The Decline in America's Reputation: Why?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Sargent

If you want to hear my most cynical side, I would say that they were blindsided by Iraq because they could not possibly imagine the US would lob them such a gimme.

That too is possible but I'm not at all sure they now look at it as a gimme. I have little doubt they'd say they do but I suspect the reality is they're still nonplussed by the Iraq incursion. They ran it out and they aren't gone but their prognosis isn't good.

I've never prayed so much in my life as I did between October 2002 and March 2003 that we would not go into Iraq.

Not being a praying type, I was merely incensed that it was being done so clumsily. I agreed with a need to do something in the ME; Iraq made strategic sense but the fumbling in the doing was apparent. He should have said nothing about Iraq, waited until his second term and gotten a better handle on things. My guess is that he feared if he did not get a second term, he was afraid his successor might not do something he thought needed doing. In any event, I wouldn't have done it the way it was done but I do believe it or something very near it was both necessary and overdue.

I firmly believed that it would not work out so well as we hoped it would.

Me too, at least as it was being touted -- I gave it a 60:40 shot at success, decided Bush was a risk taker (he's also a an inveterate smart ass and since I'm both those things, I'm a little more receptive to him than many -- even though I disagree with much he's done) and figured it'd take three or four years. After Bremer fired the Iraqi Army and Police, I upped that to five years. 2008. I also think we're up to a 70:30 shot or thereabouts. We'll see...

I just knew that once broken, Iraq would pose nearly insurmountable problems in its reconstruction. And these would be especially difficult problems unlike those posed by Germany and Japan, because we would not have the mandate to do as we wished as the victorious can over the bad guy aggressors. But if you really look closely at the post-war history of those two countries, at the end of the day we gave them most of what they needed and had clumsily sought in war.

I'm not sure one can compare the post war WW II / Iraq situations in any meaningful way for many reasons; not least that Iraq does not feel beaten; that gives a different mind set as you noted. That and the religion angle plus the interplay of other States in the Region mean a very different environment. Add in todays mass and instant communication capabilities and parallels are difficult to discern. Of course, you did not compare them, noting the difference but to even use them as a corollary or a starting point is, I think, perhaps a bit misleading to one's own thought processes.

I also think our (well, some -- not you or I, obviously and among others) initial idea of 'victory' and a democratic highly secular Iraq have run into the wall of reality. No 'victory' in insurgencies, an acceptable outcome is all that's possible (and I hope we relearned that). Still, we could leave today and most of our strategic aims will have been achieved; it'd give the opponents a propaganda scream but the myth of "America won't fight, they'll leave when it gets tough" has been sort of put to bed -- that is totally unimportant to western thought; it is extremely important in the minds of those in the ME. Very different thought processes.

I wish I had been wrong. But unfortunately I don't think I was.

Too soon to tell but I see the half full side...

And I do not fear to say that the Iraq intervention was the worst mistake of American foreign policy.

On that, I disagree; there were many blunders in the process but the strategic issue, a response to and continuing presence in the ME, was going to be necessary at one time or another. It would have been easier in 1991; not easy, just easier. It was easier in 2003 than it will be later -- and if we leave too soon and too completely or on the wrong terms; we'll be back within ten years or so and it will be harder...

There, I've bared the depths of my historian's soul.

And made sense doing it. Thank you for the good response. I understand where you're coming from, we may disagree on some issues and I'm very much aware there are probably more people who agree with thee than with me but we're all products of where we've been and age makes a difference.

My defining moment was Pearl Harbor; my wife's was the Kennedy assassination, my second son's Desert Storm (or maybe OEF/OIF, he just says the ME?), my daughter's was 9/11. "My war" was Korea, after it Laos, Viet Nam and the other places were easy. Point being that age skews your historical perception. My pick for the greatest foreign policy fiasco of my life would be Viet Nam. It cost the US more in every respect (including respect...) than have the last seven years and it still reverberates 46 years later. My belief is that Iraq will be looked much differently and more favorably in all respects in another 40 years. Again, we'll see. In any event, being a historian, I expect you to write the definitive book on it!

