The Human Element: When Gadgetry Becomes Strategy

[Surferbeetle]

COL McMaster's new article at World Affairs Journal and referenced at SWJ and FP

As did McNamara’s whiz kids, advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs applied business analogies to war and borrowed heavily from the disciplines of economics and systems analysis. Both Graduated Pressure and Rapid Decisive Operations promised efficiency in war; planners could determine precisely the amount of force necessary to achieve desired “effects.” Graduated Pressure would apply just enough force to effect the adversary’s “calculation of interests.” According to the terms of Rapid Decisive Operations, U.S. forces, based on a “comprehensive system-of-systems understanding of the enemy and the environment,” would attack nodes in the enemy system with a carefully calculated amount of force to generate “cumulative and cascading effects.”

But the U.S. experience in Vietnam, Afghanistan, and Iraq demonstrated that it was impossible to calibrate precisely the amount of force necessary to prosecute a war. The human and psychological dimensions of war, along with the friction and uncertainty generated when opposing forces meet, invariably frustrates even the most elaborate and well-considered attempts to predict the effects of discrete military actions. Enemy countermeasures such as dispersion, concealment, deception, and intermingling with the civilian population limit the reach of surveillance and precision strike capabilities. Other factors, such as cultural, tribal, and political identities enhance complexity and influence the course of events. Emphasis in planning and directing operations, therefore, ought to be on effectiveness rather than efficiency. The requirement to adapt quickly to unforeseen conditions means that commanders will need additional forces and resources that can be committed with little notice. For efficiency in all forms of warfare, including counterinsurgency, means barely winning. And in war, barely winning can be an ugly proposition.

Lots to think about...

[Ken White]

about a little military skill and a lot of just plain hard work that we continually reject for pat solutions that don't work.

Problem is the wrong people will probably be the ones who think about it...

[Bob's World]

Too many senior commanders love metrics to measure their success. All the better if they come with some sort of unilateral "easy button" program that replaces actually having to do the work to understand the nature of the environment, the problem at hand, and then craft and implement a tailored holistic solution set in support of the host nation to address.

If you are standing in the middle of an isurgency, you don't need a slide rule to know it.

[Surferbeetle]

Bob,

Ok you made me laugh with this one; touche'.

If you are standing in the middle of an isurgency, you don't need a slide rule to know it.

Ken,

...pat solutions that don't work.

Always a popular choice, dead on analysis.

So did you guys catch this opinion piece by Dr. Paul Kennedy at today's WSJ? He has a semi-recent podcast in this same theme, taken at the London School of Economics, and posted for free at Apple iTunes.

In this focus upon chronic fiscal deficits and military overstretch, certain positive measures of American strength tend to get pushed into the shadows (and perhaps should be given more light at another time). This country possesses tremendous advantages compared to other great powers in its demographics, its land-to-people ratio, its raw materials, its research universities and laboratories, its flexible work force, etc. These strengths have been overshadowed during a near-decade of political irresponsibility in Washington, rampant greed on Wall Street and its outliers, and excessive military ventures abroad.

Do metrics apply for what he describes, and what are the significant differences to the 'metrics approach' used that you see with COL McMaster's thesis? How else do we measure things?

I too understand what's going when I am in the thick of things on the ground, but other than having people in my chain of command who know and trust me how does one share one's understanding with the resource providers?

Best,

Steve

[Ken White]

Kennedy's analysis is okay but he does very badly miss one point:

"...These strengths have been overshadowed during a near-decade of political irresponsibility in Washington, rampant greed on Wall Street and its outliers, and excessive military ventures abroad."

I'd say by any measure the irresponsibility and greed run back a lot farther than a near decade -- about 48 years in my book and I think at least 30 by anyone's reckoning. A whole lot nearer a half century than ten years. He must have slept through the 70s, 80s and 90s.

I'd apply the same measure to 'military adventures' as well but I suspect the good Professor and I would differ radically on what constituted 'adventure' and on which were excessive, which were necessary and which were not...

Surferbeetle asks:

"Do metrics apply for what he describes, and what are the significant differences to the 'metrics approach' used that you see with COL McMaster's thesis? How else do we measure things?"

