COIN Perspectives From On Point

[SWJED]

COIN Perspectives From On Point
Lessons Learned in Iraq
by Sergeant Michael Hanson, USMC

COIN Perspectives From On Point (Full PDF Article)

Tanks and artillery don’t defeat Insurgents, nor do warships, fighters, or bombers. Infantry defeats insurgents. These weapons can help the infantry man, but in the end it is the soldier on point that will locate, close with and destroy the enemy either by direct action or by denying the enemy the ability to operate against him. American infantry are outstanding troops, but there are simple ways to make them even more effective. If our infantry forces are restructured and reequipped, they can be better tailored to the fight they are currently engaged in. American infantrymen are equipped with a vast array of "force multipliers" and "battlefield dominators".

This is equipment that essentially gives an American Soldier the combat power of several enemy combatants. Devices like night vision goggles, PEQ2 infrared laser aiming devices, ACOG (Advanced Combat Optical Gunsight - a 4 power rifle scope) and advanced body armor. The United States outfits its warriors with the best gear it can afford. "The best equipment for our troops" is a universal ideal that the vast majority of Americans support.

So then how have small groups of rag tag insurgents with no complex war machines of their own confounded American efforts in Iraq for over four years? How have these bands of unrelated rebels armed with Soviet-era small arms and home made weapons managed to hold on beneath massive American military might for as long as they have?

[Surferbeetle]

Hell of an article.

[Bill Moore]

The author effectively addresses several serious flaws in our operational and tactical strategy, and he proposes a daring course of action.

After reading the article, it trigger the following thoughts:

1. Our military is still overly focused on Force Protection, and it limits our ability to take the fight to the enemy effectively. This is a case where political considerations (casualty rates) have once again won over the correct tactical employment of our forces to win this type of war.

2. His high risk proposal of deploying numerous small units to saturate an area is classic, but unforunately too daring for our military. I have to disagree with one of his points though, he said said the terrorists wouldn't know where we're at, they would just know that we could be everywhere (paraphrasing), so their freedom of movement would be severely limited. U.S. military forces in an urban environment for he most part would still be identified by the locals, and that information could be relayed to the enemy by suportive locals. This tactic is still sound, but we can't assume invisibility in an urban environment. Another option to expand upon his concept to develop local forces that are capable of using this strategy.

3. We're overly focused on the IED and IED cell/network. We're spending billions of dollars to protect ourselves from this threat as he pointed out, yet in doing so we are in many ways making the IED more effective. Sometimes I see parallels in our response to the IED problem to our response to the German submarine threat during WWII. The submarine threat was a much greater strategic threat than the IED, and there was considerable effort put forth to develop technologies to mitigate this threat. It was an appropriate effort in this case. Developing new armors, jamers, etc. to counter IEDs should be pursued in a similiar effort, but it shouldn't be the main effort.

If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED we would have a much greater impact on reducing IED attacks (as noted in the relatively secure areas). It seems to me we're looking at the IED as though this something completely new, yet it has been around forever. We used to call them booby traps and mechanical ambushes. We developed tactics to pacify an area, thus we defeated this threat by defeatng the enemy, not their tactic. Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.

Great article.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

1. Our military is still overly focused on Force Protection...

True.

2. His high risk proposal of deploying numerous small units to saturate an area is classic, but unforunately too daring for our military...This tactic is still sound, but we can't assume invisibility in an urban environment. Another option to expand upon his concept to develop local forces that are capable of using this strategy.

Probably correct that it is too 'daring' at this time -- though I submit we've done it many times before in many wars, it works and it isn't really all that daring -- it just assumes some risk. I for one do not think it is high risk; a risk? Sure; but not high -- not with halfway decent training which we can do.

You're of course correct that it will not generally work for us in an alien urban environment and that the HN folks will have to do it in such a locale -- but it will work in rural areas. In all cases, the factors of METT-TC apply...

3. We're overly focused on the IED and IED cell/network... Developing new armors, jamers, etc. to counter IEDs should be pursued in a similiar effort, but it shouldn't be the main effort.

True dat. Defeat the tactic, not the weapon. Where is the Joint RPG Task Force????

If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED... Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.

Great article.

It is that.

Good job, Sergeant Hanson

[SWJED]

Sgt Hanson and SWJ have been back and forth on this article - he put his heart and soul into the writing - even with our nags about this and that and stuck with it - job well done Marine!

[William F. Owen]

Gotta applaud this guy for his effort. What I find frustrating is that what he is saying has been being said by many people for a great many years, yet still nothing is done.

Anyone who has studied the current set of infantry problems, knows how to solve them. All the equipment and TTP answers are out there, and have been for many years. Infantry science is mostly "doctrinal archaeology".

