are being tested on a daily basis to place them in a situation right now which demanded they stand alone against AQ and the other groups would probably be a bad idea and might just be what they would hope for.

Unlike Iraq the Afghans have not had 30+ years of established military experience as a group in whatever form that may have been. They are literally building ground up a military designed to do much more than any of their parts have done in recent memory.

The Taliban however have been a governing military recently and despite the fact that they were such a bad one doesn't change the comparison. I'm afraid if we try to push too hard with the ANA we run the risk of a much longer possibly insurmountable setback for them which would cost more than any small scale successful efforts might be worth right now.

Now recognizing that there are probably factors or facts that I'm unaware of are there any thoughts on whether this might be the case or not.

[Anthony Hoh]

Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

Now recognizing that there are probably factors or facts that I'm unaware of are there any thoughts on whether this might be the case or not.

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

[Tom Odom]

Originally Posted by Anthony Hoh

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

Tony,

Great post. Continual problem with any kind of assistance. Have to let the recipent skin their knees as they learn to walk and then hopefully run

Best

Tom

[Ron Humphrey]

Originally Posted by Anthony Hoh

Ron,
I think its time to let the ANA work more independently. "We" are doing things that unintentionally stifle the growth of the ANA. For example, it is common knowledge that the ANA are challenged logistically. However the process of "Afghanization" is fuzzy when it comes to fixing logistics. It has led two key players in Afghan assistance (CSTC-A and ISAF) into a true dichotomy. CSTC-A is focused on raising an independent self sustaining ANA/ANSF. ISAF in its process of Afghanization rightfully does missions jointly with the ANA. However this creates a problem, ISAF cant always wait for the ANA to get fuel, ammo, etc... because of issues with the ANA supply system. So ISAF "gifts" mission essential items to the ANA. Now CSTC-A is trying to coach, teach, mentor the ANA to make their supply system work. However, thier supply system never has to work, because ISAF is willing to gift supplies to get the job done. I ask you, if you were the Afghan commander on the ground how would you think resupply worked? You order it through your supply chain, or when I really need something the foreigners give it to you?

The ANA will never grow until we back out and let them learn it the hard way. You cant give an Army the hard lessons of poor logistics, it has to be discovered. I treasure the tactical experience of my Afghan counterparts, on the ground they can slug it out with the best of them. However when it comes to logistics for the ANA tough love is good love, and IMO the ANA are not getting enough of it.

In Service,
arh

I understand what your saying and agree in large part , I guess my greatest concern is how we determine what the best way is to let them skin their knees without getting them cutoff, or amputated because they didn't know how to clean the wound correctly. I hope you get where I'm coming from. (it may be a bad analogy)

Thanks for everything you do and keep up the good work.

[negotiator6]

Date: March through August 2003
Place: Gardez, Paktia Province, Afghanistan (with travel throughout Khwost & Ghazni Provinces)

At that time, the ANA was just in the process of standing up. There was a compound for training between the OGA and US Army PRT compound..some of you know the area.

The problems at that time was "tribal"...which seems to be a non-unifing entity both in Afghanistan, Iraq and having just returned from Southern Sudan with the Sudan People's Liberation Army/SPLA..a common thread of systemic challenges, that being "tribalism".

That said, and back to the issue of the ANA..If the soldiers who represent the ANA identify with a united Afghanistan and its government, be it evolving everyday..then perhaps the ANA can be a unifing force against radical Sunni Islam represented by the Taliban.

On the other hand, if the ANA represents factions of tribal members who identify with their tribe..by language, custom and religion, then the idea of a united ANA with a common enemy will be a "bridge too far.."

The current focus on small company size commando type units who can move, shoot and communicate without too much coalition assistance...who know the terrain..who know the enemy will provide perhaps a better opportunity to defeat the enemy based on the phrase.."no thy enemy better than I know myself.."

Salaam/RH

[SWJED]

The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine

By Sergeant First Class Anthony Hoh, US Army; Small Wars Journal Blog

A critically important security transition task that is often a secondary effort is the development of host nation military doctrine. This effort is paramount to the creation of a successful and independent force. When the world’s focus has moved on to other issues, and the coalition advisory effort draws to an end, the Afghan National Army (ANA) security foundation will rely heavily on their doctrine to continue the fight and provide national security and stability. So a few critical questions one must ask is; are we on track with the current doctrine development program? Do we have the right formula for developing doctrine on behalf of the ANA? Is developing doctrine for the ANA the right approach?