I don't think they apply across the board; I do not understand the second question; and what is being measured?

I too understand what's going when I am in the thick of things on the ground, but other than having people in my chain of command who know and trust me how does one share one's understanding with the resource providers?

If you're in the thick of things on the ground, I'd bet there's no problem having your chain of command trust you...

That second phrase is where we've gone wrong. You should not have to share your understanding with the resource providers; it is not their job to second guess you to death (literally) it is their job to support you with the resources you require. It is your chain of command's job to insure you ask for what is needed and to fire you if you ask for excess; since we know you'd never do that, you should get what you ask for. It is also their job to fight any resource battles. I've seen exceptions of course but mostly that used to work, at least prior to my retirement in 1995 -- surely you guys haven't let things go downhill that much in 13 years???

That's what should happen; sometimes it does not, most always due to a number of well intentioned laws and regulations designed to protect the taxpayers money that effectively tie the hands of all. We tolerate that and I don't know why we do -- I do know why some in positions of power tolerate, even encourage, it. Because it enhances their own power.

The Bean counters have taken over the institution and everyone is okay with that? Weird.

Which doesn't answer your question. I don't have an answer. I've never had that problem, seriously. I cannot think of a time when I asked for resources I needed that I did not get them, almost invariably with no metrics involved. I'll acknowledge occasional use of the "Ask for ten, expect five...' rule and that I sometimes would only "...get three." However, that three always worked out. That applies to uniformed and civilian service, peace and war.

I do remember that when the Army, briefly, was going to "Manage Civilians to Budget" that I proposed to eliminate five civilian positions and regrade three others only to be told that I could eliminate just two because there was a Congressionally mandated floor for civilian employees and two was my salami slice. so much for a good idea and a good program that foundered on a metric.

A metric designed to protect jobs, union members and votes -- not the taxpayer's dollars.

Like I said, I don't know why we put up with that stuff...

[Entropy]

I think it's important not to forget the primacy of the human element in warfare, but at the same time we shouldn't overly denigrate technology. As I see it, our technological forces and technological approach performed extremely well in the primary missions we were given: The overthrow of the Saddam and Taliban regimes. The problem was that those successful methods did not work when confronted with two completely unplanned, post-MCO conflicts. Some of that is undoubtedly because gadgetry doesn't work nearly as well against the enemies we faced (as well as our technology mindset), but in my mind, the biggest problem was a complete failure to appreciate, analyze and plan for "phase IV" ops. It was more a failure of research and imagination than technology. We (and our policymakers) didn't understand the societies we had invaded, nor the history, nor any number of other factors, factors that ultimately led to poor decisionmaking. This isn't to say that had we properly understood what we were getting into from the beginning that a technology-based approach would ultimately work - it wouldn't - but we would have been much better off.

[Ken White]

McMaster piece that is in opposition to what you say. In fact, seems to me he said what you said...

However, my purpose in this comment is to highlight one thing you said:

"We (and our policymakers) didn't understand the societies we had invaded, nor the history, nor any number of other factors, factors that ultimately led to poor decisionmaking."

and point out that in every war mentioned, the ideas and advice of people who were very familiar with the societies and their history was not only available to the policy makers -- but was actually provided them.

The policy makers elected to ignore the advice and ideas.

You may recall the Millenium Challenge exercise prior to the invasion of Iraq where retired Marine LTG Paul Van Riper tanked the DoD grand plan; MCMasters mentions the Sigma Exercises prior to Viet Nam which showed a preview of what occurred and mentions that Bundy thought the conclusion 'too harsh.' I happen to know several FAOs who were involved in briefings at the Pentagon before all those wars -- and to also know their advice was not taken...

McMasters is accurately pointing out that there is a human dimension in war and that it is all powerful; that those who look for technology to overcome that are almost invariably going to be disappointed; technology can assist, it cannot 'do.' He is also condemning the American politicians ubiquitous quest for cheap, quick fixes -- and pointing out there aren't any in war.

