Winning the War in Afghanistan

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by Steve the Planner

Problem with Oil/Gas inland/maritime exchange is not about whether it is technically feasible, but which resources were invested in, and the immediate impacts of change.

Right now, there are some pipelines and some tankers going to different markets, with investments in either being substantial and long-term.

There's a fundamental difference between tankers and pipelines... pipelines only go to one place. A country with an oil port, say Saudi Arabia, can load tankers going to a dozen different destinations at the same time. Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan are limited to where the pipelines go. Cuts the options a bit.

Originally Posted by Steve the Planner

Right. If kinks in that hose (now or in the future) occur, they would affect those dependent on that hose--not likely to be US.

One reality of the oil business is that a kink in anyone's hose affects everyone else. If the Chinese hose from Kazakhstan gets kinked, the Chinese won't stop burning oil. They'll buy on the spot market, push the price up, and compete to buy the oil that other buyers are now getting. Because they have lots of money, they can compete quite effectively. Just because Angola sells to China and Nigeria sells to the US doesn't mean Angolan oil is "Chinese supply" or Nigerian oil is "American oil". Either will sell to the highest bidder, like everybody else.

Cutting off oil supply from one country to another is not quite the weapon it's sometimes thought to be. It doesn't starve that country, just pushes the price up for everyone.

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Ken White

The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality. It has done us no favors over the years.

We have touched this before and IMHO the reason these adventures so often end in tears is because the military plan is conceived by politicians and yes-man generals and then poorly implemented both strategically and tactically.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

True tbat the leg bone is connected to the tailbone, but the practical reality is that if anyone affects the supply (with price increases), they also directly affect the income and stability of the country affected.

I understood the issue to be more related to whether potential kinks in the supply chain warrant US military engagement on the old Silk Road.

I'm with Ken's approach---sitting on the sidelines is sometimes beneficial.

[Bob's World]

Originally Posted by Ken White

I submit we shouldn't be concerned with deterring such conflicts in that and several other locations around the world where we really have no interests...

Other than commercial, of course -- but that 'reason' is often ferociously overstated and embellished to appear far more valuable than it actually will be. The only real reason we stick our nose into a good many conflicts is that accursed and pathetic 'do gooder' mentality. It has done us no favors over the years.

I just mean US deterrence in general, the effect of the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union; not the result of any specific program of deterrence so much as just not being anyone out there willing to risk conflict with the US as they do their own Cost-Risk/benefit analysis.

Call it "hegemony" if you will. I think we had about 4-5 years at the end of WWII; and another longer period post Soviet collapse that is probably already over. I point this out to people (not you I suspect) who have bought into the wild idea that the future is all about Irregular Warfare and that major state on state warfare is largely obsolete. My personal opinion is that there are a lot of unresolved issues that have been temporarily set on hold or "frozen" due to US hegemony that will become increasingly active and violent if need be.

I think Central Asia, with its underdeveloped resources, and sitting between a lot of more powerful, resource hungry neighbors is a likely place for conflict. One that I agree we should stay completely out of.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Bob's World

I just mean US deterrence in general...I point this out to people (sic) who have bought into the wild idea that the future is all about Irregular Warfare and that major state on state warfare is largely obsolete. My personal opinion is that there are a lot of unresolved issues that have been temporarily set on hold or "frozen" due to US hegemony that will become increasingly active and violent if need be. {* added / kw)

I think Central Asia, with its underdeveloped resources, and sitting between a lot of more powerful, resource hungry neighbors is a likely place for conflict. One that I agree we should stay completely out of.

...also Em-fat-i-cally, absolutely -- and Roger that.

I'd only add that * denotes a fog bank (defined as an area of apparent grayness...) with which I think we are not prepared to cope -- and I'm afraid a fog horn and full speed ahead aren't the right answers, particularly with our Radar set on the 1 mile range gate...

[Bill Moore]

While none of us actually know how the future will unfold, I really can't see how a conflict over energy in Central Asia would be localized. The potential confluence of seller, buyer, middle man interests and then their allies interests "could" result in a wider scale conflict that will effect more than the region. I'm not advocating U.S. involvement in other people's fights, but rather supporting Bob's argument that deterrence is probably in our national interests. Whether deterrence will work or not has always been questionable.