Thanks again for the response.

[Uboat509]

I get so tired of hearing about how we should respect the UN. As far as I am concerned we have already shown more repect than the UN has earned.

Furthermore, even if the UN has lost its way, even if we don't think that it serves the purposes for which it was established, even if it does not serve our needs, even if it is beyond the redemption we think necessary, what we ought to recognize that the weak and many states of this globe find it valuable, and if only for that we ought to respect and support it.

Certainly the UN has done some fine charitable work around the world but so do Doctors without Borders and UNICEF and while I certainly appreciate the work that these organizations do I wouldn't consider subordinating US foreign policy to them. That is precisely what we are being asked to do by getting UN approval for our actions. Pardon me if I can't get behind the idea of France, China and Russia getting a vote in our foreign policy. Maybe it's the cynic in me but I just don't feel like they have our best interests at heart.

SFC W

[JQP]

First: Ken thanks for the link, the absurdity of it all made me laugh so hard that I nearly fell off of my chair.

Jill: Thank you for your informative comments- they were dead on and absolutely correct. I am afraid that I used a poor choice of words. What I was really trying to focus on was public support for US military involvement. As you have said, we were already engaged in supporting one side and American intervention would not have altered the policies of Japan or Germany. Certainly what we face today is totally different. But I must admit to some "what if" ponderings. "What if" back then the American public was exposed to the instantaneous media blitz and worldwide access to global communications that exist today? Would it have changed the any of the events?

I agree with you that the AQ 9-11 attack was a provocation. There is no doubt that AQ has waged a magnificent PR war. I would also add that just by carrying out a large successful attack on US soil, they empowered and recruited quite a few followers.

Iraq: I must confess that I never believed that WMD's were the reason we went into Iraq, I always believed it was to create a new dynamic in the ME and we know how well that went. You are right- it definitely has been a foreign policy nightmare.

That said, it seems as if we have a second chance to turn things around, stabilize Iraq and do some Foreign Policy damage control- if there is public and political support for the opportunity to do so. How can we not be encouraged when we hear that AQ is losing the battle for "hearts and minds" in Iraq (if they ever really had them to start with).

I am less hopeful about the media war/global communications blitz and how it will effect American public opinion and our willingness to engage in diplomatic or military intervention in the world.

Goodnight, Brenda

[Uboat509]

Originally Posted by Sargent

It's a philosophical answer to Ken's question. If you have a child, and that child goes off the rails, do you stop loving that child? You may realize and acknowledge the errors, but you don't stop loving the child, you don't renounce him, you don't abandon him. The UN was our idea, we brought it into this world, we believed it in it, and we worked very hard to get the other states of the world to believe in it as well. It would be petty to forsake it because it hasn't become exactly what we want. If we believe it has gone wrong, then we must work to reform it.

Unfortunately, that child is now a smelly unemployed adult who still lives over the garage. He raids the fridge, borrows money, and argues a lot but constributes almost nothing other than dirty laundry. Plus, he has been hanging out with some pretty unsavory people lately. Still loving him is fine but it might be time for some tough love.

SFC W

[Stevely]

Originally Posted by Sargent

It's a philosophical answer to Ken's question. If you have a child, and that child goes off the rails, do you stop loving that child? You may realize and acknowledge the errors, but you don't stop loving the child, you don't renounce him, you don't abandon him. The UN was our idea, we brought it into this world, we believed it in it, and we worked very hard to get the other states of the world to believe in it as well. It would be petty to forsake it because it hasn't become exactly what we want. If we believe it has gone wrong, then we must work to reform it. But again, even if we can't, go back and read my second paragraph - for the pragmatic reason that the small and weak states of the world believe in it it is valuable.