He's also criticizing those who allow western thinking to determine what eastern opponents will do; he cites this "...one of the deans of systems analysis, Thomas Schelling, wrote in 1964. The precise, rational application of force would culminate in the United States and its adversary reaching “simultaneously a judgment about what is the most reasonable choice for us to make and what is a reasonable choice for him to be making.” That is pathetic; to believe the other guy thinks as you do is to invite defeat. Most Corporals know that...

McMasters isn't picking on "gadgetry" or technology -- he's pointing out the terrible fallibility of massive egos combined with political kowtowing in policy positions.

Rightly so.

[Fuchs]

The problem is that the relevant persons (officers, writers, politicians) have extremely varying degrees of interest in and knowledge about warfare.

You are no easy prey of seemingly 'easy' solutions if you learned very much about warfare (and had the ability to stomach the info properly).

Technology & destruction are simple to understand - it takes very little time and interest to grasp these aspects of warfare. I for one had an unhealthy emphasis on hardware about ten years ago, for example - and learned 95% of what I know about warfare in the meantime.

I see no easy way how the problem could be solved - you simply have to hope that the relevant persons understand all or most facets.


The military morale/combat psychology problem was systematically inflated by "no surrender" OPFOR in exercises, a lack of real fear in training and avoidance of really difficult combat situations since Tet (difficult as 'a battalion is about to be overrun').

We got a prime example for the importance of morale and psychology in warfare in the South Ossetian War; the material and personnel in action was quite even, but the human element failed on the Georgian side (I suspect due to radio comm-disrupting EW and a lack of psychological readiness to fight the extremely superior bigger neighbor).
The Georgians could have had FCS equipment and would likely still have folded.
This example should serve well, especially for politicians and writers.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

The problem is that the relevant persons (officers, writers, politicians) have extremely varying degrees of interest in and knowledge about warfare.

While that's true, the officers should have a great deal of knowledge and, one would hope, interest. Writers one cannot expect too much from and most Politicians in any democratic society are going to have minimal knowledge and interest. The greater problem is said Politicians should take their warfare cues from the Officers but instead take them from the writers and the Officers, subordinate to the Politicians do not always give them straightforward advice -- that's one larger problem...

You are no easy prey of seemingly 'easy' solutions if you learned very much about warfare (and had the ability to stomach the info properly).

No you aren't -- if...

That's the problem, most political policy makers do not learn much and aren't interested in doing so.

Technology & destruction are simple to understand - it takes very little time and interest to grasp these aspects of warfare. I for one had an unhealthy emphasis on hardware about ten years ago, for example - and learned 95% of what I know about warfare in the meantime.

That's why the technology element can be a trap if one isn't careful.

I see no easy way how the problem could be solved - you simply have to hope that the relevant persons understand all or most facets.

You may be correct but IMO that's not good enough; we're talking a lot of lives here and my sensing is that most Politicians tend to take their cues from popular sources as opposed to from the most knowldgable sources. We need to be able to tune down egos but we cannot...

The military morale/combat psychology problem was systematically inflated by "no surrender" OPFOR in exercises, a lack of real fear in training and avoidance of really difficult combat situations since Tet (difficult as 'a battalion is about to be overrun').

I have no idea what that statement means???

We got a prime example for the importance of morale and psychology in warfare in the South Ossetian War...This example should serve well, especially for politicians and writers.

Should but probably won't...

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

I'm so gonna use this:

Originally Posted by Bob's World

If you are standing in the middle of an insurgency, you don't need a slide rule to know it.

[Fuchs]

"I have no idea what that statement means???"

The morale element is usually not properly simulated/incorporated in exercises.
Much has been written about how 90% destruction of enemy units as in some/many exercises is simply not necessary in reality. A 10-20% decimated OPFOR unit would likely withdraw or disintegrate.
The military trains/trained more for destruction of lives and material than for the destruction of will.

Soldiers take more risks (and have much higher casualty rates) in exercises than in wartime - the psychological element in exercises is simply unrealistic due to lacking sanctions for death.

Finally, we didn't experience real crisis in wartime for more than a generation. There were failures, but it's been a while since a whole unit (battalion or larger) was about to be overrun. Our armies didn't experience the other side of combat psychology - the side of the beaten, really really beaten up one - for decades.


