Studies on radicalisation & comments

[davidbfpo]

An ICSR paper and from the flyer:

ICSR’s latest paper – ‘De-Radicalising Islamists: Programmes and Their Impact in Muslim Majority States’ – identifies key factors that make de-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation programmes more effective.

Written by Professor Hamed El Said, it examines the approaches of eight Muslim-majority states that have developed ‘soft’ strategies to counter and prevent jihadist radicalisation.

The study has found that the factors which contribute to the effectiveness of such programmes include:

• National consensus – Lack of popular and political support has denied Jordanian de-radicalisation efforts the social underpinning that contributes to their relative success in Saudi Arabia. In Yemen, initial support for de-radicalisation has ebbed away, while in Algeria it has remained relatively strong.

• Committed national leadership – Enthusiastic leadership by national governments can provide ‘soft’ counterterrorism policies with impetus; inject them with confidence; build trust in their purpose; and – in doing so – create and maintain the needed national consensus.

• Civil society – The engagement of civil society can provide new ideas and reinforce the state’s actions by empowering local communities and associations, especially those that are vulnerable and hard to reach for the government.

• Non-religious programming – Religious dialogue alone will not eliminate violent extremism. Programmes must not ignore the social, economic and political factors that contribute to radicalisation and consider them in their mix of programming.

• Cultural awareness – De-radicalisation programmes must be consistent with, and derive from, each country’s mores, culture, rules and regulations, and take account of what is acceptable and not acceptable in their societies.
El Said shows that each programme has different approaches and objectives – often depending on the nature of a particular society and the terrorist threat with which it has been faced:

• Countries like Morocco and Bangladesh, for example, have focused on countering and preventing further radicalisation, whereas Saudi-Arabia and Yemen have emphasised rehabilitating and counselling those who have become radicalised.

• Saudi Arabia has developed well-structured official programmes, while many others, including Jordan, have relied on individual and civil society based initiatives.

• Some countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, have gone through processes of collective de-radicalisation (whereby an entire group denounces violence), whereas others deal with individuals on a case by case basis.

This diversity in approaches, El Said argues, is one of the various programmes’ greatest sources of strength. However, this also makes it difficult to measure success and produce valid comparisons. One size, he concludes, does not fit all.

Link:http://icsr.info/paper/de-radicalisi...ajority-states

I wonder how well Western countries would fare if the key factors were applied?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Randy Borum, a SWC Member, to a special issue of the 'Journal of Strategic Studies' on Rethinking Radicalisation, which is free to access:http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/

Economy of effort needed, Randy's introduction is on:
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/vi...50&context=jss

[davidbfpo]

A rare IMHO article by an Indian commentator on radicalisation, which also looks briefly at Asian examples:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analy...-of-deeper-rot

[davidbfpo]

Just found this EU-funded website, which has a reference section with, currently, 171 reports on counter-extremism:https://www.counterextremism.org/resources/?&page=1

[davidbfpo]

A short, fifteen minute radio interview of Hanif Qadir on his journey:http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode...o_Hanif_Qadir/

I have assumed the link will work beyond the UK.

Hanif returned from Afghanistan to London and with his brother set up a youth club in a "hot-spot" Waltham Forest, Active Change Foundation:http://www.activechangefoundation.org/

[davidbfpo]

Young Muslim men in Germany are systematically trying to recruit their peers for jihad using sophisticated rhetoric and psychology and by targeting vulnerable youths who are searching for direction in life. Two men who have quit the scene tell their story to SPIEGEL, providing a rare look into a dangerous underground.

Link:http://www.spiegel.de/international/...-a-851393.html

There are those who argue the group involved are not Jihadists:

recruiting young men for the Hamburg branch of the Islamist organization Hizb ut-Tahrir. The group has been banned in Germany since 2003, but its members are still active underground.

Nevertheless an interesting read and one that is largely conducted in private and without any electronic communication.

[davidbfpo]

A report published a few weeks ago 'Building Resilience to Violent Extremism Among Somali-Americans in Minneapolis-St. Paul'; link to summary:http://www.start.umd.edu/start/annou...ent.asp?id=406

I found the context discovered via interviewing far more interesting than the models used, especially:

A large epidemiological survey conducted in Minneapolis‐St.Paul in 2004 found that 37% of Somali women and 25% of Somali men had been tortured....Another study...found that nearly half of Somali mothers were torture survivors; more than a quarter had no formal education; and 70% were single parents..

[davidbfpo]

Just an outlive via Twitter 'Pathways, Processes, Roles and Factors for Terrorist Disengagement, Re-engagement and Recidivism':http://www.icst.psu.edu/docs/1.Outli...ng.Outline.pdf

[davidbfpo]

A new report:

Over the past five months, we have studied dozens of cases and spoken to leading experts and policymakers. The result is an extensive report that will be released by the Bipartisan Policy Center on Tuesday. Our conclusion is clear: Online radicalization is here to stay, and future terrorist attacks against the homeland will involve individuals who have been radicalized — at least in part — on the Internet.