Regards,
Jill

I don't think it's appropriate to anthropomorphize the problem like this. I would always love my child, regardless of how bad he went, because that's a natural and normal response of a parent for his child. The child is flesh of my flesh, after all. But the relationship between a nation of 300 million people and the international organization it helped found a couple of generations ago is far too abstract for feelings like that, there is nothing actually there to love. It is a mistake to treat organizations as if they were people, they exist only to serve people, so the feelings should be directed to those the organization serve. Thus an organization can and should be scrapped, bent, radically reformed, and so on for the sake of the served if the situation requires it. It's just a tool, really. Directing affection to a tool is misplaced, and may only end up doing no service to the people the tool was supposed to help.

Yes, it would be great to reform it, but UN reforms have never gone anywhere in the 60+ years of its existence. What happens when reform doesn't work out? I am also skeptical about its value to the many and weak states of the world - who is it really valuable to, the downtrodden and suffering who make up the bulk of the people in those states, or the kleptocrats who lord it over them? I am not calling for it to be disbanded or for us to withdraw, it probably still useful on the balance, but I would never regard it now as anything other than something we stay in for cold, pragmatic reasons, it is long since ceased to be anything like noble, really it's just a den of corruption.

[Ken White]

I think uboat's got it right. Having been 1/3 of a typical two parent American family (My wife gets two votes to my one... ) I can attest to the difficulties of a twosome determining disciplinary efforts for a recalcitrant kid.

The UN has five parents with veto authority and generally two of whom will disagree with the others just for GP. That makes disciplinary decisions almost impossible...

I can love the kid in the garage but I don't have to like her and I have to acknowledge that my enabling her is detrimental to the kid herself. It does little good if I cut off her ability to get to the refrigerator and my wife is sneaking her food. Of course, my wife refuses to buy her anything so I have to slip her a few bucks every now and then...

Yep, I can love her -- but I don't have to like her and I can have lost my respect for her. I probably won't gain that back until she develops some self respect...

Sigh. Being a parent isn't easy.

[JQP]

I have no fondness for the UN. I agree with most of you that it is inept, ineffective, costly and corrupt but I don't think we can abandon it either. We do need some type of international framework with which to build diplomatic relationships and create agreements. So- do we focus our energies on reforming the UN? Or do we create a "coalition of the willing" each time we need some type of multi-national assistance? Do we make NATO our main diplomatic framework? Or do we create something like a "League of Democracies"?

[Ken White]

abandon it; if we didn't have it we'd have to invent it.

My vote would be to work for reform; I think the elevating NATO or the League of Democracies options would be counterproductive. Coalitions will be necessary in the near term and possibly always for some things; you're never going to get that many voting members to agree on much.

Reform will take years -- thus, it would seem to me we need a long term plan that will take several US administrations to bring to fruition.

Yo, State -- you got the lead.

[Uboat509]

I also agree that we shouldn't abandon the UN. It does do some things really well, sort of like a really expensive NGO. And the concept is not without merit but we definitely need to lower our expectations, a lot. We have enough trouble building building a consensus for anything we do domestically. Trying to build a consensus on anything with France, China and Russia is probably a bridge too far(three of them actually). The sooner people realize that the better it will be for everyone involved.

SFC W

[snapperhead]

J Wolfsberger quoted:

"Not all uses of tu quoque arguments involve logical fallacy. They can be properly used to bring about awareness of inconsistency, to indirectly repeal a criticism by narrowing its scope or challenging its criteria, or to call into question the credibility of a source of knowledge."

Let us say the following claim:

(p1) "A's reputation is declining."
(p2) The counter claim is "well B, C, D, and so on are worse."

How does p2 make us aware of an inconsistency or contradiction? The original claim, and issue on the thread, was P1. P2 is irrelevant to refuting anything inherent to P1's claim. For it to show us "an awareness of inconsistency" it would need to show that P1 and P2 couldn't both be true and couldn't both be false, which is clearly wrong as they both are true. America's reputation is declining (p1) according to that report. There are also countries far, far worse than America (p2), as other posters here have pointed out. But that doesn't refute the truth of P1.

You might be able to argue that P2 narrows the scope and criteria of P1. Which I would agree with. However, that doesn't refute the original claim. It only calls into question the crappy measurements to which P1, or the report, used.

patmc said:

Snapperhead, when people run out of facts, they resort to name calling, so thanks for showing your cards.