The fire team is the decisive unit at this stage of the war. 4-6 men are much more likely to make contact with the enemy, draw the enemy into an open fight where we can destroy them with superior weapons and training. Imagine:

• 98 fire teams per battalion vs. 36 squads per battalion
• 36 fire teams per company vs. 12 squads per company
• 9 fire teams per platoon vs. 3 squads per platoon

Historically, and doctrinally a fire team is actually 3-5. 6 men is two 3 man fire teams (or "glued" cells).

36 fire teams just breaks the span of control, so does 9, so some intermediate command level is needed. Lots of research in this area. Platoons are not military inventions. They are products of human nature.

However if you flexibly task organise platoons as 3-6 fire teams, or use sub task 2-3 teams into sections, you are getting to what the Australians, Brits and Israelis do in practice. It works. This also loves a lot of weight issues as well.

... I think we may have discussed this all before somewhere...

[slapout9]

Originally Posted by William F. Owen

Gotta applaud this guy for his effort. What I find frustrating is that what he is saying has been being said by many people for a great many years, yet still nothing is done.

Anyone who has studied the current set of infantry problems, knows how to solve them. All the equipment and TTP answers are out there, and have been for many years. Infantry science is mostly "doctrinal archaeology".



Historically, and doctrinally a fire team is actually 3-5. 6 men is two 3 man fire teams (or "glued" cells).

36 fire teams just breaks the span of control, so does 9, so some intermediate command level is needed. Lots of research in this area. Platoons are not military inventions. They are products of human nature.

However if you flexibly task organise platoons as 3-6 fire teams, or use sub task 2-3 teams into sections, you are getting to what the Australians, Brits and Israelis do in practice. It works. This also loves a lot of weight issues as well.

... I think we may have discussed this all before somewhere...

Wilf, I have beeen waiting for you to comment on this Of course it is a good paper it was written by a Sergeant!

[William F. Owen]

Originally Posted by slapout9

Of course it is a good paper it was written by a Sergeant!

I wish I could write and fluently and easily as he does. Very accessible style, and an object lesson is writing the way your audience hears. I can quibble with the detail, but not with the purpose and the intent.

[reed11b]

I caution against putting too much weight into the statement that insurgents "only fight when they have the advantage". My experience is that small cells will attack larger units in hit and run in order to slow them down and to allow a "swarm" style attack when possible. I feel that insurgents not so much only fights on their terms, as they only fight on their turf. Go into insurgent territory, and they will fight. For all this, it is a very well written paper that reminds me a lot of my own unpublished concept paper on infantry.
Reed

[Ken White]

I've seen exactly the same thing several places:

"...small cells will attack larger units in hit and run in order to slow them down and to allow a "swarm" style attack when possible."

but in my observation that 'will attack' generally relies on one of two factors; either the COIN unit appears to be not too competent or unprepared at the time; or the insurgents have a really, really important to them area, item or person to protect. The former reason is the most common, the latter should usually be known if the Intel is fairly good.

Generally if a unit has its act together and looks like they really know what they're doing, the insurgents will avoid contact. I've seen that repeatedly even when they outnumbered the COIN force.

METT-TC, as always...

[Uboat509]

It is also important to note that the concept of an advantage is based on the attackers perspective. Many of these insurgents have some street smarts and the older ones have gotten pretty good at staying alive, obviously, but they often don't have any real training. They may have learned do things through trial and error or gotten lucky a time or two. That does not mean they really understand the situation. When they do attack, it may well be that they think that they have an advantage, whether they do or not. I read somewhere that fighting professionals is easy because they are predictable. Fighting amateurs is harder because they just don't know what they are supposed to do. We really need to find a better class of enemy.

SFC W

[Dr Jack]

Originally Posted by SWJED

Sgt Hanson and SWJ have been back and forth on this article - he put his heart and soul into the writing - even with our nags about this and that and stuck with it - job well done Marine!

Congratulations! Great contribution.

[Ron Humphrey]

An easy to read and IMHO accurate article, Good Job.

I do have maybe one quibble or concern as it might be.

Although breaking down into smaller yet still effective groups would likely be effective however how much consideration should be taken of the fact that it also leaves those particular forces open not only to ambushes by larger enemy force but on another note possibly much more susceptible to percieved or enemy IO driven accusations with little actual capability to protect themselves from the aforementioned.

This would seem more probable in places other than the west.

How do you make sure that your "good works" don't end up misconstrued by those who constantly seek to see things other than they are already?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

...Although breaking down into smaller yet still effective groups would likely be effective however how much consideration should be taken of the fact that it also leaves those particular forces open not only to ambushes by larger enemy force...