Irregular warfare will remain (as it has for years) a persistent condition globally that will challenge our security interests in some locations, but the greatest threats are still state versus state conflicts, and of course they'll leverage the irregular actors where possible to augment other efforts (just as they did during the two world wars).

The SECDEF was correct IMO when he said we need balanced capabilities, but I suspect we're way out of balance at the moment.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Information technology advances will continue, so IW will continue as well. States are outside the OODA loop of "controlling" just about everything these days. When I warn of the rise of state on state competition and conflict I do not mean to imply that irregular competition and conflict will wane.

We will soon be enjoying the worst of both worlds, so to speak. Key is to take a major appetite suppressant as to what one convinces them self they must exercise control over. Currently we cast far too wide a net in that regard. "Influence" is the coin of the realm in the emerging competition / conflict ecosystem and that is a fuzzy concept that we have not been managing very effectively of late. Relying too heavily on military might may well earn a certain type of respect, but it can burn a lot of influence as well.

More and more the US must order or bribe or both to form "alliances of the willing" (I believe it is a bit of a Freudian recognition that we know these are not truly willing allies, or we would not feel compelled to mention it in the title). Influential leaders are followed, they they do not drive. This is repairable, but some fundamental changes are in order.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

...supporting Bob's argument that deterrence is probably in our national interests. Whether deterrence will work or not has always been questionable.

Noting your "probably" I'm unsure that doing something questionable is in our interest.

We need to be able to deter -- however, we must determine what we need to deter. I suggest we've erred in trying to 'deter' things that didn't need deterring (Viet Nam, Lebanon) and things that we could not deter (Somalia among others) while we have failed to deter things that we should have (30 years of probes from the Middle East).

As we all know, deterrence can take many approaches...

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Irregular warfare will remain (as it has for years) a persistent condition globally that will challenge our security interests in some locations, ...

Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by JMA

Then I suggest that the US and the Brits (in the main) start to apply themselves to fighting and winning these irregular small wars as an immediate priority.

Neither we or the British have much reason to participate in large number in many if any of those contests.

Build a strong capability, in a Democracy, and it will cry to be used -- whether it's necessary or not. Better to have slight capability and be able to to adjust if required. A good specialist will beat a good generalist in a specialized effort, a prudent generalist would avoid that by any means, fair or foul. There are other ways to deter, impact, disrupt. It is just stupid to play by the rules of another on his court...

I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting.

(Note underlines...)

[Steve the Planner]

Ken:

I thought I had a few, but Wikipedia tells me they were just movies. My mistake.

Steve

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Ken White

Neither we or the British have much reason to participate in large number in many if any of those contests.

Agreed... but you have and you will (thanks to your respective politicians).

Build a strong capability, in a Democracy, and it will cry to be used -- whether it's necessary or not. Better to have slight capability and be able to to adjust if required. A good specialist will beat a good generalist in a specialized effort, a prudent generalist would avoid that by any means, fair or foul. There are other ways to deter, impact, disrupt. It is just stupid to play by the rules of another on his court...

The capability needs to be built because it is going to be used as it has in the recent past.

The US has a 3m man military - half active, half reserve. Take a quarter million from each and prepare them, train them for interventions of an irregular war nature. Let the remainder prepare for the war with Russia or China that will never come... unless you are expecting an invasion from Mexico.

This approach will have a significant benefit for the US military in that it will force the military to attend to the (internationally acknowledged if not locally) weakness in the US military in the inability of companies/platoons/squads ability to operate independently with the specific command skill requirement thereof.

Secondly it will remove the 'tour mentality' that has been applied to war since Korea and at the same time keep the units and their command more constant and stable. 100 times better than right now I would say.

I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation. I've also asked for someone to name me one that the US really should have been involved with. I'm still waiting.

(Note underlines...)

Its a good question... but its irrelevant. The politicians screw it up all the time and sadly so do the generals. Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors). One notices from the Brit military that at or around Lt Col senior officers need to become politically astute to survive and advance. What that level is in the US I don't know but it will be there. The problem is that these senior officers (many of whom have abundant physical courage) don't have much in the way of the moral courage required to stand up to the politicians even if it means an end to their military careers.

The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by JMA

Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors).