Respectfully,
A psuedo-intellectual juggernaut

Touche. It was an ad hominem on my behalf. It won't happen again and I will strike out the offending sentence. However, I haven't run out of facts. I was calling into question the irrelevant arguments that were being presented. Facts don't win arguments when the individuals use them fallaciously.

Ken White said:

To include Fuchs' (but not snapperhead who has contributed nothing other than pseudointellectual bon mots).

Incorrect. I pointed out a species of red herring fallacy many of the posters have displayed. Refute his claims (as you have done) not address the irrelevant claim of whether or not other countries are worse than the U.S. The issue on the thread are claims about America's reputation yes? Not the reputation of other countries.

EDIT: It appears I'm either clueless at editing on this particular forum, or you can't edit old posts. Either way my preceding post, which include the ad hominem, stands for all to see as a signpost of my idiocy.

[Stan]

Originally Posted by snapperhead

It appears I'm either clueless at editing on this particular forum, or you can't edit old posts. Either way my preceding post, which include the ad hominem, stands for all to see as a signpost of my idiocy.

There's a time limit of approx. two hours for editing your posts.

BTW, as time permits you, please go here and introduce yourself.

Regards, Stan

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by snapperhead

...How does p2 make us aware of an inconsistency or contradiction? The original claim, and issue on the thread, was P1. P2 is irrelevant to refuting anything inherent to P1's claim. For it to show us "an awareness of inconsistency" it would need to show that P1 and P2 couldn't both be true and couldn't both be false, which is clearly wrong as they both are true.

Ahhhh

Touche. It was an ad hominem on my behalf. It won't happen again and I will strike out the offending sentence. However, I haven't run out of facts. I was calling into question the irrelevant arguments that were being presented. Facts don't win arguments when the individuals use them fallaciously.

Possibly true but how pertinent is it?

Ken White said:

Incorrect. I pointed out a species of red herring fallacy many of the posters have displayed. Refute his claims (as you have done) not address the irrelevant claim of whether or not other countries are worse than the U.S. The issue on the thread are claims about America's reputation yes? Not the reputation of other countries.

EDIT: It appears I'm either clueless at editing on this particular forum, or you can't edit old posts. Either way my preceding post, which include the ad hominem, stands for all to see as a signpost of my idiocy.

My point was that lectures on academic debate technique are pointless and add little to a discussion of the topic at hand which as you say pertain to the reputation of America.

[Sargent]

On the point of OIF as an AQ gimme, Ken wrote: That too is possible but I'm not at all sure they now look at it as a gimme. I have little doubt they'd say they do but I suspect the reality is they're still nonplussed by the Iraq incursion. They ran it out and they aren't gone but their prognosis isn't good.

I was referring to the idea that our intervention in Iraq, as a whole, was a gimme. That AQI has managed to shoot itself in both feet with its intervention is a piece of luck we could not have relied upon. They were entirely too brutal with the general population -- perhaps they ought to have read a bit more of Mao. It does, however, speak to the fact that there are not nearly so smart (and thus, not nearly such a formidable enemy) as we give them credit for being. On the other hand, AQI is not the only source of trouble in Iraq, so that even if we've managed to reduce that problem to a manageable size, we are still left with the fact that the our intervention unleashed a whole host of other radicalized forces and factions. We could still have major problems with the domestic forces who aren't particularly keen on our intervention or continued presence. (See below re chances for success viz. the SOFA.

On my comment about pre-OIF prayer, Ken wrote: Not being a praying type, I was merely incensed that it was being done so clumsily. I agreed with a need to do something in the ME; Iraq made strategic sense but the fumbling in the doing was apparent. He should have said nothing about Iraq, waited until his second term and gotten a better handle on things. My guess is that he feared if he did not get a second term, he was afraid his successor might not do something he thought needed doing. In any event, I wouldn't have done it the way it was done but I do believe it or something very near it was both necessary and overdue.