Joint Pub 1-02 defines doctrine as the “Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.” It is important to note that this definition of doctrine does not describe doctrine as how the Army wishes to fight, or how it may be able to fight at some point in the distant future. Obviously, doctrine profoundly affects a nation’s military development, but it should not be used too heavily as the catalyst for change in terms of simultaneously trying to quickly modernize an immature force. In the writing of Afghan doctrine we fail to account for Afghanistan’s history, technology, social constructs, and the nature of the threats that its armed forces face. We should no longer attempt to gift the ANA tactical, strategic or operational doctrine. Current ANA doctrine that has been “Afganisized", consists of manuals that have been cut copied and replaced… M4 for M16 or AK, Javelin for RPG. The utility of such an approach remains questionable, when manuals like the 7-8 MTP instruct Patrol Leader’s to submit overlays with route classification formulas. (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-2000), suggests the use of soft rounds when clearing staircases (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-1000), or describes the use of integrated BOS (Battlefield Operating System) in the ANA 7-20 MTP. In fairness, none of these items are tactically obtuse, far from it. However when taken on the whole they are not part of the “fundamental principles by which these military forces guide their actions”. This doctrine is generally light years ahead of anything that Afghan Army is capable of now or can be in the foreseeable future. To be clear this is not a slight towards the ANA, they can function without map overlays at the platoon level and continual BDE MDMP (Brigade Military Decision Making Process) seminars, they could get by with a few TACSOPs and GARSOP’s (Tactical and Garrison Standing Operating Procedures) that are linked with each other...

[Jedburgh]

27 Jun 08: United States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National Security Forces

....Despite achievements in Afghanistan, security threats and corruption remain major impediments to overall development. The security environment continues to be fluid, demanding continual reexamination and assessment of requirements. The 2001 Bonn Agreement established the goal of a 50,000-person ANA and a 62,000-person ANP. The Bonn II Agreement in December of 2002 expanded the ANA target end-strength to 70,000 personnel. Since the Bonn Agreements and the international declaration of the Afghanistan Compact in 2006, security conditions have evolved, with a resurgence of activity by insurgents and anti-government elements. Consequently, in May 2007, the international community’s Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) approved an increase to 82,000 authorized ANP. Similarly, with the endorsement of the JCMB on February 5, 2008, the authorized ANA force structure increased to 80,000 personnel, with an additional 6,000 allotted for the trainee, transient, hospital, and student account.

The long-term ANSF posture potentially may include a more robust Afghan National Army Air Corps (ANAAC) capability and a larger army. Additional analysis, study, and consideration must be given to the security environment, sustainability of the force, and available financial support for such efforts.....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 7 Jan 09: Winning in Afghanistan: Creating Effective Afghan Security Forces

....any effective counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan must build up strong Afghan security forces, and the use them to both defeat the enemy and create the level of security that is a critical prerequisite for governance and development. So far, however, this effort lags badly behind the need.

It has been badly mismanaged and underfunded in the past, and many of the lessons of Iraq and other recent wars were ignored. Seven years after the invasion of Afghanistan, neither the Afghan National Army (ANA) or Police (ANP) force is capable of standing on its own. Afghan military forces are still reliant upon NATO forces for leadership, logistics, and air support in combat. The development of the ANA and ANP continues to be severely under-resourced both in terms of advisors and funds.

While the ANA is more capable than the ANP, both must improve dramatically before they can take the lead in Afghan security and it is far from clear that such progress can be made in time to avoid a major further deterioration in the security situation.....

[Rex Brynen]

An interesting post recently over at Afghanistan Shrugged, on both the perils of centralized/remote battlespace control and (US) command attitudes to the ANA, from an ETT Team Chief.

This is a habitual problem here. US commanders conducting massively centralized operations, not giving the guys on the ground the freedom of maneuver. To prevent a house from maybe being hit by an 8 pound canister we let four guys who have been shooting rockets at us get away, to fight another day . This makes no sense.

In addition these US commanders treat the ANA like disposable heroes and idiots. Can you even imagine some foreign commander telling your local poilce and army what they can and can not do. Battlespace owner does not make them the Lord Govenor of Afghanistan.

More at the link above.

[Ken White]

to the norm and we do not normally micromanage like that.

I really would like to say that.

Unfortunately, right now I'm too disgusted at the fact we never learn and we kill people unnecessarily through arrant stupidity like that to say much of anything.

We used to be able to just turn off the radio and ignore them and I've done that numerous times. Now, with the eye in the sky, the troops are screwed and the rear area staffs win...

Sad. Really, really sad.

[reed11b]

Originally Posted by Ken White

to the norm and we do not normally micromanage like that.

I really would like to say that.

Unfortunately, right now I'm too disgusted at the fact we never learn and we kill people unnecessarily through arrant stupidity like that to say much of anything.

We used to be able to just turn off the radio and ignore them and I've done that numerous times. Now, with the eye in the sky, the troops are screwed and the rear area staffs win...

Sad. Really, really sad.

While I have not been high enough in the command structure to speak from personal experience, my scanning of military writing supports what you say Ken, and possibly more relevant in this case, it is also one of the BIG mistakes the Soviets made in there misadventures in Afghanistan. Makes me think that you are correct in your assertion that it all comes down to training and HR policies for promotion and retention. Perhaps someday...
Reed

[Old Eagle]

We're not talking about a U.S. unit 100 miles away micromanaging a subordinate unit, they were in effect jerking the ANA bn. The sooner that the ANA can get its own enablers, the better. Then get them used to using their own stuff rather than being dependent on our temporary, high-tech stuff.