How so? MG is out, and without commitment of substantial outside ground forces. The US isn't trying to install or maintain a government, and has a half decent chance of staying uncommitted in the inevitable post-MG mess. Those were the objectives. They were achieved. What's the problem?

Originally Posted by JMA

The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.

Maybe so, but they can be won and lost at the policy level. We screwed up in Afghanistan when we decided to install and maintain an Afghan government. Once that decision was made there was very little that could be done at any level to avoid sinking into the mire.

If winning is achieving your objective, the first and most important step to winning is to select clear, practical, objectives that are realistically achievable with the resources and within the time that you're willing to commit. That's not something the US has done terribly well.

[carl]

Originally Posted by Ken White

I've asked many times here for someone to name me a successful Small War in the IW arena won by any large force from a big or wealthy bureaucratic nation.

(Note underlines...)

How about the Philippines in the early 1900s?

Or how about all the insurrections put down by the Soviets within their empire, the USSR?

I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not.

(I am assuming IW means irregular warfare.)

[Bob's World]

The Philippines have been in a continuous state of low to high level insurgency since the Spanish first landed. No victories there.

Government suppression of those segments of the populace who dare to stand up for themselves are Pyhrric victories at best.

As to Malaya? The Brits finally conceded that they had no legitimacy or right to govern Malaya and finally removed the office of the high commissioner and also ensured that the ethnic Chinese populace had their civil rights issues addressed to the degree that they no longer supported the insurgents. They removed the thorn of external colonial intervention from the paw of the oppressed and aggrieved segment of the populace that the insurgency arose from.

There are always many motivations for why one joins an insurgency, but causation? That almost invariably derives primarily from how government governs and how some or various distinct and significant segments of the populace feel about the same.

True victories are where government evolves to address their shortcomings. So yes, of all your examples, Malaya is the best of good COIN; but not for the reasons found in military accounts of that insurgency.

[Steve the Planner]

Hate to sound like a very broken record, but there is a big difference between using SF for a targeted and localized mission, and building democracy, participatory governance and community engagement-either locally or up through the governance chain.

Back to Dahuyan's comment: A specialist beats a generalist. There is no generalist theory of new governance that has ever shown any enduring value. Soup with knives, cups of tea, hearts and mind, money as a weapon, etc... do not create viable communities or community governances---ground truth shows the opposite. Never worked in any neighborhood any of you ever lived in, and never would. Why should it work anywhere else.

It would be fun sometime to explain to the military why none of this stuff ever works, but it would require a willing organizational audience.

Libya, at present, is a community governance/participation problem for Libyans.

[Bill Moore]

Steve,

There is no generalist theory of new governance that has ever shown any enduring value. Soup with knives, cups of tea, hearts and mind, money as a weapon, etc... do not create viable communities or community governances---ground truth shows the opposite. Never worked in any neighborhood any of you ever lived in, and never would. Why should it work anywhere else.

Are you implying we have such specialists in the military or even the government? Actually I suspect history will support the argument that specialists are academics and very ineffective in the real world. It is very much the generalist, or rather the individual leader who the people either willingly embrace or fear that enables the development of new governments. Most won't be overly effective whether designed by a specialist or a generalist, it is the nature of government to be somewhat ineffective.

[Surferbeetle]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Are you implying we have such specialists in the military or even the government? Actually I suspect history will support the argument that specialists are academics and very ineffective in the real world. It is very much the generalist, or rather the individual leader who the people either willingly embrace or fear that enables the development of new governments. Most won't be overly effective whether designed by a specialist or a generalist, it is the nature of government to be somewhat ineffective.

Hmmm...so let's save the USG (...or Russian Gov, or Egyptian Gov, or...) some cash, wander over to Mickey D's and pick us up some generalists who will function as:

...drone pilots, satcom operators, and sf/d-boy stand-in's for tonights HVT mission. Specialists/academics are not needed...

...folks who will perform tonights emergency room shift and take care of broken bones, gsw, head injuries, internal damage, and follow on icu care. Specialists/academics are not needed...

....folks who can develop an engineering design, cost estimate, work breakdown statement, project schedule, statement of work, quality assurance/quality control plan, negotiate a contract, manage a contract, qualify for a construction bond, run a construction team, and get a country's infrastructure built. Specialists/academics are not needed...