Ken, I'm a devout agnostic. What amounts to prayer in the rest of my life are the occasional conversations I have with whatever might be out there about the state of things in general. I suppose this piece of background ought to have been provided with the original comment, in order for you to understand the extent to which I did not want us to go into Iraq in the manner we seemed to be. The last time I was so prayerful was during the Reagan administration, as a young teenager, when the prospect of nuclear war seemed quite large.

On the prospects for success in OIF, Ken wrote: I also think we're up to a 70:30 shot or thereabouts. We'll see...

And yet, every time things seem to be getting better, we seem almost to want to screw them up again. In this case I am referring to the SOFA discussions. 50+ bases, immunity for our personnel (military and contract), and control of airspace up to 29K feet, to name a few, seems a bit in excess. I mean, if I only consider the basing issues, almost 60 bases is just incredible to me -- we are BRACing the US and proposing a near profligate number of bases in Iraq. It also doesn't really make sense to me from a logistical point of view -- so many bases just requires that many more people to service them. I would love it if someone could explain the thinking on this to me -- or point me to a source that explains it.

On the question of post-war occupation, comparing WWII and OIF, Ken wrote: I'm not sure one can compare the post war WW II / Iraq situations in any meaningful way for many reasons; not least that Iraq does not feel beaten; that gives a different mind set as you noted. That and the religion angle plus the interplay of other States in the Region mean a very different environment. Add in todays mass and instant communication capabilities and parallels are difficult to discern. Of course, you did not compare them, noting the difference but to even use them as a corollary or a starting point is, I think, perhaps a bit misleading to one's own thought processes.

My exact point was that we could not compare what we did in Germany or Japan to Iraq. In the former we had the victor's mandate, which we most assuredly do not have in Iraq. Thus, how we can act there is far more constrained, and we must tread very lightly and differently. Furthermore, we can't justify our future presence in Iraq on the history of our presences in Germany and Japan (or Korea).

Ken wrote: I also think our (well, some -- not you or I, obviously and among others) initial idea of 'victory' and a democratic highly secular Iraq have run into the wall of reality. No 'victory' in insurgencies, an acceptable outcome is all that's possible (and I hope we relearned that). Still, we could leave today and most of our strategic aims will have been achieved; it'd give the opponents a propaganda scream but the myth of "America won't fight, they'll leave when it gets tough" has been sort of put to bed -- that is totally unimportant to western thought; it is extremely important in the minds of those in the ME. Very different thought processes.

One thing that kept us in Vietnam so long was that we feared that our allies and enemies would doubt our credibility if we gave up the cause. What we didn't realize was that after a certain point our credibility was being damaged for not recognizing that the cause was irremediable. The point is, credibility cuts both ways.

On the need to do something in the ME, Ken wrote: On that, I disagree; there were many blunders in the process but the strategic issue, a response to and continuing presence in the ME, was going to be necessary at one time or another. It would have been easier in 1991; not easy, just easier. It was easier in 2003 than it will be later -- and if we leave too soon and too completely or on the wrong terms; we'll be back within ten years or so and it will be harder...

Perhaps. But I believed (and still do, though now it would be so much more difficult to do -- perhaps under a different administration) that if we really wanted to do something of value in the ME, our much better choice would have been to settle the Israel-Palestine problem. My wild-eyed optimist's, American military can do good, utopian idea was for the US to broker a peace guaranteed, particularly on behalf of the Palestinians, by a military presence. That is, we could have helped to settle things down by serving as the Palestinian defense force. (Sort of how the UN provides forces to sit in the Sinai.) This would have provided both sides with a sense of security, and would have been such a huge boon to our standing in the region. It also would have snatched a huge piece of AQ's propaganda and recruiting energy right out from under them.