The White House agrees with us. In its 2011 counter-radicalization strategy, it promised to "develop a ... comprehensive strategy for countering and preventing violent extremism online." One year later, however, this still hasn't happened, and our first recommendation is for the administration to complete its work, make the strategy public and begin its implementation.

Link:http://www.politico.com/story/2012/1...84.html?hp=l10

Link to the report:http://www.politico.com/story/2012/1...84.html?hp=l10

I have skimmed through the report, which less than thirty pages; it has many good points and in places is IMHO rather weak.

There is a touch of "Big Brother" in some of the recommendations and several assumptions that all our enemies use electronic communications. Not to overlook a No. 151 Footnote:

To our knowledge, there has not been a single terrorism prosecution in the United States in recent years that has not relied, to a greater or lesser extent, on defendants’ personal electronic communications.

[davidbfpo]

A new, so far un-read ICSR report on four countries experience, namely UK, Netherlands, Norway and Denmark:

Since the mid-2000s, European countries have developed counter-radicalization strategies, seeking to de-radicalize committed militants and preventing the radicalization of vulnerable populations. What do these strategies entail? Where do they differ, and what do they have in common? How successful have they been?.....the most comprehensive and systematic report to date about counter-radicalization policy and practice. It sums up the experiences of four European countries, outlines key challenges and areas of convergence, and describes the lessons that have been learned in this new area of policymaking.

Link:http://icsr.info/2012/12/icsr-report...ion-in-europe/

[davidbfpo]

A short, excellent article; full title being 'U.S. Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism: An Assessment' by Clint Watts (aka CWOT) and Will McCants:http://www.fpri.org/articles/2012/12...ism-assessment

They end with:

we ask the U.S. government to take a hard look at the number of people who support terrorist groups. If their numbers are small and if their violent acts are few, a traditional law enforcement approach might be all that is required. We know that CVE is viewed by some as a more holistic approach to terrorism. But the downside of holistic approaches is that they can do a whole lot of harm and consume a disproportionate amount of resources. If CVE is required, identify sympathizers and supporters, select a limited set of actions, execute them through a few agencies and measure their effectiveness against defined objectives. Such measures might prevent a few people from pursuing a bad course in life, and if the measures fail, law enforcement knows what to do.

Interesting to note how the UK experience in this field has had so much effect, a classic case of "selling" a bad product.

[Bill Moore]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XCOp7nTTW1U

Homegrown Radicalization -- How Data Analytics Can Help Prevent Terrorism

Hat tip to David for passing the link above, which is a presentation given by Prof Peter Neuman on the radicalization process and where he thinks we should focus our efforts (it isn't root causes). An excellent overview on the radicalization process even you don't concur with his recommendations.

We have spent a lot of money at home and abroad in support of CVE, and I think it is impossible to tell if it is working or not. We may have had major successes (stopping a few folks from conducting violent acts that would have been catastrophic), but how would we ever know?

[davidbfpo]

Three ICST papers, not fully read:

1) A scholarly journal article - In Their Own Words? Methodological Considerations in the Analysis of Terrorist Autobiographies by Mary Beth Altier, John Horgan, and Christian Thoroughgood:http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/vi...10&context=jss

2) A short summary project outline, in two parts - Pathways, Processes, Roles and Factors for Terrorist Disengagement, Re-engagement and Recidivism by Altier & Horgan:http://www.icst.psu.edu/docs/2.Brief...ment.Brief.pdf and http://www.icst.psu.edu/docs/1.Outli...ng.Outline.pdf

SWC have looked at disengagement in Afghanistan and Iraq under different titles, alongside a thread on leaving the Jihad. Good to see some academic rigour appearing, this is a very neglected area of policy and study.

[davidbfpo]

A curious article from a previously unknown blogsite, but one writer is known to me, so I followed a link to find this on an Australian convert who was radicalised:http://extremisproject.org/2013/01/t...ist-extremism/

I use curious as only one person was interviewed.

It concludes:

Roche’s case also highlights that religion is not necessarily the primary motivator for violent extremism. Roche’s jihadist activities were less a result of his conversion and commitment to Islam and more a factor of his commitment to the group: it was not religious beliefs that prompted and sustained Roche’s level of activity but group loyalty and the personal benefits associated with group membership.

Roche’s trajectory from ‘moderate’ Muslim convert to active JI member suggests that individuals are not necessarily predisposed to radicalisation by virtue of their religious beliefs. Rather, sustained exposure to extremist ideologies and close interaction with radical social groups are the key drivers of radicalisation.