...folks who can operate and maintain a coal-fired, natural-gas fired, oil-fired, or even a nuclear power plant. Specialists/academics are not needed...

...folks who can devise and execute fiscal and monetary policy...

Or, perhaps things are not that simple?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by JMA

Agreed... but you have and you will (thanks to your respective politicians).

We certainly have; should've learned from Viet Nam that such interventions are foolish. We did, a bit and other than a few little aberrations, we avoided any major commitment along those lines for 30 years. Hopefully, within the next 30 -- and with two strikes to learn from -- we will grow a bit smarter. So there may be no "will."

The capability needs to be built because it is going to be used as it has in the recent past.

I don't agree on either count. "It is going to be used" is awfully positive and while you may be correct, I would hope -- as I said above, -- we get a bit smarter. There are other, better ways to handle such situations.

The capability doesn't have to built, it has to available which is not the same thing. Adjustments to training, some underway should be adequate IF they are not halted.

Let the remainder prepare for the war with Russia or China that will never come... unless you are expecting an invasion from Mexico.

We've been in several wars that weren't expected. They didn't all come in irregular form, think Korea and Kuwait...

This approach will have a significant benefit for the US military in that it will force the military to attend to the (internationally acknowledged if not locally) weakness in the US military in the inability of companies/platoons/squads ability to operate independently with the specific command skill requirement thereof.

We have had a skill deterioration, no question. That is entirely the fault of the training establishment who took decent training programs and tossed them to adopt the atrocious Task, Condition and Standard process, probably so someone could say he brought great change on his watch. We have -- too slowly -- learned that was indeed a mistake and the Army is now groping for a way to fix their problem without admitting they used a flawed process for 30 years. That's the bad news -- the good news is that some units transcend that norm and can and in fact do those things, though there are not enough of them.

Secondly it will remove the 'tour mentality' that has been applied to war since Korea and at the same time keep the units and their command more constant and stable. 100 times better than right now I would say.

Maybe, maybe not. Probably not. The tour length is a Congressional issue...

Its a good question... but its irrelevant.

No it isn't. Even dumb politicians eventually learn a little, even dumb American politicians whose egos do not allow the reading of history -- the Army needs to point that out (acknowledging that dumb Generals are another story...).

The politicians screw it up all the time and sadly so do the generals. Looking at this little exercise in Libya its hard to believe it but Obama managed to screw that as well (and he is surrounded by military advisors).

As I told you long before it started -- and he isn't surrounded by military advisors. By law, he only has one -- the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He talks to others on occasion but my impression is he talks and they listen...

One notices from the Brit military that at or around Lt Col senior officers need to become politically astute to survive and advance. What that level is in the US I don't know but it will be there. The problem is that these senior officers (many of whom have abundant physical courage) don't have much in the way of the moral courage required to stand up to the politicians even if it means an end to their military careers.

Same rank. There's some slight merit in what you say but it's far from totally accurate. It's also far more complex than moral courage -- the degree of military subordination to civilian authority in the US is hard for many from other nations to fathom. It has a very pernicious effect...

The beauty about these small wars is that they are fought at battalion level and below.

I can agree with the sentiment and all it conveys but must point out that nowadays those Battalions come from different units, frequently from different nations and small wars are only fought by all those Battalions if their higher headquarters and / or nation allow them to fight and do not otherwise intrude too heavily...

What, Perfesser, is your solution to that little rub?

[Ken White]

Originally Posted by carl

How about the Philippines in the early 1900s?

See Bob -- it was never totally quelled, just kept on a low simmer -- and we eventually left...

Or how about all the insurrections put down by the Soviets within their empire, the USSR?

Describe today's USSR to me?

I know Malaya won't be accepted but I can never figure out why not.

Because the intervening Army was the army of the government of Malaya at that time. The British had total control of ALL aspects of government. That's something no one else has ever had, including us in the Philippines and the Russians in the various SSRs. On Malaya, the distinct and obvious ethnic tilt also was unusual...

(I am assuming IW means irregular warfare.)

it does. Not also my emphasis on large forces; a few have been turned by small forces.

My point is that commitment of large conventional forces to such efforts is pretty well a route to failure; certainly to less than stellar success -- there's always a great cost in all aspects to everyone involved for small to no benefit, possibly to detriment...