On the magnitude of the error in deciding to interven in Iraq, Ken wrote: My defining moment was Pearl Harbor; my wife's was the Kennedy assassination, my second son's Desert Storm (or maybe OEF/OIF, he just says the ME?), my daughter's was 9/11. "My war" was Korea, after it Laos, Viet Nam and the other places were easy. Point being that age skews your historical perception. My pick for the greatest foreign policy fiasco of my life would be Viet Nam. It cost the US more in every respect (including respect...) than have the last seven years and it still reverberates 46 years later.

Vietnam was a colossal error. The differences between Iraq and Vietnam revolve around two points which, from a foreign policy perspective, are significant to me: Vietnam had an extant conflict which we did not create and there was a putative ally which had asked for our intervention. Neither of these obtained in Iraq. It goes back to my point about not being the party to cross the line of departure first. I just think it's bad, bad in just about any case I can imagine, and a rule we ought to just consider inviolate. If we ever come to a point where it ought to be broken, it will be so obvious as to be of the character of the exception that proves the rule. Bottom line, I do not believe in preemptive war. It's just war with an excuse. And recent history hasn't been kind to those who have started wars.

Ken wrote: My belief is that Iraq will be looked much differently and more favorably in all respects in another 40 years. Again, we'll see. In any event, being a historian, I expect you to write the definitive book on it!

I am not so partisan that I want Iraq to fail simply to be proven right.

I do worry that eventual success in Iraq might give people the idea that preemptive war is something to give serious consideration to. It would be bad enough if we started to think this way, but such a development in thinking would be hugely dangerous if our potential enemies came to the conclusion that preemption was a good idea.

As for the historian comment, don't make me get all "aw shucks" on you. After I finish the dissertation, I would like to take a crack at a social history of the officer corps -- turns out it's fairly virgin territory. I'd also like to do something with my husband about his advisory deployments -- I just think it would be really cool -- how often in history can you put that sort of thing together, a husband-wife team of officer and historian. It's like a perfect storm. By the time all that's done it might be a good time to take a crack at a real historical analysis of the decision to intervene in Iraq. I promise to do my to keep an open mind.

Ken wrote: Thanks again for the response.

No, no, thank you!

Seriously, this is where these sorts of fora work best -- when differing points of view can be hashed out seriously and without dopey rancor. Let's pat ourselves on the back!

Regards,
Jill

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Sargent

...It does, however, speak to the fact that there are not nearly so smart (and thus, not nearly such a formidable enemy) as we give them credit for being.

I don't think 'we' think they're all that smart or formidable; dangerous, yes; difficult to predict, yes -- but not formidable -- I think they may be that to not too bright Politicians some of whom use that as a bludgeon. They and the inept media that reports their blathering as if it were real.

We could still have major problems with the domestic forces who aren't particularly keen on our intervention or continued presence.

True and certainly highly possible but I think the Iraqis have finally realized what my son kept telling all he met during OIF 2 "You guys knock this stuff off and we'll be gone quickly..."

In this case I am referring to the SOFA discussions. 50+ bases, immunity for our personnel (military and contract), and control of airspace up to 29K feet, to name a few, seems a bit in excess. I mean, if I only consider the basing issues, almost 60 bases is just incredible to me -- we are BRACing the US and proposing a near profligate number of bases in Iraq. It also doesn't really make sense to me from a logistical point of view -- so many bases just requires that many more people to service them. I would love it if someone could explain the thinking on this to me -- or point me to a source that explains it.

Can't say for sure but what I can say from my limited ME time is that haggling is the national sport for every country; they live to bargain. The rules are unlike US horse trading; ask for ten, expect seven and take five. In the ME, it's ask for 200, expect 100 and take ten. Everything is exaggerated. This effort by us will force the Iraqis to take more responsibility for internal defense -- but they know they are not yet capable of external defense and therefor do not really want us to leave (yet) -- and my bet would be a fairly sensible and standard SOFA agreement will result, I note the Iraqis obtained copies of those we have with Japan, Singapore and South Korea. If we had started off asking for 5 bases, we'd have ended up with one; by asking for fifty, we'll probably get the five. Same thing with the airsapce management, they aren't capable of controlling it now so they'll let us do it and set a target for themselves to take over. It's all haggling...