Illum, for God's sake!

[Rob Thornton]

You know - given some of the distances - even parachute flares, 203 illum and hand held 57 or 60mm illum would have been helpful. If we are not going to provide enablers to our partners, then we have some choices to make:

1) do it all ourselves, and delay their development while generating further risk
2) let our partners twist, lose faith and trust in us and generate further risk
3) accept some risk and provide some enablers for the our partner
4) do as OE said and provide them with some enablers - either by introducing it into their system, providng them the materiel and training, or a combination of both.

1 & 2 are non-starters. While the clear CMD guidance needs to come from on high, the 06 and 05 are key implementers to seeing it through. A combination of 3 & 4, with the goal of seeing it institutionalized in their systems seems to be the way to go.

A good blog, I hope Vampire 06 keeps it up.

Best, Rob

[Ken White]

the ANA has or we are giving them some 60s. That was my first thought. They will ignore risk averse US Commanders desires.

The second and more scary thought was that a distant TOC could or WOULD curtail locally planned and called for Illlum. That is totally scary. It's borderline criminal IMO.

Delegate indeed. Trust your subordinates. Way to build loyalty and competence...

The link Rex provided also highlights another issue that my son surfaced after his last trip to Afghanistan; treatment of the ANA by higher US Hq. The US troops that go out with the ANA on the ground work well and get along with them -- Bn and higher too often and obviously with some exceptions seem to ignore their existence and / or don't treat them very well. How to win friends and influence people...

Sad on many counts.

[jkm_101_fso]

Originally Posted by Ken White

the ANA has or we are giving them some 60s. That was my first thought. They will ignore risk averse US Commanders desires.

Insha'llah

The second and more scary thought was that a distant TOC could or WOULD curtail locally planned and called for Illlum. That is totally scary. It's borderline criminal IMO.

Believe it. I had it happen to me in Iraq many times. It all depends on who it's for and why. In '06, my MiTT had two M119s (plus crews) attached on our little patrol base, a long, long way from any flagpoles. The IA we supported asked for fires often. This is what I found, trying to clear said fires:

US, TIC=No problem; US, non-TIC=Req. Clearance. IA TIC=Maybe. IA, non-TIC=Grab a Snickers.

Of course, this was a few years ago.

BL, If illum CFF was for CF, usually was a go. If it was for IA...not so much.
I won't even go into what it took to fire HE.

I've heard the you-might-hit-a-house-with-a-canister line before, too. Very often, actually. I just lied and sent up a different grid, DF & QE to BDE. No one knew but me, and the extremely grateful Iraqi Army Soldiers that could now see who was emplacing the IED/who shot at them. I figured if I accidently destroyed a house with a canister (which is unlikely), the angry Iraqi would come see me anyway, since my MiTT were the only Americans within 100 miles of them. And if I accidently hurt/killed somebody with a cansiter, I would have dealt with the consequences. I took my chances...seriously, what are the odds?

The link Rex provided also highlights another issue that my son surfaced after his last trip to Afghanistan; treatment of the ANA by higher US Hq. The US troops that go out with the ANA on the ground work well and get along with them -- Bn and higher too often and obviously with some exceptions seem to ignore their existence and / or don't treat them very well. How to win friends and influence people...

Sad on many counts.

Arrrggghhh.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by jkm_101_fso

...I've heard the you-might-hit-a-house-with-a-canister line before, too. Very often, actually. I just lied and sent up a different grid, DF & QE to BDE. No one knew but me, and the extremely grateful Iraqi Army Soldiers that could now see who was emplacing the IED/who shot at them. I figured if I accidently destroyed a house with a canister (which is unlikely), the angry Iraqi would come see me anyway, since my MiTT were the only Americans within 100 miles of them. And if I accidently hurt/killed somebody with a cansiter, I would have dealt with the consequences. I took my chances...seriously, what are the odds?

Good for you! That's precisely why you get paid more money than SFC Phukaboski does...

Unfortunately, unless there's been a change in the Basic Courses since I was around, I suspect that a great deal of effort goes into discouraging that kind of judgmental call.

We ought to be encouraging it. Then hopefully, when some folks get to LTC, they won't make overly cautious decisions about things they shouldn't even be involved with. In fairness, obviously, the LTCs wouldn't be behaving that way unless people above them were micromanaging...

Stupidity flows down hill...

[Entropy]

Afghanistan Shrugged is definitely one of my favorite blogs now.

It's interesting and entirely predictable that ISR has become a micromanagement tool. It's too bad. How much longer until we have this:

[Tom Odom]

GORMAN

####.(into mike)
Apone, collect magazines from everybody. We can't have any firing in there.

Whaddaya mean "we" paleface?