[Bill Moore]

Tend to agree, it is rarely about the cause, the man, or the ideology, but mostly about group identity. Soldiers, cops, gang members, and other groups with strong bonds should grasp this.

[davidbfpo]

Violent Canadian extremists are more likely to be citizens than immigrants, according to a “secret” study by the federal intelligence service. And these radicals tend to be relatively young and well-integrated members of society.

These findings appear in “A Study of Radicalization: The Making of Islamist Extremists in Canada Today,” a 21-page study released to The Globe and Mail under the Access to Information Act.

Link to CSIS paper (heavily redacted, more like reading an incomplete jigsaw):http://www.theglobeandmail.com/incom...dicals_001.pdf and press story:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/...rticle8149887/

[Bob's World]

#1 radicalizer of insurgents or terrorists? Government.

Everything else is just lubrication and nudges to move those radicals in the direction of one organization or another.

[Bill Moore]

Did the government radicalize the KKK?

You can't dismiss ethnic terrorism as simply poor governance.

[Bob's World]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

Did the government radicalize the KKK?

You can't dismiss ethnic terrorism as simply poor governance.

Ok, fair enough, let's explore this niche of "ethnic terrorism."

Is this just pure racist violence for the sake of hate, or for some political purpose?

I'm no expert on what the KKK is today, but I believe it began as a political movement among people who shared certain beliefs about the relative roles, abilities, etc between white people and black people.

Or perhaps the persistent back and forth violence between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East? That undercurrent of cultural bias is there, but any of the organizations employing terrorist tactics that I am aware of do so for political purpose.

Or the Catholics and Protestants in N. Ireland?

Like religion, race can be a powerful unifying "ideology" for an insurgent movement.

The world will always have hateful, violent, ignorant people in it. Sometimes those people are in government and organize governments around such concepts. Sometimes they are in organizations that oppose governments and employ terrorist tactics.

But does one really "radicalize" a racist? Aren't they already radicalized by their very upbringing?

Are there many groups conducting race-based violence solely for the purpose or race hating and not for a larger organizational purpose built around some profit or political purpose?

Usually I see the term "radicalization" employed by those who support some system of governance to vilify those who oppose that same system.

I am reminded of a George Carlan comedy routine where he was talking about driving. The speed of any driver is in their mind, the "proper" speed. And when one gets stuck behind someone driving slower they are "an idiot," or passed by someone driving faster they are "a maniac." Of course both the Idiot and the Manic think that it is they who are proper, and to the idiot you are a maniac, and to the manic you are an idiot. Most governments think they are governing at the proper speed, and equally see those different than them as some mix of idiots and maniacs.

Obviously there are many exceptions, but by and large I stand by my assessment that the primary radicalizer of people is governments - after all, it is a label applied by governments thinking they are the ones who are right and the power and authority to deal with those who disagree as they see fit. Many governments deal with such people in a manner that serves to further "radicalize" them and the populaces they come from.

Does anyone think drone strikes are raising feeling of good will toward American governance among the populaces subjected to such attacks? We don't need AQ operatives to "radicalize" people in places like Yemen or the Sahel, we do an outstanding job on our own.

[davidbfpo]

A seventy page long Dutch report (in English) by Alex Schmid 'Radicalisation, De-Radicalisation, Counter-Radicalisation: A Conceptual Discussion and Literature Review'.

In summary:

Based on an in-depth literature review, ICCT Visiting Research Fellow Dr. Alex P. Schmid explores the terms ‘radicalisation’, ‘de-radicalisation’ and ‘counter-radicalisation’ and the discourses surrounding
them. Much of the literature on radicalisation focuses on Islamist extremism and jihadist terrorism. This is also reflected in this Research Paper which explores the relationship between radicalisation, extremism and terrorism. Historically, ‘radicalism’ – contrary to ‘extremism’ – does not necessarily have negative connotations, nor is it a synonym for terrorism. Schmid argues that both extremism and radicalism can only be properly assessed in relation to what is mainstream political thought in a given period. The paper further explores what we know well and what we know less well about radicalisation. It proposes to explore radicalisation not only on the micro-level of ‘vulnerable individuals’ but also on the meso-level of the ‘radical milieu’ and the macro-level of ‘radicalising public opinion and political parties’. The author reconceptualises radicalisation as a process that can occur on both sides of conflict dyads and challenges several widespread assumptions. The final section examines various counter-radicalisation and deradicalisation programmes. It concludes with a series of policy recommendations.

I went straight to the conclusion, which is worth reading and this point really need to be hammered home, hence my emphasis:

....a goal which has not been reached despite more than ten years of CT efforts, is the formulation of an effective counter-narrative to the single narrative of al-Qaeda and its affiliates which claim that Islam is under attack and defensive Jihad against the West is the obligation of every Muslim.

Link:http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICC...March-2013.pdf