I'm more skeptical about the expertise of even general officers than you seem to be, Ken. Military history has many examples of very poor advice and strategies from generals. I don't recall reports about Afghanistan's military history (Brits/19th century) from the time when we joined the Afghanistan adventure.

A mere switch from writers to officers as sources of advice/info for politicians won't do anything imho.
The think tank culture and is pretty much a U.S. phenomenon, stupid policy decisions in military affairs aren't. Another example; almost all authors on military affairs in Germany are either of the pacifist crop that politicians ignore or are/were career officers.
That didn't save us from stupid missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan or Africa.
It didn't save us from gold-plated development projects that last a quarter century.
We still copied "transformation" (and adopted it as buzzword with a capital letter).
We invented/embraced an extremely questionable air mechanization concept either.
There were no ideologues without deep military expertise at work in Germany - our politicians failed after being informed solely by officers and bureaucrats (=officers and ex-officers as well).

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

The morale element is usually not properly simulated/incorporated in exercises.

True for a variety of fairly good reasons. Though simulation improves annually, it'll be a while before a realistic method of casualty and effectiveness determination in training is possible.

Much has been written about how 90% destruction of enemy units as in some/many exercises is simply not necessary in reality. A 10-20% decimated OPFOR unit would likely withdraw or disintegrate.

That's a potentially bad assumption; I've seen too many units from several Armies or groups continue to fight with over 50% casualties -- and effectively.

The military trains/trained more for destruction of lives and material than for the destruction of will.

There's a reason for that -- see my comment on units with over 50% casualties. Essentially, you may deter him by attacking the will; you will deter him if you attack his capability adequately. Further, attacking the will of people who are willing to die for their cause (See Japan in WW II, some Islamists today) or are forced to do so (see several nations in WW II) may not do the job.

Soldiers take more risks (and have much higher casualty rates) in exercises than in wartime - the psychological element in exercises is simply unrealistic due to lacking sanctions for death.

Of course it is. Can't be helped. Training can prepare you for combat but it cannot replicate combat -- not in a democracy, the legislators won't stand for it or the casualty rate it would cause -- nor will the Mothers...

...the side of the beaten, really really beaten up one - for decades.

Ah. True. Not to worry, it'll happen sooner or later...

...I don't recall reports about Afghanistan's military history (Brits/19th century) from the time when we joined the Afghanistan adventure.

Can't speak for Europe (though I did see a few in the UK press), there were plenty here -- papers were filled with predictions of thousands of casualties and the utter defeat of the US.

...The think tank culture and is pretty much a U.S. phenomenon, stupid policy decisions in military affairs aren't... politicians failed after being informed solely by officers and bureaucrats (=officers and ex-officers as well).

True, enough errors by many in many places; way of the world...

[William F. Owen]

But while the uniqueness of Vietnam limits what we might apply directly from that experience, an examination of how and why Vietnam became an American war and what went wrong there can also help us think more clearly about the wars of today and tomorrow. Indeed, as long as we resist the temptation to expect simple answers from history, strategic and operational insights from the war in Vietnam can be relevant and helpful to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Wallah! This is why the COIN Crusaders irritate me, with their free use of the word "complex". Vietnam was far more complex than Iraq and A'Stan. If Anthropologists are having a hard time in A'Stan, they'd be completely sunk in the mountains of Laos, or the villages of the tri-boarder area.

What this article leads me towards, is confirming my view that politicians win wars, not soldiers. Military force is defined by the skill of it's practitioners to deliver an outcome or opportunity close to what what the politician wants.
The bit that most don't seem to understand is that Political need is not always (and sometimes clearly not) Strategic need. - as Clausewitz clearly implies with his differentiation between total war and real war.

I would submit that the US military actions of 2001 and 2003 reflect this. It certainly guides my perspectives of my own people, and it is also pretty relevant to Terrorists and Insurgents.

[Bob's World]

Will agree with Wilf on this one.

Politicians start wars, Politicians end wars. The soldier's burden is to fight wars.

Pull the string on a bad war and you will find bad politics at the end of it. Yet here we are, over 7 years deep into the "GWOT," while the boys and girls back in DC sit on their hands anxiously waiting for the military to wrap this up so that they can get back to normal...