The solution to that is to not get ambushed or caught by such an enemy force. I'm not being facetious; that can be done with better training and some practice -- it has been and is being done by numerous US units in a lot of places over the years and today. I strongly disagree with those who say "that's too expensive" and "most units can't get to that point." I do acknowledge that you cannot get that to 100% surety -- or even 90 or maybe 85% -- but you can get to 75% at a minimum. That's good enough. Unless one is unduly risk averse.

... but on another note possibly much more susceptible to percieved or enemy IO driven accusations with little actual capability to protect themselves from the aforementioned.

That's the part I don't understand? Do you mean accusations of wrongdoing, war crime-like?

If so, I think the Colombian's have the right answer; a few forensic teams on strip alert ready to fly to and investigate any incident, gather evidence and report it honestly and rapidly to the world press...

[Ron Humphrey]

Originally Posted by Ken White

The solution to that is to not get ambushed or caught by such an enemy force. I'm not being facetious; that can be done with better training and some practice -- it has been and is being done by numerous US units in a lot of places over the years and today. I strongly disagree with those who say "that's too expensive" and "most units can't get to that point." I do acknowledge that you cannot get that to 100% surety -- or even 90 or maybe 85% -- but you can get to 75% at a minimum. That's good enough. Unless one is unduly risk averse.That's the part I don't understand? Do you mean accusations of wrongdoing, war crime-like?

And yes thats what I meant

Originally Posted by Ken White

If so, I think the Colombian's have the right answer; a few forensic teams on strip alert ready to fly to and investigate any incident, gather evidence and report it honestly and rapidly to the world press...

True enough, but exactly how long would it be before the bad guys get really good at leaving forensic evidence to support what they are trying to sell. they got tech too. And in that case what have you got to lean on other than he said she said between locals and your guys.

Also which one is more likely to be accepted?

[Cavguy]

Has anyone suggested Sgt. Hanson read some of Kitson's work on intel driven ops with small units? Might be enlightening and help shape some of his thoughts.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

...True enough, but exactly how long would it be before the bad guys get really good at leaving forensic evidence to support what they are trying to sell. they got tech too. And in that case what have you got to lean on other than he said she said between locals and your guys.

I'm not at all sure that such evidence is that easy to leave -- or difficult to counter. In any event, every action develops an equal and opposite reaction so we're confronted with the usual see saw effect of tactical ploys and counterploys. We will be slower due to the ineffable bureaucracy but we usually eventually get there...

Also which one is more likely to be accepted?

Depends on many things. There are those who will judge by the facts as they seem to be exposed, those who will defend the US or Allied position and those -- a majority in the world -- who are prepared to believe the US is evil ergo it must be wrong on our part. That's reality and it's not likely to change as long as we're the 800 pound gorilla; your kids may see a different world, you and I are unlikely to do so.

Been that way in the world since the 50s. The NKVD / MVD / KGB did their job well.

A bigger question is; does it really make that much difference who's believed in the long run? I think not. Results matter.

[Rifleman]

Originally Posted by Ron Humphrey

True enough, but exactly how long would it be before the bad guys get really good at leaving forensic evidence to support what they are trying to sell. they got tech too.

Staged crime scenes are not usually successful in the civilian world provided that the detective approaches the scene with a critical eye and has time to do a thorough investigation.

Remember the tracking thread? Sometimes it has application in crime scene investigation and reconstruction if the scene is on ground that holds tracks pretty well. Track evidence of someone entering the scene to plant evidence.....often looks like track evidence of someone entering the scene to plant evidence.

[reed11b]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

If we put half that effort into defeating the insurgency, instead of the IED we would have a much greater impact on reducing IED attacks (as noted in the relatively secure areas). It seems to me we're looking at the IED as though this something completely new, yet it has been around forever. We used to call them booby traps and mechanical ambushes. We developed tactics to pacify an area, thus we defeated this threat by defeatng the enemy, not their tactic. Now we seem to be focused entirely on the IED and the cell that emplaces it.

Great article.

That is something that I have long felt, though I have not been able to articulate it. Same thing goes for attack helicopters doing specific anti-MANPADS missions or Stryker counter-mortar ambush missions. I have always looked at these as manpower intensive for limited reward and more of a "reactionary" measure then an actual plan. I have also always told myself that the people making these decisions are far more experienced and trained then I am and that perhaps I am wrong, so it is nice to see my opinions validated.
Reed

[Steve Blair]

What is really depressing to a history type like myself is how much of this is familiar. We keep seeing the same problems over and over, and have to relearn the same lessons (empower our NCOs...don't carry tons of gear...etc.) each time.