Furthermore, we can't justify our future presence in Iraq on the history of our presences in Germany and Japan (or Korea).

Totally agree but regrettably, the idiot politicians can speak without you or I clearing their speeches for basic logic and common sense.

One thing that kept us in Vietnam so long was that we feared that our allies and enemies would doubt our credibility if we gave up the cause. What we didn't realize was that after a certain point our credibility was being damaged for not recognizing that the cause was irremediable. The point is, credibility cuts both ways.[

I think Johnson's fear of looking 'soft on Communism' was a bigger factor than US cred; with Nixon, doing it on his terms was the driver. Viet Nam was a cluster but who's at fault? Eisenhower for signing a treaty Ridgeway tried to get him not to sign? Kennedy taking advantage of that treaty and circumstances to boost the economy and develop some tough guy credibility? Johnson for expanding it? Harkins, Westmoreland and the US Army for blowing it for seven long years?

Yes, credibility does cut both ways but perception rules credibility.

In the case of Iraq, your points are well taken with respect to western attitudes but they are really wrong, IMO, with respect to ME attitudes where pride is a far, far stronger driver of attitude. You may have noticed that the Asians who are more ME than western in that respect have been muted about what we're doing there and why -- they understand. Those in the ME who rail against what we're doing there or putting on their public face; under that, they know what we're doing and are, if not impressed, at least aware. Nothing in the ME is as it seems. Afghanistan is a separate thing in almost all aspects but there, too, little is as it seems.

While westerners can logically find many faults with what we did and are doing, the folks in the ME look at it quite differently -- they'll adopt the western rhetoric in public and in English but behind that facade, they know -- and have learned. I suspect more probes from the ME but I also am willing to bet they'll be few, mostly ineffective and soon cease. That's what it was all about, that and those three to five bases.

...My wild-eyed optimist's, American military can do good, utopian idea was for the US to broker a peace guaranteed, particularly on behalf of the Palestinians, by a military presence. That is, we could have helped to settle things down by serving as the Palestinian defense force. (Sort of how the UN provides forces to sit in the Sinai.) This would have provided both sides with a sense of security, and would have been such a huge boon to our standing in the region. It also would have snatched a huge piece of AQ's propaganda and recruiting energy right out from under them.

Unfortunately, I think you are indeed be wildly optimistic. I'm afraid that would turn into a 50-60 year occupation...

...It goes back to my point about not being the party to cross the line of departure first. I just think it's bad, bad in just about any case I can imagine, and a rule we ought to just consider inviolate. If we ever come to a point where it ought to be broken, it will be so obvious as to be of the character of the exception that proves the rule. Bottom line, I do not believe in preemptive war. It's just war with an excuse...

Preemption has to be an option IMO, so I guess we'll have to agree to disagree on that score.

And recent history hasn't been kind to those who have started wars.

Nor has ancient history, yet, other than WW I and WW II (with several FDR-related caveats... ) and possibly Korea, most of our wars we have started after some provocations (to include the Civil War)...

... such a development in thinking would be hugely dangerous if our potential enemies came to the conclusion that preemption was a good idea.

Heh. Based on history and what we know of the doctrine of some likely candidates, I think they already have that thought.

...I promise to do my to keep an open mind.

No can ask for more than that -- and I'll try to do the same (if I can remember where it is; I'm old... ).

Thanks again.

[Culpeper]

Doesn't every country have a decline in reputation from different perspectives and different cultures? Example, the USA has a poor opinion for several countries. As for the reputation of the USA? Haven't we received plenty of criticism from abroad throughout our history from the small U.S. Navy and the Barbary Coast to our current political contests? Haven't we always been on the poor side of reputation not just from particular policy but from success. No different than one pilot being jealous of another pilot that achieved the impossible maneuver and survived? Human defense mechanisms that we can't control. The answer is in admitting mistakes, accepting what we can't control, courage to change, and knowing the difference. It is the foundation of American life and can be found in everything from our constitution to alcoholics anonymous. That latter being so successful that is now worldwide...