This is what happens when "Intel leads Ops." Absolutely intel drives tactical engagements, but anything higher than that had better be driven by a sound, comprehensive strategy or you are just going to be chasing "bad guys" wherever they decide to take you.

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Ken White

That's a potentially bad assumption; I've seen too many units from several Armies or groups continue to fight with over 50% casualties -- and effectively.

Let me guess; they weren't given a promising opportunity to withdraw?

You remind me of a rule that I've heard years ago. It seems as if the Russians use it sometimes.
The rule says that you should never corner a determined opponent completely - always leave him a way out of a trap/encirclement.
You don't want him to make a last stand - you want him to fight on your terms - he shall be on a costly tactical offense where you want him to be.

In short; you're doing it wrong if your enemy fights (almost) to the last man. You need to play him on the morale level. It doesn't hurt to train that.

-----------

About politicians; look at the South Ossetian War. It was embarrassing for us. Not because the Russians defeated a 'friend' of ours, but because they won a war in a few days and were able to be satisfied. Sure, there was some foreign diplomacy to limit Putin's thirst there (a phone call of Sarkozy was published) - see what example he used).
The key to the Russian success was not to go on, though. They could have had a Chechnya times ten, but they stuck to a five days war that changed the geo-strategic situation of Eastern Europe on the cheap.

Bush/Blair as Russians would certainly have continued the war, pressing for 'regime change' - and might have created a huge mess.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

Let me guess; they weren't given a promising opportunity to withdraw?

everyone will do what is 'logical' to you. everyone doesn't think the way you do -- or I do -- and no one should ever forget that combat is illogical...

In one particular case I recall, not only was a chance to withdraw not taken, when the attacker backed off, the former defending force even though severely mauled illogically attacked the withdrawing offensive force. People do odd things from time to time, even frequently and combat, again, is essentially illogical. That should never be forgotten.

You remind me of a rule that I've heard years ago. It seems as if the Russians use it sometimes. The rule says that you should never corner a determined opponent completely - always leave him a way out of a trap/encirclement. You don't want him to make a last stand - you want him to fight on your terms - he shall be on a costly tactical offense where you want him to be.

You remind me of a person who's read a lot and experienced little.

As to your 'rule,' I'd say sometimes; it all depends on the METT-TC, Fox, METT-TC...

In short; you're doing it wrong if your enemy fights (almost) to the last man. You need to play him on the morale level. It doesn't hurt to train that.

Most Armies do train that way at least to an extent; the problem is that people will do irrational things and as we both said above, training cannot and will not equal combat.

[Rex Brynen]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

You remind me of a rule that I've heard years ago. It seems as if the Russians use it sometimes.
The rule says that you should never corner a determined opponent completely - always leave him a way out of a trap/encirclement.

That would be Sun Tzu, who said:

"When you surround an army, leave an outlet free. Do not press a desperate foe too hard."

But he also said:

"It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy's one, to surround him."

I think that's ol' Sun Tzu's way of saying "sometimes; it all depends on the METT-TC, Fox, METT-TC... "

[Fuchs]

Originally Posted by Ken White

In one particular case I recall, not only was a chance to withdraw not taken, when the attacker backed off, the former defending force even though severely mauled illogically attacked the withdrawing offensive force.

That sounds a lot like they read Mao too much.

[Steve Blair]

Originally Posted by Fuchs

That sounds a lot like they read Mao too much.

Or they came from a warrior-based society or had some social code/set of behavior that required such behavior. Cultural factors can influence battlefield behavior to a great degree.

[Fuchs]

In both cases it wouldn't be so much unpredictable as unexpected behavior.

I emphasize unpredictability a lot - and I believe to know that many officers fail to value its importance. Every war has its own wealth of examples for that.
The French and Germans sent their drones (Sperwer, CL-289) during the Kosovo Air War at the same hour and often on the same flight path - military insanity.

Unpredictability is no argument for not trying to influence OPFOR's behavior. Everything can go wrong. We don't give up deception just because OPFOR will often reveal it.